azure-mcp-pilot
# IdenGraph
**Identity & Access intelligence powered by Microsoft Graph and MCP.**
A read-only MCP server that turns natural-language questions into audited answers about **Microsoft Entra ID** and **Azure RBAC** — answered by your own Copilot, inside VS Code.
[](https://marketplace.visualstudio.com/items?itemName=josimarh.idengraph)
[](https://pypi.org/project/idengraph/)
[](LICENSE)
> **It never writes.** Every create, update, delete, grant, or privilege-activation operation is blocked before routing.
## What you can ask
- Who has **Owner** on Azure? And who holds **Global Administrator** in Entra?
- Which applications were **created in my tenant**, and which are Microsoft first-party?
- Which users have **no MFA**, or rely on weak methods?
- Which **application secrets** expire in the next 30 days?
- Which objects have **no owner** assigned?
- What is the **blast radius** of a given identity?
- Are we **paying for security features we don't use**?
**66 tools** across users, groups, applications, service principals, managed identities, PIM, RBAC, authentication, conditional access, ownership, privilege timeline, licensing posture, and toxic combinations (SoD).
## Design principles
These three rules define the behavior, and they matter more than the feature list.
### Source separation
Microsoft Graph answers for identity and directory. Azure APIs answer for RBAC and resources. **Graph is never treated as a source of truth for Azure RBAC.**
### No false zero
If a permission is missing, the answer is `PERMISSION_DENIED` with `NOT_EVALUATED` coverage — **never `0`**.
"I could not evaluate this" and "this does not exist" are different answers. Conflating them in an audit is worse than not answering at all, because a false zero looks like a clean result.
This applies to licensing too: zero conditional access policies means something entirely different when the feature isn't licensed versus when it's licensed and unused.
### Read-only by construction
Only `GET`, `LIST`, `QUERY`, `ASSESS`, and `CORRELATE`. The `graph_query` tool can receive read-only KQL generated from a user request, but it does not accept arbitrary endpoints: the capability registry selects the data source, and the executor blocks mutation operators and external-access constructs before sending the query.
## Architecture
```mermaid
flowchart TB
User(["You"]) -->|natural language| Copilot["Copilot Chat<br/><i>your own model</i>"]
Copilot <-->|MCP / stdio| Server
subgraph Server["IdenGraph MCP Server · 66 read-only tools"]
direction TB
Router["Capability router<br/><i>intent → capability</i>"]
Guard{{"Write guard<br/><i>blocks mutations</i>"}}
Registry[("Capability registry<br/>43 capabilities · 29 domains")]
Executor["Read-only executor<br/><i>allowlist + validation</i>"]
Router --> Guard --> Registry --> Executor
end
Executor -->|identity & directory| Graph["Microsoft Graph"]
Executor -->|RBAC & resources| Azure["Azure Management<br/>+ Resource Graph"]
Graph --> Normalizer["Normalizer & correlation<br/><i>preserves evidence and coverage</i>"]
Azure --> Normalizer
Normalizer -->|answer + provenance| Copilot
style Guard fill:#c62828,color:#fff
style Server fill:#0B1F3A,color:#fff
style Normalizer fill:#1565c0,color:#fff
```
Two details worth highlighting:
**The write guard sits before routing**, not after. A mutation request is rejected before it can be interpreted as a query.
**The normalizer preserves coverage**, not just data. Every answer carries where it came from and whether the source could actually be evaluated — which is what makes the no-false-zero rule enforceable rather than aspirational.
### How the pieces are distributed
| Layer | Artifact | Role |
|---|---|---|
| Discovery | [VS Code extension](https://marketplace.visualstudio.com/items?itemName=josimarh.idengraph) | One-click install, prerequisite checks, settings UI |
| Engine | [`idengraph` on PyPI](https://pypi.org/project/idengraph/) | The MCP server itself |
| Model | Your Copilot subscription | No LLM cost to this project or to you |
The extension does not replace the Python package — it registers it. The engine runs the same way whether launched by the extension or configured by hand.
## Install
### Recommended: VS Code extension
Install **[IdenGraph](https://marketplace.visualstudio.com/items?itemName=josimarh.idengraph)** from the Marketplace, then sign in to Azure:
```bash
az login
```
Open Copilot Chat in **agent mode** and ask. The extension verifies prerequisites and guides you if anything is missing.
### Alternative: manual MCP configuration
Create `.vscode/mcp.json`:
```json
{
"servers": {
"idengraph": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "uvx",
"args": ["idengraph"],
"env": { "MOCK_MODE": "false" }
}
}
}
```
## Prerequisites
- **Python 3.10+**
- **[uv](https://docs.astral.sh/uv/getting-started/installation/)**
- **[Azure CLI](https://learn.microsoft.com/cli/azure/install-azure-cli)** with an active session (`az login`)
Authentication uses `DefaultAzureCredential`, which reuses your Azure CLI session. There is no API key to manage, and no credential is stored by this project.
## Configuration
| Setting | Env var | Default | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| `idengraph.useMockData` | `MOCK_MODE` | `false` (extension) | Query fictional data instead of your tenant |
| `idengraph.sanitizeOutput` | `SANITIZE_FOR_LLM` | `true` | Mask resource names, subscription IDs, and IPs before they reach the model |
| `idengraph.subscriptions` | `AZURE_SUBSCRIPTIONS` | all accessible | Restrict queries to specific subscriptions |
The Python package defaults to `MOCK_MODE=true` so that nothing touches a real tenant without explicit intent. The extension sets it to `false`, since installing it is already that intent.
## Permissions
On Azure: **`Reader`** on the subscriptions you want to audit.
On Microsoft Graph, delegated permissions vary by question:
| Area | Permission |
|---|---|
| Users, groups, applications, service principals | `Directory.Read.All` |
| Directory roles and directory PIM | `RoleManagement.Read.All` |
| Authentication methods and MFA | `UserAuthenticationMethod.Read.All` |
| Conditional access | `Policy.Read.All` |
| License posture | `Organization.Read.All` |
Missing a permission only marks the matching area as not evaluated. Everything else keeps working — and the affected area reports *why* it could not be evaluated.
## Privacy
Queried data belongs to **your** tenant and travels between your machine, Microsoft APIs, and the Copilot model **you already use**. This project sends nothing to third-party servers and collects no telemetry.
By default, `SANITIZE_FOR_LLM=true` masks resource names, resource groups, subscription IDs, and IP addresses before content reaches the model.
## Development
```bash
python -m venv .venv
.venv\Scripts\activate # Windows
# source .venv/bin/activate # Linux/macOS
pip install -r requirements.txt
cp .env.example .env
python test_smoke.py
```
The smoke test runs in mock mode and never touches a tenant.
### Repository layout
```text
mcp_server.py MCP server and tool registration
services/azure_auth.py credentials, tokens, caching
services/graph_capabilities.py capability registry
services/capability_router.py natural language → capability
services/capability_executor.py validated read-only execution
services/azure_role_definitions.py authoritative Azure role name resolution
services/azure_pim.py resource PIM with confirmed coverage
services/entra_licenses.py tenant licensing and feature availability
services/data/ mock data used when MOCK_MODE=true
extension/ VS Code extension (TypeScript)
```
The repository also contains a Streamlit portal (`app.py` + `agent.py`) used for development and demos. It is not part of the published package, whose surface is the MCP server only:
```bash
streamlit run app.py
```
## Known limitations
- Agent Identity detection is **heuristic** where the directory exposes no dedicated type. Results are labeled as such, never presented as fact.
- `Public IP` indicates a public address, which **does not prove** workload exposure.
- Without `RoleManagement.Read.All`, directory PIM reports as not evaluated rather than empty.
- License posture currently cross-references PIM and Conditional Access. Capabilities still marked `not_integrated` in the registry are not probed, and deliberately return no verdict.
## License
MIT — see [LICENSE](LICENSE).
TDQS
Scored across 66 tools
Several tools have unclear boundaries, such as list_entra_users vs list_users, list_azure_role_assignments vs graph_role_assignments, and the multiple natural-language query and assessment tools. An agent could easily choose the wrong tool for user-listing, role-assignment, or timeline questions. A few tools like identity_360 and detect_toxic_combinations are distinct, but the overall set is highly ambiguous.
Most tools follow readable snake_case list_/get_/run_ naming, but the set mixes conventions with names like identity_360, graph_assessment, and noun-first NL query tools such as pim_natural_language_query and agent_natural_language_query. The graph_* prefix is inconsistently combined with verbs, making the pattern predictable only part of the time.
66 tools is an extreme number for an identity security audit server, and many tools are near-duplicates or could be consolidated into parameterized operations. This far exceeds the 25+ threshold and creates a heavy, unwieldy tool surface.
The surface is quite comprehensive for read-only identity governance: it covers users, RBAC, PIM, MFA, licenses, agent identities, blast radius, object ownership, provenance, and Graph/API access. Since this is an audit-focused server, missing create/update/delete is acceptable; minor gaps exist around detailed sign-in/audit log exploration and remediation actions.