driftguard_audit_dependencies

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are supplied, so the description carries the full burden. "Ispettore" and "scansiona" hint at a read-only action, but nothing states that package.json is not modified, whether a vulnerability database is fetched remotely, how long a scan takes, or what the findings look like. For a tool with zero structured metadata, that leaves real behavioral gaps.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single front-loaded sentence with the role first and the detection targets second. No filler, no repetition of the tool name.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no annotations, no output schema, and no parameters, the description is the only specification an agent receives, and it omits the return shape (findings list? severity? counts?), the scope of the scan (current project only, or a path), and any caveats. It covers what the tool does but not enough to interpret results.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema declares zero parameters, so there is nothing for the description to disambiguate. Baseline 4 applies; the description does not need to explain any arguments.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

"Scansiona package.json per rilevare pacchetti compromessi noti, malware supply-chain o librerie deprecate" gives a concrete verb, a concrete target file, and three explicit detection categories. It is distinguishable from driftguard_scan_secrets by the dependency/package focus, though it never names that sibling to make the distinction explicit.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by the security-audit framing: run this when you want a dependency risk check. There is no explicit statement of when to prefer it over driftguard_scan_secrets, driftguard_policy_check or driftguard_health_score, and no prerequisites (lockfile presence, network access, project root) are named.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.