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dziuba0x

flare-mcp

by dziuba0x

fdc_verify_web2json

Verify a Web2Json attestation bound to your expected source: check the Merkle proof against the Relay root, confirm the URL matches host/path/protocol/method, then decode payload using ABI signature.

Instructions

Verify a Web2Json attestation AND bind it to the source you expected. Checks the Merkle proof locally against the on-chain Relay root, confirms the attested URL matches your expected host / path / protocol / method, then decodes the payload with the request's ABI signature. Without expect_source the proof is verified but NOT bound, which an attacker can exploit with a valid proof from their own endpoint.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
networkYes
expect_sourceNoThe source you expected. Without it the proof is verified but NOT bound, which leaves you open to a valid proof from an attacker's endpoint.
voting_round_idYes
abi_encoded_requestYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

  1. Addedv1.4.1

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Since no annotations are provided, the description carries the full behavioral burden and largely succeeds: it states that verification happens locally, what is checked, and the consequence of omitting expect_source. It stops short of describing return values or error behavior, but the core operational behavior is transparent.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is three sentences with no filler. Purpose, method, and the security-relevant caveat are front-loaded, and every sentence contributes distinct information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a complex verification tool with no output schema, the description covers what verification means, how the proof is checked, and why expect_source matters for safe use. It leaves some gaps around return values and edge cases, and the schema marks expect_source optional even though the description presents it as security-critical, but overall an agent can invoke this correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is only 25%, so the description must compensate. It does add real meaning for expect_source by explaining host/path/protocol/method binding and for abi_encoded_request by mentioning ABI decoding. However, voting_round_id and network are left to inference from their names and types, so parameter semantics are only partially enriched.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and object: 'Verify a Web2Json attestation AND bind it to the source you expected.' It then breaks verification into concrete steps—local Merkle check against the on-chain Relay root, URL component matching, and ABI payload decoding—so the tool's purpose is unambiguous and distinct from proof-request siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives clear context on when the tool is safe and when it is not: without expect_source, the proof is verified but not bound, leaving an attack vector. It does not explicitly name an alternative tool for other attestation types, but the verifier-vs-request context is clear enough to avoid the obvious siblings.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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