secret-paste
Related Servers
Alternatives to secret-paste
No user-submitted related servers found.
Related Servers
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables AI agents to request passwords, API keys, passkeys, and other secrets from a person through one-time links encrypted in the browser, then store them in a local vault the agent can use without ever seeing them. Secrets can be referenced in commands and outputs are redacted, so agents can sign in or call APIs without exposing credentials in chat.2,904 npmMIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables AI agents to securely use API keys by storing them in an encrypted vault and injecting them on demand with user approval, without exposing the key values to the model.3MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables secure credential storage for AI agents by encrypting secrets and providing agent-invisible references, ensuring sensitive data never leaks to the model.MIT
- AlicenseAqualityCmaintenanceLets an AI agent request API keys and passwords from a human through an end-to-end encrypted one-time link and pass them to exactly one command or file, without the value ever entering the agent's context. Can also send secrets as self-destructing links.3AGPL 3.0
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceLocal MCP server for entering API keys outside chat. Deliver secrets to commands or .env files using an inline MCP App or a paired localhost browser.6MIT
- AlicenseCqualityCmaintenanceEnables AI agents to securely store and manage encrypted secrets locally while using them indirectly through environment-variable injection or file writes, so plaintext values never enter the agent's context.8MIT
TDQS
Scored across 1 tool
There is only one tool, so there is no possibility of misselection or overlap. Its purpose (securely obtain and store a secret without exposing it in chat) is unmistakable.
The single name request_secret follows a clear verb_noun convention and is self-descriptive. With one tool there is nothing to be inconsistent with.
The server is narrowly scoped to secret ingestion, so one tool is defensible, but it sits at the thin end of the range. A secret-management surface usually warrants at least a companion tool for checking, rotating, or removing stored secrets.
Writing a secret to .env, keychain, or 1Password is covered, but the lifecycle is a dead end: there is no way to verify a secret already exists, rotate it, or delete it. Agents must guess or re-prompt the user, which risks redundant dialogs and stale credentials.