cyberchef_rsa_multi_key
Detect RSA vulnerabilities across multiple keys or ciphertexts: shared primes, common modulus, Håstad broadcast, and Franklin–Reiter relations. Recover plaintexts from grouped keys without factoring.
Instructions
Attack a SET of RSA keys, or several ciphertexts under one key, for leaks no single key shows: shared primes across a corpus in near-linear time (batch GCD), one message sent twice under one modulus with two exponents (common modulus), one message broadcast under a small exponent (Håstad), and two ciphertexts related by a known linear relation (Franklin–Reiter). Three of the four recover the message without factoring anything. Use rsa_attack for a single key.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| keys | Yes | The keys to attack together. Two suffice for common_modulus and franklin_reiter; Håstad needs at least e; batch_gcd wants as many as you have. | |
| attacks | No | Which attacks to try. All of the applicable ones by default. | |
| relation_a | No | For franklin_reiter: the multiplier in m1 = a*m2 + b. The relation must be KNOWN. | 1 |
| relation_b | No | For franklin_reiter: the offset in m1 = a*m2 + b. | 1 |