SentryFrogg MCP Server
Provides tools for executing parameterized SQL queries, catalog discovery, CRUD operations, and connection management with TLS support for PostgreSQL databases.
Click on "Install Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@SentryFrogg MCP Servershow tables in profile mydb"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
SentryFrogg MCP Server v4.2.0
Document Profile
Field | Value |
Product | SentryFrogg MCP Server |
Version | 4.2.0 |
Runtime | Node.js ≥ 16 |
Interfaces | Model Context Protocol (PostgreSQL · SSH · HTTP) |
License | MIT |
Related MCP server: cryptofort
Executive Synopsis
SentryFrogg MCP Server supplies a governed command plane for MCP-compatible agents that operate data platforms, remote shells and web services. The implementation prioritises deterministic behaviour, encrypted credential storage and prescriptive workflows so that autonomous agents can execute infrastructure tasks with enterprise auditability.
Functional Surface
Capability | Detail |
PostgreSQL control | Parameterised SQL, catalog discovery, CRUD helpers, mutual TLS, connection profiling. |
SSH execution | Serial command dispatch per profile, password/key authentication, reachability diagnostics. |
HTTP access | REST verbs with JSON payloads, health checks, programmable headers and bearer tokens. |
Secret vault | AES-256 encrypted profiles persisted in |
Telemetry | Tool-level statistics via |
System Components
Component | Scope |
| MCP entry point, tool catalogue, lifecycle supervision. |
| Service registration, dependency wiring, resource cleanup. |
| SQL execution, profile validation, TLS configuration, pool management. |
| SSH sessions, sequential execution enforcement, profile hygiene. |
| HTTP invocation, header synthesis, response shaping. |
| Encrypted persistence and retrieval of profile objects. |
| Key lifecycle, cryptographic primitives, payload size guards. |
| Canonical validation for incoming payloads. |
MCP Tools
mcp_psql_manager
Attribute | Specification |
Required flow |
|
Actions |
|
Credentials | Either discrete fields ( |
TLS options |
|
Query rules |
|
Response format | JSON with |
Rejection triggers | Missing profile, malformed SQL, payload limits exceeded, invalid TLS configuration. |
mcp_ssh_manager
Attribute | Specification |
Required flow |
|
Actions |
|
Execution model | Commands trimmed and length-limited; pipes/redirects permitted; per-profile execution is strictly sequential. |
Outputs | JSON containing |
Security posture | Secrets encrypted at rest; no templating—agents must supply fully qualified commands. |
mcp_api_client
Attribute | Specification |
Actions |
|
Inputs |
|
Behaviour | Local and private addresses allowed; HTTP status/body returned in structured JSON; transport or parsing failures emit MCP internal errors. |
Profile Lifecycle
Invoke
setup_profileto persist credentials and TLS artefacts; secrets encrypt with AES-256 using.mcp_profiles.key(0600permissions).Reference the same
profile_namefor subsequent operations; omitted sensitive fields inherit stored encrypted values.Rotate credentials by reissuing
setup_profile; the latest payload supersedes previous entries.Audit existing profiles via
list_profiles; responses never disclose secrets.Retire unused profiles by editing
profiles.jsonunder change control.
TLS Configuration Guidance
Prefer embedding
sslmodedirectives inconnection_url; explicit payload fields override URL parameters.Keep
ssl_reject_unauthorizedattrueunless communicating with trusted self-signed endpoints.Provide
ssl_servernamewhenever certificate CN/SAN mismatches the host.Supply PEM blocks as single-line strings using
\nescape sequences; leading/trailing spaces are disallowed.ssl_passphrasemust be non-empty if provided; omit otherwise.
Installation and Operations
Task | Command |
Clone and install |
|
Syntax check |
|
Launch (stdio) |
|
Update dependencies |
|
Reset profile store | Remove |
Security & Compliance
Encryption key lifecycle:
.mcp_profiles.keygenerated on first run; override viaENCRYPTION_KEYfor coordinated environments.Secret exposure: MCP responses never include decrypted values; rotation requires explicit
setup_profile.Input governance: SQL statements, SSH commands and HTTP payloads are length-limited; oversized inputs are rejected pre-execution.
Audit trail: stderr logging captures timestamped events per tool to support collection by SIEM platforms.
Dependency governance: locked versions of
pg,ssh2,node-fetch,@modelcontextprotocol/sdk; monitor advisories for patch cadence.
Troubleshooting Matrix
Symptom | Diagnostic Actions | Remediation |
PostgreSQL TLS failure | Inspect | Update TLS materials; rerun |
SSH command hang | Validate command length, ensure non-interactive execution, check remote prompts. | Adjust command or script; rerun |
HTTP error response | Review returned status/body, verify | Correct payload; retry request. |
Missing profile | Execute | Recreate via |
Change History Reference
Consult CHANGELOG.md for a dated record of functional and operational updates, including TLS support and renaming.
Contribution & Support
Submit changes through pull requests accompanied by verification evidence (
npm run check).Never commit
.mcp_profiles.keyor environment-specific secrets.Use maintainer contact information in
package.jsonfor escalation or integration assistance.
Available Tools
3 toolsmcp_api_clientA
HTTP caller. Fields: action ∈ {get, post, put, delete, patch, check_api}, url (required), data (JSON body for mutating verbs), headers (string map), auth_token (prefixed into Authorization unless headers.Authorization supplied). Local URLs allowed. Responses are structured results or MCP errors.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | Yes | ||
| url | No | ||
| data | No | ||
| headers | No | ||
| auth_token | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description discloses key behaviors: auth_token is prefixed into Authorization header unless overridden, local URLs are allowed, and responses are structured results or MCP errors. However, it lacks disclosures about potential risks (e.g., local URL access), rate limits, or idempotency of actions.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is very concise: two sentences that front-load the purpose ('HTTP caller') and efficiently explain all parameters and behaviors without unnecessary words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description covers all parameters and key behaviors, and mentions response format ('structured results or MCP errors'). However, without an output schema, more detail on response structure would improve completeness.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
With 0% schema description coverage, the description fully compensates by explaining all five parameters: action enum, url requirement, data for mutating verbs, headers as string map, and auth_token behavior. This adds significant meaning beyond the bare schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states it is an HTTP caller, lists all six supported actions (get, post, put, delete, patch, check_api), and specifies that it makes HTTP requests. It is distinct from sibling tools (database and SSH managers) by focusing on HTTP calls.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage for making HTTP requests by explicitly detailing action verbs and parameters. However, it does not provide explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidance, though the sibling tools are sufficiently different that confusion is unlikely.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
mcp_psql_managerB
PostgreSQL toolchain. Flow: setup_profile → action. setup_profile accepts credentials or connection_url plus optional TLS (ssl_mode, ssl_ca, ssl_cert, ssl_key, ssl_passphrase, ssl_servername, ssl_reject_unauthorized); secrets stored encrypted. Subsequent calls reuse profile_name: quick_query (adds LIMIT 100 if absent; supports params array for $ placeholders), show_tables, describe_table, sample_data, database_info, insert_data, update_data, delete_data, list_profiles.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | Yes | ||
| profile_name | No | Profile name (defaults to 'default') | |
| connection_url | No | postgres://user:pass@host:port/db url | |
| host | No | ||
| port | No | ||
| username | No | ||
| password | No | ||
| database | No | ||
| ssl | No | ||
| ssl_mode | No | disable | require | verify-ca | verify-full | |
| ssl_ca | No | PEM encoded certificate authority chain | |
| ssl_cert | No | PEM encoded client certificate | |
| ssl_key | No | PEM encoded client private key | |
| ssl_passphrase | No | Optional passphrase for the private key | |
| ssl_servername | No | Override servername for TLS verification | |
| ssl_reject_unauthorized | No | Set to false to trust self-signed certificates | |
| sql | No | ||
| params | No | ||
| table_name | No | ||
| data | No | ||
| where | No | ||
| limit | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description must cover behavioral traits. It includes key details like secret encryption and the automatic LIMIT 100 addition in quick_query. However, it does not disclose the nature of mutating actions (insert, update, delete) as potentially destructive or reversible, nor does it mention error handling or concurrency.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single dense paragraph that front-loads the key flow but then delves into setup_profile parameter details. It could be more structured (e.g., bullet points for actions) without being overly verbose. It is concise but at the cost of clarity.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's complexity (22 parameters, many actions, no output schema), the description provides a reasonable overview including the flow and key behaviors. However, it lacks information on return values for each action and has gaps in parameter explanations, making it adequate but not complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The description adds meaning beyond the input schema for some parameters, such as the params array for $ placeholders and the automatic LIMIT in quick_query. However, with only 41% schema description coverage, many parameters remain unexplained. The description partially compensates but not fully.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states it is a PostgreSQL toolchain and lists the specific actions available, distinguishing it from sibling tools (API client, SSH manager) by domain. The purpose is well-defined with a clear flow: setup_profile then action.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explains the required flow (setup_profile first), which implies usage guidance, but does not explicitly state when not to use this tool or provide comparisons to alternatives. For example, it does not advise against using destructive actions without caution.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
mcp_ssh_managerA
SSH executor. setup_profile stores host credentials (password or PEM private_key with optional passphrase); data encrypted. list_profiles enumerates profiles, system_info returns collected facts, check_host validates reachability, execute runs one trimmed command (pipes/redirects allowed) sequentially per profile; no concurrent runs.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | Yes | ||
| profile_name | No | Profile name (defaults to 'default') | |
| host | No | ||
| port | No | ||
| username | No | ||
| password | No | ||
| private_key | No | PEM encoded private key | |
| passphrase | No | ||
| ready_timeout | No | ||
| keepalive_interval | No | ||
| command | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description discloses key behaviors: data encryption for credentials, sequential per-profile execution, and no concurrency. With no annotations provided, this is adequate but lacks details on error handling, return values, or auth requirements.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is relatively concise but poorly structured, appearing as a run-on sentence listing actions. It could be improved with bullet points or clearer separation of action descriptions.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's complexity (11 parameters, no output schema), the description lacks essential details about host/port/timeout parameters and return values. It covers actions but not the full parameter context needed for correct invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is low (18%). The description adds meaning for a few parameters (password, private_key, passphrase in setup_profile) but fails to describe host, port, username, timeouts, etc. It does not sufficiently compensate for the low schema coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states it is an 'SSH executor' and lists specific actions (setup_profile, list_profiles, execute, system_info, check_host), distinguishing it from sibling tools mcp_api_client and mcp_psql_manager which serve different purposes.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear context for each action, including constraints like sequential execution and no concurrent runs. However, it does not explicitly state when to use this tool versus alternatives or when not to use it.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
TDQS
Each tool targets a completely distinct domain: HTTP API calls, PostgreSQL database management, and SSH remote execution. There is no overlap in purpose or functionality, so an agent can clearly differentiate them.
All tool names follow the pattern 'mcp_<domain>_<role>' (e.g., mcp_api_client, mcp_psql_manager, mcp_ssh_manager), using consistent snake_case and a descriptive prefix. The variation between 'client' and 'manager' is appropriate for their roles.
With only three tools, the server covers three broad areas (API, database, SSH). While each tool is rich in sub-actions, the raw count is at the low end of the range, making it borderline but acceptable for a general-purpose server.
Within the declared domains, the tools provide comprehensive coverage: HTTP client supports all methods, PostgreSQL manager includes full CRUD and schema inspection, SSH manager handles command execution and system info. Minor gaps like bulk operations exist but do not hinder core workflows.
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