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agentisend

agentisend

List webhooks

list_webhooks
Read-onlyIdempotent

Lists webhook endpoints to show delivery URLs, subscribed events, and enabled or disabled state so you can audit event routing without exposing signing secrets.

Instructions

Purpose: see where events are delivered, what each endpoint subscribes to, and whether it is disabled. NOT for: reading signing secrets. They are shown once at creation and never again — a listing that returned them would let every reader forge deliveries. Returns: each endpoint with its url, events and state.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "list_webhooks"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
limitNoPage size (1-100).
cursorNonext_cursor from the previous page. Omit for the first page.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
dataNoThis page of rows.
errorNoPresent instead of the fields above when the call was refused: code, message, fix, docs_url, retryable and, when waiting helps, retry_after_seconds.
has_moreNoTrue when another page follows.
next_cursorNoPass back as cursor for the next page; null on the last page.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint and non-destructive, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuinely new behavioral context: signing secrets are intentionally withheld and cannot be retrieved after creation, and each endpoint is returned with url, events and state. That is disclosure beyond the annotations, though pagination/deletion mechanics are left to the schema.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three labeled clauses — Purpose, NOT for, Returns — each earning its place with no filler, and the core purpose is front-loaded. Nothing is redundant with the schema or annotations.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter, zero-required read tool with an existing output schema and full annotation coverage, the description covers what it is, what it is not, and what comes back. Nothing an agent needs to invoke it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With 100% schema description coverage on both parameters (limit page size, cursor paging), the schema already carries full meaning and the description adds nothing about paging syntax. Baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (see) applied to a precise resource (webhook endpoints) and enumerates the exact attributes revealed: delivery target, subscribed events, and disabled state. An agent can distinguish this from create_webhook/delete_webhook without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The 'NOT for: reading signing secrets' clause gives an explicit exclusion plus the rationale (they are shown once, a listing returning them would enable forgery), which prevents a plausible misuse. It stops short of naming a sibling alternative for webhook mutation, so it is strong context rather than full routing guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.