PACT Board
Supported as the OAuth 2.1 authorization server for the hosted Claude apps: the board acts as an OAuth protected resource (RFC 9728) and verifies Auth0-issued JWT access tokens via the issuer's JWKS (with CIMD or DCR), matching the signed-in person to an agent's registered owner.
Supported as the OAuth 2.1 authorization server for the hosted Claude apps: the board acts as an OAuth protected resource (RFC 9728) and verifies Keycloak-issued JWT access tokens via the issuer's JWKS (with CIMD or DCR), matching the signed-in person to an agent's registered owner.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@PACT Boardlist all open tasks"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
PACT Board
An MCP server where Claude (web, Desktop, Cowork, Claude Code), Gemini and a headless Runner share work on one board. Every call carries a mandate: a chain of authority that traces back to a human, checked on every call, narrowing at each hand-off, revocable at any link.
How it fits together
Piece | What it is |
| the MCP server: 10 tools, project context, mandates, the append-only hash-chained log |
An OAuth 2.1 authorization server | signs people in for the hosted Claude apps. Bring any that issues JWT access tokens with a JWKS and supports CIMD or DCR (Keycloak, WorkOS, Auth0, …) |
Agent tokens |
|
| the Admin UI (Next.js, on Vercel). It calls the board's Admin API at |
Each agent has its own URL: https://<board>/mcp/a/<agent-id>. With OAuth, the signed-in person
must be the agent's owner; the board matches them to a registered human by verified email once,
then by the token's sub.
Client types: chat posts and watches tasks but never claims them; cowork (Claude Cowork, desk work
such as research and reports), design (Claude Design), code, gemini and runner claim and report. Claude Design has no connector settings of its own: it
uses every claude.ai connector, so a design agent is a second claude.ai connector pointing at the
design agent's URL, and Chat sees it too.
Related MCP server: Planwright
Tools
pact_whoami · pact_post · pact_list · pact_claim · pact_report · pact_defer · pact_revoke · pact_note ·
pact_message · pact_wait · pact_events.
Waiting for work. A program that keeps running (a Runner) holds pact_events open instead of
polling pact_list: the call returns as soon as there is a task the agent may claim (delegated to
it, open, or resumed by a person) or a message to it, and after at most 50 seconds with nothing. It
takes since, the same cursor as pact_list's next_since, so a dropped call loses nothing.
Holding it open marks the agent online in the Admin API. The board still cannot start an agent that
nobody runs. Contract and a client loop: docs/events.md.
Messages on a task. An agent that picked up a task and has a question asks the agent that posted
it with pact_message, instead of handing every question to a person. By default a message goes to
the other side of the task (the poster, or the agent doing it); to names another agent of the
project, or "human" for the people (they get a notification and answer from the task's page in the
Admin UI). Without body, pact_message reads the task's thread. pact_wait waits up to 50 seconds
for a message and returns it, so two agents that are both running talk almost in real time; the board
still cannot wake an agent that is not running. Unread messages show in pact_list (as inbox, not
marked read) and as a count in pact_whoami, and the Claude Code hooks hand them to Claude while it
works. A message carries no authority: it cannot approve, widen a mandate or change a task, and
deploys, prices, positioning and anything that needs approval still go to a person. Agents may send
each other 10 messages per task; then the board refuses (limit_exceeded) and tells the people once.
Bodies are redacted before they are kept, and every message is in the log.
Project context. pact_note holds a project's shared knowledge (decisions, conventions, links) so
every agent reads the same thing without anyone retelling it. Reading needs task.read; writing needs
context.write@project:<p>, which a fresh registration does not grant. A note a person pins in the Admin
UI is read-only for agents. Notes are redacted, versioned, erasable (PDPA), and served as reference data
with their author, never as instructions. They are also MCP resources:
pact://projects/<p>/context and pact://projects/<p>/context/<key>. pact_whoami lists their titles.
Signatures and credentials. The board signs every mandate with Ed25519 and publishes the public
keys at /.well-known/pact-keys.json, so a verifier elsewhere can check what the board issued. To
rotate, put a new PACT_BOARD_KEYS entry first and keep the old one until the mandates it signed have
expired. Mandates signed before Ed25519 (an HMAC under PACT_SIGNING_KEY) keep verifying. The ledger
stays the source of truth; pact.credentials is the interface that exports it as, or imports it from,
standard delegation credentials (Tenuo or Biscuit, by PACT_EXPORT_FORMAT). Agents that hold exported credentials
register an Ed25519 public key (pact-admin agent-key-add, code and runner agents only).
Exported credentials (Tenuo). With PACT_EXPORT_FORMAT=tenuo, pact_claim also hands an agent
that has a registered key a credential for the mandate it claimed with:
"credential": {"format": "tenuo", "external_id": …, "warrant_stack": <base64>}. A tool server
outside the board can then check each call offline, trusting only the board's public keys
(examples/tenuo_verifier/). The stack holds one warrant per ledger link, all held and signed by
the board, then a leaf held by the agent's key, which signs every call (proof of possession); the
board never sees an agent's private key. The leaf lives at most PACT_EXPORT_TTL_HOURS (default 24)
and is re-issued on each claim. action@project:P becomes Tenuo tool action with
project constrained to P; each limit becomes a per-call ceiling (every call must pass every
limit key); task_id is the one free argument; the TTL follows the link's expiry, at most 90 days.
When no credential can be issued (no key, or a wildcard scope such as task.*) the claim still
succeeds and says why in credential_note. Unset, claims are unchanged. The ledger stays the
source of truth: cumulative limits, DEFER and approvals are enforced only by the board.
Revoking a mandate on the board (pact_revoke, the Admin, closing or reassigning a task) puts every
credential id minted for it and for everything under it on a signed revocation list, one per format,
published at GET /.well-known/pact-revocations/<format> (version in x-pact-revocations-version;
an unknown format is a 404). For Tenuo that is /.well-known/pact-revocations/tenuo, a Tenuo SRL
(application/octet-stream). Verifiers must refetch it at least every 60 seconds and must fail
closed, refusing every call, when they cannot.
Exported credentials (Biscuit). PACT_EXPORT_FORMAT=biscuit swaps the format and nothing else:
the claim carries "credential": {"format": "biscuit", "external_id": …, "biscuit": <base64url token>}.
The token has one block per ledger link: the authority block for the root link, signed with the
board's active key (its Biscuit root key id is the first 4 bytes of SHA-256 of the public key, so a
verifier picks the right JWKS key after a rotation), then one attenuation block per later link. Each
block holds Datalog checks for its link's scope (tool(a), project(p)), per-call limits
(arg(k, $v), $v <= max, in millionths because Biscuit has integers only) and expiry; the last
block also carries holder("<agent key>") and refuses arguments nobody constrained. A verifier adds
tool(…), project(…), arg(…) and time(…) facts (pact.credentials.biscuit.authorizer_for).
Every block has a revocation id and a token's ids include its parents', so revoking any link fails
every token minted through it. Biscuit has no revocation list format, so the board publishes JSON
at /.well-known/pact-revocations/biscuit (application/json):
{"payload": "<canonical JSON>", "signature": "ed25519:<kid>:<base64url>"}, where the payload is
{"format":"biscuit","issued_at":…,"revoked":[<hex ids>],"version":n} (sorted keys, no spaces) and
the signature is over its UTF-8 bytes with the JWKS key named by kid
(pact.credentials.biscuit.verify_revocation_list). Importing Biscuit tokens is not supported yet.
Tenuo | Biscuit | |
Proof of possession | yes: the agent signs every call with its key | no: a bearer token; whoever has it can use it until it expires or is revoked |
Holder binding | leaf warrant held by the agent's key |
|
Revocation list | Tenuo SRL, board-signed | board-signed JSON (above) |
A later link widening | refused by Tenuo | not an error, but ineffective: only the authority block's |
Shape | one board-held warrant per link + the agent's leaf | one block per link |
Pick Tenuo where a leaked credential must be useless to someone else; Biscuit only where the verifier authenticates its caller some other way.
Imported credentials (Tenuo). An organization that issues its own Tenuo warrants can give one
to a PACT agent, and the board turns it into a root mandate. First an owner registers the
organization's Ed25519 key as a trusted root standing for a registered person
(pact-admin trusted-root-add <key> --human <id>, or POST /admin/api/trusted-roots
{public_key, human, label}; list with GET, revoke with DELETE /admin/api/trusted-roots/{key}).
Then an approver imports the warrant stack for an agent (pact-admin credential-import <agent> <stack>, or POST /admin/api/agents/{id}/credentials {format: "tenuo", credential}). Agents
can never import for themselves: there is no MCP tool for it. The board verifies the stack against
live trusted roots only (signatures, linkage, attenuation, expiry; anything else is
chain_broken), and requires the leaf's holder to be one of the agent's live registered keys and
every scope to fall within the agent's projects (project_mismatch). The new root mandate's issuer
is the trusted root's person, so its entries trace to a human; it expires with the warrant, and may
delegate twice on the board (0 when the leaf is terminal, never more than Tenuo's remaining depth).
Mapping is the export's in reverse: tool T with project Exact(P) or OneOf([P, …]) becomes
T@project:P; each Range.max_value(v) becomes a limit (the tightest across tools); task_id may
be Wildcard. Anything else is refused with invalid_request rather than dropped, since dropping
a constraint would widen what the issuer granted: a tool without project, a wildcard tool name,
other constraint types (Pattern, Range with a minimum, …), other arguments, outside approvals.
Revoking the trusted root stops every mandate imported under it (mandate_revoked). A revoked key
can be added again (trusted-root-add with the same key reactivates it), but only from then on:
mandates imported before the revoke stay dead and must be imported anew. An agent's
pact_revoke of an imported root gets not_issuer, and people revoke it like any root mandate.
Handoff. pact_report with completed, failed or canceled must carry a handoff in result:
a markdown section headed Handoff (what was done; repo / branch / PR / commit; checks; what is left;
what needs a human; links), or an object with a handoff key. Without it the board refuses with
handoff_required and the task stays open. Heartbeats (working) and input_required need none.
Budgets. A mandate's limits are free-form numeric ceilings, and every amount spent counts
against each link above it, so a child never spends more than its parents hold. Runners use two
keys: runs and turns. pact_claim with reserve={"runs": 1} takes a run in the claim's own
transaction (no room left: limit_exceeded, and the task stays free). pact_report with
usage={"turns": 12} records what a run already spent, even past a ceiling, and then answers
budget_exceeded with the keys that ran out, so the agent stops. When the chain has limits, both
answer with budget: what is left of each limit, the tightest across the chain. An agent can hand part of its budget to a
sub-agent through pact_post(delegate_to=…, child_limits=…) without asking a person, as long as it
stays within its own.
Agent preferences. Each agent has a JSON object of preferences (how it should work: language,
report style, …), set by people with pact-admin agent-prefs or the Admin API
(PUT /admin/api/agents/<id>/preferences) and handed to the agent in pact_whoami. They ride along in
every session, so they are capped at 4000 characters.
Daily brief. A task with action report.brief is a report for people. When it completes, its whole
result goes out as one brief notification. The result is redacted, cut to 2800 characters and its
Handoff section dropped, so it isn't just a "task closed" line. A runner with a report.brief schedule
and a chief-of-staff role (examples/runner/secretary-role.md in pact-runner) sends the CEO a morning brief this way.
When the result carries a report ({"greeting", "sections": [{"title", "items": [{"text", "task_id"}]}]},
which a Runner session returns in its structured output), the brief becomes one Slack card. Each item
about a task gets an "open task" button.
Slack cards. Notifications are Block Kit cards: an icon and headline, the task's title and detail,
the project and agent, and a button to the task in the Admin UI (PACT_ADMIN_UI_URL). An incoming
webhook can show link buttons but cannot receive clicks, so approving still happens in the Admin UI.
Notifications. The board tells people when it needs them: a task waiting for approval, a task
deferred or asking a question (input_required), a top-level task closing, and a task delegated to a
chat, cowork or design agent, which works only while a person has it open. It also warns when
an active agent's root mandate (the newest one a person issued) or its newest token is about to expire
(PACT_EXPIRY_WARN_HOURS, default 48) and again once it has expired, since an agent without them simply
stops. Each warning is sent once, and something that expired more than a day ago is never announced.
The sender process checks every 10 minutes. Each is written to a
notifications outbox in the same transaction as the event; a sender posts pending rows to the
organization's Slack webhook (set by an owner in the Admin UI, PUT /admin/api/org), retrying with backoff, so a Slack outage never fails board work. Messages
carry a redacted, shortened title and first line of detail plus a link to the task, never its body.
A mandate delegated with pact_post lives only as long as its task: once the task is completed,
failed, canceled or rejected, that mandate and everything under it is revoked, and open subtasks
posted under it are canceled. pact-admin migrate sweeps any left over from before this rule.
Refusals come back as is_error results whose text is JSON: {"error": "<code>", "message": …, "mandate_id": …}.
Run locally
cp .env.example .env # set DATABASE_URL and a long random PACT_SIGNING_KEY
createdb pact_dev
uv sync
uv run pact-admin migrate
uv run pact-admin human-add alice "Alice" owner --email alice@example.com # the first person bootstraps as owner
uv run pact-admin project-add web "Web" --by alice
uv run pact-admin agent-register code-web --by alice --client code --projects web
uv run pact-board # http://127.0.0.1:8787agent-register prints the agent's root mandate and a bearer token (shown once). For Claude Code,
put the agent's URL and token in the repo's .mcp.json:
{ "mcpServers": { "pact": {
"type": "http",
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp/a/code-web",
"headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer ${PACT_TOKEN}" } } } }uv run pact-admin --help lists the human-side commands (approve, resume, pause, freeze, halt,
revoke, erase a payload, verify the log).
Claude Code hooks
Optional hooks connect a Claude Code session to the board. Only UserPromptSubmit ever claims work.
Hook | What it does |
| when a session opens, shows the person the open tasks. Never claims. |
| hands Claude any unread messages, and auto-claim: when the person types, claims the oldest task delegated to this agent, only if every condition below holds, and hands it to Claude framed as another agent's request (the person's messages take precedence). Otherwise it says why nothing was claimed. |
| logs each shell command and file edit as an Entry on the one task the agent is working on (secrets redacted, output not kept). These entries are heartbeats, so a long task is not released. With no task in hand, nothing is logged. Unread messages to the agent come back as context for Claude, framed as information from other agents. |
| after each reply, tells the person (not the model) when open tasks arrived since that session last looked. |
Auto-claim takes a task only when all of these hold; missing any one, it claims nothing and tells the person why:
the repo turned it on:
PACT_AUTO_CLAIM=1in the agent's env file (off by default);the task's
delegate_tois this agent, and its sender is listed inPACT_AUTO_CLAIM_FROM(comma-separated agent ids);the session's permission mode is
default, so Claude still asks before acting;the working tree is clean (no uncommitted or staged changes);
the agent holds no other task (the claim is
exclusive, so two sessions of one agent cannot each take one);the project is not marked production, and not frozen.
Set up, per repo:
Put the agent's URL and token outside the repo, readable only by you:
~/.config/pact/<agent-id>.envcontainingPACT_URL=https://<board>andPACT_TOKEN=pact_…(chmod 600).Copy the
hooksblock ofhooks/settings.local.example.jsoninto the repo's.claude/settings.local.json(notsettings.json, which is committed), with the path tohooks/pact-hook.shand the agent id.
The script needs only sh and curl. If the config is missing or the board is down it prints nothing and exits 0.
The board serves the hooks at POST /hooks/a/<agent-id>/{session-start,user-prompt-submit,post-tool-use,stop} and accepts
agent tokens only. The script reports what the board cannot see in X-Pact-Auto-Claim, X-Pact-Auto-Claim-From and
X-Pact-Git-Clean headers.
Hiring agents
People hire agents from roles instead of registering them by hand. A role is a job description
kept in the Admin UI (agent_roles; eight ship with the board: chat, code, gemini, runner, worker,
secretary, design, cowork). It says what the agent can do, the project-relative actions its mandate grants
(e.g. task.work), its budget (limits), how far it may delegate, how long its mandate and token
last, and, for a Runner, the PACT_RUNNER_* settings and instructions its machine runs with.
POST /admin/api/agents/hire {role, project, id?, limits?, delegations?, days?, owner?, replaces?}registers
<role>-<project>(orid) with the role's scope, budget and term in one step, and answers how to connect it.An agent that signs in through a Claude app (chat, cowork, design) gets its connector URL.
One that uses a token (code, runner) gets a one-time setup code, valid for 15 minutes, never the token itself.
ownerhires it for another registered person. An OAuth agent answers only to its owner.replacesbans the old agent and makes the board tell anyone still calling it which agent took over.
pact-connect <board-url> <setup-code>(installed with pact-runner) runs on the machine the agent will use. It posts the code toPOST /connectand gets the token back once. It then writes the token straight into place:Claude Code: the
pactMCP server for the project directory, plus the hooks env file.Runner: its env file (mode 600) and role instructions, a clone (
--repo), and on macOS a LaunchAgent whosePATHholds theclaude,uv,ghandgitfound on that machine.
POST /admin/api/agents/<id>/renewissues a fresh root mandate from the agent's role. A Runner moves to it when the old one ends, so renewing needs no restart.PATCH /admin/api/agents/<id>with any ofrole_id,projectsandowneredits a hired agent.A new role or new projects reissue its root mandate from the role and revoke the old ones, as below.
A new owner changes nothing else.
Its id and client never change, because the log and its mandates name them. Replace the agent instead.
PATCH /admin/api/humans/<id>(owner only) changes a person'sname,emailorrole, or setsdisabled.People are never deleted, because entries, mandates and projects name them. A disabled person can't sign in or act.
A new email unpins their sign-in, so the next sign-in with it binds again.
The board always keeps one active owner.
POST /admin/api/tasks/<id>/editwithtitleand/orbodycorrects an open task. The log keeps the old text.POST /admin/api/agents/<id>/rolewith{"role_id": …}moves an agent to another role of its client. It gets a new root mandate from that role at once. Every root mandate it held before is revoked, so the old role's wider rights don't linger, and open tasks under them stop. Its token and connection stay.POST /admin/api/agents/<id>/setup-codegives a new setup code, e.g. for a new machine.Roles are managed with
GET /admin/api/roles,PUT /admin/api/roles/<id>andPOST /admin/api/roles/<id>/archive.
Agents registered before roles existed take the role their name and client point to (runner-x,
client runner → role runner).
Runner
pact-runner lives in its own repository, pact-runner. It wakes headless
Claude Code for work delegated to a runner agent; it can learn of that work at once by holding
pact_events open (the board cannot start a program that is not running). It holds
pact-connect and the push guard too. The board side is a runner agent with a budget, e.g.
pact-admin agent-register runner-web --client runner --projects web --limits '{"runs": 50, "turns": 2000}' --days 7 --by <you>.
For a task, the budget a Runner follows is the one on the mandate delegated with that task.
Organizations
One deployment can serve many organizations. Each one sees only its own people, projects, agents,
roles, tasks, notes, mandates and log. A person belongs to exactly one organization (humans.org_id),
and every Admin API call is limited to the caller's organization. An id that belongs to another
organization answers not_found with the same words as an id that does not exist.
What carries the organization: people, projects, agents, roles, approval rules, trusted roots, notifications and log entries. Everything else reaches its organization through a project, agent or mandate. The database refuses an agent in another organization's project.
What stays global: ids of people, projects and agents, because agent ids are part of MCP URLs, tokens and scopes. A taken id answers
id_taken.Roles: role ids such as
chatorrunnerrepeat in every organization. New organizations start fromrole_templates.Kill switch: each organization has its own (
orgs.halted), and the platform-widesystem_state.haltedstill stops everyone.Log: entries with no project go to the organization's own chain (
orgs.system_chain). The organization that existed before migration 019 keeps the_systemchain, because a chain's key is part of every entry's hash.The platform's operator (whoever can run
pact-adminagainst the database) has commands no Admin API route reaches:org-list(sizes only, no people),org-rename <id> <name>,org-halt <id>/org-unhalt <id>, andplatform-halt/platform-unhalt, the switch that stops every organization. Each writes to the affected organizations' own logs assystem, so their owners see what was done to them.log-verifychecks every organization's chains, or one with--org.
Signing up
With PACT_SIGNUP_ENABLED=true, someone who signs in but is not on the board yet can start their own
organization: POST /admin/api/signup {org_name, display_name, accept_terms: true, terms_version}.
They become its owner; the organization gets the roles in role_templates and the default approval
rules, and its first log entry is org.created. Someone an owner invited by email joins that
organization the first time they sign in instead, and never makes a new one. Until they sign up, the
Admin API answers not_registered; a disabled person gets account_disabled.
PACT_SIGNUP_MAX_PER_HOUR (default 30) stops sign-ups for a while when more organizations than that
were made in the last hour (signup_busy). It is a circuit breaker, not a limit on organizations.
Admin API
/admin/api/* is for people, not agents: it takes an OAuth access token whose audience is
<PACT_PUBLIC_URL>/admin, signed in with a second factor (amr contains mfa). Agent tokens and
tokens minted for agent URLs are refused. Roles: owners do everything (kill switch, production
flag, freezing, banning, trusted roots); approvers approve tasks, register agents, issue or revoke
mandates and import credentials;
viewers read. The UI lives in its own repo, hugo8xx/pact-admin.
Before revoking, GET /admin/api/mandates/{id}/impact shows what would go with it (mandates below,
open tasks that get canceled, agents that lose authority) without changing anything. Resuming a
deferred task takes an optional answer, which the agent then sees on the task in pact_list.
For the credential views, GET /admin/api/mandates also returns each mandate's format,
exported_as, external_id, issuer_principal and revocation_published (some id minted for it
is on a published revocation list); GET /admin/api/agents returns each agent's live keys, plus
listening_until and online (waiting on pact_events now, or less than 30 seconds ago); and
GET /admin/api/credentials/status gives, per format, the revocation list's version, the
revoked_count of ids on it now and its published_path, plus the current export_format
(PACT_EXPORT_FORMAT, or null).
Mandates are signed and never edited. To change an agent's permissions, POST /admin/api/mandates/{id}/replace with the new scope issues a fresh root mandate and makes it the
agent's own. With "revoke": true the old root and everything delegated under it go too; without
it, work already delegated under the old one carries on until it expires.
Configuration
Variable | Required | Meaning |
| yes | Postgres connection string |
| yes | ≥ 32 random characters. Verifies mandates signed before Ed25519 and, without |
| no | the board's Ed25519 keyring, |
| yes in production | this server's public URL, e.g. |
| for the hosted Claude apps | your authorization server's issuer URL; unset = agent tokens only |
| no | default |
| no |
|
| Admin API service | audience of Admin API tokens; set it to |
| no | default |
| no | a Slack incoming webhook for the |
| no | the Admin UI's URL, so a notification links to its task, e.g. |
| no |
|
| no | default |
| no | default |
Deploy on Railway
Create a project, add a PostgreSQL service.
Add a service from this repo. Railway builds the
Dockerfile;railway.jsonsets the health check.Set the variables above.
DATABASE_URL=${{Postgres.DATABASE_URL}}. Generate a public domain and put it inPACT_PUBLIC_URL.Deploy. Migrations run on start. Then, from your machine with the same
DATABASE_URL(Railway shows a public proxy URL), run thepact-admincommands above.In Claude: Settings → Connectors → Add custom connector →
https://<domain>/mcp/a/<agent-id>.The Admin API runs as a second service from the same repo, so the kill switch keeps working when the MCP side is down: add a service from this repo with
PACT_ROLE=admin, the sameDATABASE_URL,PACT_SIGNING_KEYandPACT_AUTH_ISSUER(Railway reference variables),PACT_ADMIN_AUDIENCE=<board URL>/admin, and its own public domain inPACT_PUBLIC_URL. Point the Admin UI'sPACT_ADMIN_API_URLat it, then setPACT_ADMIN_API=offon the board.
Checks
createdb pact_test # once; .env.test points DATABASE_URL at it
uv run ruff check . && uv run ruff format --check . && uv run mypy && uv run pytestThe test suite drops and recreates the public schema of the test database on every run.
Layout
Path | What |
| the 10 tools as plain async methods |
| project context notes |
| issuing, whole-chain verification, aggregate limits, revocation |
| append-only log, one hash chain per project, PDPA payload erasure |
| human-only operations (the Admin UI backend) |
| the Admin API as its own service ( |
| the board as an OAuth protected resource (RFC 9728, JWKS verification) |
| MCP tools, |
| credential adapters ( |
| the Claude Code hook endpoints |
| the hook script and a settings example |
| SQL schema |
| one test per done-criterion |
License
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- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceAdds trust, handoffs, and accountability to any AI agent via 14 MCP tools implementing the COWORK Protocol.4MIT

Planwrightofficial
FlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceEnables orchestration of autonomous coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, etc.) through an objective-native planning board with hash-chained audit trail. Humans define outcomes, agents claim and execute tasks via MCP.7-- AlicenseNot gradedqualityAmaintenanceEnables AI agents and humans to collaboratively manage kanban boards and Markdown documentation via MCP tools, with stable item keys, revision-safe editing, and full audit trails.MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables MCP clients to discover and create agents, durably submit messages with verifiable replies, and search source-linked local memory. Exposes eight authenticated tools with owner-approved OAuth, transcript-backed verification, and explicit control over history import and embedding.MIT