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JoeSandboxMCP

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by joesecurity

get_signature_info

Extract malware detection signatures from Joe Sandbox analysis reports to identify malicious behaviors like code injection or credential theft, with optional filtering for high-impact indicators.

Instructions

Retrieve high-impact signature detections from a sandbox analysis report.

This tool extracts detection signatures triggered during the specified analysis run. These signatures reflect behavioral or static patterns typically associated with malware, such as code injection, credential theft, or suspicious memory activity as well as general behavioural indicators.
Optional filtering parameters allow control over the inclusion of all signatures or only those with high impact.

Args:
    webid (required): The submission ID of the analysis.
    run (optional, default = 0): Index of the sandbox run to inspect (from the `runs` array in analysis info). Use 0 for the first run.
    only_malicious_indicators (default: True): If True, limits the returned signatures to those considered high impact by the detection logic.

Returns:
    A dictionary containing a list of triggered detection signatures. Each entry includes:
    - desc: Description of the detected malicious behavior or technique.
    - indicators: List of up to three supporting observations. Each indicator includes:
        - desc: Action or operation that triggered the detection (e.g., "Section loaded").
        - context: Process name or source related to the event.
        - evidence: Supporting detail, such as file paths, memory dumps, or rule names.
        - impact: Either "high" or "low", indicating the severity or confidence of the detection.  
            High-impact indicators are strongly associated with malicious behavior or confirmed threats.  
            Low-impact indicators reflect general behavior or environmental traits that may not be malicious on their own.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
webidYes
runNo
only_malicious_indicatorsNo

Implementation Reference

  • The core handler function decorated with @mcp.tool() that implements the get_signature_info tool. It fetches the analysis report XML, parses the signatureinfo section, filters signatures by impact, extracts up to 3 sources per signature, and returns structured data.
    @mcp.tool()
    async def get_signature_info(webid: str, run: int = 0, only_malicious_indicators: bool = True) -> Dict[str, Any]:
        """
        Retrieve high-impact signature detections from a sandbox analysis report.
    
        This tool extracts detection signatures triggered during the specified analysis run. These signatures reflect behavioral or static patterns typically associated with malware, such as code injection, credential theft, or suspicious memory activity as well as general behavioural indicators.
        Optional filtering parameters allow control over the inclusion of all signatures or only those with high impact.
    
        Args:
            webid (required): The submission ID of the analysis.
            run (optional, default = 0): Index of the sandbox run to inspect (from the `runs` array in analysis info). Use 0 for the first run.
            only_malicious_indicators (default: True): If True, limits the returned signatures to those considered high impact by the detection logic.
    
        Returns:
            A dictionary containing a list of triggered detection signatures. Each entry includes:
            - desc: Description of the detected malicious behavior or technique.
            - indicators: List of up to three supporting observations. Each indicator includes:
                - desc: Action or operation that triggered the detection (e.g., "Section loaded").
                - context: Process name or source related to the event.
                - evidence: Supporting detail, such as file paths, memory dumps, or rule names.
                - impact: Either "high" or "low", indicating the severity or confidence of the detection.  
                    High-impact indicators are strongly associated with malicious behavior or confirmed threats.  
                    Low-impact indicators reflect general behavior or environmental traits that may not be malicious on their own.
        """
        try:
            root = await get_or_fetch_report(webid, run)
            if root is None:
                return {"error": f"Could not retrieve or parse report for submission ID '{webid}' run {run}"}
            siginfo = root.findall("./signatureinfo/sig")
            sigs = []
            for entry in siginfo:
                attrs = entry.attrib
                is_malicious_indicator = float(attrs.get("impact", 0.0)) >= 2.0
                if is_malicious_indicator or not only_malicious_indicators:
                    sources = []
                    for source_entry in entry.findall("./sources/source"):
                        source_attrib = source_entry.attrib
                        source = {
                            "desc": source_attrib.get("op"),
                            "context": source_attrib.get("process"),
                            "evidence" : source_entry.text,
                            "impact": "high" if is_malicious_indicator else "low"
                        }
                        sources.append(source)
                        if len(sources) >= 3:
                            break
                    sig = {
                        "desc": attrs.get("desc"),
                        "indicators": sources
                    }
                    sigs.append(sig) 
            return sigs
        except Exception as e:
            return {
                "error": f"Failed to get signature info for submission ID '{webid}' run {run}. "
                         f"Reason: {str(e)}"
            }
  • Helper function used by get_signature_info to retrieve or fetch the XML report from cache or Joe Sandbox API.
    async def get_or_fetch_report(webid: str, run: int=0) -> Optional[ET.Element]:
        """
        Get a report from the cache or fetch it from the API.
        
        Args:
            webid: The webid of the report to retrieve.
            run: The analysis run index of the report to retrieve, default: 0
            
        Returns:
            The report as an XML Element, or None if it couldn't be retrieved.
        """
        cache_key = f"{webid}-{run}"
        cached = await report_cache.get(cache_key)
        if cached:
            xml_stream = io.BytesIO(cached)
            xml_tree = ET.parse(xml_stream)
            return xml_tree.getroot()
        
        # If not in cache, fetch from API
        def blocking_download():
            client = get_client()
            _, data = client.analysis_download(webid=webid, type='xml', run=run)
            return data
        
        try:
            data = await asyncio.to_thread(blocking_download)
            await report_cache.set(cache_key, data)
            xml_stream = io.BytesIO(data)
            xml_tree = ET.parse(xml_stream)
            xml_root = xml_tree.getroot()
            return xml_root
        except Exception as e:
            print(f"Error fetching report for webid {webid}, run {run}: {e}")
            return None
  • jbxmcp/tools.py:2-17 (registration)
    The __all__ list in tools.py exports get_signature_info, allowing it to be imported and used after import jbxmcp.tools.
    __all__ = [
        'submit_analysis_job',
        'search_analysis',
        'get_analysis_info',
        'get_ai_summaries',
        'get_dropped_info',
        'get_domain_info',
        'get_ip_info',
        'get_url_info',
        'get_signature_info',
        'get_unpacked_files',
        'get_pcap_file',
        'get_list_of_recent_analyses',
        'get_process_info',
        'get_memory_dumps'
    ]
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden and does well by explaining what the tool returns (a dictionary with specific structure), the nature of the data (malware-related signatures with high/low impact indicators), and the filtering behavior. It doesn't mention rate limits, authentication needs, or error conditions, but provides substantial behavioral context beyond basic functionality.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured with clear sections (purpose, args, returns) and front-loaded information. Every sentence earns its place by providing essential context about what the tool does, how to use parameters, and what to expect in return, with no wasted words.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the complexity of malware analysis tools and the absence of both annotations and output schema, the description provides complete context. It explains the tool's purpose, parameter usage, return structure with detailed field descriptions, and the significance of high/low impact indicators, making it fully self-contained for an agent.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Despite 0% schema description coverage, the description provides excellent parameter semantics in the 'Args' section, explaining all three parameters with clear purpose, defaults, and usage guidance. It adds significant value beyond the bare schema, fully compensating for the lack of schema descriptions.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool's purpose with specific verbs ('retrieve', 'extracts') and resources ('high-impact signature detections', 'sandbox analysis report'). It distinguishes itself from siblings like get_analysis_info or get_process_info by focusing specifically on detection signatures rather than general analysis data or other report components.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides clear context about when to use this tool (to extract detection signatures from analysis reports) and mentions optional filtering parameters. However, it doesn't explicitly state when NOT to use it or name specific alternative tools for different types of analysis data, though the sibling list suggests alternatives like get_analysis_info for general information.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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