MCP Inspector as MCP Server
This server lets an LLM inspect, test, debug, and steer other MCP servers over MCP tools.
Inspect MCP servers: list tools, list/read resources and templates, list/get prompts
Call tools on target servers with optional args
Manage persistent sessions: connect, disconnect, list active sessions; sessions auto-close after 30 min idle
Read session events: notifications, traffic in/out, errors, and steering messages
Inject human steering messages into a session for human-in-the-loop workflows
Choose transports: stdio, SSE, or HTTP with auto-detection, plus optional headers
Negotiate protocol era: legacy, auto, or pinned revision; reports negotiated protocol version and era
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@MCP Inspector as MCP Serverlist tools from my local weather server"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
MCP Inspector as MCP Server
A lean MCP server that enables LLMs to inspect and test other MCP servers. This is a self-contained implementation built on the MCP SDK v2 packages directly, without shelling out to external CLIs.
Features
Direct SDK integration: Built on the MCP SDK v2 packages,
@modelcontextprotocol/serverfor serving the inspector tools and@modelcontextprotocol/clientfor connecting to target serversAll transport types: Supports stdio, SSE, and HTTP (streamable) transports
Small footprint: Two runtime dependencies, the
@modelcontextprotocolv2 client and server packagesProtocol-era aware client: When connecting to a target server, can negotiate the legacy 2025-era handshake or the modern stateless protocol and report which era the server actually answered as (see Protocol negotiation)
Full MCP inspection: List tools, call tools, list resources, read resources, list prompts, get prompts
Session management: Persistent connections with automatic garbage collection
Event buffering: Capture notifications, traffic, and errors for debugging
Related MCP server: Mock MCP Server
Installation
npm install
npm run buildUsage
As an MCP Server
Add to your MCP config. While there are slight variances between different harnesses, the general format is the same:
{
"mcpServers": {
"mcp-inspector": {
"command": "node",
"args": ["/path/to/mcp-inspector-as-mcp-server/dist/server.js"]
}
}
}Available Tools
Session Management (NEW in v2.0)
Tool | Description |
| Establish a persistent connection to an MCP server. Returns a |
| Close a persistent session and release resources. |
| List all active sessions with their status and idle time. |
| Read buffered events (notifications, traffic, errors) from a session. |
| Inject a human steering message into a session's queue. |
Inspection Tools
Tool | Description |
| List all tools exposed by an MCP server |
| Call a tool on an MCP server |
| List all resources exposed by an MCP server |
| Read a specific resource |
| List resource templates |
| List all prompts |
| Get a specific prompt |
Connection Parameters
All tools accept the following connection parameters:
For stdio transport (local commands):
command: Command to run (e.g.,"node","python")args: Array of arguments (e.g.,["path/to/server.js"])
For SSE/HTTP transport (remote servers):
url: Server URL (e.g.,"http://localhost:3000/sse")headers: Optional HTTP headers object
Common:
transport: Force transport type ("stdio","sse", or"http"). Auto-detected if not specified.negotiation: Protocol era to negotiate as a client ("legacy","auto", or a pinned revision). See Protocol negotiation.session_id: (Optional) Use an existing persistent session instead of creating an ephemeral connection.
Protocol negotiation
When the inspector connects to a target server as a client, it speaks the MCP protocol. The protocol has two eras: the legacy 2025-era initialize handshake, and the newer modern (stateless) revision (2026-07-28 and later). The negotiation parameter controls which era the inspector asks for:
"legacy"(default): the SDK default. Perform the traditionalinitializehandshake. Maximum compatibility; works with every server."auto": probe the server to find out whether it speaks the modern stateless protocol, falling back to legacy. Use this to verify that a server actually serves modern clients.a pinned revision string (e.g.
"2026-07-28"): request a specific protocol revision.
Why this matters: a server that supports both eras will always answer as legacy when the client does not ask for anything else. Without negotiation: "auto" (or a pinned modern revision) you cannot tell, from a successful connection, whether a target server really supports the modern protocol. It simply negotiated down to legacy. This is the single most useful signal the inspector can return about a server during the SDK migration.
insp_connect and insp_list_sessions report the outcome per session. In the insp_connect response look for protocol_version (the negotiated MCP revision, e.g. 2025-11-25 or 2026-07-28) and era (legacy or modern); insp_list_sessions carries the same two values on each session in its listing.
Note on the inspector itself. The inspector is a tier-1 server: ported to the v2 SDK packages, it serves clients of both protocol eras, but it is not discoverable as a modern server. It does not implement
server/discover(the call returns-32601 method not found) orsubscriptions/listen. Thenegotiationparameter only governs how the inspector behaves as a client toward other servers.
Session Workflow
For debugging stateful server behavior, use persistent sessions:
1. insp_connect → returns session_id
2. insp_tools_list (with session_id) → uses persistent connection
3. insp_tools_call (with session_id) → state is preserved
4. insp_read_events (with session_id) → see notifications
5. insp_disconnect (with session_id) → cleanupSessions auto-close after 30 minutes of inactivity.
Human Steering & Observability
The inspector enables human-in-the-loop workflows where you can observe and guide LLM-driven MCP testing in real-time.
How It Works
┌─────────────┐ MCP calls ┌─────────────────┐ forwards ┌─────────────┐
│ LLM Agent │ ◄────────────────► │ MCP Inspector │ ◄──────────────► │ Target MCP │
│ (Antigravity) │ (v2.0) │ │ Server │
└─────────────┘ └────────┬────────┘ └─────────────┘
│
Events logged to
session EventBuffer
│
┌───────────────────────┼───────────────────────┐
│ │ │
▼ ▼ ▼
insp_read_events HTTP :9847/api mcp-steer CLI
(LLM reads events) (external access) (human injection)Viewing Activity
Via LLM: The agent can call insp_read_events to see what's happening:
{
"session_id": "sess_abc123",
"types": ["traffic_in", "traffic_out"],
"limit": 20
}Via HTTP: Query the steering API directly:
curl http://127.0.0.1:9847/api/sessionsSteering the Agent
Inject guidance messages that appear in the LLM's next tool response.
Using the CLI:
./bin/mcp-steer.mjs "Focus on testing the error handling paths"
./bin/mcp-steer.mjs --session sess_abc123 "Try calling with invalid params"Using HTTP:
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:9847/api/steer \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"message": "Check the authentication flow next"}'Using the MCP tool:
{
"tool": "insp_inject_steering",
"arguments": {
"session_id": "sess_abc123",
"message": "Great progress! Now test edge cases."
}
}Event Types
Type | Description |
| Messages sent TO the target server |
| Messages received FROM the target server |
| MCP notifications from the target server |
| Errors encountered during communication |
| Human steering messages injected into the session |
Typical Workflow
LLM creates session:
insp_connect→ getssess_abc123LLM starts testing:
insp_tools_callwithsession_idHuman observes:
curl http://127.0.0.1:9847/api/sessionsHuman steers:
./bin/mcp-steer.mjs "Also test the batch endpoint"LLM receives steering: Next tool response includes
⚡ STEERING from human: ...LLM adapts: Takes the human guidance into account
Examples
List tools from a local MCP server (ephemeral):
{
"command": "node",
"args": ["/path/to/some-mcp-server/dist/server.js"]
}Create a persistent session:
{
"command": "node",
"args": ["/path/to/some-mcp-server/dist/server.js"]
}
// Returns: { "session_id": "sess_abc123", "server_info": {...} }Call a tool using a session:
{
"session_id": "sess_abc123",
"tool_name": "search",
"tool_args": { "query": "hello" }
}mcp-cli
The same core, driven from a shell instead of from an MCP client. mcp-cli is a
third bin entry next to mcp-inspector and mcp-steer. It is non-interactive.
One command, one result, an exit code. The name is mcp-cli rather than mcp
because the Python SDK already installs mcp on PATH.
What it adds over the inspector tools is a client-side blocklist. The
2026-07-28 spec forbids a server from varying its tool set per connection. So
narrowing a surface without per-request authorization has to happen in the
client.
Install
The bin entry is mcp-cli. Install the package globally, or link this checkout:
npm run build
npm link # or: npm install -g .
mcp-cli --version # 2.2.0Then build a config from an existing Claude Code config:
mcp-cli import-claude # reads ~/.claude.json, writes ~/.agents/mcp-cli.json
mcp-cli servers # check what came acrossimport-claude replaces the server list and keeps the profiles already in the
file. A server removed from Claude Code therefore disappears here too. The entry
for this repo's own inspector server is skipped, and so is any entry with a dot
in its name, because the address syntax uses the dot as its separator.
Security note. import-claude copies each env value verbatim. If
~/.claude.json holds an API key in a server's env block, that key is written
into ~/.agents/mcp-cli.json in plain text, and you now have two files to
protect. The fix is to put ${NAME} in the config and export NAME in your
shell profile. Edit the imported file after the first import and the next import
will not undo it, because only the server list is rewritten. Check the file
before you share it or put it in a repository.
Config file
One JSON file, by default ~/.agents/mcp-cli.json. Override the path with
--config, or with the MCP_CLI_CONFIG environment variable.
{
"mcpServers": {
"forum": { "command": "node", "args": ["C:/Users/you/dev/forum/index.js"] },
"gsearch": { "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8766/mcp" },
"remote": {
"url": "https://example.test/mcp",
"headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer ${REMOTE_TOKEN}" }
},
"hosted": {
"url": "https://mcp.example.com/mcp",
"auth": { "type": "oauth", "scope": "files:read" }
}
},
"profiles": {
"default": { "block": [] },
"safe": { "block": ["gmail.send_*", "forum.post", "linkedin.*"] },
"housing": { "extends": "safe", "block": ["cortex.*"] }
},
"auth": { "store": "dpapi", "callbackPort": 8792, "clientName": "mcp-cli" }
}A stdio entry takes command, args, env and cwd. A URL entry takes url
and headers. The transport is detected from the URL path. A path ending in
/mcp means Streamable HTTP, anything else means SSE. Set "transport" to
"stdio", "http" or "sse" to override the detection.
A value in headers or in env written as ${NAME} is replaced from the
environment at call time. An unset name is an error, because a header sent as
the literal text ${TOKEN} fails in a way that is hard to read at the server.
Use url for a server that cannot run twice. mcp-cli reads its own config
and launches its own processes. A stdio entry that a harness also runs would be
launched a second time. A server that owns an exclusive resource, such as a
browser profile or a single port, must run once as a daemon and be reached
through a url entry. On this box google-search is that case, at
http://127.0.0.1:8766/mcp.
OAuth
A URL server that answers HTTP 401 with an OAuth challenge is signed in to once, by a person, and called with the stored token from then on:
mcp-cli auth login scalable # opens the browser; --no-browser prints the URL only
mcp-cli auth status # one row per url server: state, expiry, scope, issuer
mcp-cli auth refresh scalable # renew through the refresh grant, no browser
mcp-cli auth logout scalable # remove the stored credentialThe flow is the MCP authorization specification, revision 2025-11-25, as the
SDK implements it: the WWW-Authenticate challenge names the resource
metadata, the metadata names the authorization server, the client registers
itself dynamically when it has no pre-registered id, PKCE S256 and the
RFC 8707 resource parameter are always sent, and the redirect lands on
http://127.0.0.1:8792/callback (auth.callbackPort, or --callback-port).
login starts the listener first, prints the URL, waits up to five minutes
for the callback, exchanges the code, and proves the token with one
tools/list before it reports success.
Scope follows the specification. The client requests the scope the 401
challenge names, else the scopes_supported of the resource metadata, else
none. A per-server auth.scope is an explicit opt-in that widens the grant.
--scope on login is a step-up: it requests the union of what the server
granted before and the scope named now, through a fresh authorization request
in the browser, never through a refresh, because a refresh grant cannot widen
a scope. Nothing is added to obtain a refresh token: whether one is issued is
what auth status reports as refreshable.
Where the credential lives. Under <stateDir>/auth/ (default
~/.agents/mcp-cli-state/auth/), one <server>.cred per server holding the
tokens, the client registration and the discovery state as one blob, and one
<server>.meta.json sidecar holding only what may be read in the open: the
issuer, the client id, the scope, the expiry, and the time of the last write.
On Windows the blob is protected with DPAPI in the current user's scope, with
the server URL as entropy, so it opens only for this user on this machine and
only under this server name (auth.store: "dpapi", the default there).
Elsewhere, or with auth.store: "file", it is a plain file with owner-only
permissions, and login says so. The config file never holds a token: an
auth block that contains one is rejected, and a pre-registered client's
secret is named by clientSecretEnv, the way the bridge names its token.
What is never printed. auth status and auth login print the issuer,
the client id, the scope, the expiry and whether a refresh token is held;
never a token, a code or a verifier. Failure messages, the circuit file and
the event log pass through the same redaction as every other failure, which
also covers authorization codes and verifiers.
A call never opens a browser. Every lane runs headless: the stored token
goes on every request, a 401 runs the refresh grant when a refresh token is
held, and a login that would be needed is refused as auth_required with
the code oauth_login_required and the remediation mcp-cli auth login <server>. A refresh the server refuses deletes the tokens and reports the
same code with the note previous session expired. A 403 insufficient_scope
is oauth_insufficient_scope, with the required scope in the remediation. A
login moves the credential's stamp, which closes the server's auth_required
circuit on the next call and makes a running daemon reconnect with the new
token; no circuits reset and no restart is needed.
A server that answers 401 with no OAuth challenge is reported as before: an
auth_required failure that points at the ${NAME} header it was given.
A stored credential is bound to the URL it was minted for. When a config entry
keeps its name and changes its url, no token is sent to the new origin: a
call reports oauth_login_required naming both URLs, auth status shows
stale-url, and the next auth login replaces the record.
Profiles
Filtering is a blocklist. A profile subtracts from everything the servers
expose. Selection order is --profile, then the MCP_CLI_PROFILE environment
variable, then default. The name default may be absent from the file, and
then it blocks nothing.
extends chains one profile onto another. The child inherits every pattern of
its parent and adds its own. A cycle is an error.
A pattern is a glob over the full server.tool address:
Pattern | Matches |
| that one tool |
| every tool of |
| a tool named |
| every |
| every |
|
|
mcp-cli tools hides a blocked tool. mcp-cli tools --all shows it and marks
it with the profile and the pattern that blocked it. Calling a blocked tool
exits 3 and names both. An exact blocked address is refused before any
connection opens, so the server is never started.
A blocklist fails open on purpose. A tool a server adds tomorrow is callable immediately. That is wanted for servers you own, and it is the cost of not maintaining an allowlist for servers you do not.
Commands
mcp-cli servers
# forum stdio node C:/Users/you/dev/forum/index.js
# gsearch http http://127.0.0.1:8766/mcp
mcp-cli tools forum
# forum.post Post a message to the forum bulletin board...
mcp-cli auth login hosted --no-browser
# mcp-cli: Open this URL to sign in:
# mcp-cli: https://auth.example.com/authorize?client_id=...&code_challenge_method=S256&...
# hosted: signed in via browser
# issuer https://auth.example.com/
# scope files:read offline_access
# expires 2026-09-21T12:00:00.000Z
# refreshable yes
# tools 12
# forum.poll List subject lines of board messages you have not seen...
mcp-cli tools
# every server in the config. A server that failed to answer becomes a "!" line
# rather than aborting the listing
mcp-cli tools forum --all --profile safe
# forum.post Post a message... [blocked by profile safe: forum.post]
mcp-cli call forum.poll '{}'
# No new messages.
mcp-cli info forum
# server forum
# transport stdio
# serverInfo forum 0.2.0
# protocolVersion 2026-07-28
# era modern
# capabilities tools
mcp-cli resources n8n-mcp
# ui://n8n-mcp/operation-result Operation Result
mcp-cli read n8n-mcp ui://n8n-mcp/operation-result
mcp-cli prompts elevated-cmd
# elevated-cmd.run_process Include command output in the prompt...
mcp-cli prompt elevated-cmd.run_process '{"command":"ls"}'
mcp-cli search "berlin wohnung" --limit 3
# 1. Wohnung mieten in Berlin ...
# https://...
# ... snippet ...
# (Google first; when Google cannot answer, Brave, and stderr says so)
mcp-cli circuits status
# server open google-search rate_limited failures=1 until=2026-09-18T15:04:05.000Z "Google served /sorry/"
mcp-cli circuits reset google-search
mcp-cli import-claude
# wrote C:/Users/you/.agents/mcp-cli.json
# imported 19 servers from C:/Users/you/.claude.json
mcp-cli bridge exec "type /workspace/hello.txt"
# hello from the host bridge
mcp-cli daemon start
# daemon listening on 127.0.0.1:8791 (pid 26596)
# config C:\Users\you\.agents\mcp-cli.json
# log C:\Users\you\.agents\mcp-cli-daemon.logGlobal flags, valid on every command:
Flag | Meaning |
| config file to read. Also |
| blocklist profile. Also |
| one JSON object on stdout instead of text; a failure is the error envelope |
| total budget of one operation, queue wait included |
| with |
| with |
| read a call's JSON arguments from a file, without the |
| one string argument, repeatable; |
| one typed argument, repeatable |
| with |
| with |
| with |
| with |
| with |
| usage text, version |
import-claude also takes --from <path> for the Claude Code config to read
and --out <path> for the file to write.
Exit codes
Code | Meaning |
0 | success |
1 | the connection failed, or the tool returned an error result |
2 | usage error: unknown command, unknown flag, unknown server, bad config file, or arguments that are not a JSON object |
3 | the profile blocks this tool |
4 | refused before dispatch: a circuit is open, this exact request is excluded, the queue is full, the server needs the daemon and none answers, or the arguments are over the limit |
Results go to stdout. Errors and notes go to stderr, each prefixed with
mcp-cli: . A whole-fleet mcp-cli tools exits 0 even when some servers
failed, because the listing it produced is still useful. Naming one server that
fails exits 1.
Under --json a failure is one JSON object on stdout, {ok: false, error: {class, message, server, operation, attempts, trace, remediation, ...}, exitCode}, so a pipeline always reads one object. A successful result is
printed exactly as before. The classes, the retry rule, the circuits and the
envelope are in docs/mcp-cli-supervision.md.
search and circuits
mcp-cli search <query> runs one web search over the routes.search block of
the config: Google first, and Brave when Google answers with a rate limit, an
expired login, a stale extractor, or nothing at all. A query Google rejects as
malformed is not sent on. The rows have one shape from either provider,
{title, url, snippet, date?}, and the JSON outcome names the provider that
answered, whether it was the fallback, and every attempt with its class.
mcp-cli circuits status lists what the supervisor refuses right now: a server
whose credentials were refused, one that is rate limiting, one whose
connection failed three times in a row, and any exact request that failed
structurally. mcp-cli circuits reset [server] forgets them, which is the move
after credentials are renewed.
Addressing a tool
A tool is addressed as server.tool. The server name is everything before the
first dot, so a tool name may contain dots of its own.
Resolution is exact first. If nothing matches exactly, one case-insensitive match is accepted, then one substring match. A fuzzy hit is used, and the choice is printed on stderr:
mcp-cli call deepthink.list_branch '{}'
# mcp-cli: "deepthink.list_branch" resolved to deepthink.list_branchesSeveral matches are an error listing the candidates, and it exits 1:
mcp-cli call forum.po '{}'
# mcp-cli: "forum.po" is ambiguous. Candidates: forum.post, forum.pollServer names resolve the same way, minus the substring round. FORUM finds
forum.
When nothing resolves, the error answers with as much as it could determine.
call has already listed the server's tools by this point, and each descriptor
carries its schema, so naming the likely tool costs nothing beyond comparing
the strings.
One tool close enough to be a typo gets the call that would have worked:
mcp-cli call memory-store.memory_reed '{"name":"x"}'
# mcp-cli: No tool matches "memory-store.memory_reed". Did you mean memory-store.memory_read?
# mcp-cli call memory-store.memory_read '{"name":"<string>"}'No close tool on a known server gets that server's whole list, rather than an instruction to run a second command for it:
mcp-cli call memory-store.zzz '{}'
# mcp-cli: No tool matches "memory-store.zzz". memory-store has:
# memory-store.memory_search
# memory-store.memory_read
# ...An address naming no configured server, or carrying no dot at all, gets every server with the tools it last showed, ten per line:
mcp-cli call memory_read '{"name":"x"}'
# mcp-cli: "memory_read" is not a server.tool address. Configured servers:
# forum (post, poll, read, share_file, history)
# memory-store (memory_search, memory_read, memory_save, ...)
# scalable (not listed yet)That listing is read from <stateDir>/tools.json, which every successful
tools/list writes. Nothing is fetched to build it: a fan-out over a whole
fleet takes tens of seconds and would dial servers that are only failing. A
server no listing has reached yet is marked rather than waited for, so the
record is a display aid and never a gate. Entries are keyed against the config
file's mtime, so a changed config drops them.
An unknown server name exits 2.
Arguments
Arguments are a JSON object, in one of five forms. Omitting the argument means
{}.
mcp-cli call forum.poll '{}' # inline
echo '{"limit":1}' | mcp-cli call forum.history - # "-" reads stdin
mcp-cli call forum.history @args.json # "@path" reads a file
mcp-cli call forum.history --args-file args.json # the same file, no sigil
mcp-cli call memory-store.memory_read --arg name=pi-stack # one pair, no quoting--arg key=value gives one argument as a string and can be repeated; a dotted
key nests, so --arg a.b=c is {"a":{"b":"c"}}. It never guesses a type:
--arg n=3 is the string "3". A number, boolean, list or object is asked for
by name with --arg-json key=<json>, for example --arg-json limit=3 or
--arg-json tags='["a","b"]'. Pairs and a positional or --args-file together
are a usage error.
Git Bash is the documented shell on Windows. Windows PowerShell 5.1 strips the
double quotes from inline JSON before the process sees it, and single quotes do
not protect it. In PowerShell, use --arg, the - form or --args-file.
--args-file exists because @ is not shell-neutral. PowerShell reads a
leading @ as the array operator, so @("$path") evaluates to the bare path
and the file name arrives where JSON was expected. "@$path" and a bare
@$path both survive, but the rule is easy to get wrong and the failure used
to read Unexpected token 'C'. It now names the mistake:
mcp-cli call memory-store.memory_read @("$p")
# mcp-cli: Arguments are not valid JSON, but "C: mprgs.json" is a file that
# exists. To read the arguments from it: --args-file C: mprgs.json--args-file together with a positional argument is a usage error, because two
ways to say the same thing is a mistake rather than a precedence question.
format
--format <raw|compact|table|sample>, with call, says how a text result is
re-encoded before it is printed. raw is the text as it came. compact and
table re-serialise a JSON payload, as compact JSON or as a Markdown table.
Text that does not parse as JSON is a server's own answer and comes back
unchanged under every format.
sample is the one format that emits fewer items rather than fewer bytes per
item. It renders the lossless table first and hands it back whole when it fits
under pruning.thresholdBytes. When it does not, and the array holds at least
ten items with a field that repeats in nine of every ten, a run from the start
and a run from the end stay inline and one handle line sits between them:
| name | partition | ... |
| --- | --- | ... |
| okf-open-knowledge-format | eren | ... |
... 12 of 20 items withheld. mcp-cli spill get a1b2c3d4...
| zod-schema-checks | eren | ... |mcp-cli spill get <digest> returns the whole table byte for byte. Every kept
line is a line of the lossless table, in its original order. When there is no
repeated field to sample on, or fewer than ten items, sampling is refused, the
whole table is printed and the note on stderr says so. When even the minimum
keep-set is over the threshold, the prune that runs after adds its own byte
handle; each handle names the digest of exactly what its own spill entry holds.
--intent over a sampled result searches the whole lossless table, not the
sampled head, so a query that names only a withheld row still finds it. The
answer carries no handle line — the flag replaces the command it would print —
so the digest of the sampled table is noted on stderr instead.
The --json envelope
--json prints one envelope. Success and failure share a shape, so a caller
tests .ok once and then reads .result or .error:
{ "ok": true, "isError": false, "lane": "daemon", "result": { "record": { "updated": "2026-09-06" } } }
{ "ok": false, "error": { "class": "failure", "message": "..." }, "exitCode": 1 }lane is daemon or ephemeral: which connection served the call. A run under
a narrowed --config needs that, because the warm daemon runs its own config
and refuses a caller whose config differs. The call still succeeds on a fresh
connection, and the reason is now stated:
mcp-cli: the warm daemon did not serve this call: this daemon serves
C:\Users\yepis\.agents\mcp-cli.json, not C:\tmp\scoped.jsonA text result whose whole text is one JSON object or array arrives parsed, so
one jq hop reaches a field. Anything else — a log, a diff, a bare string —
arrives as the text that text mode would have printed.
Oversize results are pruned by shape, not by text. Text mode cuts a head and
prints a spill handle, which is right for a person and useless to a program:
the head of a cut JSON document does not parse, so every field below the cut
becomes unreachable. JSON mode instead keeps every key and replaces only a
string leaf larger than pruning.headBytes:
$ mcp-cli --json call memory-store.memory_read '{"name":"pi-stack"}' | jq -r .result.record.updated
2026-09-06 claude{
"ok": true,
"isError": false,
"lane": "daemon",
"result": {
"record": {
"updated": "2026-09-06 claude",
"body": "[18,432 bytes withheld. mcp-cli spill query 7f3a... --within record/body]"
}
},
"spill": "7f3a...",
"source": { "ref": "7f3a..." },
"next": {
"command": "mcp-cli",
"argv": ["spill", "query", "7f3a...", "--within", "record/body"],
"text": "mcp-cli spill query 7f3a... --within record/body"
},
"withheldBytes": 18432
}spill, source, next and withheldBytes appear only when something was
withheld, and they name one ref. next is the command that reaches the first
withheld field: spill query <ref> --within <pointer> prints its outline, and
--query "<words>" or --select <pointer> narrow it further. A pointer is
written record/body, /record/body or #/record/body; the three are one
pointer. Hints use the first spelling because Git Bash (MSYS) rewrites an
argument that starts with /, and one that starts with #/, as a Windows
path before the CLI sees it; cmd.exe and PowerShell pass every spelling
through. When a rewritten path does arrive, the CLI says so and names the
slash-free spelling.
mcp-cli spill get <ref> returns the whole result byte for byte. On that
record the envelope is 822 bytes where the whole payload is 19,390.
--intent under --json answers with the narrowed text, the same answer text
mode gives, because an intent asked for an answer rather than a document.
Every other command's --json output is the value that command built, printed
byte for byte: servers, tools, info, daemon status and bridge exec
are unchanged.
bridge
mcp-cli bridge runs commands in a Windows cmd.exe shell for a client that
lives somewhere else, usually an agent inside a container that needs a real
Windows shell.
There is no allowlist, so anything that can reach the socket with the token
can run any command as you. A bridge bound to anything but loopback requires
a bearer token on /exec: bridge.authTokenEnv names the environment
variable that holds it, the value is read at start and never written to the
config, the log or a response, and a request without it is answered 401. Two
commands run at once and eight wait; the ninth is answered 503 with a
Retry-After. Output is cut at bridge.maxOutputBytes per stream, one
mebibyte by default, with the cut counted in truncated. Use it on one
machine, let the Windows firewall prompt be the boundary, and do not expose
the port to a network you do not control.
One folder has two names. The client says /workspace, Windows says
C:\Users\you\agent-workspace. The bridge translates in three places: the
cwd, the command string, and the host paths in stdout and stderr. Two guards
keep the command rewrite from over-reaching. http://example.com/workspace/y
stays a URL, because the root is preceded by a slash. /workspace-foo stays
itself, because the root is followed by a hyphen. A command that runs out of its
budget returns exit 124 and timeout after Ns.
Configuration is a top-level bridge object in ~/.agents/mcp-cli.json, with
containerRoot, hostRoot, port, bind, defaultTimeout, maxTimeout,
authTokenEnv, maxActive, maxQueued and maxOutputBytes. Every key is
optional and the defaults are /workspace, <home>\agent-workspace, 8790,
0.0.0.0, 600, 3600, none, 2, 8 and 1048576. The timeouts are seconds.
--port and --bind override the file. GET /health/live, GET /health/ready and GET /status answer without a token.
mcp-cli bridge selftest # six path-contract rows, exit 1 on any FAIL
mcp-cli bridge exec "type /workspace/hello.txt" # one command, no server, the child's exit code
mcp-cli bridge serve --port 8790 # POST /exec and nothing else
mcp-cli bridge mcp # the host_exec tool over stdiobridge exec also takes --cwd, --stdin and --timeout, and --timeout is
seconds here rather than milliseconds.
For OpenHands, start bridge serve on the host and post from the container:
curl -s -X POST http://host.docker.internal:8790/exec \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H "Authorization: Bearer $MCP_CLI_BRIDGE_TOKEN" \
-d '{"cmd":"dir /workspace"}'
# {"exit":0,"stdout":" Directory of /workspace\r\n...","stderr":""}For Claude Code, Codex and mcp-cli itself, register the stdio adapter:
{ "mcpServers": { "bridge": { "command": "mcp-cli", "args": ["bridge", "mcp"] } } }Then mcp-cli tools bridge shows bridge.host_exec. A non-zero exit comes back
as a normal result, not a tool error. The bridge filters no commands; the only
narrowing is the profile blocklist, which applies when the tool is reached
through mcp-cli call, so --profile nobridge with "block": ["bridge.*"]
exits 3.
A command that fails is still HTTP 200 with its code in exit. A body that is
not JSON answers 400, a missing or wrong token 401, a body that is JSON but not
a valid request 500, and a full queue 503; either way the server keeps serving.
Full detail, including the config table and the module layout, is in docs/host-bridge.md.
daemon
mcp-cli daemon keeps one live connection per server, so two calls reach the
same server process instead of two. That matters for a stdio server that holds
its own state: cortex holds a Playwright page, and without the daemon the
second call gets a new process and an empty page.
mcp-cli daemon start # explicit, prints the pid
mcp-cli call cortex.browser_navigate '{"url":"https://example.com"}'
mcp-cli call cortex.browser_snapshot '{}' # same page, same process
mcp-cli daemon status # what is warm
mcp-cli daemon stop # close it allIt listens on 127.0.0.1:8791 and nothing else, because it holds connections to
servers that already carry your credentials. There is no authentication; the
loopback bind is the boundary. --port, MCP_CLI_DAEMON_PORT and daemon.port
move it, and mcp-cli daemon serve runs it in the foreground, which is what the
scheduled task runs. The port is not 9847, the steering API, and not 8790, the
bridge.
daemon.prewarm names the servers serve connects right after it starts
listening, one at a time, and GET /health/ready answers 200 once every one
has been tried; GET /health/live answers as soon as the process does. The
daemon serialises operations per server for every process that shares it,
drops a warm session after a connection failure so the next call connects
fresh, and answers every failure with the class the caller's executor reads.
On Windows, scripts/windows/mcp-cli-tasks.ps1 -Action install registers the
daemon and the bridge as scheduled tasks that start at logon. Each task runs
a supervisor loop that starts the process again within seconds of an exit,
and a watchdog task checks both every two minutes and restarts whichever does
not answer /health/ready. The scheduler's own restart-on-failure is
configured and not relied on; -Action probe-restart records what it does on
the box and -Action status quotes that as observed. -Action status,
repair, rollback and uninstall do what they say, and every install backs
up the previous task definitions first. See
docs/mcp-cli-daemon.md.
With no daemon running, every command behaves exactly as it did before: a
refused connection on 8791 means "no daemon", never a failure. MCP_CLI_DAEMON=0
turns the daemon off for one run without stopping it for other shells.
Two things do not change when a daemon is running. The tool list is never
cached, so a server edited between two calls still shows its new tools on the
second one. The profile blocklist is enforced in the CLI process as well as in
the daemon, so mcp-cli --profile safe call forum.post still exits 3 before
anything is contacted.
One thing to know: mcp-cli tools with no server argument connects to every
configured server, and with the daemon running all of them then stay warm for
thirty idle minutes. Name a server when you only want one.
Full detail, including the lifecycle and the wire format, is in docs/mcp-cli-daemon.md.
Connection model
With no daemon, every call connects, discovers, acts and disconnects. With a
daemon, the connection is opened once and reused, and the call still discovers
and acts. The protocol era is negotiated per connection either way, so legacy
servers keep working alongside modern ones, and mcp-cli info <server> reports
the era a server answered with. A server edited between two calls exposes its
new tools on the second one in both modes, which makes the CLI a development
loop with no reload command.
src/supervise/executor.ts holds the one seam. Every command hands it an
operation, and the two lanes behind it, ephemeral and daemon, perform that
operation while the executor decides the queue, the deadline, the retry and
the circuits. That module is described in
docs/mcp-cli-supervision.md; the architecture
pass behind the module layout is in
docs/mcp-cli-architecture-pass.md.
Architecture
├── src/
│ ├── server.ts # MCP server exposing inspector tools
│ ├── client.ts # Client wrapper (hybrid stateless/session mode)
│ ├── transport.ts # Transport factory (stdio, SSE, HTTP) + TracingWrapper
│ ├── session.ts # SessionRegistry with GC (30-min TTL)
│ ├── events.ts # EventBuffer (ring buffer for notifications)
│ ├── http-body.ts # read a request body, shared by the two loopback surfaces
│ ├── bridge/ # the host bridge
│ │ ├── path-map.ts # /workspace <-> C:\...gent-workspace, three rewrites
│ │ ├── exec.ts # run one command through cmd.exe, exit 124 on timeout
│ │ ├── selftest.ts # the six path-contract cases
│ │ ├── http.ts # POST /exec with a bearer token, a 2+8 gate and health
│ │ └── mcp-server.ts # the host_exec tool over stdio
│ ├── daemon/ # the mcp-cli warm daemon
│ │ ├── registry.ts # WarmServers: one live connection per server name
│ │ ├── core.ts # check, queue, dispatch, classify, drop a dead session
│ │ └── http.ts # POST /op, GET /status, /health/live, /health/ready
│ ├── supervise/ # the executor: queue, deadline, classes, retries, circuits
│ │ ├── executor.ts # McpExecutor.execute(server, operation)
│ │ ├── classify.ts, policy.ts, circuits.ts, store.ts, queue.ts, events.ts
│ │ └── ephemeral-lane.ts, daemon-lane.ts, scripted-lane.ts
│ ├── search/ # the SearchProvider port, Google, Brave, and the route
│ └── cli/ # mcp-cli
│ ├── index.ts # command bodies
│ ├── fleet.ts # servers + profile; answers without connecting
│ ├── server-session.ts # one open session, and performOnClient
│ ├── daemon.ts # daemon start, stop, status, serve, prewarm
│ ├── search.ts # mcp-cli search
│ ├── circuits.ts # mcp-cli circuits status | reset
│ ├── output.ts # text or JSON, one place that writes
│ ├── errors.ts # each failure carries its exit code
│ ├── config.ts # config file shape, ${ENV}, glob, profiles, supervision
│ ├── bridge.ts # the four bridge subcommands
│ ├── args.ts, input.ts, match.ts, import.ts
├── scripts/windows/
│ └── mcp-cli-tasks.ps1 # install, status, repair, watchdog, rollback the two services
├── bin/
│ └── mcp-steer.mjs # CLI tool for human steering
├── tests/ # Integration test scripts (run with npx tsx)
└── vitest.config.ts # Unit test + coverage configWhy This Exists
The original MCP Inspector is a web-based UI + CLI combo spread across multiple projects. This consolidates the core functionality into a single, lean MCP server that an LLM can use to:
Develop and debug MCP servers iteratively
Test MCP server functionality without leaving the conversation
Explore what tools/resources/prompts an MCP server exposes
Debug stateful behavior with persistent sessions
Development
npm install # install dependencies
npm run build # compile TypeScript
npm run dev # watch mode
npm test # run unit tests
npm run test:cov # run tests with coverage
npm run lint # lint source files
npm run format # auto-format with Prettier
npm run typecheck # type-check without emittingChangelog
v2.2.0
Five caller-facing fixes from pilot-05 (2026-09-22), each checked through cmd.exe, Windows PowerShell 5.1 and Git Bash by scripts/shell-matrix.mjs; see tests/shell-matrix/README.md.
Added
--arg key=valueand--arg-json key=<json>: one call argument per flag with no quoting rule in any shell, a dotted key nests, a value is a string unless--arg-jsonnames its type. Windows PowerShell 5.1 strips the quotes from inline JSON, so this is the form to use thereA
--jsonfailure is reported once, as the envelope on stdout; nothing repeats it on stderr. Text mode is unchangedA withheld-body envelope names one ref:
spill,source.ref, the marker andnextall carry the source ref,nextreaches the first withheld field with--within, andspill get <ref>prints the result's own text byte for byteA
spill queryexcerpt never opens or closes inside a word, andresult.totalsays how many items the whole answer holds before pagingA pointer may be written
record/body,/record/bodyor#/record/body; hints use the first because Git Bash (MSYS) rewrites the other two as Windows paths, and a rewritten path is refused with a message that names the fix--jsonprints one envelope forcall,{ok, isError, lane, result}on success to match the failure envelope it already printed. A JSON payload arrives parsed instead of escaped inside a string, so onejqhop reaches a field, and an oversize result is pruned by shape rather than by text: every key survives and only a string leaf overpruning.headBytesis replaced, withspillandwithheldBytesbeside it. On a 19,390-byte memory record the envelope is 822 bytes. Every other command's--jsonoutput is unchangedAn address that resolves to nothing answers with what it could determine: the call that would have worked when one tool is within two edits, that server's whole tool list when only the server is known, and every server with the tools it last showed when neither is. The widest of the three is read from
<stateDir>/tools.json, which every successful listing writes, so it costs 0.3 s instead of a 25 s fan-out and never dials a failing serverAdded
--args-file <path>: a call's JSON arguments from a file with no@sigil, because PowerShell reads a leading@as the array operator. Argument text that does not parse but does name an existing file now says so instead of reportingUnexpected token 'C'Added
mcp-cli tools <server> --schema: each tool's argument schema, which is also where the corrected call in an address error comes fromA call the warm daemon did not serve says why on stderr, so a run under a narrowed
--configcannot silently look like a warm oneThe Windows tasks supervise their own process: a loop inside each service task restarts node within seconds of an exit, the watchdog probes
/health/readyon both services and never starts a second loop,statusprints a recovery block with the supervisor state, the watchdog tick age and the scheduler probe as observed, and-Action probe-restartmeasures the scheduler's restart-on-failure instead of assuming itAdded
mcp-cli auth login|status|logout|refresh: OAuth for a URL server per the MCP authorization specification (revision 2025-11-25) through the SDK's own flow. The credential is DPAPI-protected on Windows and owner-only elsewhere, the sidecar holds nothing secret, a login closes the server'sauth_requiredcircuit and reconnects a warm daemon, and no lane ever opens a browser: a needed login is reported asoauth_login_required. Scope follows the specification;auth.scopeis an explicit opt-inPut one executor between every command and every server: operations instead of callbacks, one queue per server with the wait counted against the deadline, eight failure classes, one retry for reads and none for anything that may write, server and request circuits persisted across processes, a JSONL event log with trace ids, a
--jsonfailure envelope, and exit code 4 for a refusal before dispatch. See docs/mcp-cli-supervision.mdAdded
mcp-cli search: Google first, Brave when Google cannot answer, one row shape from either, andmcp-cli circuits status|resetThe daemon prewarms the servers
daemon.prewarmnames, serialises per server, drops a dead warm session, answers/health/liveand/health/ready, and logs to a file with--logThe bridge requires a bearer token on a network bind (
bridge.authTokenEnv), runs two commands at once with eight queued, cuts output atbridge.maxOutputBytes, and answers/health/live,/health/readyand/statusAdded
scripts/windows/mcp-cli-tasks.ps1: the daemon and the bridge as supervised scheduled tasks with a two-minute watchdog, backups and rollbackThe
sampleformat's minimum is ten items, the count its ratio rule already impliednpm run format:checkchecks files again on WindowsAdded
mcp-cli daemon: an explicitly started, loopback-only daemon on port 8791 that keeps one live connection per server, so a stdio server keeps its own state between two calls. The tool list is never cached, and the profile blocklist is enforced in both processes. See docs/mcp-cli-daemon.mdAdded
mcp-cli bridge: a zero-auth host exec bridge with a/workspacepath contract, served either asPOST /execover HTTP or as thehost_execMCP tool over stdio. See docs/host-bridge.mdAdded the
negotiationconnection parameter for client-side protocol-era negotiation (legacy/auto/ pinned revision)insp_connectandinsp_list_sessionsnow report the negotiated protocol revision and era of each session
v2.1.0
Added human steering (
insp_inject_steering) for human-in-the-loop workflowsAdded HTTP API on port 9847 for external steering/observability
Added
mcp-steer.mjsCLI tool for easy human interactionFixed critical bug in
TracingTransportWrapperwhere handler capture timing caused message loss
v2.0.0
Added session management (
insp_connect,insp_disconnect,insp_list_sessions)Added event buffering (
insp_read_events)All inspection tools now support optional
session_idfor persistent connectionsAdded automatic garbage collection (30-minute TTL for idle sessions)
Backward compatible: omit
session_idfor original ephemeral behavior
v1.0.0
Initial release with ephemeral connections
License
MIT
Targeted retrieval and checked execution
Read the query and process guide for exact tool schemas, bounded queries over retained responses, version 2 output, and native process execution with raw stdout and stderr capture. Existing envelope and shell requests remain supported.
Available Tools
7 toolsinsp_prompts_getC
Get a specific prompt from an MCP server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| command | No | Command to run the MCP server (e.g., 'node', 'python') | |
| args | No | Arguments to pass to the command (e.g., ['build/index.js']) | |
| url | No | URL for SSE/HTTP transport (alternative to command) | |
| transport | No | Transport type (auto-detected if not specified) | |
| headers | No | HTTP headers for SSE/HTTP transport | |
| prompt_name | Yes | Name of the prompt to get | |
| prompt_args | No | Arguments to pass to the prompt |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries full burden for behavioral disclosure but offers minimal information. It states the tool retrieves a prompt but doesn't describe what happens if the prompt doesn't exist, whether authentication is required, if there are rate limits, what format the prompt returns in, or whether this is a read-only operation. The description is too basic for a tool with 7 parameters and server interaction.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, clear sentence that gets straight to the point with zero wasted words. It's appropriately sized for a retrieval operation and front-loads the essential information. Every word earns its place in communicating the core functionality.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a tool with 7 parameters, server communication, and no output schema, the description is insufficiently complete. It doesn't explain what constitutes a 'prompt' in this system, what the return format looks like, error handling, or authentication requirements. The combination of complex parameters and no annotations means the description should provide more contextual information about the operation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all 7 parameters thoroughly. The description adds no additional parameter information beyond what's in the schema - it doesn't explain relationships between parameters (like command/args vs url/transport), provide examples of prompt_name formats, or clarify when prompt_args are needed. This meets the baseline for high schema coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action ('Get') and resource ('a specific prompt from an MCP server'), making the purpose immediately understandable. It distinguishes from sibling tools like 'insp_prompts_list' by specifying retrieval of a single prompt rather than listing multiple. However, it doesn't explicitly mention what 'prompt' refers to in this context (e.g., AI prompt templates, system prompts).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives. It doesn't mention when to choose this over 'insp_prompts_list' (for listing all prompts) or 'insp_tools_call' (which might handle different operations). There's no discussion of prerequisites, error conditions, or typical use cases for prompt retrieval.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
insp_prompts_listC
List all prompts exposed by an MCP server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| command | No | Command to run the MCP server (e.g., 'node', 'python') | |
| args | No | Arguments to pass to the command (e.g., ['build/index.js']) | |
| url | No | URL for SSE/HTTP transport (alternative to command) | |
| transport | No | Transport type (auto-detected if not specified) | |
| headers | No | HTTP headers for SSE/HTTP transport |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries full burden for behavioral disclosure. It states it's a list operation, implying read-only behavior, but doesn't mention any side effects, permissions required, rate limits, or what the output format looks like. For a tool that interacts with external servers, this lack of operational context is a significant gap.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, clear sentence that efficiently conveys the core purpose without any fluff. It's front-loaded with the main action and resource, making it easy to parse. Every word earns its place in defining what the tool does.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the complexity of connecting to external servers via multiple transport methods and the lack of annotations and output schema, the description is insufficient. It doesn't explain what 'prompts' are in this context, how results are returned, or any error conditions. For a tool with 5 parameters and no structured safety hints, more operational detail is needed.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema fully documents all 5 parameters. The description adds no parameter-specific information beyond implying the tool connects to an MCP server. This meets the baseline of 3 where the schema does the heavy lifting, but the description doesn't compensate with additional context like default behaviors or parameter interactions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action ('List all prompts') and the target resource ('exposed by an MCP server'), making the purpose immediately understandable. It distinguishes from siblings like insp_tools_list by specifying 'prompts' rather than 'tools', but doesn't explicitly contrast with insp_prompts_get, which would fetch a specific prompt rather than list all.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives like insp_prompts_get or insp_tools_list. It mentions the scope ('all prompts') but offers no context about prerequisites, typical use cases, or limitations that would help an agent decide between this and sibling tools.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
insp_resources_listC
List all resources exposed by an MCP server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| command | No | Command to run the MCP server (e.g., 'node', 'python') | |
| args | No | Arguments to pass to the command (e.g., ['build/index.js']) | |
| url | No | URL for SSE/HTTP transport (alternative to command) | |
| transport | No | Transport type (auto-detected if not specified) | |
| headers | No | HTTP headers for SSE/HTTP transport |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It states it 'lists' resources, implying a read-only operation, but doesn't cover aspects like whether it requires authentication, how it handles errors, if it's rate-limited, or what the output format looks like (e.g., JSON list). This leaves significant gaps for an agent to understand its behavior.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, clear sentence that front-loads the core purpose without unnecessary words. It efficiently conveys the essential information, making it easy for an agent to parse quickly.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the complexity (5 parameters, no annotations, no output schema), the description is insufficient. It doesn't explain what 'resources' entail in this context, how results are returned, or any behavioral traits like error handling. For a tool that likely inspects server capabilities, more context is needed to guide effective use.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema has 100% description coverage, so parameters are well-documented in the schema itself. The description adds no additional meaning about parameters beyond implying the tool interacts with an MCP server, which is already inferred from the schema's command/args/url fields. This meets the baseline for high schema coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action ('List all resources') and the target ('exposed by an MCP server'), providing a specific verb+resource combination. However, it doesn't explicitly differentiate from sibling tools like 'insp_resources_read' or 'insp_resources_templates', which likely have different purposes related to resources.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives. With siblings like 'insp_resources_read' (likely for reading a specific resource) and 'insp_resources_templates' (likely for templates), there's no indication of context, prerequisites, or exclusions for this list operation.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
insp_resources_readC
Read a specific resource from an MCP server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| command | No | Command to run the MCP server (e.g., 'node', 'python') | |
| args | No | Arguments to pass to the command (e.g., ['build/index.js']) | |
| url | No | URL for SSE/HTTP transport (alternative to command) | |
| transport | No | Transport type (auto-detected if not specified) | |
| headers | No | HTTP headers for SSE/HTTP transport | |
| uri | Yes | URI of the resource to read |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It states 'Read a specific resource,' implying a read-only operation, but doesn't cover critical aspects like authentication needs, rate limits, error handling, or what the output looks like (e.g., raw data, structured format). For a tool with 6 parameters and no output schema, this is a significant gap in transparency.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, clear sentence that directly states the tool's purpose. It's front-loaded with the core action ('Read a specific resource') and avoids unnecessary details. Every word earns its place, making it highly concise and well-structured for quick understanding.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's complexity (6 parameters, nested objects, no output schema) and lack of annotations, the description is incomplete. It doesn't explain the resource type, how parameters like 'transport' affect behavior, or what the read operation returns. For a tool that likely involves server interaction and resource retrieval, more context is needed to guide effective use.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, meaning all parameters are documented in the input schema. The description adds no additional meaning beyond the schema, such as explaining how parameters interact (e.g., 'command' vs. 'url' for transport) or providing examples. With high schema coverage, the baseline score of 3 is appropriate, as the description doesn't compensate but also doesn't detract.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states the tool 'Read a specific resource from an MCP server,' which clearly indicates a read operation on a resource. However, it doesn't specify what type of resource (e.g., file, data object) or differentiate from sibling tools like 'insp_resources_list' (which likely lists resources) or 'insp_resources_templates' (which might handle templates). The purpose is clear but lacks sibling differentiation.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives. It doesn't mention prerequisites (e.g., server setup), exclusions (e.g., not for writing), or compare to siblings like 'insp_resources_list' for listing resources. Without such context, an agent might struggle to select the correct tool in a given scenario.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
insp_resources_templatesB
List resource templates exposed by an MCP server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| command | No | Command to run the MCP server (e.g., 'node', 'python') | |
| args | No | Arguments to pass to the command (e.g., ['build/index.js']) | |
| url | No | URL for SSE/HTTP transport (alternative to command) | |
| transport | No | Transport type (auto-detected if not specified) | |
| headers | No | HTTP headers for SSE/HTTP transport |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It states the tool lists resource templates but doesn't describe what 'exposed by an MCP server' entails, such as whether this requires server connectivity, authentication, or specific permissions. For a tool with 5 parameters and no annotation coverage, this is a significant gap in transparency.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, efficient sentence that directly states the tool's purpose without unnecessary words. It's front-loaded and wastes no space, making it easy to understand at a glance while being appropriately sized for its function.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the complexity (5 parameters, no annotations, no output schema), the description is minimal but covers the basic purpose. It lacks details on behavioral aspects like server interaction requirements or output format, which are important for a tool that likely involves external communication. However, the high schema coverage mitigates some gaps, making it adequate but with clear room for improvement.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema has 100% description coverage, providing clear details for all 5 parameters (e.g., command, args, url, transport, headers). The description doesn't add any parameter-specific information beyond what's in the schema, such as examples or usage context. With high schema coverage, the baseline score of 3 is appropriate as the schema handles the heavy lifting.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action ('List') and target ('resource templates exposed by an MCP server'), providing a specific verb+resource combination. However, it doesn't explicitly distinguish this from sibling tools like 'insp_resources_list' or 'insp_resources_read', which likely handle different aspects of resources, leaving some ambiguity about differentiation.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives. It doesn't mention any prerequisites, context for usage, or comparisons to sibling tools such as 'insp_resources_list', which might handle actual resources rather than templates. This lack of guidance could lead to confusion in tool selection.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
insp_tools_callC
Call a tool on an MCP server. Connects, calls the tool, and disconnects.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| command | No | Command to run the MCP server (e.g., 'node', 'python') | |
| args | No | Arguments to pass to the command (e.g., ['build/index.js']) | |
| url | No | URL for SSE/HTTP transport (alternative to command) | |
| transport | No | Transport type (auto-detected if not specified) | |
| headers | No | HTTP headers for SSE/HTTP transport | |
| tool_name | Yes | Name of the tool to call | |
| tool_args | No | Arguments to pass to the tool (key=value pairs) |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It mentions connecting, calling, and disconnecting, which implies network/process operations, but doesn't disclose critical traits like error handling, timeouts, authentication needs, rate limits, or what happens if the server is unavailable. For a tool that interacts with external servers, this lack of behavioral context is a significant gap.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is extremely concise (one sentence) and front-loaded with the core purpose. Every word earns its place by summarizing the tool's lifecycle (connect, call, disconnect). There's no redundancy or fluff, making it efficient for quick understanding.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's complexity (7 parameters, no annotations, no output schema), the description is incomplete. It doesn't address what the tool returns, error conditions, or how to interpret results from the called tool. For a tool that dynamically invokes other tools on a server, more context about output format, success/failure states, and integration patterns is needed to be fully helpful.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all 7 parameters thoroughly. The description adds no additional meaning beyond what's in the schema (e.g., it doesn't explain parameter interactions or provide examples). With high schema coverage, the baseline score of 3 is appropriate, as the description doesn't compensate but also doesn't detract from the well-documented schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's purpose: 'Call a tool on an MCP server' with specific verbs (connects, calls, disconnects). It distinguishes from siblings like insp_tools_list (which lists tools) but doesn't explicitly contrast with other tools that might also involve calling operations. The purpose is well-defined but could be more specific about what distinguishes it from potential alternatives.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives. It doesn't mention siblings like insp_tools_list (which might be used to discover tools before calling) or other tools that might handle MCP server interactions differently. There's no context about prerequisites, error conditions, or typical use cases, leaving the agent with minimal usage direction.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
insp_tools_listC
List all tools exposed by an MCP server. Connects, lists tools, and disconnects.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| command | No | Command to run the MCP server (e.g., 'node', 'python') | |
| args | No | Arguments to pass to the command (e.g., ['build/index.js']) | |
| url | No | URL for SSE/HTTP transport (alternative to command) | |
| transport | No | Transport type (auto-detected if not specified) | |
| headers | No | HTTP headers for SSE/HTTP transport |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It mentions the connection and disconnection process, which is helpful, but lacks critical details such as whether this is a read-only operation, potential side effects (e.g., server state changes), error handling, or performance considerations (e.g., timeouts). For a tool that interacts with external servers, this is a significant gap.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is extremely concise—just one sentence with three clauses—and front-loaded with the core purpose. Every word earns its place by conveying essential information about the tool's function and operational flow without any redundancy or fluff.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the complexity of connecting to and querying an MCP server, the description is incomplete. It lacks details on output format (no output schema is provided), error conditions, authentication needs, or rate limits. While the schema covers parameters well, the overall context for safe and effective use is insufficient, especially for a tool with external dependencies.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema description coverage is 100%, meaning all parameters are documented in the input schema. The description adds no additional parameter semantics beyond what's in the schema (e.g., it doesn't explain parameter interactions or provide examples). This meets the baseline score of 3 for high schema coverage, but doesn't compensate with extra value.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action ('List all tools') and resource ('exposed by an MCP server'), providing a specific verb+resource combination. It also mentions the operational flow ('Connects, lists tools, and disconnects'), which adds useful context. However, it doesn't explicitly differentiate this tool from its sibling 'insp_tools_call', which appears to be for invoking tools rather than listing them.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives like 'insp_tools_call' or other sibling tools. It mentions the operational steps but doesn't specify prerequisites, use cases, or exclusions. This leaves the agent without clear direction on tool selection in context.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
7 tool updates
v1.0.0- First observed
insp_prompts_get - First observed
insp_prompts_list - First observed
insp_resources_list - First observed
insp_resources_read - First observed
insp_resources_templates - First observed
insp_tools_call - First observed
insp_tools_list
TDQS
Scored across 7 tools
Every tool has a clearly distinct purpose targeting different MCP server components: prompts (get/list), resources (list/read/templates), and tools (list/call). There is no overlap or ambiguity in functionality, making it easy for an agent to select the correct tool.
All tools follow a consistent 'insp_[component]_[action]' pattern with snake_case, using clear verbs like get, list, read, call, and templates. This predictability enhances usability and reduces confusion.
With 7 tools, the server is well-scoped for inspecting MCP servers, covering prompts, resources, and tools comprehensively. Each tool earns its place without being excessive or insufficient for the domain.
The tool set provides complete coverage for inspecting MCP servers, including listing and accessing prompts, resources (with templates), and tools (with calling capability). There are no obvious gaps, ensuring agents can perform all necessary inspection tasks.
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
The Remote MCP server acts as a standardized bridge between LLM applications (like Claude, ChatGPT, and Cursor) and external services, enabling AI agents to access external tools and resources. Its primary capability is providing a centralized search tool to discover other MCP servers and their respective tools. Unlike local implementations, it runs remotely with OAuth authentication and permission controls for security.
Security scanner for MCP servers. Detect vulnerabilities, prompt injection, and tool poisoning.
Remote MCP server for supportsheep: run AI interviews and manage support content for your blog.
Remote MCP server exposing SMI Aware tools, resources, and skills over Streamable HTTP.
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