Approval Gate MCP
An MCP server for requesting, tracking, and consuming human approvals for consequential agent actions; it records intent/decisions but never executes the action or approves requests over MCP.
Register an intended action with
request_approval, including reason, optional TTL, operation, JSON payload, and self-reported requester.Check approval status with
check_approvalor block/wait for a decision withwait_for_approval; pending/timeout is not approval.List pending requests page-by-page with
list_pending.Deny pending requests or revoke approved-but-unconsumed requests with
decide_approval; approval must be done by a human via the CLI.Consume an approval exactly once with
consume_approvalimmediately before acting, only when approved, unexpired, and the action text plus any operation/payload match exactly.Maintain status information and an audit trail of requests, decisions, expiries, and consumptions.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@Approval Gate MCPget approval before emailing alice@example.com subject: Invoice 1042"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
approval-gate-mcp
An MCP server and library for requesting a human decision before a consequential agent action. Approvals expire, are single-use and can bind an operation to an exact payload.
The trusted executor must enforce the approval. Installing an MCP server does not prevent an agent from using another tool, and the gate is not a security boundary against processes with the same OS-user privileges. Read the trusted execution boundary and threat model before integration.
Release and verification
As of 31 October 2026, v0.4.1 on GitHub and 0.4.1 on npm are published. Source changes, GitHub releases and registry publication are separate states; these links identify the released version.
Requires Node.js 22+. See the MIT license, changelog and test suite. The 0.4.1 release notes describe the shipped changes. Tests apply to the revision and environment where they ran; they do not establish production certification. The quickstart below pins the published package; run npm test for your own checkout.
Related MCP server: actionproxy
Why
Sending, deleting, publishing, spending and deploying need a decision tied to the actual operation. A general instruction to "ask first" leaves the executor to interpret an informal conversation. This project records a specific request, a human decision, an expiry and a single-use consume step that trusted execution code can enforce.
Use it when you control that execution boundary. If an agent can bypass it through a shell, another tool or direct file access, adding this server alone cannot enforce approval.
30-second quickstart
claude mcp add approval-gate -- npx -y @itcustomsolution/approval-gate-mcp@0.4.1Claude Desktop (claude_desktop_config.json):
{
"mcpServers": {
"approval-gate": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@itcustomsolution/approval-gate-mcp@0.4.1"]
}
}
}Approve or deny from your terminal with npx -p @itcustomsolution/approval-gate-mcp@0.4.1 approval-gate list.
Example
Your agent wants to email a customer. It calls
request_approvalwithaction: "send email to alice@example.com, subject: Invoice 1042"and gets back ida1b2c3d4e5f6.It calls
wait_for_approval. Nothing is sent.In your own terminal:
approval-gate list, thenapproval-gate approve a1b2c3d4e5f6 looks right.The agent can observe
approved, but that status does not authorize sending. The trusted executor callsexecuteApprovedfor that id and the exact action (plus operation/payload binding, if present) immediately around its send function. See Trusted execution boundary. It must not accept an agent-supplied or MCP JSON result as proof. Denial, timeout or expiry prevents a successful consume.~/.approval-gate/audit.jsonlnow has the request and your decision.
Design principles
Fail closed. The only thing that authorizes an action is a successful consume:
consume_approvalreturningok: true(once, for the exact approved action), orexecuteApprovedin trusted code. Pending, approved-but-not-consumed, denied, expired, timeout, error: none of those is an authorization; all of them mean no.The gate never executes anything. It records intent and decisions. Your agent asks first, then acts only on approval. Separation of decision and execution keeps the gate simple and auditable.
Decisions are out-of-band. A human approves or denies with a CLI in their own terminal, not inside the agent's context. The MCP tools cannot approve. The CLI asks for an interactive terminal and a re-typed confirmation, which is a speed bump, not authentication: anything running as your OS user (a shell, a PTY, or file access) can still get past it. See Threat model.
Only a consume authorizes.
status: "approved"is informational. Status responses carryauthorizesExecution: falseand aneffectiveStatus(approved_unconsumed,approved_expired,consumed,revoked, ...). Trusted code that performs the side effect should callexecuteApproved(see Trusted execution boundary), which consumes the approval itself. A consume result that arrived over MCP, from a file or from an agent is never proof of approval, however well-formed.Everything is audited. Every request, decision, expiry, and consumption is appended to
~/.approval-gate/audit.jsonl(an append-only convention, not a tamper-proof log).Requests expire. Default TTL is 1 hour; a stale approval is not an approval.
Approvals are single-use and bound to the action.
consume_approvalsucceeds once, only for the exact action text that was approved (and, if the request carried them, the same operation name and the same canonical JSON payload), and only if the clock read after all of its persistence is still at or before the request's expiry.
Install
Requires Node.js 22 or later (Node 18 and 20 are past end of life; the MCP SDK's @hono/node-server
dependency needs Node 20+).
From npm:
npm install -g @itcustomsolution/approval-gate-mcp@0.4.1 # installs `approval-gate` and `approval-gate-mcp`From source:
git clone --branch v0.4.1 --depth 1 https://github.com/itcustomsolution/approval-gate-mcp.git
cd approval-gate-mcp
npm ci --ignore-scripts
npm test # builds the source and runs the tests
node dist/cli.js listWire it into an MCP client
Claude Code:
claude mcp add approval-gate -- node /path/to/approval-gate-mcp/dist/index.jsOr in any MCP client config:
{
"mcpServers": {
"approval-gate": {
"command": "node",
"args": ["/path/to/approval-gate-mcp/dist/index.js"]
}
}
}Tools
Tool | Purpose |
| Register an intended action ( |
| Poll a request's status: |
| Block up to |
| List requests awaiting a human, oldest first, one page at a time ( |
| Call right before acting. Succeeds once, only if approved, unexpired, and |
| Deny a pending request, or revoke an approved one that has not been consumed. Approving through MCP is refused by default, so an agent cannot approve its own request; approvals come from the CLI. Operators can opt in with |
The human side
approval-gate list # pending requests
approval-gate show a1b2c3d4e5f6
approval-gate approve a1b2c3d4e5f6 looks right, ship it
approval-gate deny a1b2c3d4e5f6 wrong recipient
approval-gate revoke a1b2c3d4e5f6 changed my mind # approved but not yet consumed
approval-gate list approved --limit 20 --after a1b2c3d4e5f6 # page through history
approval-gate archive --older-than-days 30 # retention: move finished requests asideshow and the approve confirmation print the operation and the full canonical payload (escaped)
when a request binds one: that is exactly what an executor will be allowed to run.
Suggested agent policy
Put something like this in your agent's system prompt or policy file:
Before any outbound or destructive action (send, publish, delete, purchase, deploy), call
request_approvaland thenwait_for_approval. When it returnsapproved, callconsume_approvalwith the same id and exact action text, and proceed only if it returnsok: true. Never calldecide_approvalfor your own requests.
Trusted execution boundary
When your own code (not the agent) performs the side effect, let the gate consume the approval at that boundary and run exactly the approved payload:
import { executeApproved } from "@itcustomsolution/approval-gate-mcp/dist/store.js";
// id comes from the agent; the action, operation and payload are what your code is about to run.
await executeApproved(id, { action, operation: "smtp.send", payload: { to, subject, body } }, async (ctx) => {
ctx.assertActive(); // re-check expiry immediately before the side effect
await smtp.send(ctx.payload); // ctx.payload is a frozen copy of what the human approved
});executeApproved accepts no receipt. It performs the single-use consume itself (binding to the
action text, and to the operation and payload if the request carried them), writes an
execution_started audit line (fsync), checks expiry again, and only then calls your function. If
the start record cannot be written, or the approval expired during that write, nothing runs. Call
ctx.assertActive() again after any await that precedes the side effect.
assertConsumed(result, id, action, binding?) remains for code that calls consumeApproval
itself: it accepts only a grant object issued by consumeApproval in the same process, once,
for the same id/action/binding, before expiry. A copy, a JSON round trip (an MCP response, a file,
an agent message) or a hand-built object is always refused. 0.3.0 accepted any well-shaped object;
see the changelog.
Crash and replay semantics. Consumption is at-most-once: once .used is claimed the approval is
spent, whatever happens next, including refusals after the claim (expired during persistence, audit
failure). A crash after execution_started and before execution_finished means the outcome is
unknown: inspect the external system and, if needed, create and approve a new request. Nothing is
retried automatically, and there is no atomic guarantee between this gate's files and the external
system your callback touches. Details: docs/authorization-states.md.
Limits
Limit | Value |
| 8192 UTF-8 bytes each |
| 256 bytes (self-reported, never authenticated) |
| 1-128 of |
| JSON only; 32 KiB canonical (RFC 8785), depth 32, 10000 values; no |
TTL | MCP: integer 10 s to 7 days; library: any finite number up to 7 days (zero or negative gives an already-expired request) |
Requests awaiting a decision |
|
List page | 1-100 (default 50) |
State directory | New requests are refused at 100,000 entries in |
When the queue is full, request_approval fails with approval queue full until a human decides
requests or they expire. Finished requests stay on disk until you run approval-gate archive, which
moves only finished requests that were created and expired at least 8 days ago, so nothing archived can
still be used. An MCP client can create and deny its own requests without a human, so it can fill
requests/ up to the creation limit; that blocks new requests (an availability limit, like the queue
cap), never a human's decisions. Each listing page reads every request file, so listing slows down as
history grows until you archive. Paginated listing streams directory entries and retains at most the requested
page plus one continuation summary, without payload text. The legacy listRequests API intentionally returns
all matching full records and is not memory-bounded by page size.
State
Everything lives in ~/.approval-gate/ (override with APPROVAL_GATE_DIR):
requests/*.json for current state, requests/*.final / *.used one-time decision and
consumption markers, audit.jsonl for the history and archive/ for archived requests. The
directory is created 0700 and files 0600.
Privacy: action text, reasons, requested_by and any bound payload are stored in plain text in
these files, and action text and reasons are copied into audit.jsonl. Do not put credentials or
secrets in them.
Threat model
What the gate does protect against:
An agent that can only reach this server over MCP approving its own request (MCP cannot approve).
An agent driving the CLI from a non-interactive shell (
approverequires a TTY plus a typed confirmation).Reusing one approval for a second or different action (
consume_approvalis single-use and action-bound).Using an approval after the request's expiry, races between approve/deny/expiry, guessed ids (128-bit random), malformed or hand-edited state files without a matching decision record, and terminal escape sequences, bidirectional overrides and invisible characters in request text that try to disguise what you are approving (the CLI shows them as
\uescapes). Ordinary look-alike letters from other scripts (a Cyrillic "а" in a hostname) are shown as they are: read request text, do not skim it.
What it does not protect against:
Trust limitation, not a bug that has been fixed: an agent with a shell, a PTY, or file access as your OS user. It can drive a pseudo-terminal, edit
~/.approval-gate/, or simply skip the gate and perform the action. The gate is a cooperation protocol plus an audit trail, not a sandbox. For hard enforcement, run the agent as a separate OS user (or in a container) that cannot read or write the gate directory, and keep the gate's CLI for yourself.The actual payload.
consume_approvalmatches the action text. It cannot prove that the email, SQL, or deploy the agent then runs equals what you read. That binding is cooperative. See docs/design-trusted-executor.md for an enforced design (proposal only).Unattended, consequential use. Without OS-level separation (see above), do not treat this gate as the only control for unattended agents doing irreversible things. Keep those paths fail-closed, with no automatic execution.
An agent that never calls the gate. Enforcement of asking is up to your agent's policy and tooling.
Tampering with
audit.jsonlby anyone with write access to it.
executeApproved and payload binding are local safeguards: they make the executed payload equal
the approved one when your trusted code uses them. They do not authenticate the human or stop a
same-user agent from bypassing the gate. A separately trusted authority/executor would still need:
The executor running as a different OS user, container or service account that the agent cannot control, holding the only credential for the side effect.
A gate state directory the agent's user cannot read or write.
Human approval made with a credential the agent does not have (for example a hardware-key signature or an OS prompt for another user), not a TTY.
The agent asking the executor to run an approved id by reference, never sending the payload again.
A tamper-evident (hash-chained or off-host) audit log.
None of that is created by this package; it needs an owner decision and new credentials. See docs/design-trusted-executor.md.
Setting APPROVAL_GATE_ALLOW_MCP_APPROVE=1 re-enables approval over MCP and removes the main
protection. Only use it when a human is the only one driving the MCP client.
State transitions, revocation, and crash behavior are specified in
docs/authorization-states.md. approval-gate revoke <id> (or deny
on an approved request) cancels an approval that has not been consumed yet.
Why so small?
The package concentrates on requests, decisions, expiry, consumption and local records. Your integration supplies the actual operation and decides where to enforce it. Keeping that responsibility explicit makes the boundary easier to review and the limitations easier to test.
Applying the gate to a workflow
This is an inspectable approval component. A working integration still needs a trusted executor, access controls, failure handling and end-to-end acceptance checks for the actual operation. A package install or passing test suite does not establish that a live workflow enforces approval or meets a compliance requirement.
For help defining owners, exceptions and evidence around one IT workflow, see ITC's IT Operations Workflow Review. Implementation and operation are separately scoped; the review does not supply an enforcement boundary or certify an integration.
Contributing
Issues and pull requests are welcome. Keep changes small and fail-closed: anything that
could turn a "no" into a "yes" needs a test. Run npm test before opening a PR.
See CHANGELOG.md for release history.
License
MIT, see LICENSE.
Built by Olufela "Lu" Fagbure · itcustomsolution.com · MIT license
Available Tools
6 toolscheck_approvalA
Check the current status of an approval request. Informational only: no status here authorizes execution (authorizesExecution is always false). See effectiveStatus (approved_unconsumed, approved_expired, consumed, revoked, ...). Only consume_approval ok:true authorizes.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | The request id returned by request_approval |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden and does well: it declares that authorizesExecution is always false and enumerates the effectiveStatus values (approved_unconsumed, approved_expired, consumed, revoked), which is the key behavioral fact an agent needs to avoid treating a check as a clearance. It omits any note on side effects or permissions, though for a pure read that is minor.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three short sentences, with the core purpose and the safety-critical constraint front-loaded and no wasted words. Every clause (informational-only, status fields, consume_approval handoff) earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
No output schema exists, so the description must explain return values, and it does name the two fields that matter most (authorizesExecution and effectiveStatus). It does not sketch the remaining status values or response shape, leaving a small gap for a tool whose entire output is status data.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Only one parameter and schema description coverage is 100% – the schema already documents id as "the request id returned by request_approval". The description adds no format, sourcing, or lookup guidance beyond that, so the baseline of 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ("Check the current status of an approval request") and explicitly separates itself from consume_approval, the sibling that actually authorizes execution. An agent can tell exactly which tool performs a status read versus an authorization.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives an explicit when-not ("no status here authorizes execution") plus the correct alternative ("Only consume_approval ok:true authorizes"). It does not route against the other read-oriented siblings (list_pending, wait_for_approval), so it falls just short of full when/when-not/alternatives coverage.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
consume_approvalA
Call this IMMEDIATELY before performing an approved action. Succeeds exactly once per request, only if the request is approved, not past its expiry, action is byte-for-byte the text that was approved, and operation/payload (if the request had them) are identical. ok:false for any reason means do NOT proceed. An approval cannot be reused for a second or different action. The returned JSON is not a transferable credential: no other component may accept it as proof of approval.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | The request id returned by request_approval | |
| action | Yes | The exact action text you passed to request_approval | |
| payload | No | Optional JSON payload the action will execute (at most 32768 bytes canonical). The human reviews it; consume must present an identical payload. | |
| operation | No | Optional operation name a trusted executor must present, e.g. 'smtp.send' (A-Z a-z 0-9 . _ : / -) |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so: exactly-once success, the four preconditions (approved state, unexpired, byte-for-byte action match, identical operation/payload), failure semantics, and a security caveat that the returned JSON is not a transferable credential. These are non-obvious behaviors an agent could not derive from the schema alone.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The imperative directive is front-loaded in the first clause, and every subsequent sentence adds a distinct, load-bearing constraint (preconditions, abort rule, no-reuse, credential warning). No filler or repetition of schema content.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 4-parameter mutation-like tool with no annotations and no output schema, the description covers the critical failure path ('ok:false') and the credential caveat, but does not indicate what a successful response contains beyond implying `ok:true`. That is a minor gap given the otherwise thorough disclosure.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3; the description earns above that by sharpening the matching rules — `action` must be 'byte-for-byte the text that was approved' and operation/payload must be identical if the request had them. It reinforces the strictness of the match rather than restating field types.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific action (consume an approval) and its precise placement in the workflow: 'Call this IMMEDIATELY before performing an approved action.' That timing constraint, plus the exactly-once semantics, cleanly separates it from the sibling lifecycle tools (request_approval, check_approval, wait_for_approval, decide_approval).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives an explicit when ('IMMEDIATELY before performing an approved action'), an explicit when-not ('ok:false for any reason means do NOT proceed'), and an explicit non-reuse rule ('An approval cannot be reused for a second or different action'). The agent is told both the trigger and the abort condition without inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
decide_approvalA
Deny a pending request, or revoke an approved-but-unconsumed one. Approvals are not possible through MCP; a human must run approval-gate approve <id> in their own terminal.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | The request id returned by request_approval | |
| reason | No | Human's stated reason, verbatim | |
| approve | Yes | true to approve (refused unless enabled by the operator), false to deny |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden. It usefully discloses the out-of-band approval constraint and the two state transitions it causes, but says nothing about what happens on failure (e.g. request already consumed), whether denial is reversible, or how `reason` is used — and it does not reconcile the tension with the schema's `approve` parameter, which can still be set to true when the operator enables it.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two tight sentences, no filler, with the primary action stated first and the hard constraint immediately after. Every clause earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 3-parameter state-mutating gate tool with no output schema, the description covers the main paths and the human-approval constraint. It is still thin on error behavior and post-denial state, which an agent needs before committing to a mutation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so id, reason, and approve are already fully documented, establishing the baseline of 3. The description adds only indirect meaning about the approve flag and nothing about the format or purpose of `reason`.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource: denying a pending request or revoking an approved-but-unconsumed one. That scope implicitly separates it from request_approval and consume_approval, though no sibling is named explicitly.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Clearly frames the two valid use cases (deny pending, revoke unconsumed) and adds the critical when-not: an agent cannot approve through MCP and must direct a human to run the CLI. It stops short of routing to a specific sibling tool by name.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_pendingA
List approval requests awaiting a human decision, oldest first, one page at a time. Returns {items, nextCursor}; nextCursor is present only when more requests exist (pass it back as cursor). Items omit payload text; use check_approval for one full request.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | Page size, 1-100 (default 50) | |
| cursor | No | nextCursor from the previous page |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does well: it discloses the return envelope {items, nextCursor}, that nextCursor is conditional, and that item payloads are truncated. It does not state the operation is read-only or note any permission/auth expectations, which is a modest remaining gap for a no-annotation tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three short sentences, front-loaded with purpose, then return shape, then the escalation path to check_approval. No filler and no repetition of schema details.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
No output schema exists, and the description compensates by describing the response envelope and paging contract. An agent has everything needed to paginate correctly and to know when to escalate to a detail tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is already 100%, so the baseline would be 3, but the description adds real meaning: it explains that cursor is a nextCursor fed back from a prior page and that nextCursor only appears when more results exist. This clarifies the paging loop in a way the schema's one-line field descriptions do not.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ("List approval requests awaiting a human decision") plus ordering and paging scope, and names the sibling that serves single-record reads. An agent can distinguish it from check_approval and the decide/consume siblings without opening any schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
"Items omit payload text; use check_approval for one full request" gives an explicit alternative and the condition that selects it. There is no exclusion for the remaining siblings (wait_for_approval, decide_approval), so the routing guidance is clear but not exhaustive.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
request_approvalA
Register a consequential action for human approval BEFORE performing it. Returns a request id. The action is NOT executed by this server; status 'approved' does NOT authorize anything by itself. Right before acting, call consume_approval with the same id, the exact action text and the same operation/payload if you supplied them; proceed only on ok:true. Anything else means no (fail closed).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | Yes | Precise description of the action you intend to take, e.g. 'send email to alice@example.com with subject X' | |
| reason | Yes | Why this action is needed right now | |
| payload | No | Optional JSON payload the action will execute (at most 32768 bytes canonical). The human reviews it; consume must present an identical payload. | |
| operation | No | Optional operation name a trusted executor must present, e.g. 'smtp.send' (A-Z a-z 0-9 . _ : / -) | |
| ttl_seconds | No | How long the request stays valid, pending or approved (default 1 hour) | |
| requested_by | No | Identifier of the requesting agent or workflow (self-reported, not authenticated) |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations exist, so the description carries the full burden and does so: it discloses that the server does not execute the action, that an 'approved' status is not authorization, that a request id is returned, and that the system fails closed. These are exactly the non-obvious behavioral traits an agent would otherwise get wrong.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Four tight sentences, front-loaded with the purpose, then the return value, then the critical caveat, then the next step. No filler and the ordering matches the agent's decision sequence.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no output schema, the description correctly supplies the return value (a request id). The only gaps are secondary: it does not say what happens when ttl_seconds expires or how a pending request becomes visible to a human, both of which are covered by siblings like wait_for_approval and list_pending.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3; the description earns above that by explaining the cross-call coupling — operation and payload supplied here must be re-presented identically at consume time — which is the parameter behavior most likely to cause silent failure. It does not add anything for ttl_seconds or requested_by, but those are self-explanatory in the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Register a consequential action for human approval') and immediately pins down the workflow position: BEFORE performing it. It also names the follow-up sibling consume_approval, so an agent can tell this apart from check_approval/decide_approval without opening a schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicit about when to call (before a consequential action), what to do next (consume_approval with the same id, action text, operation/payload), and the decision rule ('proceed only on ok:true. Anything else means no (fail closed)'). This is the rare description that leaves nothing to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
wait_for_approvalA
Block until a human decides the request, it expires, or the timeout elapses. Returns the final (or still-pending) request. Informational only; it never authorizes execution. A timeout returns 'pending' (not approved). After 'approved', call consume_approval and proceed only on ok:true.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | The request id returned by request_approval | |
| poll_seconds | No | Polling interval | |
| timeout_seconds | No | Maximum time to wait (default 5 minutes) |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does well: it discloses that the call blocks, that a timeout yields 'pending' rather than approval, and that approval alone does not permit execution. Missing are operational notes such as whether long blocks are safe or how concurrent waits behave.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Four short sentences, front-loaded with the blocking behavior and followed immediately by the safety caveat and the required next step. Only the clause 'Returns the final (or still-pending) request' adds little beyond what precedes it.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
No output schema and no annotations, and the description covers the critical contract: what blocks, what a timeout means, and how to proceed after approval. The returned request's shape and status values are not described, but the decision-relevant behavior is complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents id, poll_seconds and timeout_seconds and the baseline is 3. The description adds real meaning by explaining the consequence of the timeout parameter returning 'pending' rather than approved, which the schema does not convey.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and effect: block until a human decides, the request expires, or the timeout elapses, then return the request. An agent can tell this is a waiting/polling call rather than a decision call. However, it never explicitly names check_approval as the non-blocking alternative, so the wait-vs-check distinction is left implicit.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives a clear call sequence: after 'approved', call consume_approval and proceed only on ok:true, plus an explicit 'never authorizes execution' exclusion. It stops short of saying when to prefer check_approval or how to pick a timeout, so the guidance is contextual but not exhaustive.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
6 tool updates
v0.4.1- Changed
check_approval1 field changed- removed
Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false
- Changed
consume_approval1 field changed- removed
Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false
- Changed
decide_approval1 field changed- removed
Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false
- Changed
list_pending1 field changed- removed
Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false
- Changed
request_approval1 field changed- removed
Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false
- Changed
wait_for_approval1 field changed- removed
Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false
6 tool updates
v0.4.0- Changed
check_approval1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / id / maxLengthAdded value: +64
- Added
consume_approval - Changed
decide_approval4 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / approve / descriptionPrevious value: -"true to approve, false to deny"New value: +"true to approve (refused unless enabled by the operator), false to deny" - added
Input schema / properties / id / descriptionAdded value: +"The request id returned by request_approval" - added
Input schema / properties / id / maxLengthAdded value: +64 - added
Input schema / properties / reason / maxLengthAdded value: +8192
- Changed
list_pending3 fields changed- added
Input schema / additionalPropertiesAdded value: +false - added
Input schema / properties / cursorAdded value: +{ + "description": "nextCursor from the previous page", + "maxLength": 64, + "minLength": 1, + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / limitAdded value: +{ + "default": 50, + "description": "Page size, 1-100 (default 50)", + "maximum": 100, + "minimum": 1, + "type": "integer" +}
- Changed
request_approval7 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / action / maxLengthAdded value: +8192 - added
Input schema / properties / operationAdded value: +{ + "description": "Optional operation name a trusted executor must present, e.g. 'smtp.send' (A-Z a-z 0-9 . _ : / -)", + "maxLength": 128, + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / payloadAdded value: +{ + "description": "Optional JSON payload the action will execute (at most 32768 bytes canonical). The human reviews it; consume must present an identical payload." +} - added
Input schema / properties / reason / maxLengthAdded value: +8192 - changed
Input schema / properties / requested_by / descriptionPrevious value: -"Identifier of the requesting agent or workflow"New value: +"Identifier of the requesting agent or workflow (self-reported, not authenticated)" - added
Input schema / properties / requested_by / maxLengthAdded value: +256 - changed
Input schema / properties / ttl_seconds / descriptionPrevious value: -"How long the request stays pending before it expires (default 1 hour)"New value: +"How long the request stays valid, pending or approved (default 1 hour)"
- Changed
wait_for_approval1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / id / maxLengthAdded value: +64
5 tool updates
v0.1.0- First observed
check_approval - First observed
decide_approval - First observed
list_pending - First observed
request_approval - First observed
wait_for_approval
TDQS
Scored across 6 tools
Each tool maps to a distinct lifecycle stage: register, poll, block, enumerate, deny/revoke, and consume. The only fuzzy cluster is check_approval vs wait_for_approval vs consume_approval, all of which report status; the descriptions do explicitly separate them (informational poll vs blocking wait vs single-use authorization), which keeps misselection recoverable but still requires careful reading.
Five of six tools follow a clean verb_noun pattern (request_approval, check_approval, wait_for_approval, decide_approval, consume_approval). list_pending breaks the pattern by omitting the noun object (implied 'approvals'), a minor deviation but still readable and unambiguous.
Six tools is well-scoped for an approval gate: one per lifecycle operation with no redundant entries. Nothing feels padded or missing on the surface.
Covers the full request-poll-wait-list-decide-consume loop, with the notable and intentional absence of an MCP-side approve (humans approve out-of-band). Minor gap: there is no way to enumerate decided/expired/consumed requests by status, so an agent that lost a request id can only recover via paginated list_pending.
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
Supervised API-write gateway for AI agents with policy, human approval and execution receipts.
Preventive human-approval write-gate for AI agents: writes commit only after a human approves.
Checks AI agent actions before they run. Signed, RFC 3161 timestamped evidence for audits.
Set up human approval for your AI agents' tool calls.
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseAqualityDmaintenanceHuman-in-the-loop approval gate for AI agents. Your agent calls submit_approval before any irreversible action; a human reviews on a branded page; a signed webhook fires back with the decision.11MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceProvides a human-in-the-loop approval gateway for AI agents, enforcing policies and audit logging for MCP-compatible tool calls.Apache 2.0
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceA local human-in-the-loop gate for AI agents that blocks actions until human approval, with timeout defaulting to denial.31 npmMIT

raposa-mcpofficial
AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceHuman approval for AI agents: request_human_approval pauses a high-stakes action until a named person approves or rejects (console, email, Telegram, Slack); silence is not consent. Every decision is sealed in a hash-chained audit log. EU-hosted.347 PyPI1MIT