PMCP
PMCP is a gateway that discovers, provisions, invokes, and manages downstream MCP servers and native CLIs without loading all tool schemas upfront.
Search and recommend tools, servers, CLIs, and registry packages via
gateway.catalog_search,gateway.request_capability, andgateway.search_registry.Inspect full tool schemas and invoke downstream tools with argument validation, truncation, redaction, timeouts, and trace metadata via
gateway.describeandgateway.invoke.Provision, connect, disconnect, restart, update, and register MCP servers from manifests or the registry via
gateway.provision,gateway.provision_status,gateway.connect_server,gateway.disconnect_server,gateway.restart_server,gateway.update_server, andgateway.register_discovered_server.Store credentials or acknowledge URL elicitation for downstream servers via
gateway.auth_connect.Read and manage startup policy/config via
gateway.config_status,gateway.get_startup_policy, andgateway.set_startup_policy.Monitor, cancel, and fetch results for pending requests and downstream MCP tasks via
gateway.list_pending,gateway.cancel,gateway.tasks_list,gateway.tasks_get,gateway.tasks_cancel, andgateway.tasks_result.Detect platform/available CLIs and check gateway/server health via
gateway.sync_environmentandgateway.health.Reload backend configs and reconnect servers via
gateway.refresh.Submit technical feedback for PMCP issues via
gateway.submit_feedback.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@PMCPfind a tool to get GitHub issues for a repository"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
PMCP - Progressive MCP
A gateway that lets your AI coding assistant use dozens of external tools without loading them all up front.
PMCP sits between your assistant (Claude Code, Codex, and others) and the services it can plug into — GitHub, Jira, databases, 90+ more. Instead of loading every tool's full schema before you've asked a question, it offers a short menu first and fetches the detailed schema only when a tool is actually used.
Why it exists
Assistants reach external services through MCP (Model Context Protocol) — a common interface for an AI to talk to other software. When an assistant connects to a dozen MCP servers directly, it loads all of their tool definitions into context at once.
Context is limited and metered: every tool definition costs tokens and crowds out room for the actual work. Loading 50+ tools you may never call is slow and expensive, and adding a new service usually means restarting the assistant. Anthropic has highlighted context bloat as a key challenge with MCP tooling.
PMCP is the single connection point that keeps this compact and on-demand.
Related MCP server: Caplets
Who it's for
Developers and teams running AI coding assistants with many connected tools — especially anyone hitting "too many tools" or context-full limits.
What you get
Lower token cost — the assistant sees a compact capability card, not 50+ full schemas, before doing real work.
Load tools only when needed — downstream servers stay dormant until first use ("lazy by default"), and eager-start only when listed in
autoStart.Add tools without restarting — provision a new server on demand from a manifest of 90+.
One stable connection — your assistant sees ~26 steady meta-tools instead of a shifting set of many.
Guardrails built in — output size caps and optional secret redaction.
Works out of the box — core capability matching needs no API key.
Quick Start
Installation
# With uv (recommended)
uv pip install pmcp
# Or run directly without installing
uvx pmcp
# With pip
pip install pmcp
Upgrading from 2.x
3.0.0 refuses several things 2.7.3 accepted. Most importantly, a repository's
.mcp.json, .pmcp/manifest.yaml and .mcp-gateway-policy.yaml are ignored
until you approve them with pmcp trust approve <absolute path>.
MIGRATING.md has an upgrade checklist, a section for each
breaking change (with a check, the fix and how to verify it), and how to roll
back. To stay on 2.x for now, pin pmcp<3.
Capability matching is built-in — no API key needed.
gateway.request_capabilityuses a pure-Python matcher that can return direct CLI guidance for installed native tools, MCP server candidates, or registry search guidance.
Configure with pmcp setup
PMCP includes a wizard-style helper that can render ready-to-use MCP client config for Claude and OpenCode.
The generated config only connects your client to the PMCP gateway. Downstream MCP
servers stay lazy until first use unless you add them to autoStart in your
.mcp.json.
Use pmcp setup to print the generated config:
pmcp setup --client claude --mode stdio # Claude local stdio
pmcp setup --client claude --mode http # Claude shared-service HTTP
pmcp setup --client opencode --mode stdio # OpenCode local stdio
pmcp setup --client opencode --mode http # OpenCode shared-service HTTPNamed profiles cover the common modes:
pmcp setup --profile local-stdio
pmcp setup --profile shared-local-http
pmcp setup --profile authenticated-shared-http
pmcp setup --profile ciWrite directly into your client config with --write:
pmcp setup --client claude --mode http --writeWithout --write, pmcp setup prints the config so you can paste it into:
Claude:
~/.mcp.jsonOpenCode:
~/.config/opencode/opencode.json
Use shared-service HTTP mode when running one PMCP service for multiple sessions or clients. Use single-process stdio mode for local testing.
Shared Service Mode (Manual)
If you prefer manual config, point each client to the shared HTTP endpoint:
{
"mcpServers": {
"pmcp": {
"type": "http",
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:3344/mcp"
}
}
}Why this mode: PMCP uses a singleton lock (~/.pmcp/gateway.lock), so multiple local launches can conflict. One shared service avoids lock collisions and keeps tool state consistent.
Shared gateway state:
All clients connected to one PMCP HTTP gateway share downstream server connections, pending requests, provisioned tools, and live lifecycle state.
gateway.refresh(force=true),gateway.disconnect_server(force=true), andgateway.restart_server(force=true)can cancel or interrupt downstream work started by another client using the same gateway.gateway.healthand livepmcp status --verboseshow startup policy observations for downstream servers without exposing secret values.--rate-limit/PMCP_RATE_LIMITapplies per observed source IP on/mcp; localhost clients and reverse-proxied clients can share one bucket unless the proxy preserves distinct client IPs.
Quick verification:
systemctl --user is-active pmcp
curl -sS http://127.0.0.1:3344/health/mcp is POST-only as of 2.0.0 — a bare curl against it returns
405 Method Not Allowed with Allow: POST, DELETE, so use /health for a
liveness check.
Security
HTTP transport is unauthenticated by default. For any non-localhost exposure, choose an HTTP auth mode and terminate TLS in front of PMCP.
shared-secret mode is the backward-compatible single-tenant guard. It accepts
one static bearer value on /mcp:
# Start with bearer auth from the environment
PMCP_AUTH_TOKEN=mysecrettoken pmcp --transport httpAvoid passing production tokens with --auth-token; command-line arguments can
be visible in process listings on shared hosts.
Clients must then include Authorization: Bearer mysecrettoken on /mcp requests.
/health and /metrics remain unauthenticated by design; protect them with
firewall rules, IP allowlists, or reverse-proxy policy before any non-localhost
exposure.
resource-server mode makes PMCP validate Authorization Server issued access
tokens as an OAuth 2.1 Resource Server. Configure the HTTP app with a public
issuer, JWKS URL, resource audience, required scopes, and exact allowed origins:
create_http_app(
mcp_server,
auth_mode="resource-server",
resource_server_issuer="https://issuer.example",
resource_server_jwks_url="https://issuer.example/.well-known/jwks.json",
resource_server_audience="https://pmcp.example/mcp",
resource_server_allowed_algorithms=("RS256", "ES256"),
required_scopes=["pmcp.invoke"],
allowed_origins=["https://app.example"],
)PMCP validates token signature, issuer, expiry, not-before, and audience. The
audience is bound to the configured resource_server_audience (the server's
canonical resource URI, per RFC 8707); it is never derived from the request
Host header. resource-server mode fails closed at startup if the issuer,
JWKS URL, or audience is missing, and resource_server_jwks_url must be an
https URL and is rejected when its host is a non-public IP literal or
localhost (the accepted form is below). Token
signatures are only accepted for the operator-configured
resource_server_allowed_algorithms allowlist (default RS256/ES256); the
token's own alg header is never trusted. JWKS is fetched
asynchronously and cached, so validation never blocks the event loop; an
unreachable JWKS endpoint, or a key set with no usable keys, returns 503
while an invalid token returns 401. Each JWKS fetch has a 5 s total timeout,
and a failed fetch opens a 5 s backoff shared by the requests waiting on it. A
token with an unknown kid forces at most one refresh per 10 s; others in that
window are checked against the cached keys. The resource published at
/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource is the configured
resource_server_audience, or, when that is unset, the origin of the configured
protected-resource metadata URL plus /mcp, with a scheme-default port such as
:443 dropped. A path prefix in the metadata URL is not carried over: PMCP
serves MCP at /mcp on the address it listens on, and that is the public URL
only when nothing in front of PMCP rewrites the path. Behind a reverse proxy
that strips a path prefix (for example nginx
location /pmcp/ { proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:3344/; }), MCP's public URL
is https://<host>/pmcp/mcp; set --oauth-audience to that URL so the token
audience names it. That is all a pmcp CLI deployment needs: the CLI does
not publish protected-resource metadata, so it serves no metadata route.
The metadata URL is a create_http_app parameter
(protected_resource_metadata_url) for applications that embed PMCP. There,
set resource_server_audience to the public MCP URL as well, so the published
resource names it, and pick a metadata URL whose path reaches PMCP
unchanged: PMCP serves the metadata at the URL's literal path, so
https://<host>/pmcp/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource behind that proxy
arrives as /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource and returns 404
(Consiliency/pmcp#334
tracks that case). Use the
RFC 9728 form for a resource with a path,
https://<host>/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/pmcp/mcp, and forward
that path to PMCP unchanged. An application that mounts PMCP under a
root_path must route that path to the mounted app as well: mounted at
/pmcp, it answers at /pmcp/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/pmcp/mcp,
not at the URL's own path. The resource is never taken from the request
Host. A forged token, including one whose algorithm does not match the
published key's type, gets 401, never 500. In resource-server mode over
HTTP, PMCP refuses to start, with a one-line error, if the JWKS URL
(--oauth-jwks-url, PMCP_OAUTH_JWKS_URL or resource_server_jwks_url) is
not an accepted auth URL, or if a required scope is not a single RFC 6749
scope (printable ASCII with no space, quote or backslash; --required-scope
and PMCP_REQUIRED_SCOPES alike), so every 401/403/503 it later sends
can be built. The CLI takes no metadata URL. An application that embeds
PMCP and passes protected_resource_metadata_url to create_http_app gets
the same refusal for that URL, in any auth mode; such a URL used to be
dropped, with the metadata route silently omitted.
An auth URL is accepted only if it is an absolute https:// URL whose port,
if it has one, is a number no greater than 65535, and whose host is in
canonical form -- a DNS name of dot-separated labels of 1 to 63 ASCII
letters, digits and hyphens, each starting and ending with a letter or
digit, the last starting with a letter, so never a number (an IDN in its xn-- form); a
dotted-quad IPv4 address with no leading zeros; or a bracketed IPv6 address
with no zone id -- and is a public address or a name other than
localhost. An IPv6 address that embeds an IPv4 address (IPv4-mapped,
IPv4-translated, IPv4-compatible, NAT64, ISATAP, 6to4, Teredo) must be
public on the embedded address too; the local-use NAT64 prefix
64:ff9b:1::/48 is refused. Because ISATAP is recognised by its interface
id, an address whose interface id is ISATAP-shaped and embeds a non-public
IPv4 address is refused even under a global prefix: [2606:4700::5efe:a00:5]
(10.0.0.5) is refused, as it was before, while [2606:4700::5efe:808:808]
is accepted. A host in any other spelling is refused rather
than rewritten, because the HTTP client and a browser would rewrite it
first: https://127.0.0.1/ (full-width digits), 127。0。0。1, full-width
localhost, 127%2E0%2E0%2E1, 127.0.0.1. (trailing dot), legacy numeric
and octal forms such as 2130706433 or 0177.0.0.1, 127.000.0.1,
example.123, -a.example.com, [v1.fe] and [fe80::1%25eth0] are all
refused, as are bücher.example (write xn--bcher-kva.example),
underscores and empty labels. PMCP strips leading spaces and C0 control
characters, and trailing tabs, CRs and LFs, and nothing else; any control
character (U+0000 to U+001F, or DEL) left after that strip is refused, a
backslash is refused anywhere in the URL, and, for a JWKS or metadata URL,
so is any whitespace character (anything Python's str.isspace matches,
so a trailing space, a no-break space or U+2028 too). A DNS name is not
resolved (see below), and only the exact name localhost is treated as
loopback: *.localhost is a name like any other and passes unresolved.
Userinfo such as user:pass@ is accepted and dropped. Everything else is
refused, including plain http:// to any host, loopback hosts too, and
https:// to localhost or a loopback address. (Plain http:// to
localhost, 127.0.0.0/8, [::1] or [::ffff:127.x.y.z] is accepted in
one place only: a URL the operator types into gateway.auth_connect.) For
example, as a JWKS URL or a metadata URL:
URL | Result |
| accepted |
| accepted |
| accepted |
| accepted (userinfo dropped) |
| refused: plain http |
| refused: plain http |
| refused: plain http |
| refused: non-public host |
| refused: non-public host |
| refused: non-public host |
| refused: not an absolute http(s) URL |
| refused: not an absolute http(s) URL |
| refused: invalid URL |
| refused: whitespace |
| accepted |
| refused: host not in canonical form |
| refused: host not in canonical form |
| refused: host not in canonical form |
| refused: host not in canonical form |
| refused: host not in canonical form |
| refused: host not in canonical form |
| refused: host not in canonical form |
| refused: host not in canonical form |
| refused: non-public host |
| refused: backslash |
In public auth metadata URLs it rejects hosts written as non-public IP
literals — private, CGNAT, link-local, loopback, multicast, site-local, and
unspecified — including IPv4 addresses embedded in IPv6 literals and legacy
numeric forms such as 2852039166. This is a filter on literals only: a DNS
name is accepted without being resolved, so a name that points at an
internal address still passes. PMCP therefore no longer presents such a URL as
one it checked: a server-supplied URL is relayed unverified and presented as
such — UrlElicitationInfo.url_verified, AuthMetadataInfo.verified_urls,
and AuthChallengeInfo.resource_metadata_url_verified all default to
unverified, and the caveat is carried in the next_step an agent follows and in
CLI output. Where PMCP fetches a URL itself it fails closed instead, requiring
a verified public literal
(Consiliency/pmcp#211). PMCP is still not an
Authorization Server and does not provide dynamic client registration, SSO,
RBAC, billing, or a complete multi-tenant identity service.
Auth mode and OAuth resource-server parameters are configurable from the CLI or environment (CLI flags take precedence; env values are read only when the flag is unset):
Flag | Env var | Purpose |
|
| Select the HTTP auth mode. When unset, PMCP infers |
|
| Authorization Server issuer (resource-server mode). |
|
| Public |
|
| Canonical resource audience, RFC 8707 (resource-server mode). |
|
| Scopes every token must present. |
|
| Browser Origins permitted on |
Origin and Host posture (DNS-rebinding defense). The Origin check runs by
default in every auth mode, even when no --allowed-origin is configured: a
request carrying a browser Origin header is rejected with 403 unless the
origin is loopback, same-origin with the request Host, or explicitly
allow-listed. Requests with no Origin header — the normal case for
non-browser MCP clients — always pass. Configuring --allowed-origin (or
PMCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS) additionally turns on Host-header validation: the
request Host must be loopback or one of the hosts derived from the configured
origins and the gateway's own canonical resource host (--oauth-audience /
protected-resource metadata URL); other Hosts get 403. Host validation stays
off by default so that reverse-proxy deployments that forward an arbitrary
public Host keep working; if you enable it behind a proxy, make sure your
gateway's public hostname is reachable through the configured origins or
audience so the proxied Host is accepted.
Assumptions and trust model:
PMCP binds to
127.0.0.1by default — not safe to expose publicly without an HTTP auth mode (PMCP_AUTH_TOKENforshared-secret, orresource-server).User-scoped and explicitly configured sources (
~/.mcp.json, an explicit--config, an explicit--policy) are trusted inputs — treat them like code. A project-scoped.mcp.json,.pmcp/manifest.yamlor.mcp-gateway-policy.yamlchecked into a repository is not trusted until you approve it withpmcp trust approve <absolute path>; until then it is ignored, and approval is keyed to the file's exact bytes, so editing an approved file revokes the approval. See the v13 trust boundary section ofSECURITY.mdfor the full model.Secrets you export in the shell that starts PMCP are inherited by child MCP server processes; protect them accordingly. Keys that PMCP itself loads from a project
.envor.env.pmcpare not propagated to spawned servers — only a server's own declared credential is — so a repository's.envcannot bleed into every downstream server.
Production background service (Linux systemd):
# ~/.config/systemd/user/pmcp.service
[Unit]
Description=PMCP MCP Gateway
[Service]
Environment=PMCP_AUTH_TOKEN=replace-with-secret-token
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/pmcp --transport http
Restart=on-failure
[Install]
WantedBy=default.targetsystemctl --user enable --now pmcpOr with nohup:
cd ~ && PMCP_AUTH_TOKEN=replace-with-secret-token nohup pmcp --transport http > /dev/null 2>&1 &The gateway writes its own log to .pmcp/logs/gateway.log relative to its
working directory (rotated at 1 MB, 5 backups), so started from ~ as above —
or as a systemd user service, whose working directory is your home — it lands
in ~/.pmcp/logs/gateway.log. Don't redirect stderr onto that same file: every
line would be written twice.
TLS / Reverse Proxy
PMCP's HTTP transport is plaintext. For any exposure beyond localhost, terminate TLS at a
reverse proxy and forward to 127.0.0.1:3344. Keep --host 127.0.0.1 (the default) so PMCP
only listens on the loopback interface.
Nginx (/etc/nginx/sites-available/pmcp):
server {
listen 443 ssl;
server_name pmcp.example.com;
ssl_certificate /etc/letsencrypt/live/pmcp.example.com/fullchain.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /etc/letsencrypt/live/pmcp.example.com/privkey.pem;
location / {
proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:3344;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Connection "";
}
}Caddy (Caddyfile):
pmcp.example.com {
reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:3344
}Caddy handles TLS automatically via Let's Encrypt.
Other MCP Clients
PMCP works with any MCP-compatible client. Below are configuration examples for popular clients.
Codex CLI
Add to ~/.codex/config.toml (verify in the Codex documentation):
[mcp_servers.pmcp]
command = "pmcp"
args = []Gemini CLI
Add to ~/.gemini/settings.json (verify in the Gemini CLI documentation):
{
"mcpServers": {
"pmcp": {
"command": "pmcp",
"args": []
}
}
}Note: Configuration paths and formats vary by client. Verify the exact location and format in each client's official documentation.
Your First Interaction
You: "Take a screenshot of google.com"
Claude uses: gateway.invoke {
tool_id: "playwright::browser_navigate",
arguments: { url: "https://google.com" }
}
// Then: gateway.invoke { tool_id: "playwright::browser_take_screenshot" }
Returns: Screenshot of google.comArchitecture
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Claude Code │
│ Only connects to PMCP (single server in config) │
└────────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ PMCP │
│ • 26 meta-tools (catalog, invoke, tasks, config, etc.) │
│ • Progressive disclosure (compact cards → full schemas) │
│ • Policy enforcement (allow/deny lists) │
└────────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────┘
│
┌────────────────────┼────────────────────┐
▼ ▼ ▼
┌───────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐
│ Explicit │ │ Manifest │ │ Custom Servers │
│ autoStart │ │ (90+ servers │ │ (your own MCP │
│ servers │ │ on-demand) │ │ servers) │
└───────────────┘ └─────────────────┘ └─────────────────┘Key principle: Users configure ONLY pmcp in Claude Code.
The gateway discovers and manages all other servers.
Why Single-Gateway?
No context bloat - Claude sees 26 tools, not 50+
No restarts - Provision new servers without restarting Claude Code
Consistent interface - All tools accessed via
gateway.invokePolicy control - Centralized allow/deny rules
Gateway Tools
The gateway exposes 26 meta-tools organized into four categories:
Tool annotations are preserved as untrusted hints only; policy and safety notes
continue to use PMCP's own risk model. When a tool schema omits $schema, PMCP
reports the JSON Schema dialect as https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema.
See SPEC_COMPLIANCE.md for the current MCP specification
compliance matrix and next-revision tracking checklist.
Core Tools
Tool | Purpose |
| Search available tools, returns compact capability cards with small metadata such as title, icons, execution hints, and schema dialect, plus additive compact CLI hints, registry candidates, and (with |
| Get detailed schema and richer metadata for a specific tool, including output schema, annotations, execution/task support, icons, and schema dialect |
| Call a downstream tool with argument validation, including task-augmented execution for task-capable tools |
| Reload backend configs and reconnect; refuses while requests or active MCP tasks are pending unless |
| Get gateway and server health status |
| Read effective config and startup/auth status with source attribution |
| Read persisted |
| Preview or explicitly apply |
Lifecycle Tools
Tool | Purpose |
| Connect or start a known configured, manifest/provisioned, or registered discovered server |
| Runtime-stop a server without editing |
| Runtime-stop then reconnect a server without changing persistent config |
Capability Discovery Tools
Tool | Purpose |
| Natural language capability matching that can return direct CLI guidance or MCP server candidates |
| Detect platform and available CLIs |
| Install and start MCP servers on-demand |
| Update an MCP server package and reconnect it |
| Store API-key credentials or acknowledge URL-mode elicitation and retry provisioning |
| Preview/submit technical PMCP feedback issues to GitHub |
| Check installation progress |
| Search the cached public MCP Registry metadata for external servers |
| Register a registry result for provisioning, pinned to its resolved npm version; provisioning needs operator approval (see Discovered packages) |
Monitoring Tools
Tool | Purpose |
| List pending tool invocations with health status |
| Cancel a pending tool invocation |
| List brokered downstream MCP tasks by opaque task ID |
| Get current status for one downstream MCP task |
| Fetch and process a downstream MCP task result |
| Cancel a downstream MCP task |
gateway.refresh is intentionally conservative in shared-service mode. If a
downstream request or active MCP task is in flight, refresh returns ok=false
without disconnecting or reconnecting servers. Use gateway.list_pending to
inspect active PMCP request IDs and gateway.tasks_list to inspect downstream
MCP task IDs, then retry with force=true only when cancelling that work is
acceptable.
gateway.disconnect_server and gateway.restart_server follow the same
shared-service disruption policy for the target server: they refuse while that
server has pending requests or active MCP tasks unless force=true. With
force=true, only pending requests and active tasks for the named server are
cancelled. These controls are runtime-only; they free local resources and update
live gateway state, but they do not edit .mcp.json, remove server definitions,
or change autoStart. In HTTP shared service mode, stopping or restarting a
downstream server can affect other clients using the same PMCP gateway.
MCP task IDs are downstream server identifiers and remain distinct from PMCP
pending request IDs such as server::local_id. Use gateway.cancel only for
PMCP request IDs from gateway.list_pending; use gateway.tasks_cancel for MCP
task IDs. Task records are transient in-memory gateway state. PMCP can bind
visibility to the server and requestor context it observes, but unauthenticated
local transports cannot provide cross-user authorization isolation.
Auth And Elicitation
PMCP reports downstream authorization as structured, non-secret state. Gateway
outputs and health rows may include auth_state values of none,
missing_auth, insufficient_scope, elicitation_required, policy_denied, or
unknown, plus optional next_step, auth_methods, scope names, sanitized
metadata URLs, and URL-mode elicitation summaries.
Supported flows:
Local API-key servers continue to use env-store credentials. When
gateway.provisionreportsauth_state="missing_auth"andauth_mode="api_key", callgateway.auth_connectwith a credential and PMCP stores it in the selected user or project env file. User scope writes~/.config/pmcp/pmcp.env; project scope writes<project>/.env.pmcp. Project scope is useful for local development and CI workspaces, while user scope is better for credentials that should follow one operator across projects.Remote bearer headers use env placeholders such as
Authorization: Bearer ${REMOTE_API_TOKEN}. PMCP resolves placeholders from process env, project env-store, and user env-store values, but status, doctor, health, and feedback output only show required or missing env var names, not the resolved header value.A tenant-scoped header resolver exists for applications that embed PMCP: it reads only
<project>/.pmcp/tenants/<tenant_id>/pmcp.envand reports missing env var names without printing header values. The gateway's own remote connections never select a tenant, and no config key, flag or env var turns tenant mode on (see Consiliency/pmcp#353).Remote authorization discovery is diagnostic-only. PMCP can preserve and report OAuth Protected Resource Metadata, Authorization Server Metadata, OpenID Connect discovery, Client ID Metadata Document URLs, and declared scopes when a server or
WWW-Authenticatechallenge provides them.URL-mode elicitation is out of band. PMCP returns a sanitized URL and
elicitation_id; complete that URL flow outside PMCP, then acknowledge it withgateway.auth_connect(auth_mode="url_elicitation", elicitation_id=..., consent_acknowledged=true).
PMCP is not an authorization server and does not implement enterprise SSO, Cross-App Access, DPoP, workload identity federation, or third-party refresh token storage. Do not paste OAuth codes or third-party credentials into URL-mode gateway calls.
Subordinate MCP Updates
gateway.update_serveris the phase-1 update path for subordinate MCPs.pmcp update <server>andpmcp update --allcall the same gateway update workflow.Update information is reported on request by
gateway.update_server; the gateway does not volunteer unprompted "update available" notices. It cannot observe which package version a running server is actually executing, so a volunteered notice could be wrong in either direction (Consiliency/pmcp#150).npm package identity comes from npm's own parser, or not at all. For an
npx/npmserver the gateway asks the host npm's ownnopt, config definitions andnpm-package-argwhich package that command line would run, and refuses rather than guess when anything could redirect resolution — acwdinside a node project, annpm_config_*variable in the server's env or the gateway's own, or any flag beyond--yes/--package. A refused server keeps working; it just loses auto-update and version reporting, and refreshes its cached descriptions every cycle. Where node is not installed the gateway falls back to its own flag tables, which is the pre-2.5.2 behaviour (Consiliency/pmcp#195).
The environment across the update's probe window. gateway.update_server
probes for a new package version and then re-resolves the server config before
restarting anything. Two different kinds of environment change behave
differently across that window, and they are not one rule:
A config-driven change is refused. That means anything resolved into the server's
env— which includes every manifest credential, since a manifest credential is resolved into the server config at load time. If it changes while the probe is running,update_serverreturnsok=Falseand does not restart: the package is fetched but not activated, and no version is recorded. The guarantee is that the config restarted onto is the config that was probed (Consiliency/pmcp#151). Your change is not lost — rotate a credential mid-update and it applies on the next update, rather than to a process that was probed with the old value.A genuinely ambient variable — one set in the gateway's own environment rather than in a server's config — is live at spawn. It can never cause a refusal (both sides of the check derive from the same base environment, so an ambient change affects them equally and cancels out), and the restarted server receives the value in force when it is spawned, not the one in force when the update began. This is the same behaviour as
gateway.connect_server,gateway.refreshand auto-reconnect: every spawn path reads the ambient environment at spawn time.
Freezing the ambient environment across an update is deliberately not done (Consiliency/pmcp#162).
Feedback Telemetry
PMCP can emit failure feedback hints and generate GitHub issue payload previews for agents.
Telemetry is technical-only and warns before submission; payloads include PMCP/tool context.
Disable permanently with
pmcp guidance --telemetry off.
Preview is the default; posting is opt-in. gateway.submit_feedback builds the
exact issue payload and a browser URL an operator can open. PMCP posts nothing
itself unless both of the following are true, and it never spawns gh:
The operator has allowed it.
pmcp guidance --feedback-submission onsetsguidance.enable_feedback_submission: truein~/.claude/gateway-guidance.yaml. It is off by default,pmcp guidance --feedback-submission offturns it back off, andpmcp guidanceshows the current value.enable_telemetry: falseoverrides it: with telemetry off nothing is built or sent at all. An agent'sconfirm_submission=trueis the user's consent to the payload, not the operator's authority to send it, and is not by itself enough to post.The operator has exported a token.
PMCP_FEEDBACK_TOKEN— a dedicated GitHub token with permission to open an issue on the destination repository.GITHUB_TOKENandGH_TOKENare not read on this path.
The token must be exported in the shell that starts pmcp. PMCP refuses a
PMCP_FEEDBACK_TOKEN it introduced into its own environment: one stored through
gateway.auth_connect, one loaded at startup from PMCP's own credential stores
(~/.config/pmcp/pmcp.env, the project .env.pmcp), or one a .env in the current
checkout supplied. The credential that authorises an outbound post has to come from
you, not from something the agent or the repository could have written.
The destination is validated. The default is Consiliency/pmcp, this project's
repository. PMCP_FEEDBACK_REPO overrides it, under the same rule: an override a
checkout's .env introduced is refused, so is one that is not owner/repo shaped,
and a refused destination is never rendered into a URL you are handed to open.
Refusals are loud rather than silent. Each one says what to do — the exact
pmcp guidance command, or the variable to export — and the ones that can still be
acted on by hand return the payload and a browser URL. If PMCP sent a request and
never saw the response, it says so (submission_outcome: "dispatched_unconfirmed")
and hands back a search URL, because the issue may already exist.
Progressive Disclosure Workflow
PMCP follows a progressive disclosure pattern - start with natural language, get recommendations, drill down as needed.
Step 1: Request a Capability
You: "I need to look up library documentation"
gateway.request_capability({ query: "library documentation" })For local work where an installed native CLI is the right surface, PMCP returns compact CLI guidance and does not execute the command:
gateway.request_capability({ query: "git commits", available_clis: ["git"] })Returns:
{
"status": "use_cli",
"message": "Use Bash/direct CLI with 'git'. PMCP is recommending the native command here; it is not executing the command or provisioning an MCP server for this path.",
"cli": {
"name": "git",
"description": "Git version control CLI",
"available": true,
"help_command": ["git", "--help"],
"examples": ["git status --short", "git log --oneline -5"],
"reason": "Matched query against CLI keywords and examples."
},
"recommendation": "Run 'git' directly via Bash/direct CLI. Use gateway.request_capability again only if you need an MCP server."
}After status: "use_cli", use Bash/direct CLI. PMCP stops at guidance here:
it does not execute the command and does not fetch full native help output for
the normal compact path. If PMCP returns server candidates instead, continue
with MCP provisioning, gateway.describe, and gateway.invoke.
Returns:
{
"status": "candidates",
"candidates": [{
"name": "context7",
"candidate_type": "server",
"relevance_score": 0.95,
"is_running": true,
"reasoning": "Context7 provides up-to-date documentation for any package"
}],
"recommendation": "Use context7 - already running"
}Step 2: Search Available Tools
gateway.catalog_search({ query: "documentation" })CLI recommendations are returned separately from MCP tool cards:
gateway.catalog_search({ "query": "git" })Returns:
{
"results": [{
"tool_id": "github::list_issues",
"server": "github",
"tool_name": "list_issues",
"short_description": "List issues in a repository",
"tags": ["github", "git", "search"],
"availability": "online",
"risk_hint": "low"
}],
"total_available": 3,
"truncated": false,
"cli_hints": [{
"name": "git",
"description": "Git version control CLI",
"available": true,
"path": "/usr/bin/git",
"help_command": ["git", "--help"],
"examples": ["git status --short", "git log --oneline -5"],
"reason": "Matched query against CLI name."
}]
}Use cli_hints as recommendations for Bash/direct CLI commands. They are not
MCP tools, do not appear in results, and cannot be passed to
gateway.describe or gateway.invoke. Start with either
gateway.request_capability or gateway.catalog_search; when PMCP returns
use_cli or matching cli_hints, that is enough context to switch to
Bash/direct CLI. Otherwise stay on the MCP path.
Registry-backed matches can appear as registry_candidates in
gateway.catalog_search or as status="candidates" from
gateway.request_capability. They are read-only discovery metadata from the
MCP Registry cache and may include package identifiers, transport, remote
(streamable-http/sse) endpoints for hosted servers, server-card URLs,
protected-resource metadata URLs, authorization-server metadata URLs,
declared scopes, and placeholder header names. Candidates are deduplicated to
the latest published version. PMCP does not install, connect, or pass
credentials for a registry result until you explicitly register and provision
the selected server.
Step 3: Get Tool Details
gateway.describe({ tool_id: "context7::query-docs" })Step 4: Invoke the Tool
gateway.invoke({
tool_id: "context7::query-docs",
arguments: { libraryId: "/facebook/react", query: "useEffect cleanup" }
})Downstream tool names and arguments come from the downstream server, not from
PMCP; the shipped context7 and playwright entries run the latest published
package, so use gateway.describe for the current schema.
Offline Tool Discovery
When using gateway.catalog_search, you can discover tools from servers that haven't started yet:
// Search all tools including offline/lazy servers
gateway.catalog_search({
"query": "browser",
"include_offline": true
})This uses pre-cached tool descriptions from .mcp-gateway/descriptions.yaml,
relative to the gateway's working directory. pmcp refresh writes to .pmcp/
by default, so point it at the directory the gateway reads (see
Consiliency/pmcp#352):
pmcp refresh --cache-dir .mcp-gatewayNote: Cached tools show metadata only. Full schemas are available after the server starts (use gateway.describe to trigger lazy start).
The MCP Registry cache is stored separately, at
$XDG_CACHE_HOME/pmcp/registry-cache.json (~/.cache/pmcp/registry-cache.json
when XDG_CACHE_HOME is unset); PMCP uses the cache when the public registry is
unavailable. Registry candidates can coexist with cached offline tool cards
without changing total_available.
Private registry (debugging, opt-in)
By default PMCP discovers only from the public MCP Registry and surfaces GA-shaped, latest-version entries. Developers debugging their own private MCP servers can opt in with an environment flag (default off):
export PMCP_REGISTRY_ALLOW_PRIVATE=1
export PMCP_REGISTRY_PRIVATE_ENDPOINT=https://registry.internal.example/v0/serversThe opt-in can also be set with a top-level "allowPrivateRegistry": true in
.mcp.json (project, then user, then --config; first one that states it
wins). PMCP_REGISTRY_ALLOW_PRIVATE overrides the config value only when it is
set. The endpoint must be https:// (plain http:// only for localhost or a
loopback address) and must not be a link-local, multicast or unspecified address; otherwise
PMCP logs a warning and uses the public registry.
When enabled, PMCP fetches from the configured private endpoint and tolerates
draft/non-GA server.json schema fields, surfacing all versions (including
non-latest entries) for inspection. This is a debugging aid, not for
production discovery; with the flag off, behavior is unchanged.
Dynamic Server Provisioning
PMCP can install and start MCP servers on-demand from a curated manifest of 90+ servers.
Example: Adding GitHub Support
You: "I need to manage GitHub issues"
gateway.request_capability({ query: "github issues" })Returns (if not already configured):
{
"status": "candidates",
"candidates": [{
"name": "github",
"candidate_type": "server",
"is_running": false,
"requires_api_key": true,
"env_var": "GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN",
"env_instructions": "Create at https://github.com/settings/tokens with repo scope"
}]
}requires_api_key here reflects the effective requirement, not merely
whether the entry declares one — a server whose manifest entry carries
api_key_optional_when and whose named variable is set reports
requires_api_key: false and no auth_connect recommendation, even though
the underlying entry still has requires_api_key: true. See
Private manifest overlay below.
Provisioning
# 1. Set API key (if required)
export GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN=ghp_...
# 2. Provision via gateway
gateway.provision({ server_name: "github" })Optional Eager Startup
Packaged manifest servers do not start automatically. They are lazy by default: PMCP can discover or provision them from the manifest, then connect on first use.
To eagerly start a server every time PMCP starts, list it in top-level
autoStart:
{
"autoStart": ["playwright", "context7"],
"mcpServers": {}
}Common opt-in choices:
Server | Description | API Key |
| Browser automation - navigation, screenshots, DOM inspection | Not required |
| Library documentation lookup - up-to-date docs for any package | Not required |
Startup policy decisions are visible through gateway.health and live
pmcp status --verbose. Health rows keep the existing name, status,
tool_count, and error fields, and may also include:
Field | Meaning |
|
|
| Resolver source such as |
| Machine-readable skip reason such as |
| Required environment variable name for missing-auth skips |
| Machine-readable downstream auth state such as |
| Non-secret suggested next action when an auth state needs operator action |
For persistent administration, use the config tools:
gateway.config_status({})
gateway.get_startup_policy({})
gateway.set_startup_policy({
"operation": "add",
"names": ["playwright"],
"source": "project"
})gateway.set_startup_policy is preview-only by default. To write, select exactly
one source or path and pass both "apply": true and "dry_run": false.
The writer updates only top-level autoStart, preserves unrelated .mcp.json
keys and server definitions, writes atomically, and returns a refresh next step
instead of silently reconnecting servers. Diagnostics report stale autoStart,
legacy disableAutoStart conflicts, policy-denied rows, and missing-auth rows
without printing secret values.
PMCP negotiates the current MCP protocol version with downstream servers and
continues to connect to older supported servers. The local conformance matrix
covers negotiated status handling for 2024-11-05, 2025-03-26,
2025-06-18, and 2025-11-25, with 2025-11-25 preferred for new
initialization attempts. gateway.health and pmcp status --json can include
the negotiated protocol_version and declared server capabilities when a
connected server reports them.
Modern MCP task support is conservative. PMCP forwards task-augmented tool calls
only when a tool advertises execution.taskSupport and the downstream server
advertises task capability. Required-task tools fail before dispatch if the
server does not advertise task support. Task records are transient gateway state,
not durable PMCP storage.
The tenant code-mode host contract in
specs/tenant-code-mode-host-contract.md freezes the PMCP/companion-server
boundary for future hosted sandbox execution. PMCP remains the broker; the
companion tenant server remains the execution authority.
Gateway observability is local and structured. gateway.invoke accepts trace
context through _meta.traceparent, _meta.tracestate, and _meta.baggage and
preserves those string values on PMCP-owned downstream request metadata. The
same keys are tolerated on HTTP requests. PMCP does not require or configure an
OpenTelemetry exporter.
gateway.health may include gateway_diagnostics and recent audit_events.
Diagnostics report transport/header compatibility, trace support, audit buffer
readiness, auth metadata presence, and rate-limit configuration without secret
values. Audit events are bounded in memory and include method/action, server or
tool identity, protocol version when known, task ID when present, outcome,
latency, auth state, and redacted error text.
PMCP's Streamable HTTP endpoint serves two protocol eras on the same /mcp
route, upstream of clients. A client that negotiates through initialize is
served the handshake era — 2024-11-05 through 2025-11-25. A client that
instead sends an MCP-Protocol-Version: 2026-07-28 header together with a
params._meta envelope carrying io.modelcontextprotocol/protocolVersion
and io.modelcontextprotocol/clientCapabilities is served the modern era —
2026-07-28 — for tools/list, tools/call, resources/list,
resources/read, prompts/list, prompts/get, and server/discover. The
modern era is not reachable through initialize; it is selected per request
by those headers. The modern era has no server-initiated request
back-channel, so sampling/createMessage and elicitation/create do not
exist at 2026-07-28 — PMCP does not proxy either today, so this is a
protocol-era limitation, not a PMCP gap. (Server-initiated notifications
are a separate mechanism — subscriptions/listen, below.) Downstream, PMCP's
connections to the servers it proxies are negotiated only at the handshake
era described above (2025-11-25 preferred) — no downstream server is ever
reached at 2026-07-28. A modern-era client's tools/call is still proxied
live over that handshake-era downstream connection; only the upstream
envelope differs.
GET /mcp is retired. It now answers 405 Method Not Allowed with
Allow: POST, DELETE instead of accepting a standing connection; there is no
persistent GET/SSE channel of any kind, pre-session or otherwise. GET /health and GET /metrics are unaffected and remain separate, unauthenticated
routes. The replacement for server-initiated notifications is
subscriptions/listen — a long-lived POST stream reachable only at
protocol version 2026-07-28 — over which a client that opens a subscription
receives notifications/tools/list_changed, notifications/resources/list_changed,
and notifications/prompts/list_changed as PMCP's own catalog changes — a
gateway.connect_server, gateway.disconnect_server, or gateway.refresh
call that adds, removes, or updates downstream tools, resources, or prompts,
or a downstream server's own notifications/*/list_changed. A downstream
notification is not relayed as-is: PMCP re-indexes that server's catalog
first and publishes only once reconciliation confirms something actually
moved, so a client that refetches on receipt of the notification sees the
new catalog rather than the stale one. Progress and logging notifications
from a downstream server are not proxied — catalog-change notifications
only. No existing client loses delivered data from the GET
retirement — PMCP never published anything on the old GET stream, so this
removes a channel PMCP never wrote to, not one clients were receiving events
over. The concurrency cap the old pre-session keep-alive shim enforced
returns one-for-one as PMCP_MAX_LISTEN_STREAMS (default 64, same as
before), now bounding subscriptions/listen instead. The old shim's
absolute-lifetime cap (PMCP_KEEPALIVE_MAX_SECONDS) is deliberately
not replaced — a subscription is long-lived by design, and severing it
every N seconds was the defect this release fixes, not a property worth
preserving. PMCP_MAX_KEEPALIVE_STREAMS and PMCP_KEEPALIVE_MAX_SECONDS are
both gone; if you relied on either, there is no drop-in replacement for the
lifetime cap — what bounds exposure instead is the concurrency cap, the SDK's
own per-stream event-backlog cap, and /mcp auth whenever auth_mode is
configured.
Servers stopped with gateway.disconnect_server remain visible in health as
offline or lazy when PMCP still knows their configuration, and startup policy
observation fields are preserved.
Example missing-auth health row:
{
"name": "github",
"status": "offline",
"tool_count": 0,
"startup_policy": "skipped",
"startup_source": "manifest",
"startup_skip_reason": "missing_auth",
"startup_env_var": "GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN"
}Available Servers
The manifest includes 90+ servers that can be provisioned on-demand:
No API Key Required
Server | Description |
| File operations - read, write, search |
| Persistent knowledge graph |
| HTTP requests with robots.txt compliance |
| Problem solving through thought sequences |
| Git operations via MCP |
| SQLite database operations |
| Timezone operations |
| Headless Chrome automation |
Requires API Key
Server | Description | Environment Variable |
| GitHub API - issues, PRs, repos |
|
| GitLab API - projects, MRs |
|
| Slack messaging |
|
| Notion workspace |
|
| Linear issue tracking |
|
| PostgreSQL database |
|
| Web search |
|
| Google Drive files |
|
| Error tracking |
|
| Payments and billing |
|
| Monitoring and observability |
|
| Edge network and Workers |
|
| Design files and components |
|
| Issue tracking |
|
| Spreadsheet database |
|
| CRM and marketing |
|
| SMS and voice |
|
| Use | — |
See .env.example for all supported environment variables.
Code Execution Guidance
PMCP includes built-in guidance to encourage models to use code execution patterns, reducing context bloat and improving workflow efficiency.
Guidance Layers
L0 (MCP Instructions): Brief philosophy in server instructions (~60-90 tokens)
"Write code to orchestrate tools - use loops, filters, conditionals"
L1 (Code Hints): Ultra-terse hints in search results (~8-12 tokens/card)
Single-word hints: "loop", "filter", "try", "poll" (cut to
max_hint_length, default 8 characters)
L2 (Code Snippets): Minimal examples in describe output (~40-80 tokens, opt-in)
3-4 line code examples showing practical usage
L3 (Methodology Resource): Full guide (lazy-loaded, 0 tokens)
Accessible via
pmcp://guidance/code-executionresource
Guidance Configuration
Create ~/.claude/gateway-guidance.yaml:
guidance:
level: "minimal" # Options: "off", "minimal", "standard"
layers:
mcp_instructions: true # L0 philosophy
code_hints: true # L1 hints
code_snippets: false # L2 examples (default: off)
methodology_resource: true # L3 guide
enable_telemetry: true # failure feedback hints and issue previews
enable_feedback_submission: false # let PMCP POST feedback to GitHub (default: off)
# custom_instructions: "..." # optional: replaces the default L0 workflow textLevels:
minimal(default): L0 + L1 (~230 tokens overhead)standard: L0 + L1 + L2 (~290 tokens overhead)off: No guidance
level is a preset that sets all four layers flags, and it is applied after
the file is read, so it overrides whatever layers: says: level: minimal
with code_snippets: true still has no L2 snippets. To get L2, set
level: standard.
View Guidance Status
pmcp guidance # Show configuration
pmcp guidance --show-budget # Show token estimates
pmcp guidance --telemetry on|off # Feedback telemetry
pmcp guidance --feedback-submission on|off # Let PMCP post feedback (default: off)pmcp guidance prints both switches, and each -- form above persists the
decision to ~/.claude/gateway-guidance.yaml before printing the new state. See
Feedback Telemetry for what submission requires.
Token Budget
Minimal mode: ~230 tokens typical workflow (L0 + a 15-card search)
Standard mode: ~290 tokens (L0 + search + 1 describe)
80% reduction vs loading all tool schemas upfront!
Configuration
Config Discovery
PMCP discovers MCP servers from:
Project config:
.mcp.jsonin project root (highest priority). The project root is--projectwhen given, otherwise the nearest ancestor of the working directory holding a.mcp.json,.git,package.json,pyproject.tomlor.pmcp/manifest.yaml, stopping before$HOME. Every project input -- this file, the manifest overlay, the project policy and the project's credentials -- comes from that one project root. A project.mcp.jsonis ignored until you runpmcp trust approve <path>(see Security).User config:
~/.mcp.jsonor~/.claude/.mcp.jsonCustom config: Via
--configflag orPMCP_CONFIGenv var
On a server-name collision the earlier source wins. PMCP_CONFIG,
PMCP_POLICY and PMCP_MANIFEST_PATH are honoured only when exported in the
shell that starts PMCP; a value set by a .env or .env.pmcp file is ignored
with a warning.
Private manifest overlay
If you built your own MCP servers (or want private provisionable definitions),
you can add manifest entries without editing the shipped manifest. PMCP
merges these overlay files over the built-in manifest, so your servers get
first-class treatment in gateway.request_capability keyword matching,
gateway.catalog_search offline discovery, gateway.provision, and startup
resolution — answering "can I add my own private manifest items?" with yes.
Overlay locations, lowest → highest precedence (later overrides earlier, by server name; a same-named entry is replaced whole, not deep-merged):
Shipped manifest (base)
User:
~/.pmcp/manifest.yamlProject:
<project>/.pmcp/manifest.yamlat the served project root ----projectwhen given, otherwise the project root found from the working directory (see the project config above); never$HOME's, which is the user overlay; ignored until you runpmcp trust approve <path>Explicit:
PMCP_MANIFEST_PATHenv var (wins over all; honoured only when exported, not when set by a.envfile)
Overlays use the same entry schema as the shipped manifest. Example
~/.pmcp/manifest.yaml:
servers:
# Local (stdio) server provisioned via a command
my-private:
description: "My private internal server"
keywords: [myprivate, internal widget]
command: "npx"
args: ["-y", "@me/my-mcp"]
requires_api_key: true
env_var: MY_TOKEN
# Remote server reached over streamable HTTP
my-remote:
description: "My private remote server"
keywords: [myremote, internal api]
url: "https://mcp.internal.example.com/mcp"
headers:
Authorization: "Bearer ${MY_REMOTE_TOKEN}"A server that supports a self-hosted, keyless deployment can declare which
extra_env variable makes its credential optional via
api_key_optional_when. Declaring the field alone changes nothing — an
operator must separately supply that variable. The shipped firecrawl entry
already declares api_key_optional_when: ["FIRECRAWL_API_URL"], so supplying
the URL is all an overlay needs to do — via a server_env patch, not a
servers: block (servers: is whole-entry replace: a partial firecrawl:
entry here would erase its command/install metadata and reset
requires_api_key to its unset default, turning the credential gate off):
server_env:
firecrawl:
FIRECRAWL_API_URL: "http://localhost:3002"Both parties must act — the manifest entry names the variable, and the
operator supplies it — so no overlay can unilaterally relax a credential the
entry never declared relaxable. A server naming its own credential as its own
relaxer is ignored, and an unset, empty, or unexpanded ${VAR} value fails
closed: the credential stays required.
Overlay loading is fail-soft: a missing file is skipped silently, and a
malformed file logs a warning and is skipped; so does a single entry that pmcp
could not use: a field some part of pmcp would fail on, such as keywords: [1],
an args list holding a number, a command or transport that is not a
string, or a CLI alternative with an empty check_command. Fields pmcp stores
but never reads (status), or reads only as true or false (auto_start,
requires_api_key), are accepted whatever their value, as before. A
transport string without a url is accepted as before, whatever the string;
with a url it must be one of pmcp's transport names (local, remote,
sse, http, streamable-http). The warning names the field, not
its value, and does not show the entry's name unless pmcp ships it. A blank field
(description: with nothing after it) means "not set". None of this crashes the
gateway — the shipped manifest always still loads. pmcp re-reads
overlay files on every manifest load, so edits apply without a restart, and
logs each warning once per change rather than on every load — except that a
file that cannot be read or parsed is reported on every load until it is
fixed.
An overlay's servers are found by their own keywords. Sharing a keyword with
another server, or replacing a shipped server, never hides another server from
gateway.catalog_search or gateway.request_capability (within the result
limit; ties rank by name; a query that names a server resolves to it). A CLI an
overlay adds or replaces is recommended only when no server matches, and is listed
after pmcp's own CLIs.
Security: a manifest entry can specify an arbitrary
command/argsto run when provisioned — treat an overlay file with the same trust as your own.mcp.json. Policy still applies (denied servers stay denied).
Pinning a client version
To hold an npx-launched server at one version, add to ~/.pmcp/manifest.yaml (or an
approved project overlay):
server_version:
firecrawl: "3.25.5"or version: "3.25.5" on a whole servers: entry. pmcp writes the pin into the server's
args and every install argv, keeping the package name. It must be one exact version: a
range, a dist-tag such as latest, build metadata or a package spec is ignored with a
warning. What happens to an earlier pin depends on where the bad pin sits. Sources apply in
order (shipped, user, project, PMCP_MANIFEST_PATH), and within one source servers:
entries replace whole entries before server_version patches apply.
A bad
server_version: any pin from an earlier source stands, unless aservers:entry for this server in this or a later source replaced it, or a later source set another pin.A bad
version:: it rides on a wholeservers:entry, which replaced the earlier entry and any pin with it. So the server is unpinned unless this source'sserver_versionor a later source pins it.server_version: {name: null}sets nothing; to remove a pin, delete its line.
Only npx servers whose package slot is a plain registry name (pkg, pkg@1.2.3,
pkg@tag) can be pinned this way, and only if the entry's own env cannot redirect npm:
locale and terminal keys, npm's logging/timing settings and the keys pmcp ships for that
server are fine; anything else (such as npm_config_registry or NODE_OPTIONS) makes pmcp
ignore the pin. Only a bare npx launcher is pinned (not a path such as ./npx or
node_modules/.bin/npx; on Windows, npx.cmd/npx.exe too). The launcher of every
install argv is judged by the rules of the host pmcp runs on, whatever platform key it sits
under, so a windows: argv using npx.cmd refuses the pin on Linux or macOS. For uvx, pip,
cargo or docker, or any other case, pin the version in the server's own command/args in
.mcp.json (or the file you pass with --config).
The pin fixes the npm spec; npm resolves it in your own environment (your .npmrc, npm's
cache, and a node_modules in the directory pmcp runs in; a .npmrc there can also set
the npm keys allowed next to a pin). gateway.update_server does not move a pinned server.
pmcp update shows it as [PINNED] with the version you wrote, except when npm
configuration is set where pmcp cannot see past it. That happens in three cases:
the entry itself sets an npm setting such as
npm_config_loglevel;the gateway process's own environment sets any
npm_config_*variable (for example an exportednpm_config_cache) orNODE_OPTIONS, which turns off package detection for the whole process;the directory the gateway runs in, or any directory above it, contains a
package.jsonor anode_modulesdirectory (npm would then read that project's.npmrcor run a local bin). This covers running pmcp from inside a Node project, or anywhere under a directory tree with anode_moduleshigher up.
In each case it prints [FAILED] … Could not determine a registry package, and still moves
nothing: the pin is still in every argv.
Adding Custom Servers
For MCP servers not in the manifest, add them to ~/.mcp.json:
{
"autoStart": ["my-custom-server"],
"mcpServers": {
"my-custom-server": {
"command": "node",
"args": ["./my-server.js"],
"env": {
"API_KEY": "..."
}
}
}
}PMCP supports both local command-based and remote URL-based downstream entries from discovered config files. Entries in mcpServers make downstream servers available lazily/on demand; they do not by themselves mean the server should be eagerly started.
index-it-mcp code-index pilot
For a fleet pilot of the local-first code indexer, add index-it-mcp to your
.mcp.json with a pinned version and its operational env. PMCP spawns it
over stdio and applies the env block verbatim on top of the gateway's
environment, minus PMCP-stored credentials and keys PMCP loaded from .env /
.env.pmcp (_connect_stdio builds the child env with
sanitized_subprocess_env(config.env, project_root)), so this is the supported
channel for the server's configuration:
{
"mcpServers": {
"index-it-mcp": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": ["--from", "index-it-mcp==<approved-version>", "index-it-mcp", "stdio"],
"env": {
"MCP_ALLOWED_ROOTS": "/path/to/repo",
"SEMANTIC_SEARCH_ENABLED": "true",
"SEMANTIC_DEFAULT_PROFILE": "code",
"SEMANTIC_EMBEDDING_BASE_URL": "http://localhost:8000/v1",
"QDRANT_URL": "http://localhost:6333",
"OPENAI_API_KEY": "local-vllm-placeholder"
}
}
}
}Notes:
Pin the version (
index-it-mcp==<approved-version>) so a PyPI release-line change can't silently swap the indexer under a running fleet. Replace<approved-version>with the operator-approved pin.OPENAI_API_KEYis only the token the server presents to a local OpenAI-compatible endpoint (e.g. a vLLM embedding server atSEMANTIC_EMBEDDING_BASE_URL); it is not an api.openai.com secret.Env must go via
.mcp.json. Anenv:key in a shipped-manifest or private-overlay entry is ignored. Manifest entries take non-secret variables only throughextra_env:(or an overlayserver_env:patch), which cannot carry a credential; for a server like this one, put its env in the.mcp.jsonmcpServersentry.Pin the Python interpreter with
"args": ["--python", "3.12", "--from", …].index-it-mcp==1.2.0depends ontree-sitter-languages, which has no wheel for CPython 3.13; without the pin,uvxmay pick 3.13 and fail to launch.
Repository registration must use the same storage env as the config. Before
agents get indexed results, each repo must be registered and the gateway-spawned
server must read the registry the registration wrote. The registry location is
resolved from MCP_INDEX_STORAGE_PATH / MCP_REPO_REGISTRY. If you set those in
the .mcp.json env above but run index-it-mcp repository register without
them, the CLI writes to the default ~/.mcp/repository_registry.json while the
PMCP-spawned server reads $MCP_INDEX_STORAGE_PATH/repository_registry.json — so
the server reports repositories: [] and every query falls back to native search
(unregistered_repository). Register with the same env the config uses:
export MCP_INDEX_STORAGE_PATH=/path/to/shared/.indexes
export MCP_REPO_REGISTRY="$MCP_INDEX_STORAGE_PATH/repository_registry.json"
for repo in /path/to/repo-a /path/to/repo-b; do
uvx --python 3.12 --from index-it-mcp==1.2.0 index-it-mcp repository register "$repo"
done
# Verify the server-side view before trusting results:
uvx --python 3.12 --from index-it-mcp==1.2.0 index-it-mcp repository list # expect your repos
uvx --python 3.12 --from index-it-mcp==1.2.0 index-it-mcp preflight # readiness checkCheck readiness before trusting indexed answers. The server's status/query
tools report a readiness state (ready, unregistered_repository,
missing_index, stale_commit, …) and, when not ready, safe_fallback: "native_search". Agents should treat any non-ready state as non-authoritative
and fall back to native search rather than reporting stale/empty index results.
The top-level autoStart list controls explicit eager startup. Names can refer to
servers defined in mcpServers or packaged manifest entries such as playwright
and context7. Omit a server from autoStart to keep it lazy.
The legacy top-level disableAutoStart list is still honoured and overrides
autoStart. PMCP_LEGACY_MANIFEST_AUTOSTART=1 additionally eager-starts
manifest entries that declare auto_start: true; no shipped entry does, so it
matters only for overlay entries.
The same policy is available locally from the CLI:
pmcp config status --json
pmcp config startup-policy
pmcp config set-startup-policy add playwright --source project
pmcp config set-startup-policy add playwright --source project --applyCLI mutation previews by default. --apply is required before writing.
Writing an approved project .mcp.json this way carries its trust approval
forward to the rewritten bytes; an unapproved one stays ignored until
pmcp trust approve.
Lazy Excalidraw example:
{
"mcpServers": {
"excalidraw": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mcp.excalidraw.com/mcp"
}
}
}Eager Excalidraw example:
{
"autoStart": ["excalidraw"],
"mcpServers": {
"excalidraw": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mcp.excalidraw.com/mcp"
}
}
}Remote Downstream Servers
You can also configure downstream MCP servers over HTTP/SSE directly in .mcp.json using type: "sse" or type: "http" (or type: "remote" for generic remote transport):
{
"mcpServers": {
"acme-sse": {
"type": "sse",
"url": "https://mcp.acme.dev/sse",
"headers": {
"Authorization": "Bearer ${ACME_MCP_TOKEN}",
"X-Tenant": "${ACME_TENANT_ID}"
}
},
"acme-http": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mcp.acme.dev/mcp",
"headers": {
"Authorization": "Bearer ${ACME_MCP_TOKEN}"
}
}
}
}urlshould be the full remote endpoint for that server.headersvalues support${ENV_VAR}interpolation (Consiliency/pmcp#40).Resolve those environment variables from your shell environment or
~/.config/pmcp/pmcp.env.
Important: Don't add pmcp itself to this file. PMCP is configured
in your MCP client config, not in the downstream server list.
Tenant Code-Mode Server Registration
PMCP can broker a separate tenant code-mode MCP server as a normal downstream
server. The contract in specs/tenant-code-mode-host-contract.md defines the
boundary: PMCP discovers, invokes, monitors, truncates, and redacts through
gateway surfaces; the companion tenant server owns sandbox execution, tenant
authorization, logs, and artifacts. PMCP does not run scripts itself.
Register the hosted server in .mcp.json with the configured name
tenant-code-mode:
{
"mcpServers": {
"tenant-code-mode": {
"type": "streamable-http",
"url": "https://tenant.example.com/mcp",
"headers": {
"Authorization": "Bearer ${TENANT_CODE_MODE_MCP_TOKEN}",
"X-Tenant-ID": "${TENANT_CODE_MODE_TENANT_ID}"
}
}
}
}For local companion-server development, use a replaceable stdio command from that server's checkout:
{
"mcpServers": {
"tenant-code-mode": {
"command": "/path/to/tenant-code-mode-server",
"args": ["serve", "--transport", "stdio"]
}
}
}The registration is lazy by default. Add tenant-code-mode to top-level
autoStart only when the operator wants PMCP to connect during startup.
Discovery and startup use the existing gateway.request_capability,
gateway.catalog_search with include_offline: true, gateway.provision, and
gateway.invoke flow.
Tenant runs use the existing task broker. Submit long-running work with
gateway.invoke and non-secret task.metadata, task.ttl,
task.poll_interval, task.requestor_context, and trace keys such as
_meta.traceparent; PMCP forwards those fields to the downstream server only
when the server and tool advertise task support. task.ttl and
task.poll_interval are in seconds, at most 9,007,199,254,740. PMCP sends them
downstream in milliseconds, which is the unit MCP 2025-11-25 uses (ttl: 300
reaches the server as ttl: 300000). The ttl and poll_interval of every
task PMCP returns are converted back from the server's milliseconds to seconds,
and may be fractional (1500 ms is reported as 1.5). A task's raw object
keeps the values exactly as the server sent them. The returned downstream MCP
task ID is then used with gateway.tasks_list, gateway.tasks_get,
gateway.tasks_result, and gateway.tasks_cancel. Do not use PMCP request IDs
from gateway.list_pending or gateway.cancel for tenant task operations.
gateway.tasks_result continues to apply host-side truncation and optional
secret redaction to sandbox-shaped logs and diagnostics.
Credential Scope Management (pmcp secrets)
PMCP stores secrets in environment files by scope:
userscope:~/.config/pmcp/pmcp.envprojectscope:<project_root>/.env.pmcp
You can manage both scopes with pmcp secrets:
# Store a secret in user scope (shared by all projects); prompts for the value
pmcp secrets set API_TOKEN --scope user
# Store a secret in project scope (the default scope), reading the value from stdin
printf '%s' "$TOKEN" | pmcp secrets set API_TOKEN --stdin --project /path/to/project
# Copy all user-scoped secrets into project scope
pmcp secrets sync --from-scope user --to-scope project --overwrite
# Copy project-scoped secrets into user scope
pmcp secrets sync --from-scope project --to-scope user --overwriteCopying out of a project copies credentials only. A project .env.pmcp is the
repository's, and your user store loads into pmcp's environment at every start
(and pmcp upgrade runs uv or pip in it), so sync copies a name only if it
is credential-shaped (*_TOKEN, *_KEY, *_SECRET(S), *_PASSWORD,
*_CREDENTIAL(S), *_PAT, *_DSN, *_AUTH) or a server in the manifest
declares it as its credential (POSTGRES_URL, say). Everything else --
UV_INDEX_URL, PIP_CONFIG_FILE, DATABASE_URL, anything named PMCP_*, proxies,
LD_*/NODE_*/NPM_CONFIG_* and the like, even when credential-shaped -- is
skipped, as is any value containing ${ or spanning more than one line. Each
skipped name prints one pmcp: Not copying <NAME> from .env.pmcp: ... line and
is listed under "refused"; the other keys still sync. Set one yourself with
pmcp secrets set <NAME> --scope user if you mean it.
Passing the value on the command line (pmcp secrets set API_TOKEN your-token)
still works but exposes it in ps output and shell history. pmcp secrets check
prints, as JSON, the keys your configured servers require and which are present.
Use scope-appropriate values such as API_TOKEN and keep the values in the generated .env files; PMCP and downstream MCP servers read from these files according to your active mode.
For service users, ~/.config/pmcp/pmcp.env is ideal for shared tokens used by all sessions.
Policy File
Create a policy file to control access and limits:
~/.claude/gateway-policy.yaml:
servers:
allowlist: [] # Empty = allow all
denylist:
- dangerous-server
tools:
denylist:
- "*::delete_*"
- "*::drop_*"
packages: # npm packages; globs match the package NAME only
allowlist:
- "@acme/*" # Discovered servers provision without a per-version approval
denylist:
- "*-evil-*" # Refused even when approved, manifest-backed servers included
limits:
max_tools_per_server: 100
max_output_bytes: 50000
max_output_tokens: 4000
redaction:
patterns:
- "(api[_-]?key)[\\s]*[:=][\\s]*[\"']?([^\\s\"']+)"
- "(password|secret)[\\s]*[:=][\\s]*[\"']?([^\\s\"']+)"Every section has an allowlist and a denylist of glob patterns; a denylist
match always refuses, and a non-empty allowlist admits only what it matches.
Besides servers, tools (server::tool), packages, limits and
redaction shown above, three sections are available:
gateway_tools— whichgateway.*tools are advertised and callable (for example, allowlist onlygateway.health,gateway.catalog_search,gateway.describeandgateway.invoke).resources— downstream resources, matched asserver::uri.prompts— downstream prompts, matched asserver::name.
PMCP looks for the policy at ~/.claude/gateway-policy.yaml or
~/.claude/gateway-policy.json, and for a project policy at
.mcp-gateway-policy.yaml or .mcp-gateway-policy.json at the project root
(--project when given, otherwise the project root found from the working
directory -- the same root as every other project input); a project policy is
ignored until approved with pmcp trust approve, and can only narrow the
operator's policy. --policy / PMCP_POLICY names one explicitly.
An explicitly requested policy (--policy or PMCP_POLICY) is a fail-closed
boundary: a missing, unreadable, malformed, or schema-invalid file terminates
startup.
An automatically discovered policy at a default location is fail-closed too, with one deliberate exception. A discovered file that parses but is not a valid policy terminates startup exactly like an explicit one, because falling back would replace it with the default allow-all policy and silently unrestrict the gateway. Best-effort fallback now covers only a file that cannot be read, or that the parser rejects outright — which could be anything rather than a policy; that case warns, says that no policy is in effect, and continues.
The line between the two is drawn by the parser, not by the file's shape, so it
falls in different places for the two formats. In a .yaml file a list root, a
scalar root and an empty file all load cleanly — yaml.safe_load returns a
list, a str and None — and so all three are fatal. In a .json file, a
document whose root is valid JSON but not an object ([], 42, null) is
likewise fatal, but an empty .json file is not valid JSON at all, so it
takes the warn-and-continue path. If you are testing this behaviour, use an empty
.yaml file to see the refusal.
Discovered packages need an operator's approval
A server registered with gateway.register_discovered_server runs an npm
package an agent chose, so it does not start until an operator opts that package
in. Registration resolves the package in the npm registry and pins the resolved
version into the server's install command and its args (npx -y name@version); a package that does not resolve to one exact version is refused
at registration. After that, gateway.provision, gateway.connect_server and
gateway.restart_server refuse the server until one of these holds:
The exact version is approved. The refusal message prints the command to run, for example:
pmcp trust approve-package @acme/example-server@1.4.2Then provision again. The approval covers that one version: a registration that resolves to a newer version needs a new approval.
The operator's policy allowlists the package name under
packages.allowlist, as in the example above.
A packages.denylist match refuses the package in every case, including when an
approval is recorded; such a refusal reports auth_state="policy_denied", and
every other package refusal reports auth_state="unknown". Package globs match the
name alone. A version-bearing entry such as pkg@1.2.3 is rejected when the
policy loads, because it could never match. A project .mcp-gateway-policy.yaml
can deny a package but cannot allow one the operator's policy does not.
gateway.update_server never updates a discovered server, approved or not. To move
one to a newer version, call gateway.register_discovered_server again with the
same server_name and package, approve the version it resolves, then connect it.
A discovered server may declare, in env_vars or through gateway.auth_connect,
only credential-shaped variable names: names ending in _TOKEN, _KEY, _SECRET,
_SECRETS, _PASSWORD, _CREDENTIAL, _CREDENTIALS, _PAT, _DSN or _AUTH.
Names that start with NPM_CONFIG_, NODE_, COREPACK_, YARN_, PNPM_ or
BUN_ (in any case) and names that affect code loading are refused even when
credential-shaped, because they change what npx fetches or how it runs. Configure
a server that needs any other variable in .mcp.json instead.
Manifest-backed and .mcp.json servers need no approval and keep their env var
rules. The one exception is the denylist: a packages.denylist entry also refuses
a manifest-backed server whose npm package it names (its package field, or a
package its npx command or install command runs, including one chosen with -p or
--package), at gateway.provision,
gateway.connect_server, gateway.restart_server and gateway.update_server.
While any packages.denylist is in force, a manifest entry whose npx packages pmcp
cannot determine (an unrecognised npx option such as --registry or -c, or a
package selected as github:owner/repo or ./dir) is refused too, and the refusal
names the argument; without a denylist it starts as before. .mcp.json servers
are not checked against the package lists.
Approvals live in ~/.config/pmcp/package_approvals.json, beside the trust
store. Review and remove them with:
pmcp trust list-packages
pmcp trust revoke-package @acme/example-server@1.4.2 # one version
pmcp trust revoke-package @acme/example-server # every versionEvery install spawn logs its command at WARNING before it runs. That includes
starting a stdio server whose command is npx, uvx, pnpx or bunx, in any
Windows or POSIX spelling (such as C:\tools\npx.cmd or UVX.EXE), and every gateway.update_server probe. Arguments are redacted except
the executable, the flags -y, --yes and --quiet, --registry (its name, not
its value) and a pinned name@version, so an operator can see which package ran
without a credential reaching the log.
Scoped advisor research
PMCP v1.20.0 adds the scoped_advisor_audit.v1 profile for isolated advisor
research. Start each seat with the shipped policy, a unique lock directory, and
an explicit audit sink:
pmcp \
--policy examples/scoped-advisor-policy.yaml \
--audit-jsonl /run/board/seat-1/audit.jsonl \
--lock-dir /run/board/seat-1/locksThe profile exposes only gateway.health, gateway.catalog_search,
gateway.describe, and gateway.invoke; downstream invocation is limited to
the policy's Firecrawl and Bright Data research patterns. MCP resource and
prompt surfaces are denied, and scoped catalog results omit native-CLI,
registry, and provision candidates. Every invoke must
supply run_correlation_id, seat_correlation_id, and a SHA-256
evidence_label_digest together. The append-only audit stores correlations,
tool/status/policy/result digests, and a hashed public-source reference—not raw
URLs, queries, arguments, credentials, or result bodies—and ends with one
fsynced completeness marker. A call whose arguments fail the tool's input schema
is recorded as a separate audit.rejection event (terminal_status: "invalid_arguments") carrying only the tool, the failing JSON path
(caller-chosen keys shown as null) and the failing schema keyword. Only
arguments that passed the tool's input schema, and only the top-level keys it
declares, are read into any record; a call denied by policy records none of its
arguments.
Consumers can fail closed on older installations with:
pmcp capabilities --jsonThe capability is active in gateway.health only when the exact explicit
advisor policy and audit sink are both present. Concurrent seats must use unique
--lock-dir and --audit-jsonl paths.
Tenant code-mode hosting uses the same policy fields. This example allows only the tenant server, blocks a high-risk submission tool, bounds output, and adds a tenant artifact redaction pattern without granting access to unrelated MCP servers:
servers:
allowlist:
- tenant-code-mode
tools:
denylist:
- "tenant-code-mode::run_script"
allowlist:
- "tenant-code-mode::get_*"
- "tenant-code-mode::cancel_*"
limits:
max_output_bytes: 50000
max_output_tokens: 4000
redaction:
patterns:
- "TENANT_CODE_MODE_[A-Z_]+=[^\\s]+"
- "artifact_token=[^\\s]+"For hosted tenant auth, keep credentials in PMCP env storage or tenant-scoped
project storage and reference only placeholders from config:
${TENANT_CODE_MODE_MCP_TOKEN} and ${TENANT_CODE_MODE_TENANT_ID}. Use
pmcp secrets set ... --scope project or gateway.auth_connect to populate
env-store values (a key also in your user store wins over the project's; see
MIGRATING.md); the
gateway does not select a per-tenant env file itself
(see Auth And Elicitation). PMCP diagnostics report missing
field or env-var names such as
TENANT_CODE_MODE_MCP_TOKEN; they must not print token values.
Hosted operators should require Bearer auth on /mcp, tune --rate-limit or
PMCP_RATE_LIMIT for the deployment, and keep /health and /metrics behind
network controls. gateway.refresh, gateway.disconnect_server, and
gateway.restart_server can disrupt in-flight downstream work unless forced by
policy; use downstream task IDs with gateway.tasks_cancel for tenant run
cancellation. PMCP task records are transient, and bounded: at most 100 per
server and 1000 in total. To cancel a task pmcp no longer tracks, call
gateway.tasks_get first, which tracks it again. A forced disconnect,
restart or refresh cancels only the tasks pmcp still tracks when it starts.
On a remote tenant server, a task that was evicted before then keeps running
after the disconnect. Cancel it explicitly first, with gateway.tasks_get
and then gateway.tasks_cancel. Durable sandbox logs, artifacts,
tenant authorization, and artifact retention remain responsibilities of the
companion tenant server and its deployment controls.
CLI Commands
# Start the gateway server (default)
pmcp
# Check server status
pmcp status
pmcp status --json # JSON output
pmcp status --verbose # Include startup policy details when available
pmcp status --server playwright # Filter by server
pmcp status --pending # Include pending requests
pmcp status --probe # Actively connect to each configured server
# View logs (reads .pmcp/logs/gateway.log in the current directory)
pmcp logs
pmcp logs --follow # Live tail
pmcp logs --tail 100 # Last 100 lines (default 50)
pmcp logs --level error # Filter by level
pmcp logs --server github # Filter by server name
# Regenerate cached tool descriptions (default cache dir: .pmcp; the gateway
# reads .mcp-gateway, so pass --cache-dir .mcp-gateway for offline discovery)
pmcp refresh
pmcp refresh --server github # Refresh specific server
pmcp refresh --force # Refresh even if not stale
pmcp refresh --check-versions # Report stale cached descriptions without refreshing
# (honours --cache-dir; a local server whose package
# cannot be classified reports stale on every run)
# Update subordinate MCP server packages (needs a running HTTP gateway at PMCP_GATEWAY_URL)
pmcp update github
pmcp update --all --json
# Upgrade pmcp itself (detects uv tool vs pip --user)
pmcp upgrade --dry-run
pmcp upgrade --restart-service
# Machine-readable capability/version metadata
pmcp capabilities --json
# Initialize config (interactive)
pmcp init
# Render client setup snippets
pmcp setup
pmcp setup --client claude --mode stdio
pmcp setup --client opencode --mode http --write
# Run diagnostics for lock/mode/http checks
pmcp doctor
pmcp doctor --project /path/to/project
pmcp doctor --timeout 10 # HTTP health probe timeout (default 3s)
# Manage project/user secrets
pmcp secrets set API_TOKEN --scope user # prompts for the value
pmcp secrets sync --from-scope user --to-scope project --overwrite
pmcp secrets check # JSON: keys required by configured servers, present/missing
# Store a credential for a server and retry provisioning through the running
# HTTP gateway (CLI form of gateway.auth_connect)
pmcp auth connect github --scope user # prompts for the credential
pmcp auth acknowledge my-remote --elicitation-id <id>
# Approve, list and revoke trust decisions
pmcp trust approve /abs/path/to/project/.mcp.json # a project config file's current bytes
pmcp trust list
pmcp trust revoke /abs/path/to/project/.mcp.json
pmcp trust approve-package @acme/example-server@1.4.2 # a discovered package, one exact version
pmcp trust list-packages
pmcp trust revoke-package @acme/example-server # every version, or name@version for oneGateway options and environment variables
Options for the gateway itself (pmcp with no subcommand):
Flag | Env var | Default | Purpose |
|
|
| Transport to serve. |
|
|
| HTTP bind address. |
|
|
| HTTP port. |
|
|
|
|
| — |
|
|
| — | discovered | Project root for |
|
| — | Extra MCP config file. |
|
| discovered | Policy file (YAML or JSON). |
|
|
| Singleton lock directory. |
|
| — | Scoped-advisor audit sink. |
|
| — | Shared-secret bearer token (HTTP only). |
| — | — | Read the token from a file (whitespace stripped); cannot be combined with |
|
|
| Child MCP server processes spawned at once. |
|
|
| Requests per minute per client IP on |
|
|
| HTTP request timeout, in seconds. |
The auth and OAuth flags are listed under Security. Precedence is
not uniform: PMCP_TRANSPORT, PMCP_HOST, PMCP_PORT and PMCP_LOG_LEVEL
override the flag whenever they are set (for the log level, --debug and -q
still win over PMCP_LOG_LEVEL), while every other variable above is read only
when its flag is absent. --auth-token-file wins over --auth-token,
which wins over PMCP_AUTH_TOKEN.
Other environment variables:
Env var | Purpose |
| Running HTTP gateway that |
| Explicit manifest overlay (Private manifest overlay). |
| Concurrent |
| |
| |
| |
| Legacy manifest |
pmcp doctor (Recommended before/after upgrades)
Use pmcp doctor to diagnose common PMCP startup and connectivity issues. It checks:
lock: reports whether a gateway holds the singleton lock at~/.pmcp/gateway.lock(the file itself stays between runs and is harmless when nothing holds it)mode: detects local command-mode MCP config conflicts when a shared PMCP system service is runninghttp: probes the unauthenticated/healthendpoint derived fromPMCP_GATEWAY_URLorhttp://127.0.0.1:3344/mcpremote: detects unresolved remote downstream header environment referencesinstall: detects conflictinguv toolandpip --userinstalls
Example:
pmcp doctorIf any checks fail, follow the command in the output and rerun pmcp doctor.
Singleton Lock
By default, PMCP uses a global lock at ~/.pmcp/gateway.lock to ensure only one gateway runs per user. The lock is held by the running gateway and released when it exits (or dies); the file itself is never removed, so a leftover file never blocks a start and never needs deleting. The lock file must be a plain regular file, and a link at its name is refused. The default ~/.pmcp may be your own symlink (for example into a dotfiles repository): it follows exactly the rule ~/.config/pmcp follows for the trust store -- accepted wherever it leads, except into a checkout being judged (the project pmcp serves, or the one it was started in). An explicit --lock-dir / PMCP_LOCK_DIR that is itself a symlink is refused, since a repository can supply that path. This prevents multiple gateway instances from spawning duplicate downstream servers.
Override the lock directory:
# CLI flag
pmcp --lock-dir /custom/path
# Environment variable
export PMCP_LOCK_DIR=/custom/path
pmcpPer-project lock (not recommended):
pmcp --lock-dir ./.mcp-gatewayDownstream call tunables
# Per-line stdout read limit for downstream stdio servers (default 10 MiB).
# A single response line larger than this is dropped (failing only that call,
# with the server kept connected) rather than disconnecting the server.
export PMCP_STDIO_READ_LIMIT=$((20 * 1024 * 1024))
# Absolute backstop for a single downstream tool call (default 600000ms / 10 min).
# `timeout_ms` is an INACTIVITY timeout — a call survives as long as the server
# keeps producing output; this ceiling caps total wall-clock time for tool calls
# so a chatty-but-never-completing call cannot hang forever.
export PMCP_REQUEST_CEILING_MS=600000The per-call inactivity timeout is gateway.invoke's options.timeout_ms
(default 30000, range 1000–300000).
Deprecations
The
mcp-gatewaycommand no longer exists; the package installs onlypmcp.Use
pmcpfor all CLI commands.Migration examples:
mcp-gateway refresh --force->pmcp refresh --forcemcp-gateway status --json->pmcp status --json
Docker
# Using Docker
docker run -it --rm \
-v ~/.mcp.json:/home/appuser/.mcp.json:ro \
-v ~/.env:/app/.env:ro \
ghcr.io/consiliency/pmcp:latest
# Using Docker Compose
docker-compose up -dDevelopment
# Clone the repo
git clone https://github.com/Consiliency/pmcp
cd pmcp
# Install with uv (recommended)
uv sync --all-extras
# Run tests
uv run pytest
# Run with debug logging
uv run pmcp --debugRunning Tests
# Run all tests
uv run pytest
# Run with coverage
uv run pytest --cov=pmcp
# Run specific test file
uv run pytest tests/test_policy.py -vProject Structure
pmcp/
├── src/pmcp/
│ ├── __init__.py
│ ├── __main__.py # python -m pmcp entry
│ ├── cli.py # CLI commands (status, logs, setup, doctor, trust, ...)
│ ├── server.py # MCP server implementation
│ ├── config/
│ │ └── loader.py # Config discovery (.mcp.json)
│ ├── client/
│ │ └── manager.py # Downstream server connections
│ ├── policy/
│ │ └── policy.py # Allow/deny lists
│ ├── tools/
│ │ └── handlers.py # Gateway tool implementations
│ ├── transport/
│ │ └── http.py # Streamable HTTP transport
│ ├── auth.py # HTTP auth modes (shared-secret, resource-server)
│ └── manifest/
│ ├── manifest.yaml # Server manifest (90+ servers)
│ ├── loader.py # Manifest loading and overlays
│ ├── installer.py # Server provisioning
│ └── environment.py # Platform/CLI detection
├── tests/ # 8000+ tests
├── Dockerfile
├── docker-compose.yml
├── .env.example
├── pyproject.toml
└── README.mdTroubleshooting
Server Won't Connect
pmcp status --probe # actively connect to each configured server
pmcp logs --level errorThen reconnect it with gateway.restart_server or gateway.connect_server.
(pmcp refresh regenerates cached tool descriptions; it does not reconnect a
running gateway's servers.)
Missing API Key
gateway.request_capability and gateway.provision report the variable a
manifest server needs (env_var, env_instructions); pmcp secrets check
lists the keys your configured servers require and which are missing.
# Set the key in the shell that starts pmcp...
export GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN=ghp_...
# ...or store it through a running HTTP gateway (prompts for the value)
pmcp auth connect github --scope userTool Invocation Fails
gateway.catalog_search({ query: "tool-name" })
gateway.describe({ tool_id: "server::tool-name" })
gateway.list_pending()If gateway.refresh reports pending requests or active MCP tasks, inspect them
with gateway.list_pending() and gateway.tasks_list(), or retry refresh with
force=true to cancel them before reloading server configuration.
If gateway.disconnect_server or gateway.restart_server reports pending
requests or active MCP tasks, inspect gateway.list_pending(server="<name>")
and gateway.tasks_list(server_name="<name>"), or retry with force=true to
cancel only that server's pending work.
License
MIT
Available Tools
26 toolsgateway.auth_connectA
Store credentials for a server and make them available to provisioning. Use this when gateway.provision reports missing authentication.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| scope | No | Where to store the credential | user |
| env_var | No | Optional explicit environment variable key | |
| auth_mode | No | API-key storage or URL-mode elicitation acknowledgement | api_key |
| credential | No | API key, token, or subscription credential to store | |
| server_name | Yes | Server name that needs authentication | |
| elicitation_id | No | URL-mode elicitation identifier | |
| elicitation_url | No | Sanitized URL-mode elicitation URL | |
| consent_acknowledged | No | Acknowledge that the out-of-band URL flow was completed |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It only says 'store credentials' without addressing persistence, security, overwrite behavior, or the implications of the two auth modes (api_key vs url_elicitation). This is a significant gap for a credential-management tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, the first for purpose and the second for usage context. No wasted words; it is highly efficient and front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The schema is rich with descriptions and enums, but the description does not explain the relationship between auth modes and parameters like elicitation_id and consent_acknowledged. It also doesn't tell the agent what to expect after invoking (no output schema). It is adequate but not comprehensive for a tool with this complexity.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema has 100% parameter coverage with individual descriptions, so the baseline of 3 applies. The description itself adds no parameter-specific meaning, but the schema already handles that sufficiently.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's function: storing credentials for a server and making them available to provisioning. It distinguishes itself from siblings by explicitly referencing the gateway.provision missing-authentication scenario, which differentiates it from other connection/server management tools.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It provides a specific, actionable when-to-use condition: 'Use this when gateway.provision reports missing authentication.' This gives clear context but does not mention alternatives or when not to use it, so it stops short of the most complete guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.cancelA
Cancel a pending tool invocation. By default, refuses to cancel healthy requests (recent heartbeat). Use force=true to cancel anyway. Use gateway.list_pending first to see request IDs and health status.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| force | No | Force cancel even if request is healthy (has recent heartbeat) | |
| request_id | Yes | Request ID in format "server_name::local_id" from gateway.list_pending |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries full burden. It discloses the key behavioral trait: default refusal of healthy requests and the force flag to override. It also notes the request ID format. It could mention idempotency or error states, but the core behavior is well-transparent for a cancel operation.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three concise sentences: purpose, default behavior with force alternative, and prerequisite advice. No wasted words, front-loaded with the core action. Ideal structure for quick agent comprehension.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given no output schema and simple tool, the description covers all needed context: prerequisite list_pending, default safety behavior, force option, ID format. For the complexity level, it is fully complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The description adds context to schema-defined parameters: it explains the request ID format (already in schema) and the force parameter's effect. With 100% schema coverage, baseline is 3, but the description adds extra usage context, raising it to 4.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool cancels a pending tool invocation, specifies the verb and resource, and distinguishes from siblings by referencing gateway.list_pending and explaining default refusal of healthy requests. It leaves no ambiguity about the tool's purpose.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly advises to use gateway.list_pending first to get request IDs and health status, and explains the default behavior and force flag. This provides clear when-to-use and when-not-to-use guidance, effectively integrating with the sibling tool.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.catalog_searchA
Search for available tools across all connected MCP servers. Returns compact capability cards without full schemas. Use filters to narrow results by server, tags, or risk level. Set include_offline=True to also discover provisionable servers not yet running. This is the primary tool discovery entry point.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | Maximum number of results to return | |
| query | No | Search query to match against tool names, descriptions, and tags | |
| filters | No | ||
| include_offline | No | Include tools from offline servers |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the burden of behavioral disclosure. It adds useful context beyond the schema by mentioning the return format ('compact capability cards without full schemas') and the behavior of include_offline for discovering 'provisionable servers not yet running.' It does not describe pagination or error behavior, but the key behavioral traits are disclosed.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is three concise sentences, front-loaded with the primary purpose and followed by relevant filter/offline usage and a positioning statement. Every sentence earns its place with no repetition or fluff.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a search tool with no output schema, the description covers the core behavior, return type, filtering options, offline discovery, and its role in the wider system. It lacks explicit return field details, but the schema's limit parameter and the mention of 'compact capability cards' provide sufficient context for an agent to invoke the tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 75%, and the schema already documents each parameter, including query matching behavior and filter meanings. The description adds limited new parameter semantics, only elaborating that include_offline discovers provisionable servers. Since the schema covers most parameter meaning, the description provides marginal added value beyond baseline.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's function: 'Search for available tools across all connected MCP servers.' It also differentiates this tool from siblings by noting it returns 'compact capability cards without full schemas' and positioning it as 'the primary tool discovery entry point,' which distinguishes it from more specific tools like gateway.describe or gateway.search_registry.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear usage context by identifying this as the primary discovery entry point and explaining how filters and include_offline refine results. However, it does not explicitly mention when not to use this tool or name alternative tools for full schema details, so it falls short of fully explicit guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.config_statusA
Show read-only effective configuration and startup policy status with source attribution and non-secret diagnostics.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It clearly discloses the read-only nature and adds useful context like 'non-secret diagnostics' and 'source attribution.' It doesn't mention authentication or rate limits, but for a status tool this is adequate.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, concise sentence that front-loads the read-only nature and scope. Every word earns its place with no filler or repetition.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a no-parameter status tool with no output schema, the description sufficiently covers the tool's purpose and output nature. It could elaborate on what 'effective configuration' includes, but overall it is complete for a tool of this complexity.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool has zero parameters, so the input schema is empty (100% coverage). The description adds meaning by explaining what the tool reports (effective configuration, startup policy status, source attribution, non-secret diagnostics), going beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses the specific verb 'Show' and identifies the resource as 'effective configuration and startup policy status,' clearly stating the tool's purpose. However, it doesn't explicitly differentiate itself from sibling gateway.get_startup_policy, which also deals with startup policy.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance is provided on when to use this tool versus alternatives like gateway.get_startup_policy or gateway.health. The description only states what it does, not when to prefer it or what scenarios it is designed for.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.connect_serverA
Connect or start a known downstream MCP server by name. Resolves configured, provisioned manifest, and registered discovered servers.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| server_name | Yes | Name of the server to connect |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It only states the action ('connect or start') without disclosing side effects, required permissions, rate limits, or safety considerations. For a tool that may alter server state, more transparency is needed.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences, concise and to the point. Every word adds value, with no filler or repetition. The structure is well-suited for quick understanding.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's simplicity (one parameter, no output schema, no annotations), the description adequately covers its purpose and scope. However, for a gateway tool in a diverse set, slightly more context on when to use this over sibling tools would improve completeness.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
With 100% schema description coverage, the schema already defines the parameter. The description adds no extra meaning beyond 'by name', which is redundant. No additional context on parameter format, source, or constraints is given, so it meets the baseline but adds minimal value.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action ('connect or start'), the resource ('downstream MCP server'), and the method ('by name'). It also distinguishes from siblings by specifying it resolves configured, provisioned manifest, and registered discovered servers, making the purpose specific and distinct.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies when to use (to connect servers that are configured, provisioned, or discovered), but does not explicitly state when not to use it or provide alternatives. Sibling tools like 'provision' or 'register_discovered_server' are not contrasted, leaving some ambiguity.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.describeA
Get detailed information about a specific tool, including its arguments and constraints. Use this before invoking a tool to understand its requirements.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| tool_id | Yes | The tool ID in format "server_name::tool_name" |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries full burden. It indicates a read-only operation by describing it as 'get detailed information', but does not explicitly state it is non-destructive or disclose any other behavioral traits like auth needs or rate limits.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, both essential and front-loaded. No redundant or vague language. Every word contributes value.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple describe tool with one parameter, the description adequately explains what the output contains (arguments and constraints). However, without an output schema, slightly more detail on the output structure would improve completeness.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema already covers the single parameter 'tool_id' with format guidance. The description does not add additional meaning beyond the schema, so with 100% coverage, a baseline of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description explicitly states the verb 'Get detailed information' and the resource 'a specific tool', making the purpose clear. It distinguishes itself from siblings like invoke or search_registry by focusing on tool metadata.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Provides a clear usage context: 'Use this before invoking a tool to understand its requirements.' This guides the agent on when to use it, though it does not explicitly mention when not to use or alternatives.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.disconnect_serverA
Disconnect a running downstream MCP server without changing persistent config. Refuses by default when that server has pending requests; set force=true to cancel them.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| force | No | Cancel this server's pending requests before disconnecting | |
| server_name | Yes | Name of the server to disconnect |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It discloses a critical behavioral trait: the tool refuses to disconnect if there are pending requests unless force=true is set, which cancels them. This goes beyond a simple statement of action and informs the agent of side effects. It omits other details like reversibility, but the disclosed behavior is significant.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences, front-loaded with the action, and every phrase earns its place. No filler or repetition of schema details.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a tool with no output schema and no annotations, the description covers the core behavior, the default refusal condition, and the force override. It does not explain what happens after disconnect (e.g., how to reconnect) but that may be implied by sibling tools. Overall, it provides sufficient context for correct invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% and both parameters have descriptions. The tool description adds meaningful context for the force parameter by explaining the default refusal behavior and that setting force=true cancels pending requests. This enriches the schema's default value without redundancy.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with 'Disconnect a running downstream MCP server' – a specific verb and resource. It further clarifies 'without changing persistent config', which distinguishes it from configuration-changing tools and gives a precise scope of action.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear operational context: it refuses by default when pending requests exist and explains when to use force=true. It does not explicitly name alternatives or exclusion criteria, but the persistent-config qualification helps differentiate from sibling tools like update_server or connect_server.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.get_startup_policyA
Return persisted autoStart and legacy disableAutoStart entries grouped by config source.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It indicates a read operation ('Return') but does not explicitly confirm no side effects, permissions required, or other behaviors like rate limits. Adequate but not explicit.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single sentence that efficiently conveys the tool's exact purpose with no extraneous words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given no output schema or annotations, the description provides enough context for the tool's core function. It identifies what is returned and grouping, though details on 'config source' or output format are missing. Adequate for a simple retrieval.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema has no parameters (0 params, 100% coverage). The description adds no param info, but none is needed. Baseline 4 is appropriate for a parameterless tool.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool returns persisted autoStart and disableAutoStart entries grouped by config source, using a specific verb ('Return') and resource. It implicitly distinguishes from the sibling 'set_startup_policy'.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No explicit usage guidance is provided, but the purpose is clear as a retrieval operation. The description implies when to use (when you need startup policy data), but does not mention exclusions or when-not-to-use.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.healthA
Get the health status of the gateway and all connected MCP servers. Shows server status, tool counts, and last refresh time.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It clearly states the tool returns health status, server status, tool counts, and last refresh time, implying a read-only, non-destructive operation. However, it does not explicitly state that it is non-destructive or mention any auth requirements.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, front-loaded sentence that efficiently communicates the tool's purpose and output without any unnecessary words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given no parameters and no output schema, the description is complete. It specifies the key outputs (server status, tool counts, last refresh time) that an agent would need to understand what the tool does.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool has zero parameters, and the schema description coverage is 100%. The description adds value by explaining what the tool returns, which goes beyond the empty schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses the specific verb 'Get' and clearly identifies the resource as 'health status of the gateway and all connected MCP servers'. It distinguishes from sibling tools by focusing on health, tool counts, and refresh time, which no other sibling explicitly covers.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description does not explicitly state when to use this tool versus alternatives or when not to use it. While the purpose is clear, there is no guidance on proper usage context or exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.invokeB
Invoke a tool on a downstream MCP server. Arguments are validated against the tool schema before execution. Output is automatically truncated if too large.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| options | No | ||
| tool_id | Yes | The tool ID in format "server_name::tool_name" | |
| arguments | No | Arguments to pass to the tool (must match tool schema) | |
| run_correlation_id | No | Scoped-advisor run correlation ID | |
| seat_correlation_id | No | Scoped-advisor seat correlation ID | |
| evidence_label_digest | No | SHA-256 digest of the caller evidence label |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It discloses validation before execution and automatic output truncation, but lacks details on error handling, idempotency, or authentication requirements.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, no redundant information, purpose is front-loaded. Every sentence provides essential behavioral insight.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Despite describing core behaviors, the description omits return value format, error handling, and how to structure the nested 'options' object. For a complex gateway proxy tool, more detail is needed.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 83%, so the schema already describes most parameters. The description adds context about validation and truncation but does not elaborate on parameter usage beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool invokes a tool on a downstream MCP server, with specific actions like validation and truncation. It distinguishes from sibling tools as no other gateway tool serves a similar proxy invocation purpose.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance is provided on when to use this tool versus alternatives, nor any conditions or exclusions. The agent has no help in deciding context.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.list_pendingA
List all pending tool invocations with health status. Shows elapsed time, heartbeat age, and current state for each request. Use this to monitor long-running operations before deciding to cancel.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| server | No | Filter to pending requests on a specific server (optional) |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description must carry the burden of behavioral disclosure. It describes the output fields but does not explicitly state that the operation is read-only or that it does not modify state. However, the action 'list' generally implies safety, and the use case suggests monitoring rather than mutation.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences: the first explains what the tool does, the second provides usage guidance. It is concise with no wasted words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description includes what information the output contains, which is helpful given the lack of an output schema. The parameter is well-documented in the schema, and the overall context is sufficient for correct invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema has 100% coverage for the single parameter 'server', which already includes a description. The tool description adds no additional meaning beyond the schema, so the baseline score of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description explicitly states the verb (List), resource (pending tool invocations), and the specific data shown (health status, elapsed time, heartbeat age, current state). This clearly distinguishes it from sibling tools like gateway.tasks_list.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides a clear use case: 'Use this to monitor long-running operations before deciding to cancel.' It implies when to use but does not explicitly contrast with alternatives, though the context of canceling hints at the sibling cancel tool.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.provisionA
Provision (install and start) a specific MCP server from the manifest. Use this after reviewing candidates from gateway.request_capability. Returns immediately with a job_id for tracking. Poll gateway.provision_status to check progress. Use gateway.request_capability instead if you don't know the exact server name.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| server_name | Yes | Name of the server to provision (from manifest) |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden for behavioral transparency. It discloses that the tool returns immediately with a job_id and directs the agent to poll gateway.provision_status for progress, covering the asynchronous execution model. It does not mention potential side effects beyond install/start (which is the intended function), but overall it provides meaningful behavioral context.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a compact set of three sentences, each earning its place: purpose, usage context, and asynchronous behavior. No fluff, key information is front-loaded, and the structure is easy to scan.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple one-parameter tool with no output schema, this description is complete. It explains what it does, when to use it, what to expect (job_id), how to track progress (poll provision_status), and when to use an alternative (request_capability). No critical missing context for an agent to select and invoke the tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema already covers server_name with a description ('Name of the server to provision (from manifest)'), and schema coverage is 100%. The description adds workflow context by emphasizing the need for the 'exact server name' and connecting it to the request_capability discovery process, which enriches the parameter's meaning beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action ('Provision (install and start)') and the specific resource ('a specific MCP server from the manifest'). It distinguishes itself from siblings like gateway.request_capability (discovery) and gateway.provision_status (tracking) by focusing on the installation/start action.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicit usage guidance is provided: 'Use this after reviewing candidates from gateway.request_capability' and 'Use gateway.request_capability instead if you don't know the exact server name.' This clearly tells when to use this tool versus the alternative, with a concrete workflow.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.provision_statusA
Check the status of a running server installation. Use after gateway.provision returns a job_id. Returns progress percentage, output log, and final tools when complete.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| job_id | Yes | Job ID from gateway.provision response |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description discloses what the tool returns: 'progress percentage, output log, and final tools when complete.' Since no annotations are provided, the description carries the full burden and does so excellently, indicating a read-only operation without side effects.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, no redundant words. Key information is front-loaded: purpose, usage context, and return values. Every sentence earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a single-parameter tool with no output schema, the description fully covers what the tool does, when to use it, and what to expect in return. The agent can use it without additional guesswork.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema defines job_id with a description, but the tool description adds context ('Use after gateway.provision returns a job_id'), clarifying the parameter's origin and purpose, going beyond the schema's minimal description.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool checks the status of a server installation, specifying the verb 'check' and the resource 'status of a running server installation'. It distinguishes itself from siblings like 'config_status' or 'health' by focusing on the provisioning lifecycle.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly states when to use the tool: 'Use after gateway.provision returns a job_id.' This provides clear context, though it does not mention when not to use or list alternatives, which would further differentiate it from siblings.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.refreshA
Reload backend MCP server configurations and reconnect. Use this when new MCP servers have been configured or to recover from connection errors. Refuses by default while downstream requests are pending; set force=true to cancel them.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| force | No | Cancel pending downstream requests before refreshing | |
| reason | No | Reason for refresh (for logging) | |
| source | No | Config source to reload from |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It reveals an important behavioral trait: 'Refuses by default while downstream requests are pending; set force=true to cancel them.' This adds meaningful context beyond a simple reload/reconnect statement, though it could mention additional side effects (e.g., impact on active connections).
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences, front-loaded with the primary action, and every word earns its place. There is no redundant or filler content.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given no output schema and no annotations, the description adequately covers purpose, usage context, and a key behavioral nuance (refusal/force). It lacks return-value or error details, but those are not strictly required for a tool of this simplicity and are sufficiently implied.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description reinforces the 'force' parameter ('set force=true to cancel them') but adds no new semantic meaning beyond what the schema already provides for reason and source.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with 'Reload backend MCP server configurations and reconnect,' a specific verb+resource pair that clearly states what the tool does. It also distinguishes from siblings by explicitly mentioning the use cases: 'when new MCP servers have been configured or to recover from connection errors.'
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear context for when to use the tool ('Use this when new MCP servers have been configured or to recover from connection errors'). However, it does not mention when not to use it or suggest alternative tools, so it falls short of a 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.register_discovered_serverA
Register an externally-discovered MCP server package so it can be provisioned. Call this after gateway.search_registry to register the chosen package, then call gateway.provision to install and start it.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| package | Yes | npm package identifier (e.g. '@modelcontextprotocol/server-github') | |
| env_vars | No | Required environment variable names (e.g. ['GITHUB_TOKEN']) | |
| description | No | Short description of the server's purpose | |
| server_name | Yes | Logical name for this server (e.g. 'github') used with gateway.provision |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations exist, so the description carries full burden. It hints at the registration action but does not disclose idempotency, overwrite behavior, auth requirements, or failure modes. Adequate but incomplete.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences efficiently convey purpose and usage sequence. No wasted words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given no output schema and no annotations, the description explains the tool's role in a pipeline but omits return value, error conditions, or confirmation details. Adequate but not fully complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% with descriptions for all four parameters. The description does not add extra meaning beyond what the schema already provides, thus baseline score applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action 'Register an externally-discovered MCP server package' and distinguishes the tool from siblings by placing it in a pipeline: after gateway.search_registry and before gateway.provision.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly tells when to use this tool: 'Call this after gateway.search_registry to register the chosen package, then call gateway.provision to install and start it.' This provides clear context and ordering.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.request_capabilityA
Recommend the right tool for a task — describe what you need in natural language. Examples: 'scrape a website', 'search Slack messages', 'query Postgres', 'browse the web'. Matches against installed CLIs and 90+ provisionable MCP servers and returns ranked candidates; it does NOT start anything — call gateway.provision to actually install/start the recommended server. Prefer this over gateway.provision when you don't already know the exact server name.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | Yes | Natural language description of the capability needed (e.g., 'I need to scrape a website', 'browser automation') | |
| available_clis | No | Optional: CLIs known to be available in the environment |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description fully explains that the tool returns ranked candidates by matching against CLIs and MCP servers. It explicitly states it does NOT start anything, making the non-destructive, advisory nature clear. Absent are details about return structure or limitations like rate limits, but these are minor for a recommendation tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is extremely concise with three sentences: one explaining the tool's purpose with examples, one clarifying it doesn't execute, and one giving usage guidance. Every sentence adds value with no redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple recommendation tool with two parameters and no output schema, the description covers essential aspects: purpose, examples, non-execution behavior, and sibling differentiation. It mentions matching against 90+ provisional MCP servers, providing helpful context. Minor omissions like exact return format are acceptable given the tool's simplicity.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema covers 100% of parameters, establishing a baseline of 3. The description adds value by providing contextual examples for the query parameter (e.g., 'scrape a website') and explaining the available_clis parameter's purpose. It also mentions that results are ranked candidates, going beyond schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states this tool recommends the right tool for a task based on natural language description. It uses specific verbs ('Recommend', 'describe what you need') and distinguishes itself from sibling tool gateway.provision by clarifying it does not start anything.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly advises preferring this tool over gateway.provision when the exact server name is unknown, providing clear when-to-use guidance. It also offers examples of queries, though it lacks explicit when-not-to-use scenarios beyond the contrast with provision.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.restart_serverA
Restart a known downstream MCP server without changing persistent config. Refuses by default when that server has pending requests; set force=true to cancel them.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| force | No | Cancel this server's pending requests before restarting | |
| server_name | Yes | Name of the server to restart |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden. It discloses that the tool refuses by default if pending requests exist and that force=true cancels them. This adds meaningful behavioral context beyond just saying 'restarts a server'. It could mention that the restart is not persistent and that the server must be known, but overall it's good.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences, front-loaded with the main action. Every sentence adds value without redundancy. It is efficient and well-structured.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the simplicity of the tool (2 parameters, no output schema, no nested objects), the description is sufficiently complete. It covers the default behavior and the force option. It could mention what happens after restart (e.g., server comes back online), but the core functionality is clear.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3. The description adds value by explaining the default refusal behavior for the force parameter and how it relates to pending requests. This is extra context beyond the schema's 'Cancel this server's pending requests before restarting', justifying a 4.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool restarts a known downstream MCP server without changing persistent config. It uses a specific verb (restart) and resource (downstream MCP server), avoiding tautology. It also implicitly distinguishes from sibling tools like connect_server or update_server.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides explicit guidance on when to use the force parameter: when there are pending requests, the tool refuses by default, so force=true is needed to cancel them. It does not mention alternatives or explicitly state when not to use this tool, but the context is clear.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.search_registryA
Search the public MCP Registry for external servers not in the local manifest. Use this when gateway.request_capability returns not_available. Returns package names and metadata; call gateway.register_discovered_server then gateway.provision to install.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | Maximum number of results to return | |
| query | Yes | Natural language description of the capability needed |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It indicates the tool is a search operation returning package names and metadata, but does not disclose potential side effects, authentication requirements, rate limits, or error handling. The description is adequate but lacks detailed behavioral context beyond the basic read-only nature implied by 'search'.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences, front-loading the purpose and usage condition, then providing the expected output and follow-up steps. Every sentence adds value, and there is no redundancy or wasted words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a search tool with two well-documented parameters and no output schema, the description provides essential context: trigger condition, output type, and next steps. It does not cover edge cases or output formatting, but the schema compensates. Given the tool's simplicity, this is sufficiently complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% with clear descriptions for both 'query' and 'limit'. The description adds context by stating the query is a 'natural language description of the capability needed', which aligns with the schema. However, it does not elaborate on the 'limit' parameter, so it adds no meaning beyond the schema's own description.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the verb ('Search'), resource ('public MCP Registry'), and scope ('external servers not in the local manifest'). It explicitly distinguishes this tool from siblings like gateway.catalog_search and gateway.request_capability by specifying the registry target and the condition for use.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides an explicit when-to-use condition ('Use this when gateway.request_capability returns not_available') and outlines the subsequent workflow ('call gateway.register_discovered_server then gateway.provision to install'). This gives clear guidance on when and how to use the tool.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.set_startup_policyC
Preview or explicitly apply an autoStart add/remove/set operation against one selected config source or path.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| path | No | ||
| apply | No | ||
| names | No | ||
| source | No | ||
| dry_run | No | ||
| operation | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description mentions 'preview or explicitly apply' but does not disclose side effects, reversibility, or required permissions. With no annotations, the agent lacks key behavioral context.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Single sentence with no wasted words, though it sacrifices clarity for brevity. Could be better structured to separate preview vs apply modes.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Missing output schema and no return value description. Does not explain what happens after applying the policy or how to interpret preview results. Insufficient for a tool with 6 parameters.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must explain parameters. It covers 'operation' (add/remove/set) and implies 'dry_run' via 'preview', but leaves 'path', 'apply', 'names', and 'source' undefined or ambiguous.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool performs preview or explicit application of an autoStart add/remove/set operation on a config source or path. It distinguishes from the sibling 'get_startup_policy' which reads the policy.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No explicit guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives like 'get_startup_policy'. No mention of prerequisites or scenarios where preview/apply is appropriate.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.submit_feedbackA
Prepare and optionally submit a PMCP feedback issue to GitHub. By default returns an exact preview payload; set confirm_submission=true to submit.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| title | Yes | Issue title | |
| issue_type | No | bug | |
| description | Yes | Issue details (technical data only) | |
| failed_tool_call | No | Specific failed tool call (if known) | |
| confirm_submission | No | Set true only after user confirms submission | |
| subordinate_server | No | Subordinate MCP server involved (if known) |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden. It discloses the two-phase behavior: by default returns a preview, and submission only occurs when confirm_submission is true. This is clear and transparent, though no further details like rate limits or auth needs are given.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is extremely concise: two sentences, no wasted words. It front-loads the main purpose and then clarifies the key behavior (default vs. submission). This is an efficient and well-structured description.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given six parameters and no output schema, the description covers the main behavioral distinction (preview vs. submit) but omits details such as the preview payload format, error handling, or expected output. This leaves the agent with some gaps about how to interpret the result.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 83% (5 of 6 parameters described), so the baseline is 3. The description adds value only for confirm_submission (explaining its role in submission) but does not elaborate on other parameters like title, description, or issue_type. Thus, it provides marginal additional meaning.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool prepares and optionally submits a PMCP feedback issue to GitHub. It specifies the default behavior (preview) and the action to submit (confirm_submission=true). The tool is distinct from siblings, which are all about gateway operations, not feedback submission.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage for feedback preparation or submission but does not provide explicit guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives or when not to use it. No exclusions or alternative tools are mentioned, so the guidance is minimal.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.sync_environmentA
Sync environment information from the host. Detects the platform (mac/wsl/linux/windows) and probes for installed CLIs. This information is used to prefer CLIs over MCP servers when matching capabilities.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| platform | No | Override detected platform (optional) | |
| detected_clis | No | Override detected CLIs (optional) |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description fully explains the tool's behavior: it syncs environment info by detecting platform and CLIs, and the info is used for capability matching. It does not mention side effects like updates to internal state, but for a sync operation this is reasonable transparency.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences with no redundancy. Every clause carries useful information: what it does, how it works, and why it's used. Ideal conciseness.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool has no required parameters, no output schema, and simple behavior. The description covers the core purpose and parameters well. Minor omission: it doesn't state what the sync returns (if anything), but for a sync operation this is a minor gap.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3. The description adds context by explaining that parameters override detected values, which is meaningful beyond the schema's 'override' phrase. This elevates the score slightly.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description specifies the verb 'sync' and the resource 'environment information', and elaborates that it detects platform and CLIs. This clearly distinguishes it from all sibling tools, none of which mention environment syncing.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explains that synced info is used to prefer CLIs over MCP servers for capability matching, giving clear context for use. It does not explicitly state when not to use, but no sibling tools serve a similar purpose, so alternatives are not needed.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.tasks_cancelB
Cancel a downstream MCP task by opaque task ID. Use gateway.cancel only for PMCP request IDs from gateway.list_pending.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| force | No | ||
| task_id | Yes | ||
| server_name | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations provided, so description must disclose behavior. It only says 'Cancel' but does not mention side effects (e.g., whether task termination is immediate or graceful), auth requirements, or success/failure conditions. The 'force' parameter is not explained.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, no redundancy. However, efficiency is slightly compromised by not integrating parameter details, though the structure remains clean.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Without output schema or annotations, the description fails to explain return values, error states, or parameter semantics. The tool is a cancellation operation, but the user is left unsure of behavior.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, but description adds no extra meaning for any of the three parameters. 'force' is a boolean with default false, but its effect is not specified. 'server_name' and 'task_id' lack format or value constraints.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Description clearly states the verb 'Cancel' and resource 'downstream MCP task', and specifies the identifier type 'opaque task ID'. It distinguishes from sibling 'gateway.cancel' by noting it is for PMCP request IDs.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly states when to use this tool vs 'gateway.cancel', providing a clear boundary: 'Use gateway.cancel only for PMCP request IDs from gateway.list_pending.'
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.tasks_getC
Get current status for one downstream MCP task.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| task_id | Yes | ||
| server_name | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries full responsibility for behavioral traits. It does not disclose idempotency, error handling, or any side effects. The minimal statement 'get current status' lacks depth on what constitutes 'status' or expected outcomes.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single sentence with 9 words, achieving brevity. However, it is too sparse to be fully useful; it sacrifices necessary detail for conciseness. Front-loaded with the verb, but lacks structure for additional context.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's simplicity (2 params, no output schema) and lack of annotations, the description should provide more detail. It does not explain what 'current status' means, output format, or how to use the parameters effectively, leaving gaps for an agent.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, and the description adds no meaning to the parameters (task_id, server_name). It does not explain their purpose, format, or constraints, forcing the agent to rely solely on the parameter names and types.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the verb 'get' and the resource 'current status for one downstream MCP task', differentiating it from siblings like tasks_list (list) and tasks_cancel (cancel). However, it does not elaborate on what 'downstream' means, slightly reducing clarity.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives. It does not mention prerequisites, exclusions, or when not to use. The description simply states the function without context for selection.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.tasks_listA
List brokered downstream MCP tasks. MCP task IDs are opaque downstream task identifiers, not PMCP request IDs.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cursor | No | Optional downstream pagination cursor | |
| server_name | No | Optional server filter |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It discloses an important semantic distinction about task IDs being opaque downstream identifiers, which is useful context. However, it does not mention read-only behavior, return structure, or pagination; the schema covers the cursor parameter, but the description adds only this one behavioral nuance.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single sentence of 12 words, front-loaded with the verb and resource. The additional clarification about opaque identifiers is concise and earns its place without wasted words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple list tool with two optional parameters and no output schema, the description covers the core function and adds a key clarification about ID semantics. The cursor parameter's schema description already provides pagination context, making the description largely complete. A brief mention of the return format would be helpful but is not essential for correct invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema already provides descriptions for both parameters (cursor and server_name) with 100% coverage. The description does not add any parameter-specific information beyond the schema, so the baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb ('List') and identifies the resource ('brokered downstream MCP tasks'). The added clarification that task IDs are opaque downstream identifiers, not PMCP request IDs, further distinguishes this tool from related request-id tools.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage for downstream tasks rather than PMCP request IDs, but it does not explicitly state when to use this tool versus alternatives like gateway.list_pending or gateway.tasks_get. No exclusions or alternative names are provided.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.tasks_resultA
Fetch a downstream MCP task result and apply the same output redaction and truncation options as gateway.invoke.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| options | No | ||
| task_id | Yes | ||
| server_name | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden. It adds value by disclosing that output redaction and truncation options are applied, but it omits important behavioral details such as whether the call waits for task completion, error handling for missing/pending tasks, or permission requirements.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single sentence with a front-loaded verb, no redundant words, and all information is directly relevant to the tool's purpose.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
There is no output schema or annotations, and the description does not explain return values, error conditions, or the relationship to the asynchronous invoke flow. Given the existence of siblings like tasks_get and tasks_list, the description does not provide enough context for an agent to reliably choose and use this tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% and the description does not explain the parameters server_name, task_id, or the options object beyond referencing gateway.invoke for redaction/truncation. While the parameter names are self-explanatory, the description adds minimal semantic value and does not compensate for the lack of schema descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses the specific verb 'Fetch' and clearly identifies the resource as a 'downstream MCP task result', which distinguishes it from siblings like tasks_list or tasks_get. It also references gateway.invoke to clarify the output processing scope.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage for retrieving results from a downstream MCP task and mentions the same redaction/truncation options as gateway.invoke, but it does not explicitly state when to use this tool versus alternatives like tasks_get, nor does it mention prerequisites or exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway.update_serverA
Update a subordinate MCP server package to latest version and restart it so the new version is actually running. Call this to check for and apply an update -- the gateway does not volunteer update notices, so nothing will prompt you. Refuses to restart by default when the server has pending requests; set force=true to cancel them.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| force | No | Cancel this server's pending requests before restarting | |
| server_name | Yes | Name of server to update |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Despite no annotations, the description transparently discloses that the tool mutates the server by updating and restarting it. It also details the conditional refusal to restart when pending requests exist and the effect of force=true. While it does not mention potential side effects like version compatibility or downtime, the core behaviors are clearly described. The lack of annotations is compensated by the explicit statements in the description.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise yet informative, comprising three sentences that cover purpose, when to call, and behavioral nuance. It is well-structured, starting with the primary action, then usage context, and finally a caveat about pending requests. No unnecessary words or repetition; every sentence adds value.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given that there is no output schema, the description adequately covers all necessary context: the action (update and restart), the trigger (check for updates), and the behavioral condition (force). It provides enough information for an agent to invoke the tool correctly without needing additional details. The description is self-sufficient.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema provides descriptions for both parameters: 'Name of server to update' and 'Cancel this server's pending requests before restarting'. These descriptions are clear and adequate, and the tool description adds further context about force, explaining its purpose. The semantics are unambiguous, though the parameter descriptions are minimal. Overall, the meaning is well conveyed.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description explicitly states the tool's purpose: 'Update a subordinate MCP server package to latest version and restart it.' It uses a specific verb ('update') and a clear resource ('subordinate MCP server package'). It distinguishes itself from sibling tools like 'restart_server' by emphasizing the update aspect, making it easy for an agent to select this tool for update operations.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear guidance on when to call: 'Call this to check for and apply an update' and explains that the gateway does not volunteer update notices, so proactive checking is needed. It also mentions the conditional behavior with pending requests and force, giving explicit instructions on how to override the default behavior. This is sufficient for an agent to know when and how to use the tool.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
1 tool update
v2.1.1- Changed
gateway.update_server1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / forceAdded value: +{ + "default": false, + "description": "Cancel this server's pending requests before restarting", + "type": "boolean" +}
8 tool updates
v1.21.1- Added
gateway.auth_connect - Added
gateway.catalog_search - Added
gateway.config_status - Added
gateway.disconnect_server - Added
gateway.provision - Added
gateway.refresh - Added
gateway.tasks_list - Added
gateway.tasks_result
9 tool updates
v1.20.0- Removed
gateway.auth_connect - Removed
gateway.catalog_search - Removed
gateway.config_status - Removed
gateway.disconnect_server - Changed
gateway.invoke3 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / evidence_label_digestAdded value: +{ + "description": "SHA-256 digest of the caller evidence label", + "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / run_correlation_idAdded value: +{ + "description": "Scoped-advisor run correlation ID", + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / seat_correlation_idAdded value: +{ + "description": "Scoped-advisor seat correlation ID", + "type": "string" +}
- Removed
gateway.provision - Removed
gateway.refresh - Removed
gateway.tasks_list - Removed
gateway.tasks_result
26 tool updates
v1.18.0- First observed
gateway.auth_connect - First observed
gateway.cancel - First observed
gateway.catalog_search - First observed
gateway.config_status - First observed
gateway.connect_server - First observed
gateway.describe - First observed
gateway.disconnect_server - First observed
gateway.get_startup_policy - First observed
gateway.health - First observed
gateway.invoke - First observed
gateway.list_pending - First observed
gateway.provision - First observed
gateway.provision_status - First observed
gateway.refresh - First observed
gateway.register_discovered_server - First observed
gateway.request_capability - First observed
gateway.restart_server - First observed
gateway.search_registry - First observed
gateway.set_startup_policy - First observed
gateway.submit_feedback - First observed
gateway.sync_environment - First observed
gateway.tasks_cancel - First observed
gateway.tasks_get - First observed
gateway.tasks_list - First observed
gateway.tasks_result - First observed
gateway.update_server
TDQS
Scored across 26 tools
Every tool has a clearly distinct purpose with descriptive names and detailed descriptions. Ambiguities like gateway.cancel vs gateway.tasks_cancel are explicitly resolved in the descriptions, so agents can reliably differentiate them.
All tools follow a consistent `gateway.` prefix with lowercase snake_case verbs and nouns (e.g., list_pending, config_status, search_registry). The naming pattern is uniform and predictable across the entire set.
With 26 tools, the count exceeds the recommended upper bound of 25 for a cohesive toolset. While the gateway domain is broad, several tools could be consolidated (e.g., merging status/check tools) to reduce cognitive overhead.
The tool surface covers core lifecycle operations: discovery, provisioning, invocation, task management, config, health, and feedback. Minor gaps exist (no explicit uninstall/remove server tool), but the common workflows are well-supported.
Maintenance
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