io.github.justrunme/agent-security-contract
Related Servers
Alternatives to io.github.justrunme/agent-security-contract
No user-submitted related servers found.
Related Servers
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnforces allow/deny/ask policies on MCP tool calls before they reach downstream servers, with tamper-evident audit logging.MIT

authensor-mcp-serverofficial
AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenancePolicy enforcement gateway for MCP tool calls, evaluating every tool invocation against declarative YAML policies (allow/deny/escalate-to-human), generating cryptographic hash-chained audit receipts, and including built-in content safety scanning.2MIT- AlicenseAqualityCmaintenanceProvides advisory AI-governance checks for MCP hosts and coding agents, enabling policy verdicts, PII masking, and audit traces before executing tool calls.382 npmMIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables MCP clients to check content and full input/output exchanges against active policy guardrails, list guardrails, view activity statistics, and report incorrect decisions.Apache 2.0
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceProvides a governance layer for MCP servers, enforcing policy-based allow/deny/approval rules, requiring human approval for risky calls, and recording an auditable trail of every AI agent tool call.MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnforces fine-grained, context-aware access control on MCP tool calls, with a tamper-evident, replayable audit log that records denials and verifies every decision.MIT
TDQS
Scored across 4 tools
The tools have largely distinct purposes: runtime enforcement (check_tool_call), corpus-level verification (verify_corpus), single-scenario verification (verify_scenario), and policy inspection (list_policy_tools). The boundary between check_tool_call and verify_scenario is slightly blurry because both evaluate traces against a policy, but the descriptions make the intended contexts clear.
All tool names use a consistent snake_case verb_noun pattern: check_tool_call, verify_corpus, verify_scenario, list_policy_tools. The conventions are predictable and readable throughout.
Four tools is well-scoped for a security-contract enforcement server. Each tool covers a distinct workflow: runtime checking, whole-corpus verification, single-scenario verification, and policy inspection.
The surface covers the core lifecycle: enforce a policy on a proposed tool call, test one scenario, test the whole corpus, and inspect configured policies/tools. A minor gap is the absence of a standalone policy-validation or policy-diff operation, but agents can work around this through the existing check and list tools.