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Bee by HEOSSI

Official

Smith EIC Military-Grade Assurance

bee_smith_assurance
Read-onlyIdempotent

Run evidence-first critical-systems assurance reviews for authorized targets: plan engagements, assess controls, review evidence, plan red teams, and issue release dispositions.

Instructions

Commission Smith for an evidence-first critical-systems assurance review of a customer-owned or explicitly authorized target. A Bee-operated run is internal automated assurance, not government certification or an external-independent audit.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
taskYes
targetYes
profileNocritical-systems
evidenceYes
authorization_scopeYesCustomer ownership or written authorization and exact boundary

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.0.65

TDQS

B3.1/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, non-destructive and openWorld, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuinely useful context beyond that – that authorization is a prerequisite and that the output is internal automated assurance rather than certification – but says nothing about what artifacts the run returns, cost, latency, or what happens to supplied evidence.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, no filler, with the action and target front-loaded and the scope disclaimer trailing where it belongs. The jargon ('Commission Smith for...') costs a little clarity, but every sentence earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, 4 required parameters, and 20% schema coverage, the description is not complete enough: it never defines the task modes, the expected evidence format, or what the run produces. For a multi-mode assurance tool this leaves the agent guessing at invocation details.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is only 20% across 5 parameters, so the description carries most of the burden and does not deliver. It alludes to 'target' and 'authorization_scope' but never explains the five task enum values (engagement_plan, control_assessment, evidence_review, red_team_plan, release_disposition), the profile enum, or what 'evidence' should contain.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

It gives a specific verb and resource – commissioning a critical-systems assurance review against a customer-owned or explicitly authorized target – and the second sentence carves out scope ('not government certification or an external-independent audit'). It stops short of naming any sibling tool (bee_security, bee_verify_provenance), and 'Smith EIC' is never defined, so an agent cannot fully distinguish this from related Bee operations.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description states a precondition (target must be customer-owned or explicitly authorized) and a negative boundary (not a certification or independent audit), which implies when the tool is appropriate. It never names an alternative tool or a competing condition, so the routing decision versus bee_security or bee_verify_provenance is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.