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evgenyzh

network-terminal-mcp

by evgenyzh

terminal_write_secret

Inject a stored secret into a live password or passphrase prompt during an interactive terminal session, keeping the value out of tool arguments, results, and audit logs.

Instructions

Send a pass entry value at a live password or passphrase prompt.

Use this for every secret typed interactively (device logins, ssh, enable, TACACS). The value is resolved inside the server and never appears in tool arguments, results or audit; only the entry name and byte count are logged.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
entryYes
session_idYes

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
entryYes
stateYes
bytes_sentYes
session_idYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.1

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does well: it discloses that the value is resolved server-side and never appears in arguments, results, or audit, and that only the entry name and byte count are logged. It omits failure behavior, e.g. what happens if the session is not at a prompt or the entry does not exist.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the action, then the selection rule, then the security/logging contract, in three tight sentences. The backtick markup on ``pass`` is slightly noisy but nothing is wasted.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need no explanation, and the security model is covered. What remains thin is error/precondition handling for a tool that types into a live prompt, plus the undocumented session_id.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It clarifies that `entry` is a ``pass`` entry name whose value is resolved internally, which is genuinely useful, but `session_id` is never described beyond the implied "live" session context.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb and resource (write a ``pass`` entry value into a live terminal prompt) and scopes it to secrets, which distinguishes it in spirit from the sibling terminal_write for non-secret input. It stops short of naming terminal_write as the alternative, so the differentiation is implied rather than explicit.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

"Use this for every secret typed interactively" gives a clear selection rule, reinforced with concrete prompt examples (device logins, ssh, enable, TACACS). It never states the inverse case (use terminal_write for non-secret text) or prerequisites such as an active session sitting at a prompt.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.