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quipu_verdict_verify

Read-only

Verify a signed verdict against the root of trust at signing time, checking that the key was registered and authorized for the predicate so consumers can gate trust decisions.

Instructions

Verify a signed Verdict against the root of trust AS OF the signature (signing-plane S1): the signature must be valid under a key registered to the verifier at that instant, AND that same registration must authorize the predicate. 'trusted' is that conjunction — the property a consumer should gate on. Pass 'verdict' (the stored verdict's IRI) for a trust decision: quipu then reads when the store recorded the signature, which the signer cannot choose. 'as_of.basis' says which instant was used (recorded | caller-supplied | now). A caller-supplied signed_at/tx is a what-if: 'trusted' is then always false and the answer is in 'would_verify_as_of_supplied_instant'.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
txNoExplicit transaction to verify as of (a what-if query; default latest)
tierNoEvidence tier (default: committed)
schemeNoSignature scheme: ed25519 (default) | webauthn-es256 | webauthn-eddsa | sshsig-sk-ed25519. Hardware schemes are refused unless [quipu.governance] hardware_verdict_schemes is on, and verify only against registrations declaring the same aegis:signatureScheme
outcomeYesVerdict outcome (satisfied | unsatisfied | unknown)
verdictNoIRI of the stored verdict carrying this signature; verify as of when the store recorded it (preferred for trust decisions)
verifierYesVerifier IRI whose registered key verifies the signature
signatureYesThe signature over the verdict message: hex for ed25519 (default); base64url DER/raw assertion signature for webauthn-*; the armored SSH SIGNATURE block for sshsig-sk-ed25519
signed_atNoExplicit valid-time instant to verify at (a what-if query; default now)
target_refYesTarget the verdict is about
predicate_idYesPredicate the verdict attests
evidence_hashYesEvidence hash the signature seals
client_data_jsonNowebauthn-* only: base64url clientDataJSON from the assertion; its challenge must equal the one quipu derives from the verdict message
authenticator_dataNowebauthn-* only: base64url authenticatorData from the assertion

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.17.0

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the read-only, non-destructive, open-world profile, so the description's job is to add semantics — and it does: it defines 'trusted' as a conjunction, explains that quipu reads the store-recorded signing time which 'the signer cannot choose', and discloses that caller-supplied instants force trusted=false. The one gap is that it never describes the overall response shape or failure modes (e.g. what a malformed signature returns).

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

It is front-loaded with the core definition, then the recommended call pattern, then the what-if caveat — a sensible order. The prose is dense and jargon-heavy ('signing-plane S1', 'conjunction', 'what-if') with long compound sentences, which costs some readability but no sentence is filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 13-parameter cryptographic verification tool with no output schema, the description carries the key conceptual load: what trusted means, how as_of is chosen, and where the what-if answer appears. It leaves the full return payload undocumented, which is a real gap given there is no output schema, but the decision-critical fields are covered.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description earns more by adding decision-level meaning the schema lacks: the 'verdict' IRI is declared the preferred path because the recorded instant is not signer-controllable, and 'as_of.basis' is explained as reporting which instant was used (recorded | caller-supplied | now). That reframes the what-if parameters from neutral inputs into a mode switch an agent must choose deliberately.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource ('Verify a signed Verdict against the root of trust') and defines the exact semantics of a positive result ('the signature must be valid under a key registered to the verifier at that instant, AND that same registration must authorize the predicate'). It implicitly distinguishes itself from quipu_verifier_authorized by covering signature + registration + predicate authorization as a conjunction, but it never names that sibling, so an agent must infer the boundary.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives concrete routing guidance between the two calling modes: 'Pass verdict ... for a trust decision' versus caller-supplied signed_at/tx being 'a what-if'. The consequence of each mode is spelled out (trusted always false for what-if, answer in would_verify_as_of_supplied_instant). It stops short of naming sibling tools or stating when not to use this tool at all.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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