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kernel_audit_logs

Query agent event logs for security analysis, including activity, errors, tool calls, token consumption, and failure patterns.

Instructions

Query the agent event log for security analysis. Shows agent activity, errors, tool calls, token consumption, and failure patterns.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "kernel_audit_logs"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
limitNoMax results (default: 50, max: 200) (max 200)
sinceNoOnly events after this ISO timestamp (default: last 6 hours)
agent_idNoFilter by agent ID
event_typeNoFilter by event type (e.g. 'run', 'step')
event_subtypeNoFilter by subtype (e.g. 'error', 'tool_call', 'completed')

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.5.1

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden. It conveys that this is a read/query of the event log and enumerates the categories of data returned, which is useful. It omits the default lookback window, result limiting behavior, and ordering/pagination semantics, though the most critical of these (default 6 hours, max 200) are recoverable from the schema.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two short sentences, front-loaded with the verb and resource, then the returned data categories. No filler and nothing redundant with the schema.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Five optional parameters, no annotations, and no output schema mean the description should explain both safety profile and return shape. It partially compensates by enumerating returned data categories, but says nothing about read-only safety, ordering, or how the filters combine. Adequate but with clear gaps for a security-analysis tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and every parameter (limit, since, agent_id, event_type, event_subtype) is documented with defaults and examples, so the schema does the heavy lifting. The description adds only the general framing of what dimensions of activity exist, not syntax or filter interaction details. Baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Query the agent event log') plus the payload it returns (activity, errors, tool calls, token consumption, failure patterns). However, it does not distinguish itself from close siblings such as kernel_audit_changes, kernel_audit_cost_report, or kernel_audit_who_changed, so an agent must infer the boundary.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The phrase 'for security analysis' implies a usage context, but there is no explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidance and no mention of the audit siblings that overlap in scope. The agent is left to infer that broad event-log exploration belongs here and narrower queries belong elsewhere.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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