veriql-mcp
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| VERIQL_API_KEY | No | Prepaid credits, instead of a wallet (a key wins if both are set). | |
| VERIQL_BASE_URL | No | Point at another deployment. | https://veriql.app |
| VERIQL_MAX_USD_PER_CALL | No | Refuse any single payment above this. | 0.05 |
| VERIQL_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY | No | EVM key of a dedicated payment wallet (USDC on Base, Polygon, Arbitrum or Avalanche). |
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {
"listChanged": true
} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| veriql_scanA | Scan a public wallet address for risky token approvals across 5 EVM chains (Ethereum, BNB Chain, Polygon, Arbitrum, Base). Returns a 0-100 Security Score with itemised drivers, every risky approval, and a best-effort USD value-at-risk. |
| veriql_tokenA | Check a token contract for honeypot, punishing taxes, mintable supply, hidden owner and proxy risks, each surfaced as a plain-English flag. EVM chains + Tron. |
| veriql_launchB | A transparent 0-100 launch-safety score for a token/mint with itemised penalty drivers and full metrics. EVM chains + Tron + Solana. |
| veriql_payeeA | Before sending money to an address: is it OFAC-sanctioned, on Drain Watch, or frozen by Tether or Circle (funds sent there can never leave). Answers do_not_pay, no_known_risk or incomplete, and incomplete is not a clean result. EVM, Bitcoin, Solana, Tron. |
| veriql_sendA | Before sending USDT on Tron or Ethereum: will this transfer go through (frozen sender, unactivated account, too little USDT, too little TRX or ETH for the fee, a contract that refuses it, read off the chain with the exact fee), and should it go there at all (recipient OFAC-sanctioned, on Drain Watch, or frozen by Tether, where USDT arrives and can never leave). Answers do_not_send, will_fail, may_fail, goes_through or incomplete, and incomplete is not a clean result. |
| veriql_signatureA | Before signing: decodes an approve, Permit, Permit2, EIP-7702 delegation, transfer or revoke, checks who gains the power against OFAC and Drain Watch, and answers block, warn or allow. Anything it cannot decode is block. |
| veriql_preflightA | Every check one transaction needs, in one call, on whatever you pass: the recipient screen (OFAC, Drain Watch, Tether and Circle freezes) on |
| veriql_batch_screenA | Screen up to 50 addresses in one call against OFAC SDN sanctions, Drain Watch and Tether and Circle freezes (EVM and Tron). For payout runs, token holder lists and sniper wallets. Each address gets do_not_pay, no_known_risk or incomplete; incomplete is not a clean result. |
| veriql_x402_seller_checkA | Before paying an x402 endpoint: reads its 402 (version, networks, testnet or not, the real price when the asset is USDC) and screens every wallet it asks to be paid at against OFAC, Drain Watch and Tether and Circle freezes. Answers GO, CAUTION or STOP. GO does not mean the seller delivers. |
| veriql_deployerA | Who created this Solana pump.fun token (read from its bonding curve on chain) and what happened to that creator's other tokens Veriql scored: each one's verdict and any measured liquidity withdrawal or sell-off. History starts 2026-09-30; no record is unknown, never clean. |
| veriql_freezeA | Has Tether or Circle frozen this address, read straight off the issuer's contract, and did it receive USDT directly from an address Tether froze (exposure, not guilt). EVM and Tron. Free, no key needed. |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 11 tools
Most tools target distinct checks, but veriql_preflight explicitly re-implements veriql_payee, veriql_send, veriql_launch and veriql_signature in a single call, leaving genuine ambiguity about when to use the composite versus the components. veriql_launch vs veriql_token (both score token safety) and veriql_freeze vs the freeze screening inside veriql_payee/veriql_batch_screen also overlap. Detailed descriptions mitigate this but boundaries are not crisp.
All tools use a consistent veriql_ prefix followed by a single short noun or noun phrase (scan, token, launch, payee, send, signature, freeze), which is predictable. The exception is veriql_x402_seller_check, a three-word outlier, and the set mixes noun names with verb-ish names, but overall it reads as one coherent family.
11 tools is squarely in the well-scoped range for a crypto safety screening server, and each tool covers a recognizably different surface (approvals, token risk, launch, recipient, transfer, signature, batch, x402, deployer history, freeze). No padding is apparent given the breadth of chains and pre-transaction checks.
The pre-transaction safety lifecycle is well covered from multiple entry points (single, batch, aggregator, x402), plus a freeze oracle and deployer history. The main gap is remediation: veriql_scan surfaces risky approvals but no tool builds or simulates a revoke transaction, and NFT/collection screening and Solana transfer simulation are absent, though agents can partially work around these.