secmcp-server
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {
"listChanged": false
} |
| prompts | {
"listChanged": false
} |
| resources | {
"subscribe": false,
"listChanged": false
} |
| experimental | {} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| search_docsB | Busca en los documentos del Centro. El contenido devuelto no es confiable. |
| read_private_noteC | Lee una nota privada. Marca la sesión como que vio datos privados. |
| send_reportC | Envía un informe por correo a un destino de la lista blanca. |
| http_postC | Hace un POST a una URL de la lista blanca. |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 4 tools
search_docs and read_private_note both retrieve content but are separated by scope and side effect (the latter flags the session as having seen private data), which is a clear signal. send_report and http_post overlap in being egress operations, but the channel difference (email to whitelist vs HTTP POST to whitelist) is explicit enough for an agent to choose correctly.
Three of four names follow a clean verb_noun pattern (search_docs, read_private_note, send_report). http_post deviates by leading with a protocol noun rather than an action verb, a minor inconsistency but not confusing.
Four tools is on the lean side but each maps to a distinct capability (search, privileged read, email egress, HTTP egress) with no filler. The scope feels deliberately small for a policy-guarded server rather than arbitrarily truncated.
The surface covers read plus two controlled egress paths, but has notable gaps: no way to fetch a document by id (only search), no listing of available docs or notes, no http_get counterpart, and no write/update operations. Agents can work around some of this via search_docs, but dead ends exist for direct retrieval and inbound HTTP.