homelab-mcp

An MCP server that gives an assistant (Claude Code, the Claude app, or any MCP client) operational access to a home lab through one authenticated HTTPS endpoint:

• Proxmox VE — list nodes and every VM/LXC (discovered live, so new guests appear automatically), start/stop/reboot, edit guest config, snapshots, storage, run commands inside guests (pct exec / QEMU guest agent), and a raw API escape hatch.

• Home Assistant — read states, call services, drive automations, browse the area/device/entity registries (incl. ESPHome devices), history, logbook, error log, plus raw REST and WebSocket escape hatches.

• ESPHome — list nodes, read/edit YAML, validate and flash over OTA, via the dashboard add-on or over SSH.

• Shell & Docker — run commands, read/write files, manage systemd units and journals, and manage Docker/compose on any host over SSH.

• Fully Kiosk — control Fully Kiosk Browser tablets over the Remote Admin API: screenshot, load a URL, screen on/off, brightness, text-to-speech, restart, and a raw command escape hatch.

• Network — ping sweep, TCP port scan and ARP/neighbour tables to discover what is on the LAN.

Call homelab_overview first — it reports which backends are configured and gives a live inventory of each.

How it fits together

Claude app / Claude Code
        │  HTTPS + Bearer token
        ▼
  mcp.fabrici.xyz   (your reverse proxy: nginx / NPM / Traefik)
        │  http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp
        ▼
   homelab-mcp   ──► Proxmox API (token)
   (LXC/VM/Docker)──► Home Assistant (REST + WS)
        │        ──► ESPHome dashboard
        └────────►  SSH to hosts, network scans

The server speaks streamable HTTP MCP and enforces a bearer token (and an optional IP allowlist) itself, so it is safe to expose behind your existing reverse proxy alongside ha.fabrici.xyz.

Related MCP server: Homelab MCP Server

Quick start

python -m venv .venv && . .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e .

cp config/homelab.example.yaml config/homelab.yaml
$EDITOR config/homelab.yaml            # fill in hosts, tokens, ssh key

export MCP_AUTH_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 32)   # or put it in the file
homelab-mcp --check                    # validate config, list modules
homelab-mcp                            # serve on :8787/mcp

Every module is optional: leave a section blank and its tools report that they are not configured instead of failing the whole server.

Deployment

The intended target is a small LXC container on Proxmox. See deploy/ for a systemd unit, an install script and reverse-proxy snippets (nginx / Nginx Proxy Manager). docs/SETUP.md walks through provisioning the Proxmox API token, the Home Assistant token, the SSH key and the mcp.fabrici.xyz proxy entry end to end. docs/RESILIENCE.md documents what the access path depends on, the safeguards on the container (protection flag, weekly vzdump) and how to rebuild or re-mint credentials from scratch.

Connecting a client

Add to the Claude app / Claude Code as a remote MCP server:

• URL: https://mcp.fabrici.xyz/mcp

• Header: Authorization: Bearer <MCP_AUTH_TOKEN>

Security

The user of this repo chose full access (unrestricted shell, all write tools). That is powerful: the bearer token is effectively root on the whole network. Accordingly the server:

• requires a bearer token on every request (hmac.compare_digest);

• fails closed: refuses to start with neither a token nor an allowlist on a non-loopback bind, unless server.insecure: true is set explicitly;

• supports an IP allowlist; X-Forwarded-For is honoured only from trusted proxies, and then the right-most untrusted hop is used, so the allowlist cannot be spoofed by prepending a header (note: a LAN-only allowlist also blocks the Claude app connector — see docs/CLIENT.md);

• writes a redacted JSONL audit log (owner-only, 0600) of every state-changing call, and scrubs registered secrets from error messages too;

• keeps timestamped backups when overwriting files;

• can optionally refuse a few catastrophic commands (guard_destructive: true, off by default) — a best-effort fat-finger backstop, not a security boundary: every configured client already holds full shell access.

Secrets never go in git: config/homelab.yaml, .env and SSH keys are git-ignored, and config values can be pulled from environment variables.