ratchet-mcp
Server is an effect gate for AI agents: ask before an irreversible action, get a durable decision, and record the outcome so duplicates are prevented across crashes and retries.
Ask before acting —
ratchet_begin_effectreturnsexecute,duplicate,in_flight,blocked,approval_required, ordenied; onlyexecuteauthorizes the action.Record outcomes honestly —
ratchet_report_effectlogs success or clean failure; if uncertain, you report nothing and the effect becomesindeterminateinstead of risking a duplicate.Keep long actions alive —
ratchet_heartbeat_effectextends the lease while work is still in progress.Check state without consuming allowance —
ratchet_check_effecttells whether an action already happened;ratchet_list_effectslists recent effects and finds unresolvedindeterminatework.Resolve unknowns safely —
ratchet_resolve_effectsettles indeterminate effects after verifying at the vendor, with evidence.Read policies and budgets —
ratchet_get_policyshows per-effect-type lease, attempt, and spend limits;ratchet_usagereports plan, credits, and spend against ceilings.Roll back multi-step workflows —
ratchet_unwind_groupreturns ordered compensations, andratchet_group_statusinspects a unit of work after a crash.Prove decisions —
ratchet_effect_receiptsreturns signed receipts verifiable offline against a published key.Find gate bypasses —
ratchet_reconcilecompares vendor-reported idempotency keys against gated effects to reveal code paths that acted without asking.Show the savings —
ratchet_prevented_losscounts duplicates refused and estimated cost avoided in the last 30 days.Check circuit breakers —
ratchet_circuit_statusreports whether an effect type is being stopped or throttled by an open breaker.
Integrates with Stripe to gate payment-related side effects, with commands for checking payment configuration and listening for Stripe webhooks, ensuring charges and refunds are authorized and deduplicated.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@ratchet-mcp Begin an email.send effect with idempotency key welcome:user_123 and tell me if I can proceed."
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
An effect gate for AI agents. Your agent asks before it does anything it cannot take back — charge a card, ship a deploy, publish a package, send the email — and gets a durable decision, so the same real-world action is attempted at most once across crashes and retries. Agents can also read back what a run already did, and spend against a limit they cannot raise.
Agents retry. LLM control flow is non-deterministic, network calls fail ambiguously, and processes die mid-action. The result is duplicate emails, double charges, and repeated writes — and nothing in the stack knows which. Vendor idempotency keys help for the few vendors that offer them, and never across separate agent processes or model providers.
Ratchet does not execute your actions. It holds a durable decision record in front of them.
POST /v1/effects/begin → decision: execute | duplicate | in_flight
| blocked | approval_required | deniedOnly execute authorises the caller to act.
Project documents
High-level design — what the gate is and what it deliberately is not | |
Threat model, trust boundaries, and the argument for each security requirement — including what is not defended | |
What the next year holds, and what will never be built | |
Who decides, and what happens if they stop | |
How to report a bug or propose a change | |
How to report a vulnerability, and how fast you hear back | |
What is expected, and who to tell | |
Everything that is not true yet, stated plainly |
Related MCP server: everrun
The part that matters
If your process dies between "go" and "done", most systems quietly let the next caller retry.
Ratchet won't. The lease expires and the effect becomes indeterminate — a known unknown,
surfaced instead of buried. What happens next is the policy you declared for that effect type:
| Behaviour | Use for |
| No automatic retry. A human or verifying agent resolves it. | Anything irreversible |
| A fresh attempt is granted, up to | Vendors that are genuinely idempotent |
| Caller must verify at the vendor and record evidence first. | Charges, transfers, payouts |
Exactly-once delivery is not achievable in a distributed system and this project does not claim it. What Ratchet guarantees is at-most-once initiation, a recorded outcome that later callers replay, and an explicit state for the case nobody else admits exists.
Quick start
Requirements: Node 20.11+, Docker (for local Postgres).
npm install
cp .env.example .env # defaults work for local development
npm run dev:db # Postgres on :5433 via Docker
npm run migrate
npm run dev # control plane on :8787
npm run dev:worker # lease reaper + webhook delivery (separate terminal)Then open http://localhost:8787, or drive it from the shell:
bash examples/curl/walkthrough.shnpm run seed populates a workspace with realistic state — a completed effect, a duplicate, an
indeterminate one, and one awaiting approval — so the console has something to show.
Or with Docker Compose
AUTH_SECRET=$(openssl rand -base64 32) docker compose up --buildThe core loop
# 1. Ask, before you act.
curl -X POST http://localhost:8787/v1/effects/begin \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $RATCHET_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"effect_type": "email.send",
"idempotency_key": "welcome:user_123",
"payload": { "to": "sam@example.com" },
"estimated_cost_micros": 800
}'
# → { "decision": "execute", "effect_id": "eff_...", "lease_token": "lt_..." }
# 2. Do the real thing, yourself. Ratchet never touches it.
# 3. Say what happened.
curl -X POST http://localhost:8787/v1/effects/eff_.../report \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $RATCHET_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{ "lease_token": "lt_...", "outcome": "succeeded",
"result": { "message_id": "msg_9f2" } }'
# Any later caller with the same key now gets:
# → { "decision": "duplicate", "result": { "message_id": "msg_9f2" } }The one rule: report failed only when you know the action did not reach the outside world.
If you are unsure — a timeout, a dropped connection — report nothing. The lease lapses and Ratchet
records an honest indeterminate. A false failed is worse than silence, because it licenses a
duplicate.
Idempotency keys
Derive the key from the work, deterministically.
Good | Broken |
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A key that changes on every attempt makes every retry look like new work.
When Ratchet is unreachable
Ratchet sits in your critical path, so decide this before integrating: on an outage your agent either acts without the gate (fail-open) or refuses to act (fail-closed). Use fail-closed for anything you would have to apologise for; fail-open where the vendor deduplicates anyway.
Full contract, client patterns, and the honest availability posture:
docs/FAILURE_MODES.md.
Architecture
┌──────────────────────────────┐
agents ──────────▶│ control plane (stateless) │
REST + MCP │ Fastify · /v1 · /mcp · web │
└──────────────┬───────────────┘
│
┌──────────────▼───────────────┐
│ Postgres │
│ effects · policies · ledger │
│ spend windows · audit │
└──────────────▲───────────────┘
│
┌──────────────┴───────────────┐
webhooks ◀────────│ worker (long-running) │
│ lease reaper · delivery · GC│
└──────────────────────────────┘The control plane is stateless and scales horizontally — it may run on serverless infrastructure.
The worker may not. It expires leases on a timer whether or not a request is in flight; a
serverless function cannot do that. Run it as a long-running container. Multiple replicas are safe
(every claim uses FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED).
At-most-once is enforced by a database unique constraint on
(workspace_id, effect_type, idempotency_key) — not by application logic.
Full detail: docs/handoff/ARCHITECTURE.md.
Deploying
The control plane is stateless and can scale freely. The worker cannot — it expires leases on a
timer whether or not a request arrives, so it must be a long-running process. That single
constraint rules out purely serverless hosts (Vercel, Netlify functions) despite their being
easier, and is why fly.toml runs both process groups from one image.
brew install flyctl && fly auth login # once, needs your browser
npm run deploy:flyThe script is idempotent: it creates the app, provisions managed Postgres, generates AUTH_SECRET
once (never rotating it, since that would invalidate every API key), deploys both processes, and
verifies readiness. It refuses to proceed unless preflight passes:
npm run deploy:preflightPreflight runs the full suite and production build, then checks that AUTH_SECRET is strong and
not the dev default, PUBLIC_URL is set (otherwise the manifest would advertise localhost),
RATE_LIMIT_OVERRIDE is unset, private-network webhooks are off, CORS carries no wildcard, and —
if Stripe is selected — that both the key and the webhook secret are present. It prints no secret
values.
Any container platform works; only fly.toml is Fly-specific. Set DATABASE_URL, AUTH_SECRET,
PUBLIC_URL, NODE_ENV=production, then run node dist/api/server.js (scale freely) and
node dist/worker/main.js (at least one, always on).
To rehearse the exact production containers locally:
AUTH_SECRET=$(openssl rand -base64 32) docker compose up --buildCommands
Command | What it does |
| Control plane with reload |
| Worker with reload |
| Local Postgres in Docker |
| Apply migrations (advisory-locked; safe to run concurrently) |
| Populate a workspace with realistic state |
| Typecheck + unit + integration + e2e against a disposable database |
| One layer |
| TypeScript in strict mode |
| Compile to |
| Run the compiled build |
| MCP server over stdio |
| Write the OpenAPI document to disk |
| Verify the build and configuration are safe to deploy |
| Deploy control plane, worker, and database to Fly.io |
| Operating metrics against the pricing-review thresholds |
| Report payment configuration and verify it against Stripe |
| Forward Stripe events to a local instance and print a webhook secret |
| Production dependency audit |
Environment
Every variable, with defaults and safety notes, is in .env.example. The two that
are required:
Variable | Notes |
| Postgres connection string |
| 32+ random characters. Derives the API-key pepper and console session ids. Rotating it invalidates every API key and session. |
In NODE_ENV=production the process refuses to start if AUTH_SECRET is the development
default or shorter than 32 characters, if CORS_ORIGINS contains *, or if
WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK is on.
For agents
Surface | Path |
OpenAPI 3.1 |
|
Capability manifest |
|
Machine docs |
|
MCP tool schemas |
|
MCP (Streamable HTTP) |
|
MCP (stdio) |
|
Seven MCP tools: ratchet_begin_effect, ratchet_report_effect, ratchet_get_effect,
ratchet_resolve_effect, ratchet_list_effects, ratchet_get_policy, ratchet_get_usage.
Ready-to-use configs and code: examples/ — Python, TypeScript, curl, Claude Desktop,
Cursor, and generic MCP over HTTP.
Security posture
Only a SHA-256 fingerprint of your payload is stored — never the payload itself.
API keys are stored as HMAC-SHA256 peppered with a server secret; a database leak alone yields no usable key. Comparison is constant-time and runs even for unknown prefixes.
Every query is workspace-scoped; a cross-tenant lookup returns
404, never a hint.SSRF defence in two layers: static URL validation, then DNS re-resolution with the socket pinned to the checked address on every delivery attempt. Redirects are never followed.
Agent-supplied text is data, never instructions. Decisions come from stored policy and database state — nothing in a payload can widen a scope, raise a budget, or change a policy.
Unknown request fields are rejected, not silently dropped.
No third-party audit has been performed. There is no SOC 2 report and no penetration test.
Details and threat model: docs/handoff/SECURITY_REVIEW.md.
Pricing
One meter: a gated effect — the first begin for a given (effect_type, idempotency_key).
Duplicate suppression, in-flight checks, retries, reports, reads, policy changes, and webhooks are
all free. You are never charged for the retry behaviour the product exists to absorb.
Plan | Price | Included effects/mo | Overage |
Free | $0 | 1,000 | $1.50 / 1,000, prepaid credit only |
Pro | $29/mo | 25,000 | $1.50 / 1,000 |
Custom | contact | above 250,000 | negotiated |
Free stops at its allowance unless you load prepaid credit; there is no automatic overage and no invoice. Past roughly 19,300 effects a month, Pro is cheaper than paying credit on Free, so the upgrade is arithmetic rather than a wall.
Two plans, not three: three tiers assert knowledge of three customer segments, and there is no
usage history yet to support one. See
docs/handoff/PRICING_AND_DISTRIBUTION_REVIEW.md
for the reasoning, including why the previous ladder priced a 20x usage range at one number.
Overage draws from prepaid credit, so a runaway agent stops at your balance rather than generating
an invoice. Cost model and assumptions:
docs/handoff/PRICING_AND_UNIT_ECONOMICS.md.
Payments
Stripe is fully wired: startCheckout creates real Checkout Sessions, and the signed
checkout.session.completed webhook credits the ledger. Card details are entered on Stripe's own
page and never reach Ratchet, and credit is applied only on the signed webhook — never on the
browser returning to a success URL.
Both STRIPE_SECRET_KEY and STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET are required before checkout opens. A key
alone selects Stripe but keeps checkout closed: taking a payment that cannot be confirmed would
leave a customer charged and uncredited. Run npm run stripe:check to see exactly what is
configured (it prints no secret values).
For local development, get a webhook secret without a public URL:
npm run stripe:listen # prints whsec_… ; put it in .env and restartMost of Stripe's onboarding checklist does not apply. Ratchet builds line items inline and never
reads your Stripe catalog, so there is no product to create; it does not use Stripe Invoicing;
and it creates Checkout Sessions through the API, not the no-code builder. What does matter before
live payments: verify your account (Stripe's KYC), create a webhook endpoint pointing at
your deployed /v1/billing/webhook/stripe and use that endpoint's signing secret in production,
and decide whether you need tax collection (STRIPE_AUTOMATIC_TAX, off by default).
With no Stripe credentials at all, the built-in test adapter runs instead: no card is charged and
no external request is made. Verified so far in Stripe test mode only — see
docs/handoff/KNOWN_LIMITATIONS.md before going live,
particularly regarding refunds.
Documentation
Document | Contents |
Where everything lives | |
State machine, concurrency, deployment topology | |
Every significant choice, with the reasoning | |
Endpoints, schemas, error codes | |
Threat model and implemented controls | |
Cost model and scenarios | |
What was tested and measured | |
What is not done, and what it would take |
License
Apache-2.0.
Available Tools
15 toolsratchet_begin_effectAsk permission to perform a side effectAInspect
Call this IMMEDIATELY BEFORE performing any side effect that touches the outside world (sending a message, charging a card, creating a resource, writing to someone else's system). Returns a decision you MUST obey. If the response carries budget_warning, a spend ceiling exists but nothing was counted toward it — surface that to the operator rather than ignoring it. If it carries integration_warning, you have been beginning effects without reporting them: call ratchet_report_effect after every action, and tell the operator, because the effects already begun will start being blocked. Decisions:
"execute": you hold the lease. Perform the action now, then call ratchet_report_effect. If the response carries vendor_idempotency_key, send that key to the vendor as ITS own idempotency key (the response says where it goes). Where enforced is true the vendor itself will then refuse a duplicate, which protects the action even if some other caller skips this gate entirely.
"duplicate": this action ALREADY HAPPENED. Do NOT perform it. Use the returned
resultas though you had just done the work."in_flight": another process is doing it right now. Do NOT perform it. Wait
retry_after_secondsand ask again."blocked": an earlier attempt may or may not have taken effect. Do NOT perform it. Tell the user what is unresolved, or verify at the vendor and call ratchet_resolve_effect.
"approval_required": a human must approve. Do NOT perform it.
"denied": policy or budget refused it. Do NOT perform it. The idempotency_key must be derived deterministically from the work itself so that a retry of the same logical action produces the same key. Never use a random value or the current time.
Inputs: effect_type (required), idempotency_key (required), run_id, vendor, +8 more.
ratchet_extend_leaseSay you are still working on an effectAInspect
Call this periodically during a long action you were authorised to perform, before the lease expires. It tells Ratchet you are alive and extends your hold. Use it when work turns out to take longer than the lease you asked for — a slow vendor, a large export, a retrying upload. Without it, the lease expires while you are still working, the effect is recorded as having an UNKNOWN outcome, and your report is then refused. If it fails with lease_expired or lease_lost, STOP. Your hold is gone and the outcome is already recorded as unknown. Do not keep going and do not retry the action — call ratchet_begin_effect to find out where things actually stand.
Inputs: effect_id (required), lease_token (required), extend_seconds.
ratchet_get_circuitCheck whether surge containment is holding your workARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Call this when a begin returned "approval_required" or "denied" and the reason mentions a circuit breaker. A breaker opens when an effect type is being performed far more often than its configured hourly ceiling — usually because something is looping.
What to do with the answer:
If a breaker is open, STOP creating effects of that type. Retrying will not help and each attempt is recorded.
resets_at tells you when it closes itself. If it is null, a human opened it deliberately and only a human will close it — do not wait, and do not poll.
Report the reason to your operator and stop. Do not attempt to work around it by renaming the effect type, splitting the work across keys, or using a different idempotency key: that defeats a safety control that exists to protect the people your actions reach.
effect_type "*" means every effect type in the workspace is stopped.
Inputs: no named parameters.
ratchet_get_effectCheck whether an action has already been doneARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Look up the recorded state of an action WITHOUT reserving a lease and without consuming your plan allowance. Use it to answer "did I already do this?" — for example when resuming after a crash, or when a user asks whether something went through. To actually perform work, use ratchet_begin_effect instead; this tool never grants permission.
Inputs: effect_type (required), idempotency_key (required).
ratchet_get_groupInspect a unit of workARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Shows every step in a multi-step unit of work: what succeeded, what can still be undone, what has already been undone, what is irreversible, and what has an unknown outcome. Use it to answer "where did this workflow actually get to?" after a crash, without changing anything.
Inputs: group_key (required).
ratchet_get_policyRead the policy for an effect typeARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Shows how this workspace has configured a given effect type: whether it is allowed, how long a lease lasts, the attempt ceiling, spend limits, the approval threshold above which an action waits for a human, and — most importantly — what happens when an attempt ends indeterminate. Check this before designing a retry strategy.
Inputs: effect_type (required).
ratchet_get_prevented_lossWhat the gate has actually savedARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Counts duplicate actions refused in the last 30 days and what they would have cost. Only counts refusals where a cost was declared on the effect, so it under-reports rather than flatters. IMPORTANT: pass estimated_cost_micros on ratchet_begin_effect or this reads zero — the number is only as good as what callers declare. This is money not spent at your vendors, never money paid to Ratchet.
Inputs: no named parameters.
ratchet_get_runWhat have I already done in this run?ARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Recall the work already gated under a run id, before doing anything that might repeat it. Call this FIRST when resuming a task — after a restart, a handoff, or when your context has been compacted and you are no longer certain what you did. It returns what succeeded with the recorded results, what is still in flight, what failed, and — separately, because it is the only category that can hurt you — what has an unknown outcome. Anything under "done" has already happened: use its result rather than performing it again. Costs about a seventeenth of the context of listing the same effects.
Inputs: run_id (required).
ratchet_get_usageCheck plan, credit balance, and spendARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Returns the current plan, remaining included effects for the month, prepaid credit balance, and today's declared external spend against each budget ceiling. Use it to warn a user before a long run exhausts an allowance or a budget.
Inputs: no named parameters.
ratchet_list_effectsList recent gated effectsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Review recent effects for this workspace, optionally filtered by state or run. Use it to find unresolved work — filter by state "indeterminate" to see every action whose outcome is unknown and still needs verification.
Inputs: limit, state, run_id, effect_type.
ratchet_list_receiptsGet signed proof of the decisions on an effectARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Returns a signed receipt for every decision made about one effect, refusals included. Each signature is over the exact bytes in body and verifies offline against the Ed25519 key published at /.well-known/ratchet-receipt-key — you do not have to trust this server to check them. Use this when a human asks you to PROVE an action was or was not authorised, rather than asserting it.
Inputs: effect_id (required).
ratchet_reconcile_effectsFind real-world actions that bypassed the gateARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Given the idempotency keys for actions a vendor says actually happened, returns which ones went through Ratchet and which it has never seen. The unseen ones are code paths that acted WITHOUT asking, so a retry there can act twice — a bug the operator almost certainly does not know about. Send references only; never send credentials.
Inputs: keys (required), effect_type (required).
ratchet_report_effectReport the outcome of an effect you executedAInspect
Call this IMMEDIATELY AFTER performing an action that ratchet_begin_effect authorised. Pass the lease_token you were given. Report "succeeded" with a result — future duplicate callers replay that result instead of repeating the action. Report "failed" ONLY when you are certain the action did NOT reach the outside world (for example, a validation error before the request was sent). That permits a clean retry. If you are UNSURE whether it went through — a timeout, a dropped connection, an ambiguous error — do NOT report anything. Say so to the user. Letting the lease lapse records an honest "indeterminate", which is far safer than a false "failed" that licenses a duplicate.
Inputs: outcome (required), effect_id (required), lease_token (required), result, +2 more.
ratchet_resolve_effectSettle an effect whose outcome was unknownAInspect
Use ONLY after you have checked the third-party system and now know what really happened to an effect that was left "indeterminate". Record "succeeded" if the action did occur, "failed" if it did not, or "cancelled" to abandon it. Include how you verified it in evidence. Never guess: resolving incorrectly is exactly the duplicate or lost action this service exists to prevent.
Inputs: outcome (required), effect_id (required), result, evidence.
ratchet_unwind_groupRoll back a multi-step unit of workAInspect
Call this when a multi-step workflow fails partway and the steps that already succeeded must be undone — a booking made but not paid for, a resource created but not configured.
Returns the exact compensations to perform, in the order to perform them, which is the REVERSE of the order they succeeded in. Undoing forwards can strand a step that depended on an earlier one.
Ratchet does NOT perform the compensations. For each step: call ratchet_begin_effect with the step's suggested_idempotency_key and compensates_effect_id, do the real undo, then call ratchet_report_effect. Gating the undo is what stops a retry from refunding twice.
Read unresolved first. If any effect in the group has an unknown outcome, STOP and resolve it before undoing anything around it. Read irreversible too: those steps succeeded and declared no way to undo themselves, so a human has to decide what to do about them. Say so plainly rather than implying the rollback was complete.
Inputs: group_key (required), reason.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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TDQS
Scored across 15 tools
Each tool targets a distinct concern: authorization, reporting, lease extension, state lookup, group/run inspection, receipts, policy, usage, reconciliation, and safety statistics. The only superficially similar retrieval tools (get_effect, list_effects, get_run, get_group) are clearly separated by what they return and when to use them.
All tools share the ratchet_ prefix and follow a consistent snake_case verb_noun pattern (begin_effect, report_effect, get_policy, unwind_group). Even compound targets like get_prevented_loss preserve the same structure, so the naming convention is predictable.
Fifteen tools is at the top of the ideal range, but the domain is substantial: effect lifecycle, leases, lookup, audit receipts, policies, budgets, circuit breakers, reconciliation, and rollback. Each tool has a distinct role and none feels redundant.
The surface covers the full effect lifecycle—begin, report, extend, resolve—plus all inspection and recovery needs: runs, groups, circuits, receipts, policy, usage, reconcile, and prevented-loss stats. No obvious dead end exists for the intended agent workflows.
Maintenance
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Authorize AI agent tool calls before they run: policy-as-code, human approval, signed receipts.
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