Aegis Jail MCP
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TDQS
Scored across 8 tools
Each tool maps to a distinct step of the sandbox lifecycle (run, diff, apply, discard, list, profiles), and descriptions clarify intent well. The one real hazard is aegis_run vs aegis_runs, which differ by a single character and mean very different things (execute vs list), and aegis_probe vs aegis_scan both read as 'security check' at a glance.
Uniform aegis_ prefix plus a short snake_case verb for every tool, with no camelCase or style drift. The pattern is immediately predictable across all eight tools.
Eight tools for a sandboxed-execution server is well scoped; every tool covers a necessary stage (execute, inspect, promote, discard, audit, configure). Nothing appears redundant or missing from the count perspective.
The core lifecycle is fully covered: run in a copy, list runs, diff, then apply or discard, plus profiles and pre-flight scanning. Gaps are minor: profiles are read-only (no create/update a profile) and there is no way to cancel an in-flight run, but neither blocks normal workflows.