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secure-edge-ai-governance

by h00w

Why this project exists

Edge AI governance is often documented as policy, diagrams, or compliance checklists. Those artifacts matter, but they do not prove that a release decision is actually enforced.

This project turns governance into executable software. A candidate release is approved only when deployment identity, two distinct human approvals, risk, drift, signature, attestation, and regression evidence satisfy deterministic policy. Any missing or failed control produces manual_hold.

Advisory AI can recommend. Deterministic policy and accountable humans authorize.

Related MCP server: @vaibot/mcp-server

Core engineering principle

The system deliberately separates:

  • probabilistic AI advice from release authority;

  • human accountability from automated scoring;

  • evidence collection from policy evaluation;

  • model quality from device trust; and

  • demo claims from production security capabilities.

The objective is not simply to predict whether a release is safe. The objective is to make the release decision inspectable, testable, fail-closed, and reproducible.

Release gate

flowchart TD
    A[Deployment candidate] --> B[Deployment identity]
    B --> C[Two distinct approvers]
    C --> D[Risk within limit]
    D --> E[Drift within limit]
    E --> F[Signature valid]
    F --> G[Attestation valid]
    G --> H[Regression passed]
    H -->|all pass| I[APPROVED]
    B -->|fail| X[MANUAL HOLD]
    C -->|fail| X
    D -->|fail| X
    E -->|fail| X
    F -->|fail| X
    G -->|fail| X
    H -->|fail| X

Architecture

flowchart LR
    A[Model / Firmware / Wasm Candidate] --> B[Cloud Control Plane]
    H[Two Human Approvers] --> B
    AI[Advisory AI\nRisk · Drift · Optimization] --> B
    B --> G{Deterministic Governance Gate}
    G -->|Approved| S[Sign / Stage Release]
    G -->|Failed evidence| M[Manual Hold]
    S --> T[Secure Transport + Attestation]
    T --> D[Edge Device Runtime]
    D --> O[Health / Drift / Telemetry]
    O --> B
    O -->|Failure| R[Known-good Rollback]
    R --> D

What is implemented

Capability

Implementation

Release evidence

Deterministic release gate

lib/policy.ts

explicit approve/manual-hold result

Separation of duties

policy + UI + MCP

duplicate approver identities rejected

Risk and drift gates

deterministic thresholds

out-of-policy values block release

Signature check

release policy

invalid signature blocks release

Attestation check

release policy

invalid evidence blocks release

Regression gate

qualification policy

failed regression blocks release

Governance simulator

web application

reproducible reviewer scenarios

MCP tool surface

/api/mcp

bounded governance actions

Streamlit reviewer demo

demos/streamlit/

portable public proof

CI

GitHub Actions

repeatable TypeScript + Python verification

Verify it in two minutes

  1. Open the live Streamlit demo.

  2. Keep all evidence valid and use two distinct approvers → approved.

  3. Change risk above the threshold, invalidate attestation, fail regression, reuse one approver identity, or remove an approval → manual_hold.

  4. Inspect lib/policy.ts and demos/streamlit/policy.py to see the policy implemented independently in TypeScript and Python.

  5. Check GitHub Actions for repeatable verification.

MCP governance tools

The /api/mcp JSON-RPC surface exposes bounded governance operations:

Tool

Purpose

request_two_person_approval

validate deployment identity and approver separation

evaluate_deployment_gate

execute the fail-closed release policy

place_manual_hold

create an explicit hold with reason and next action

An AI agent may call these tools, but it cannot override the deterministic policy implemented inside them.

Security boundary

Implemented as executable controls:

  • deterministic fail-closed decision logic;

  • two-person approval semantics;

  • risk and drift limits;

  • signature, attestation, and regression evidence checks;

  • explicit hold reasons; and

  • independent CI verification.

Not represented as completed production infrastructure:

  • identity-provider authorization;

  • hardware-backed TPM/TEE quote verification;

  • HSM/KMS production release signing;

  • production mTLS lifecycle;

  • append-only audit storage;

  • real OTA fleet orchestration; and

  • production rollback execution.

See docs/SECURITY_MODEL.md for the hardening path.

Run locally

git clone https://github.com/h00w/secure-edge-ai-governance.git
cd secure-edge-ai-governance
npm ci
npm run lint
npm test
npm run dev

Streamlit reviewer demo:

cd demos/streamlit
python -m pip install -r requirements.txt
python -m pytest -q
python -m streamlit run app.py

Proof chain

Architecture → Policy → Interactive UI → MCP Tool Surface → Tests → CI → Documentation → Live Demo

Author

Hendarmawan, PhD Eng.
AI Engineering · Secure Edge AI · Trusted Computing · AI Governance · Production AI

Website · LinkedIn · GitHub

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