rattan
This server does not currently have a deployable release on Glama. Follow the repository's setup instructions to install and configure it for your MCP client, including any required credentials and local dependencies.
Rattan
An MCP server that runs commands inside an Arch Linux sandbox: seccomp
(pledge-style) + user namespaces + bubblewrap + Landlock + overlayfs. Agent
changes are discarded unless you call env_commit.
Implemented: host capability probe, a C stage3 inner binary (no_new_privs →
Landlock → seccomp), a bootstrapped Arch rootfs with pacman, content-addressed
overlay commits, and 22 MCP tools.
The server exposes sandboxed file tools — rattan_read_file, rattan_write_file,
rattan_edit, rattan_grep — that mirror Vibe's host-side file tools but operate
inside the sandbox. They accept container paths only (under /workspace or
/tmp); host paths are rejected loudly. With --bind-cwd, /workspace maps to
the host launch directory, so sandboxed writes land in the real project. These
let subagents do file I/O without Vibe's host-touching tools.
┌───────────────┐ stdio ┌────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ MCP client │ ◀────────▶ │ rattan server (Python, trusted, unpledged) │
│ (agent/LLM) │ └────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
bwrap + overlayfs
│
┌────────────────────┼─────────────────────┐
▼ ▼ ▼
┌────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐
│ base rootfs │ │ committed │ │ session upperdir │
│ (read-only) │ │ layers (COW) │ │ (writable, │
│ │ │ │ │ discard default)│
└────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘
┌───────────────────────────────┐
│ /init = stage3 (C binary) │
│ no_new_privs → Landlock → │
│ seccomp → execvp(user cmd) │
└───────────────────────────────┘Security
Layers, outermost to innermost:
user namespaces — commands run as unprivileged uid/gid 1000
bubblewrap
--unshare-all— separate mount/PID/IPC/UTS/network namespaces; network denied in agent modeoverlayfs COW — read-only base rootfs + committed layers; writes land in a session-only upperdir
stage3 (
/init) — applies no_new_privs, Landlock, rlimits, seccomp beforeexecvp
stage3 denies keyctl, add_key, request_key, ptrace (unless gdb),
unshare, setns, mount, pivot_root, umount2, reboot.
It's a containment tool, not a malware sandbox: the host kernel and host tools
are trusted. Network is only available to pacman_install (provisioning).
Redirects (>, >>, <, 2>, 2>&1) are applied, with targets confined to
/workspace and /tmp.
Enforceable invariants, each with a test: docs/security-invariants.md.
Related MCP server: mcp-box
Requirements
Linux ≥ 6.2, unprivileged userns enabled, Landlock active, bubblewrap, overlayfs
Python ≥ 3.10
make verify checks all of it.
Build
git clone https://github.com/jmars/rattan.git && cd rattan
python3 -m venv .venv && .venv/bin/pip install -e .
make stage3 # needs cosmocc + assimilate on PATH
make bootstrap-rootfs # base Arch rootfs → ~/.local/share/rattan/rootfs/base
make verifyRun
rattan --probe # host capability check
rattan # MCP server over stdioMCP client config:
{ "mcpServers": { "rattan": {
"command": "/path/to/rattan/.venv/bin/rattan",
"args": []
}}}Tools (18)
command execution:
shell_run,shell_listenvironment:
env_status,env_reset/env_discard,env_commit,env_snapshot_list,env_rollback,env_gcpackages:
pacman_install,pacman_runbackground jobs:
shell_job_start,shell_job_status,shell_job_wait,shell_job_output,shell_job_kill,shell_job_listhost access:
bind_host_dir
Examples
shell_run(command="uname -a", structured=False)
# "Linux rattan ... GNU/Linux"
pacman_install(packages=["tree"]) # network
shell_run(command="tree /workspace")
env_discard() # tree is gone again
env_commit(message="added tree") # → {commit_id, ...}
env_snapshot_list()
env_rollback(to_commit_id="...")
env_gc()
pacman_run(args=["-Q", "tree"]) # read-only, no network
shell_job_start(command="make -j4", cwd="/workspace")
shell_job_wait(job_id=1)
bind_host_dir(host_path="/home/me/data", mount_point="/mnt/data", mode="ro")Only user data directories can be bound: a non-hidden subdir under $HOME
(e.g. ~/projects/foo). bind_host_dir rejects /, all system dirs
(/etc /proc /sys /usr /var /boot /dev /run /bin /lib /root /tmp /opt /srv ...),
another user's home, $HOME itself and every hidden $HOME/.* subtree
(config/credentials like .ssh, .config), and the rattan data dir.
Server CLI
The MCP server accepts a few startup flags:
rattan [--bind HOST=MOUNT[:ro|rw] ...] [--bind-cwd]--bind HOST=MOUNT[:ro|rw]— bind a host directory into the container for every session (read-write by default;--bind-rois the read-only alias). Repeatable. Same path rules asbind_host_dirabove.--bind-cwd— bind the directory the server was launched from onto/workspace(read-write), with/workspaceas the default working directory. The agent then operates directly on that host directory via/workspace— nocdinto a container-specific path is needed, because/workspaceis the host dir the server launched from. Both reads and writes flow straight through to the host directory.
Verify
make verify # host gate: capability probe, bwrap, stage3, overlay, shell_run
make test # 187 testsDocs
docs/architecture.md · docs/implementation-plan.md ·
docs/security-invariants.md · docs/bootstrap.md · docs/decisions/
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Maintenance
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