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aapanel-mcp

aapanel-mcp

by devochkaskustikom
OverviewSchemaSourceRelated ServersDiscussionsAdmin
TypeScript
Remote

Deploy a certificate to sites

ssl_deploy

Bind a stored SSL certificate to one or more sites by hash and domain, replacing their current SSL configuration.

Instructions

Bind a stored certificate to one or more sites, replacing their current SSL configuration.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "hash": "<hash>",
      "domains": "<domains>"
    },
    "name": "ssl_deploy"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
hashYesCertificate hash from ssl_list or ssl_upload.
domainsYesDomains to bind, e.g. ["example.com","www.example.com"].

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.0.1-alpha.0

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already disclose readOnlyHint=false, destructiveHint=false, idempotentHint=false and openWorldHint=true, so the safety profile is largely covered. The description nonetheless adds a genuinely useful behavioral fact not derivable from the annotations: the deployment overwrites the sites' existing SSL configuration, which tempers the 'non-destructive' hint. It does not cover failure behavior, rollback, or auth requirements.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single, front-loaded sentence with the action first and the side effect second. No filler, no restatement of the title, nothing wasted.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter mutation tool with full schema coverage and annotations but no output schema, the description covers what it does and its main side effect. It stops short of naming the upstream prerequisite (an uploaded certificate) and what happens if binding fails for one of several domains, which would be helpful for a multi-target operation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, with both required parameters documented (hash sourced from ssl_list/ssl_upload; domains as an array of domain strings). The description adds only the loose confirmation that domains can be multiple sites, so the baseline of 3 applies since the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource ('Bind a stored certificate') plus the target scope ('to one or more sites') and the effect ('replacing their current SSL configuration'). The phrase 'stored certificate' implicitly separates it from ssl_upload (which stores) and ssl_disable (which removes), so an agent can pick it without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: the word 'stored' hints that a certificate must already exist (via ssl_upload or ssl_list) before deploying. There is no explicit when-to-use, no statement of when NOT to use it (e.g., vs ssl_disable), and no mention of prerequisites or required panel permissions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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