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jaseonline

unifi-console-mcp

by jaseonline

unifi_console_network_list

Destructive

Preview and apply create, update, or delete changes to firewall policy port, address, and domain lists, with fingerprint checks, read-back verification, and rollback details.

Instructions

Preview, then apply, a change to the console's network lists (port, address and domain lists used by firewall policies).

Two steps, always: call with confirm=false to get a read-only preview (before, after, diff, warnings, what uses the list, a fingerprint); call again with the same fields plus confirm=true and that fingerprint to apply. The list is re-read first, so a stale preview is refused. Applying also needs UNIFI_CONSOLE_ENABLE_WRITES=true and 'network_list' in UNIFI_CONSOLE_WRITE_ENTITIES. A list that firewall policies or traffic objects still use cannot be deleted, and editing one warns that the change takes effect for them at once. After applying, the list is read back and the result reports verified true/false, the diff, and the exact rollback call. Every write is journalled.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
paramsYes

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, so the safe-vs-write profile is covered, yet the description adds far more: stale previews are refused because the list is re-read first, applying requires UNIFI_CONSOLE_ENABLE_WRITES=true and 'network_list' in UNIFI_CONSOLE_WRITE_ENTITIES, edits take effect on dependent policies immediately, deletion is blocked while in use, results are read back and verified, and every write is journalled with an exact rollback call.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The workflow is front-loaded in the opening sentence and the remaining prose is dense but non-redundant, with each clause carrying a distinct operational fact. It is on the longer side for a description, but nothing reads as filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the mutation risk, the two-step safety protocol, the environment prerequisites, the dependency blocking rules, and an output schema (so return values need not be described), the description covers everything an agent needs to invoke this tool correctly and safely. No significant gap remains.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Every nested field carries a schema description, so the schema does most of the per-parameter work and the baseline is 3. The description goes beyond it by explaining the confirm/fingerprint contract as a workflow-coupled pair and by clarifying the fingerprint must come from the preview of exactly this change, which is the semantics an agent most needs.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb and resource: it manages (preview then apply) changes to a console's network lists, and immediately defines what those are (port, address and domain lists used by firewall policies). This lets an agent distinguish it from sibling tools like unifi_console_firewall_policy and unifi_console_traffic_object without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The usage model is stated explicitly and operationally: call with confirm=false for a read-only preview, then call again with the same fields plus confirm=true and the returned fingerprint to apply. When-to-use is unambiguous, and exclusions are supplied (a list still referenced by firewall policies or traffic objects cannot be deleted).

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.