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jamesdfinance-dev

lazaretto-mcp

Check a whole lockfile for known-malicious dependencies (free, no API key)

check_lockfile

Check each exactly-pinned dependency in a lockfile against published malicious-package advisories (OSV/OpenSSF) to identify known malware before installation.

Instructions

Checks every exactly-pinned dependency in a lockfile against published malicious-package advisories (OSV / OpenSSF). One call covers the entire dependency tree.

WHEN TO USE: before installing dependencies, or when auditing a project you did not write. This is the broadest and cheapest check, so start here. Prefer scan_artifact when you need to know what a specific package DOES rather than whether it is already known malware. Prefer known_bad_lookup when you already hold a sha256 of a file rather than a lockfile.

COST AND EFFECTS: free, no API key, no payment. Read-only. Reads the lockfile from the working directory itself, so a large lockfile never has to be pasted through the model context.

LIMITS: only exactly-pinned versions can be answered. A range such as ^5.0.0 has no definitive answer, because a compromised release usually sits between clean ones (chalk 5.6.1 was malware while 5.3.0 and later releases were not). Entries with no published registry identity (file:, link:, workspace:, git) are counted under skipped rather than silently dropped.

READING THE RESULT: malicious lists confirmed known-malware versions with advisory ids. An empty malicious list is an all-clear ONLY when unverified is also empty: anything under unverified could not be checked and must never be reported as clean.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
pathNoLockfile path relative to the working directory, e.g. "package-lock.json" or "apps/web/pnpm-lock.yaml". Omit to auto-detect package-lock.json, npm-shrinkwrap.json, yarn.lock, or pnpm-lock.yaml in the working directory. Only those filenames are read.
lockfileNoFull text contents of a lockfile, for when it is not on disk (for example fetched from a PR diff). Supplying this skips reading from disk. Prefer omitting it and letting the tool read the file, which keeps a large lockfile out of the context window.
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations provided, but the description thoroughly discloses behavior: it's free, read-only, reads from working directory, explains limits on version ranges and non-registry entries, and how to interpret results (malicious vs unverified).

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Well-structured with clear sections (WHEN TO USE, COST AND EFFECTS, LIMITS, READING THE RESULT). Every sentence adds value, no redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given no output schema, the description explains result format (malicious, unverified) and interpretation. Covers limitations, cost, and usage comprehensively for a two-parameter tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Input schema has 100% description coverage for both parameters, but the description adds extra context (e.g., auto-detection for path, when to use lockfile parameter) beyond schema descriptions.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Description clearly states the tool checks a lockfile for known-malicious dependencies, specifies it works on exactly-pinned versions, and distinguishes from siblings (scan_artifact, known_bad_lookup).

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit guidance on when to use (before installing, auditing), when to prefer alternatives (scan_artifact for package behavior, known_bad_lookup for sha256), and limitations (only exactly-pinned).

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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