Security Intel MCP

Known Exploited

known_exploited

Read-onlyIdempotent

Check if a CVE is confirmed exploited in the wild via CISA's KEV catalog, or list recent exploited vulnerabilities with vendor, product, or ransomware filters.

Instructions

Check whether a CVE is on the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog — confirmed exploited in the wild — or list the most recently added exploited vulnerabilities. Pass cve_id to check one; omit it to list recent (optionally filter by vendor/product, or ransomware_only). Source: CISA KEV, updated ~daily.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`limit`	No	When listing, how many newest entries to return (default 20, max 100).
`cve_id`	No	Optional. Check a single CVE, e.g. CVE-2021-44228.
`vendor`	No	Optional. Filter by vendor or product name substring.
`ransomware_only`	No	Optional. Only vulns CISA links to known ransomware campaigns.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`name`	No
`cve_id`	No
`filter`	No
`listed`	No
`source`	No
`vendor`	No
`product`	No
`due_date`	No
`released`	No
`returned`	No
`date_added`	No
`provenance`	No	Where this answer came from. served_at is when Datakoot answered (UTC); upstream lists the official sources consulted. Datakoot may serve a briefly cached copy, so the source's own observation can be older than served_at.
`catalog_count`	No
`catalog_version`	No
`required_action`	No
`vulnerabilities`	No
`known_ransomware_use`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedv2.1.0Oct 15, 2026

TDQS

A4.3/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already establish read-only, idempotent, non-destructive, open-world behavior, so the bar is lower; the description adds genuine value beyond them by naming the data provenance (CISA KEV) and freshness (~daily updates), which materially affects trust in the answer. It does not discuss rate limits, pagination of list mode, or staleness handling.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two tight sentences: purpose and dual-mode invocation come first, filters second, provenance and freshness last. No filler, no restated boilerplate, and the most routing-relevant content is front-loaded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema present, return-shape explanation is unnecessary, and the description covers both operating modes, optional filters, data source, and update cadence. Nothing an agent needs to call this correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all four parameters are already documented, and the description's restatement of the vendor/product and ransomware_only filters duplicates that. Its only marginal addition is scoping the filters to list mode, which is a small increment over the per-parameter schema text — baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific dual verb+resource: checking a CVE against the CISA KEV catalog, or listing the most recently added exploited vulns. The scope ('confirmed exploited in the wild') cleanly separates it from the sibling cve_lookup (generic lookup) and epss_score (predicted likelihood), so an agent can route without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit mode-selection guidance: 'Pass cve_id to check one; omit it to list recent (optionally filter by vendor/product, or ransomware_only).' That removes all inference about how to invoke each mode, but it never states when to prefer this tool over the siblings for exploitability questions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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