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jbisaccia-9

mcp-gate

by jbisaccia-9

mcp-gate

ci

A path is a request. The roots boundary is the guarantee.

An MCP file-access server enforces which files a model may touch through roots — a set of authorized directories. mcp-gate demonstrates the difference between telling the server to stay inside its roots and enforcing it: the same attack suite is run against a version that only has an instruction, and a version that canonicalizes every path and checks it against the boundary before any read. One leaks; one holds. Both directions are enforced in CI.

This is an independent implementation of concepts from Anthropic's advanced MCP material, written to showcase three things explicitly:

Capability

Where it shows up

Advanced MCP server

src/mcp_gate/server.py — a FastMCP server exposing typed tools (list_roots, read_file, list_dir, summarize_file), with structured errors and server-initiated sampling (ctx.session.create_message) so the server can ask the client to run the model.

Logs & progress

Every tool streams MCP logging notifications (ctx.info) and progress (ctx.report_progress) as it runs — including logging the exact moment a request is blocked at the boundary. src/mcp_gate/client.py shows the matching logging_callback / sampling_callback.

Access control

src/mcp_gate/boundary.py — the guarantee: .. traversal, absolute paths, symlink escapes, and %2e-encoded traversal are all normalized before the roots check. This is the gate.

The two modes

Mode

How it decides

Result

prompt (insecure control)

A system-prompt instruction says "only read files under the roots," but the path is opened as given.

Leaks — the naive path-handler is a worst-case control, on purpose.

boundary (enforced)

Each path is decoded, realpath-resolved (collapsing .. and following symlinks), then required to sit inside an authorized root.

Holds — out-of-bounds requests are refused before any file is opened.

The attack suite

Attack

prompt mode

boundary mode

direct_ask (a legitimate in-root file)

served ✓

served ✓

dotdot_traversal (../out_of_bounds/secret.txt)

leaks

blocked

absolute_path (absolute path to the secret)

leaks

blocked

symlink_escape (a symlink inside the sandbox → outside)

leaks

blocked

encoded_traversal (%2e%2e/...)

leaks

blocked

direct_ask succeeding in both modes is the deceptive part: a quick manual test of prompt-layer security looks safe, then fails under an attack you didn't try.

Related MCP server: personal-mcp-bridge

The gate (CI-enforced, both directions)

python -m mcp_gate gate boundary   # exit 0 only if 0 escapes
python -m mcp_gate gate prompt      # exit 0 only if the leak is still demonstrated
python -m mcp_gate suite            # both halves must hold

gate prompt failing to leak would mean the demo has gone vacuous (the "secure" result is meaningless if the insecure one also passes), so CI treats that as a build failure too.

Quickstart

python -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e ".[dev]"

pytest -q
python -m mcp_gate gate boundary
python -m mcp_gate gate prompt
python -m mcp_gate suite

Run the live MCP server + client demo (needs pip install -e ".[demo]" and an ANTHROPIC_API_KEY in your environment for the sampling tool):

python -m mcp_gate serve ./data/sandbox      # start the server over stdio
python -m mcp_gate.client ./data/sandbox     # drive it: logs, progress, sampling, a blocked attack

See RESULTS.md for captured output — every block there is real command output, regenerated by scripts/make_results.py, never hand-edited.

Notes

  • All data under data/ is fictional; data/out_of_bounds/secret.txt is a labeled stand-in for "a file the server must never serve."

  • Part of the -gate family: nothing ships until it passes a gate.

A
license - permissive license
Not graded
quality - not tested
C
maintenance

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