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Draugr

Run Trivy, Semgrep, Gitleaks and more from one file. Get one SARIF report and one verdict.

CI OpenSSF Scorecard OpenSSF Best Practices Latest release License

Describe your app. Draugr figures out the rest.

Every application carries problems nobody put there on purpose: a library that turned out to have a hole in it, a password committed by accident, a server setting that leaves a door open. Draugr finds them, works out which ones actually matter for your app, and answers the question you are really asking before a release — is this safe to ship?

It runs the established open-source scanners for you — Trivy, Semgrep, Gitleaks and others — so there is nothing to choose between, wire up, or read five of. You describe what you built, once, in one file: where the repositories are, what images it builds, what it exposes, what infrastructure it runs on. Draugr picks the checks that apply, runs the right tool for each, and produces evidence you can hand to somebody else. Bring the scanners you already pay for, or use the open-source defaults.

Findings are ranked, not listed. A scanner's "critical" describes a flaw in the abstract — how bad it could be at its worst, anywhere. The same flaw is act-now in the service strangers can reach and backlog in the internal tool three people use, and no scanner can tell those apart because the difference is in the file you wrote, not in the code. And draugr diff gates a pull request on new findings only, so inheriting two hundred existing ones does not block every change.

Quickstart · See it in action · What it checks · In your pipeline · Documentation · What Draugr doesn't promise · Security

See it in action

$ draugr scan .
Draugr — FAIL   (draugr-demo 1.0)

Priorities:  P1 197   P2 629   P3 229   P4 18

Controls:
  iac       FAIL   7 high  10 medium  23 low
  images    FAIL   20 critical  153 high  248 medium  37 low
  licenses  pass   353 medium  176 low
  sast      FAIL   7 high  10 medium
  sca       FAIL   4 critical  10 high  13 medium  1 low
  secrets   FAIL   1 high

Reachability:
  govulncheck  2 reachable, 2 unreachable
  Unreachable findings are ranked down in priority, not removed from the report.

1 finding suppressed by config.exclude — 1 accepted by demo@example.com

Fix first (top 10 of 1073, by priority):
  Priority  Severity  Score  Rule            Control  Scanner  Location
  P1        critical  9.8    CVE-2026-42010  images   trivy    python:3.8-slim
            libgnutls30: gnutls: Authentication Bypass via NUL Character in Username
  P1        critical  9.8    CVE-2026-31789  images   trivy    python:3.8-slim
            libssl3: OpenSSL: Heap buffer overflow on 32-bit systems from large X.509
  P1        critical  9.8    CVE-2019-20477  sca      trivy    app/requirements.txt:4
            PyYAML 5.1: command execution through python/object/apply in FullLoader

Abridged: the real run lists ten and says how many it did not. That last block is the point — a thousand findings, ordered, with the three that matter this week at the top.

Priority (P1–P4) is not severity. Severity says how bad a flaw is at its worst, anywhere. Priority weighs that against how exposed and how important the part of your app it sits in is — which no scanner can work out, because it is not in the code.

draugr-dev/draugr-demo is a deliberately vulnerable app wired to Draugr: every control lights up, findings land in the repo's Security → Code scanning tab, and its example pull requests show the new-vs-fixed diff.

Related MCP server: SAST MCP Server

Quickstart

curl -fsSL https://draugr.dev/install.sh | sh

Installs to ~/.local/bin, no sudo. It verifies before it installs and says which checks ran — the archive's SHA-256 against the release checksums.txt, plus the cosign signature on that file when cosign is on your PATH — and installs nothing if a check fails. The script is readable in the repo; other routes, including Homebrew and go install, are in the install guide.

draugr tools install     # fetch the scanners, pinned and verified
draugr scan .            # scan this repo with sensible defaults
draugr init              # or scaffold a draugr.saga.yaml to customize

Then describe what you actually ship:

project: my-app
release:
  version: "1.0"
config:
  controllers:
    images:
      enabled: true
components:
  - name: web
    images:
      - image: alpine:3.19
draugr scan draugr.saga.yaml            # console summary; exits non-zero on fail
draugr scan draugr.saga.yaml -o out/    # also writes report.json + results.sarif
draugr scan draugr.saga.yaml --format markdown   # or html, junit, json, sarif

Your editor already knows this file. Draugr's JSON Schema is registered with SchemaStore, so any *.saga.yaml gets completion, hover docs and typo warnings on open with nothing to configure.

Or let discovery write the descriptor for you:

draugr survey github repos --org my-org -o draugr.saga.yaml
draugr survey k8s images --namespace prod -o draugr.saga.yaml

Full walkthrough: quickstart.

What it checks

Eleven controls, each backed by a tool Draugr executes rather than bundles — so every scanner stays under its own license, and you can swap it.

Control

Looks for

By default

sca

known flaws in the libraries you depend on

Trivy — Grype and Mend opt-in

secrets

passwords and keys committed by accident, history included

Gitleaks

sast

patterns in the code you wrote that let somebody in

Semgrep — gosec opt-in for Go

iac

settings that leave a door open, in Terraform, Kubernetes and Dockerfiles

Trivy

images

what is baked into your container images

Trivy — Grype opt-in

licenses

terms attached to code you did not write

Trivy

dast

problems only visible from outside a running app

Nuclei — authenticated, and from an OpenAPI spec

headers

how your site answers a browser

native

tls

certificates and encryption

native

infrastructure

your Kubernetes cluster, against the CIS benchmarks

native — kube-bench opt-in

threats

whether anything you talk to is on a public blocklist

abuse.ch URLhaus

Every scanner, what it sends and whose terms it carries: integrations catalog.

Alongside them: content-hash caching, an SBOM per repository and image, KEV/EPSS enrichment, per-control gate thresholds, and suppressions that stay in the report with the reason someone gave rather than disappearing.

In your pipeline

The first-party GitHub Action installs Draugr, provisions the scanners, and hands the merged SARIF to code scanning — one clean Draugr tool in the Security tab:

permissions:
  contents: read
  security-events: write

steps:
  - uses: actions/checkout@v4
  - id: draugr
    uses: draugr-dev/draugr@v0     # pin @vX.Y.Z for reproducible CI
    with:
      saga: draugr.saga.yaml
      tools: true                  # provision the scanners the controls need
  - if: always()                   # publish findings even when the gate fails
    uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
    with:
      sarif_file: ${{ steps.draugr.outputs.sarif }}

GitHub Actions · GitLab — an include, GitLab's own report formats, a sticky merge-request comment · Azure Pipelines — a step template

From an AI coding assistant. Ask one to check a change and it will, using whatever scanner it finds over a scope it chose. draugr mcp serves Draugr over the Model Context Protocol so it reads your committed descriptor instead — and scanning is off by default, because it clones repositories and runs external tools.

claude mcp add draugr -- draugr mcp

See use Draugr from an AI coding assistant.

Documentation

Documentation index →

What Draugr doesn't promise

A passing verdict means the controls you configured found nothing they were looking for. It is not a statement that your software is secure — it is silent about anything your descriptor does not declare, controls you did not enable, and whatever the underlying scanners miss. License findings are information, not legal advice. Draugr is provided under Apache-2.0 without warranty.

The details, including whose terms the scanners carry and your responsibility for authorization when scanning live endpoints: scope and disclaimer.

Security & supply chain

A security tool should hold itself to what it checks. Draugr does:

  • Standard output — every finding is normalized to SARIF 2.1.0 (OASIS), so results flow into GitHub / GitLab / Azure DevOps code scanning and any SARIF-aware tool.

  • Signed releases + provenance — release archives' checksums.txt is keyless-signed with cosign (Sigstore) into a checksums.txt.sigstore.json bundle, and each release publishes SLSA build-provenance attestations (gh attestation verify …); verify before installing (recipe).

  • SBOMs — a Syft SBOM is published for every release archive.

  • Verified toolingdraugr tools install fetches scanners pinned by SHA-256 and, where the upstream signs them, verifies the cosign signature too — and cosign itself is installable, so verification is self-sufficient.

  • We scan ourselves — Draugr runs on its own repo every PR (dogfood self-scan), and we track our supply-chain posture with the OpenSSF Scorecard (badge above).

    That card reports SAST: 0, and it is worth saying why we are leaving it there. Static analysis does run on this repository: Semgrep and gosec through Draugr's own sast control on every scan, and gosec again inside golangci-lint on every pull request. Scorecard looks for a specific set of tools it recognizes, and ours are not in it.

    Adding a third static analyzer purely to move the number would be the same thing as writing tests that touch code without asserting anything — a metric improved without the property behind it improving. We would rather the score be wrong and the analysis be real. If you want to check the analysis rather than the score, the findings are in the repository's Security tab, uploaded by the scan itself.

  • Report a vulnerability — see SECURITY.md.

Development

Requires Go 1.26+. make build builds ./bin/draugr; make gate runs the full local gate — fmt, vet, lint, race tests with coverage, and govulncheck. See CONTRIBUTING.md.

License

Draugr is licensed under the Apache License 2.0.

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

No tool schema history has been recorded yet.

Maintenance

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