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Web Injection Probe

web_injection_probe
Destructive

Probe one URL parameter for open redirect, CRLF, LFI, XXE, or HPP injection. Optionally generate WAF-regex bypass payloads to reveal hidden vulnerabilities.

Instructions

[EXPLOIT — requires human approval] Detect open redirect, CRLF, LFI, XXE or HPP in one parameter.

target is the full URL carrying the parameter to test (one parameter — & is refused project-wide). parameter names it. bug_class is one of open-redirect, crlf, lfi, xxe, hpp.

regex_bypass expands the class's payload set with generated WAF-regex bypass variants (every mode x every encoding, bounded at 500): a WAF regex that blocks the textbook ../ or <script> often lets the same byte through when written as %2e%2e/ or split by a metachar replacement. It multiplies the request count and is strictly a second pass — run the plain probe first and reach for this only when a parameter reflects but nothing fires.

Every result is a CANDIDATE: the class signature must appear in the injected response and not in the baseline request. Nothing is confirmed here.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
targetYes
bug_classNoopen-redirect
parameterYes
regex_bypassNo

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

  1. First observedv2.1.0

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description goes beyond the original annotations by explaining that it sends injected payloads, compares responses to baseline, and returns only candidates (not confirmations). It also discloses that regex_bypass multiplies request count and is strictly a second pass. The destructiveHint annotation is reinforced by the 'requires human approval' note, providing a coherent picture of the tool's behavior without contradiction.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is moderately long but well-structured: the purpose is front-loaded, followed by parameter clarifications, then regex_bypass guidance, then result interpretation. Each sentence serves a distinct function, and there is no redundant or filler content. The formatting with line breaks improves readability.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's complexity (4 parameters, enums, no output schema provided), the description covers the essential context: what it detects, how the detection works (signature in response vs baseline), when to use regex_bypass, and the candidate-only nature. It does not mention authentication, rate limits, or side effects beyond injection, but the 'requires human approval' and destructiveHint annotation already cover safety. The absence of explicit output schema is acceptable as the description explains result semantics.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema provides only types and an enum, with no per-parameter descriptions. The description fills this gap completely: it explains target as the full URL carrying the parameter, parameter as the name, bug_class as one of five enumerated values, and regex_bypass as a boolean that expands payloads with WAF bypass variants (bounded at 500). This gives the agent all necessary semantic understanding.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool's action (detect) and resource (injection types in one parameter), listing specific bug classes: open redirect, CRLF, LFI, XXE, HPP. This distinguishes it from sibling probes like cmdi_probe, sqli_validate, or xss_validate, which target other vulnerability classes. The 'requires human approval' note adds important context without obscuring the purpose.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides actionable usage guidance: 'run the plain probe first and reach for this only when a parameter reflects but nothing fires' for the regex_bypass option. It also defines when the tool is appropriate (detecting the listed injection types) and notes the candidate-only nature of results. However, it does not explicitly compare to sibling injection probes or state when not to use this tool in favor of others, though the purpose listing implicitly covers this.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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