Penthera: Cyber Security Agent
Enables GitHub Copilot CLI and GitHub Copilot in VS Code to run Penthera through MCP and access read-only security scan results.
Allows JetBrains IDEs to connect to Penthera's MCP server for read-only security scanning and findings review.
Supports Replit as an app-builder environment where Penthera can be invoked through its MCP tools to scan projects for security issues.
Penthera: your open-source cyber security agent
The security review you never had time for. Offline, rule-based, and you can verify every finding yourself.
penthera.org: check your live site in a few seconds. Passive, nothing stored.
Daily notes from Penthera: x.com/penthera_org
Who builds it: Daan van der Zwaag, part-time and in the open.
How it compares: next to Snyk, Socket, Semgrep, ZAP and GitHub.
New in 2.4: penthera --card makes a security receipt of your repo to post, every surface counts one set of problems with the same words, and 13 ways to hide a finding or stall a scan are closed (what changed).
From your coding agent: add Penthera (one line per agent), then say "Hey Claude, run Penthera on this repo."
132 readable rules · 6 read-only MCP tools · 0 runtime dependencies · 0 requests past loopback in the benchmark · MIT, no telemetry
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What it is
Penthera checks your app, its dependencies and your AI coding tools on your own
machine. It fixes what it can, with your approval. Every finding comes from a
rule you can read, with its evidence at file:line. A model may propose; a rule
decides.
It is also an open R&D project. We measure every check in public and publish the results, good or bad, so you can see how far to trust it.
It finds known classes of problems, not novel ones. It does not replace a human pentester.
Related MCP server: Trivy
Start in 30 seconds
You need Node.js 22 or later. No install, no account.
Building with Cursor, Claude Code, Codex, VS Code, Windsurf, Gemini CLI, Zed, JetBrains or Kiro, or an app builder such as Lovable, Bolt, Base44, Replit or v0? Penthera in your coding tool has the setup for each.
In your terminal. Run this in your project folder:
npx pentheraIt detects your setup offline, asks what to check, and gives you a grade per area and the three things to fix first. It scans your running app only after you confirm the app is yours. Nothing is committed or pushed (guided start).
In your coding agent. Pick yours, then ask "scan my app for security issues". The MCP lines pin the version.
Agent | Run this |
Claude Code, plugin (skill only, runs the CLI) |
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Claude Code, MCP server only |
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Codex |
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GitHub Copilot CLI |
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GitHub Copilot in VS Code | the |
Gemini CLI |
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Cursor, Windsurf | the JSON in mcp.md |
Any agent that reads skills |
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The skill tells your agent how to run Penthera; the MCP server gives it six read-only tools. More routes: skill.md, mcp.md.
Where AI fits. Rules decide every finding and every exit code. A model may only propose:
Role | Who | How |
Decides | Penthera's rules, always | Every finding, every exit code |
Looks further (optional) | A model, with | Proposes problems no rule describes; the rules check each one, and unchecked ones are listed apart and never fail CI (AI mode) |
Fixes | Your own coding agent | Through the MCP server, the skill or |
To run it in a container:
docker build -t penthera . && docker run --rm penthera https://your-app.example.
Public benchmarks
We test Penthera on public datasets that other people built, next to the free open-source tools that do the same job, scored the same way. Each dataset was split in half before we looked: we improved Penthera on one half and scored it once on the other, sealed half. The rules for scoring and ranking were written down before that run (protocol).
Benchmark | Score | Penthera 1.9.0 | Penthera 2.0.0 | Rank among free tools | Best other free tool |
F1 | 0.18 | 0.74 | 2nd of 10 | deepsecrets 0.78 | |
caught minus false alarms | 0.57 | 0.71 | 1st of 6, tied 1st to 3rd ⁴ | malcontent 0.63 | |
caught minus false alarms | 0.74 | 0.82 | 1st of 8, tied 1st to 3rd ⁴ | GuardDog 0.74 | |
found in the right file | 0.16 | 0.70 | 1st of 8, tied 1st to 4th ⁴ | odgen 0.68 |
⁴ A tied range is a rank interval: the range Penthera's rank fell in, in 95% of 10,000 bootstrap redraws of each tool's counts (on SecBench.js, of its 64 test bugs). Penthera alone came out first in 76% of the redraws on npm, 82% on PyPI and 60% on SecBench.js. Exploratory: computed after the registered ranking.
Leaked secrets: 2nd by F1, the registered score; 1st by F0.5, which weighs precision more (0.82 against deepsecrets 0.80); 2nd by F2, which weighs recall more (0.68 against deepsecrets 0.77).
Some ranked tools are barely in the contest. Other ranked tools scoring below 0.10: 1 of 9 on CredData (trufflehog); 3 of 5 on npm (clamav, yara, ossgadget); 4 of 7 on PyPI (clamav, ossgadget, bandit4mal, aura); 1 of 7 on SecBench.js (njsscan).
If 1 package in 1,000 were malicious, the share of Penthera's malware flags that would be right: npm, about 2.7% at the top of the false-alarm interval (it raised no false alarm on that sample); PyPI, about 1.6% at the measured false-alarm rate, 0.9% at the top of its interval. Exploratory, like the rank intervals.
Leaked secrets (Samsung CredData)
Rank | Tool | Precision | Recall | F1 |
1 | deepsecrets 2.2.0 | 0.80 [0.79, 0.82] | 0.77 [0.75, 0.78] | 0.78 |
2 | Penthera 2.0.0 | 0.89 [0.87, 0.90] | 0.64 [0.62, 0.66] | 0.74 |
3 | noseyparker 0.24.0 | 0.76 [0.74, 0.78] | 0.62 [0.60, 0.64] | 0.69 |
4 | gitleaks 8.30.1 | 0.85 [0.84, 0.86] | 0.37 [0.35, 0.39] | 0.52 |
5 | ripsecrets 0.1.11 | 0.65 [0.64, 0.67] | 0.35 [0.33, 0.37] | 0.45 |
6 | kingfisher 2.14.0 | 0.96 [0.94, 0.97] | 0.29 [0.28, 0.31] | 0.45 |
7 | detect-secrets 1.5.0 | 0.30 [0.29, 0.31] | 0.53 [0.51, 0.56] | 0.38 |
8 | secretlint 13.0.7 | 0.92 [0.89, 0.94] | 0.19 [0.18, 0.21] | 0.32 |
9 | whispers 2.4.0 | 0.46 [0.43, 0.50] | 0.09 [0.08, 0.10] | 0.15 |
10 | trufflehog 3.99.3 | 0.40 [0.35, 0.45] | 0.05 [0.05, 0.07] | 0.10 |
– | credsweeper 1.19.4 ¹ | 1.00 [1.00, 1.00] | 0.98 [0.98, 0.99] | 0.99 |
– | Penthera 1.9.0 | 0.56 [0.51, 0.60] | 0.10 [0.09, 0.12] | 0.18 |
Free tools, mean / median | 0.68 / 0.76 | 0.36 / 0.35 | 0.43 / 0.45 |
Malicious npm packages (DataDog)
Rank | Tool | Caught | False alarms on benign packages | Caught minus false alarms |
1 | Penthera 2.0.0 | 0.71 [0.62, 0.78] (79/112) | 0.00 [0.00, 0.02] (0/150) | 0.71 |
2 | malcontent 1.27.1 (bf280ad6), yara-x 1.21.0 | 0.68 [0.59, 0.76] (76/112) | 0.05 [0.03, 0.10] (8/150) | 0.63 |
3 | GuardDog 3.2.0 ² | 0.62 [0.52, 0.70] (69/112) | 0.03 [0.01, 0.07] (4/150) | 0.59 |
4 | ossgadget 0.2.20 (414b6a59) | 0.94 [0.88, 0.97] (105/112) | 0.89 [0.83, 0.93] (133/150) | 0.05 |
5 | clamav 1.5.4 | 0.01 [0.00, 0.05] (1/112) | 0.00 [0.00, 0.02] (0/150) | 0.01 |
6 | yara yara-python 4.5.4 (YARA 4.5), YARA-Forge core 20261004 | 0.00 [0.00, 0.03] (0/112) | 0.00 [0.00, 0.02] (0/150) | 0.00 |
– | osv-scanner 2.6.0 ³ | 0.90 [0.83, 0.94] (101/112) | 0.01 [0.00, 0.04] (1/150) | 0.90 |
– | Penthera 1.9.0 | 0.57 [0.48, 0.66] (64/112) | 0.00 [0.00, 0.02] (0/150) | 0.57 |
Malicious PyPI packages (DataDog)
Rank | Tool | Caught | False alarms on benign packages | Caught minus false alarms |
1 | Penthera 2.0.0 | 0.87 [0.81, 0.92] (131/150) | 0.05 [0.03, 0.10] (8/150) | 0.82 |
2 | GuardDog 3.2.0 ² | 0.85 [0.79, 0.90] (128/150) | 0.11 [0.07, 0.17] (16/147) | 0.74 |
3 | malcontent 1.27.1 (bf280ad6), yara-x 1.21.0 | 0.93 [0.87, 0.96] (139/150) | 0.22 [0.16, 0.29] (32/147) | 0.71 |
4 | yara yara-python 4.5.4 (YARA 4.5), YARA-Forge core 20261004 | 0.25 [0.18, 0.32] (37/150) | 0.00 [0.00, 0.03] (0/147) | 0.25 |
5 | clamav 1.5.4 | 0.00 [0.00, 0.02] (0/150) | 0.00 [0.00, 0.03] (0/147) | 0.00 |
6 | ossgadget 0.2.20 (414b6a59) | 0.77 [0.70, 0.83] (116/150) | 0.97 [0.93, 0.99] (143/147) | -0.20 |
7 | aura 2.1 (SourceCode-AI/aura b40e6dd2) | 0.59 [0.51, 0.67] (88/149) | 0.83 [0.75, 0.88] (100/121) | -0.24 |
8 | bandit4mal lyvd/bandit4mal 03ba95f3 (bandit 1.6.3 fork) | 0.59 [0.51, 0.67] (89/150) | 0.84 [0.78, 0.89] (124/147) | -0.25 |
– | Penthera 1.9.0 | 0.83 [0.77, 0.88] (125/150) | 0.09 [0.06, 0.15] (14/150) | 0.74 |
– | osv-scanner 2.6.0 ³ | 0.74 [0.66, 0.80] (110/149) | 0.00 [0.00, 0.03] (0/147) | 0.74 |
Injection bugs in JavaScript libraries (SecBench.js)
Rank | Tool | Command injection | Code injection | Both |
1 | Penthera 2.0.0 | 35/47 | 10/17 | 0.70 [0.58, 0.80] |
2 | odgen c5157ee | 36/46 | 6/16 | 0.68 [0.55, 0.78] |
3 | codeql 2.27.2 (used under the GitHub CodeQL terms, for research on open-source code) | 37/47 | 4/17 | 0.64 [0.52, 0.75] |
4 | eslint-plugin-security 4.2.0 | 32/47 | 9/17 | 0.64 [0.52, 0.75] |
5 | semgrep 1.180.0 | 15/47 | 9/17 | 0.38 [0.27, 0.50] |
6 | graudit 849d7c7 | 12/47 | 10/17 | 0.34 [0.24, 0.47] |
7 | bearer 2.1.1 | 14/47 | 0/17 | 0.22 [0.14, 0.33] |
8 | njsscan 1.0.1 | 2/45 | 1/15 | 0.05 [0.02, 0.14] |
– | semgrep, every file 1.180.0 (another setting of semgrep, not ranked) | 16/47 | 9/17 | 0.39 [0.28, 0.51] |
– | Penthera 1.9.0 | 0/47 | 10/17 | 0.16 [0.09, 0.26] |
A rank is shown only where at least 5 other free tools were measured; otherwise "–". The rank column orders tools by score, and close scores can swap places. Penthera's 95% rank interval (bootstrap, exploratory): 2nd on CredData, 1st to 3rd on npm, 1st to 3rd on PyPI, 1st to 4th on SecBench.js.
Paid tools (GitGuardian, Socket, Snyk, Phylum, Semgrep Pro) publish no results on these benchmarks, so they are not in the tables.
Published elsewhere, on other datasets (context, not comparable):
¹ Not ranked: trained on this dataset by its authors. ² Found most samples in this dataset, so its rate is inflated by construction. ³ Not ranked: a lookup of already-reported packages, not detection.
What these numbers do not show: a benchmark is not your code. CredData replaces
real secrets with look-alikes, which favors pattern rules like ours over tools
that verify keys; the free tools ran on their defaults while Penthera was tuned
on the other half; GuardDog helped build the malware dataset. Accuracy on real
projects is experiment E1. To reproduce every table, get the sealed split with
npm run bench:public -- --fetch-split, then run
npm run bench:public -- --split test --final and
npm run bench:public -- --competitors --split test --final.
What it does
flowchart LR
U["You or<br/>your agent"] --> P(("Penthera<br/>on your machine"))
P --> APP["Your app<br/>live and code"]
P --> DEP["Dependencies<br/>npm and Python"]
P --> AI["AI tooling<br/>skills, MCP, hooks"]
APP & DEP & AI --> F[["Findings<br/>rules decide"]]
F --> FIX["Fix<br/>asks first"]
F --> R["Reports<br/>SARIF, ui, MCP"]
F --> E["Evidence<br/>signed bundle"]
FIX -. "re-scan" .-> F
classDef core fill:#0000ed,stroke:#0000ed,color:#ffffff
classDef box fill:#ffffff,stroke:#000000,color:#000000
class P core
class U,APP,DEP,AI,F,FIX,R,E boxThe default scan sends no attack payloads. --deep, --fuzz and --adaptive
start only after you confirm the hostname, or pass --confirm-target <host> in
CI. Limits are in METHODOLOGY.md.
%%{init: {"flowchart": {"nodeSpacing": 24, "rankSpacing": 40}}}%%
flowchart LR
APP["Running app<br/>penthera URL"] --> DEF
APP --> ACT
subgraph DEF["Default: no attack payloads"]
direction TB
B1["TLS, headers<br/>cookies, CORS"]
B2["Routes<br/>OpenAPI, files"]
B3["Auth, JWT, OAuth<br/>IDOR: review"]
B4["JS libraries<br/>bundle keys"]
end
subgraph ACT["Opt-in, gated"]
direction TB
A1["--deep<br/>SQLi, XSS, SSRF"]
A2["--fuzz<br/>API bodies"]
A3["--adaptive<br/>may send DELETE"]
end
DEF & ACT --> F[["Findings"]]
classDef core fill:#0000ed,stroke:#0000ed,color:#ffffff
classDef box fill:#ffffff,stroke:#000000,color:#000000
class F core
class APP,B1,B2,B3,B4,A1,A2,A3 box
style DEF fill:none,stroke:#0000ed,stroke-width:2px
style ACT fill:none,stroke:#0000ed,stroke-width:2px,stroke-dasharray:6 4Code sinks use taint-lite within one file, with no call graph. Dependency capabilities are what code can do, not proof it is malicious.
%%{init: {"flowchart": {"nodeSpacing": 24, "rankSpacing": 40}}}%%
flowchart LR
REPO["Code and config"] --> RS
REPO --> OWN
subgraph RS["penthera --repo ."]
direction TB
W1["Secrets<br/>key formats"]
W2["Routes<br/>auth per route"]
W3["Code sinks<br/>eval, vm, exec"]
W4["CI, runtimes<br/>Actions, pins"]
end
subgraph OWN["Own commands"]
direction TB
W5["deps<br/>capabilities, IOCs"]
W6["agents<br/>MCP, skills, hooks"]
W7["install, hook<br/>before it lands"]
end
RS & OWN --> F[["Findings"]]
classDef core fill:#0000ed,stroke:#0000ed,color:#ffffff
classDef box fill:#ffffff,stroke:#000000,color:#000000
class F core
class REPO,W1,W2,W3,W4,W5,W6,W7 box
style RS fill:none,stroke:#0000ed,stroke-width:2px
style OWN fill:none,stroke:#0000ed,stroke-width:2pxRules decide every finding. Exit code 0 means nothing critical or high, 1
critical or high, 2 an incomplete or refused scan. Under --ai a model only
proposes.
%%{init: {"flowchart": {"nodeSpacing": 30, "rankSpacing": 40}}}%%
flowchart LR
subgraph IN["Inputs"]
direction LR
R["Signed rule packs"]
GI["--giants, opt-in"]
AI["--ai, opt-in"]
end
IN --> FD[["Finding<br/>severity, confidence"]]
FD --> EX{"Exit<br/>0, 1 or 2"}
EX --> OUT
subgraph OUT["Outputs"]
direction LR
O1["Reports, SARIF"]
O2["penthera ui, MCP"]
O3["Action, Vercel check"]
O4["Evidence bundle"]
end
classDef core fill:#0000ed,stroke:#0000ed,color:#ffffff
classDef box fill:#ffffff,stroke:#000000,color:#000000
class FD core
class R,GI,AI,EX,O1,O2,O3,O4 box
style IN fill:none,stroke:#0000ed,stroke-width:2px
style OUT fill:none,stroke:#0000ed,stroke-width:2pxBefore you deploy
Job | What Penthera does | Command |
Test the app | Scans your localhost or preview URL (TLS, headers, CORS, cookies, auth, JWT, IDOR, OAuth, OpenAPI; injection and fuzzing only when you ask, after a confirmation) and your repository (routes, trust boundaries, code-execution sinks, secrets including AI keys) | |
Check your runtimes | Whether the PHP, nginx, Apache, Node.js, Python, OpenSSL or MongoDB version you run is affected by a known advisory, from the signed advisories pack | |
Fix and verify | Applies deterministic fix recipes on a local branch, re-scans to prove they worked, and remembers the result. Never pushes | |
Block it at commit time | Stops secrets, risky agent config and dependency changes before they are committed |
What you build with
Job | What Penthera does | Command |
Vet dependencies | Shows what every npm and Python package can do (install scripts, shell, network, env, obfuscation), what an upgrade added, lookalike names and licenses | |
Guard installs | Shows what a new package brings before any install script runs, and stops it under your policy | |
Review pull requests | Comments the dependency capability diff on every PR that touches the lockfile | |
Audit your AI tooling | Checks skills, MCP servers, hooks, plugins and rule files for hidden instructions, unpinned servers, over-broad permissions and silent updates | |
Work from your agent | Six read-only MCP tools: scan the repo, check dependencies, audit AI tooling, runtime advisories, explain a finding, a passive URL scan |
After you ship
Job | What Penthera does | Command |
Report and prove | Writes reports for developers, owners and auditors; a hashed, signable evidence bundle; NIS2 and CRA readiness reports and drafts | |
See it all | A local dashboard on 127.0.0.1. Simple mode for non-programmers: a one-sentence verdict, problems in plain words, and a check-and-fix mode with Apply, Skip and Stop per change. Advanced adds dependencies, AI tooling, history and evidence | |
Keep watching | Scheduled checks of production for drift: certificates, headers, new endpoints, keys in bundles, new CVEs in your SBOM | on the roadmap |
Every finding carries a severity, a confidence label (confirmed, likely,
potential, needs-human-review), its evidence and the research behind it.
Reports come out as Markdown, JSON and SARIF for GitHub code scanning. Exit
code 1 means critical or high findings. Every command and flag is in
docs/commands/. Compliance output is readiness
tooling, not a certification and not legal advice.
AI mode (opt-in). penthera --repo . --ai lets a local model
propose problems no rule describes. Penthera checks each proposal with its
rules, and anything unconfirmed is labelled "model-proposed, unverified" and
never fails CI. Whether it finds more than the rules alone is not measured yet
(AI mode).
How far each part has been taken
Part | Status |
Scans: URL, repo, dependencies, AI tooling, installs, pre-commit hook | Stable: in every release since 1.x, covered by the tests and the release gate |
Fix loop and local dashboard ( | Stable; the dashboard was redesigned in 1.9.0 |
MCP server, Agent Skill, Claude Code plugin | Stable, since 1.9.0 |
Gemini CLI extension | Stable: it installs the newest release (2.4.0) |
Evidence bundles, NIS2 and CRA drafts | Stable as readiness tooling, not a certification |
AI mode ( | Experimental: whether it finds more than the rules alone is not measured yet (AI mode) |
Live check on penthera.org | Beta: passive only, terms |
How it is measured
Each feature goes through the same path: method → evidence → tool.
Method. The methodology states the threat model, what black-box (HTTP) and white-box (source) analysis can and cannot see, the confidence model, and the false-positive controls on each probe. Each design choice cites the research or standard it rests on: 158 verified references, in APA style, in docs/references.md.
Evidence. A benchmark runs on every release, and the release gate fails if precision or recall drops by more than 0.02. Experiments that decide what ships next are pre-registered in docs/research/prereg/ before any data is collected, and the results are published either way.
Tool. What holds up ships in a reviewed, signed release. What does not hold up is dropped, and the rules stay.
Measure | Result | Sample |
Precision, bundled benchmark | 0.92, 95% CI 0.74 to 0.98 | 22 true and 2 false positives |
Recall, bundled benchmark | 0.96, 95% CI 0.79 to 0.99 | 1 miss, explained |
Requests past loopback during the benchmark | 0 | Enforced by a network guard |
Public benchmarks (E11b), sealed test half | 1st on npm and PyPI malware (tied 1st to 3rd), 1st on JS library injection bugs (tied 1st to 4th), 2nd on leaked secrets | 4 public datasets, up to 10 free tools each (results, summary) |
E10 pilot, known-vulnerable apps | Precision 0.88, 95% CI 0.78 to 0.93. Recall 0.07 before fixes, 0.71 (CI 0.45 to 0.88) after | 14 root causes in Juice Shop and DVNA (results). No run logs in, so it doesn't cover login or access rules |
Detection rules, all readable | 132 in this release: 16 URL scan templates, 24 secret and AI-key patterns, 15 dependency capabilities, 47 AI-tooling rules, 5 fix recipes, and 25 rules in the signed rule packs |
The bundled benchmark is 24 findings in small labs we wrote ourselves. It
catches regressions; it does not measure real-world accuracy. The E10 pilot
used one labeller and is not independent: the fixes were written after seeing
the misses on the same two apps. On WebGoat, held out, recall stayed at 2 of 9.
Accuracy on real projects is experiment E1, pre-registered and not yet run.
Intervals are Wilson. What Penthera cannot see is listed under
Known limitations. Refresh the counts
with npm run docs:numbers and npm run bench.
Cite this repository with the button on GitHub or CITATION.cff. APA and BibTeX forms are in the methodology.
Why you can trust it
Local and offline. No account, no telemetry, no cloud.
--offlinelimits network traffic to the target you named, and every report lists the hosts it contacted (network use).Tested unplugged. Repo scans,
agents,deps,brief, evidence bundles and URL scans with--offlinemade no outside connections. They gave the same result twice, and the same with the network blocked, on macOS and Ubuntu (E17 results). The test can't watchgit, which Penthera uses only for local commands.Deterministic. Rules you can read, with
file:lineevidence. A model may propose a fix or a lead; a deterministic re-scan and your tests decide.Non-destructive by default. Default scans send no attack payloads. Payload testing (
--deep,--fuzz,--adaptive,--all) is opt-in, asks for a confirmation bound to the target, and is rate-limited. It can change data, so read what active modes can change first.Asks before it changes anything. The fix loop works on a local branch, asks before every change by default, and never pushes or opens pull requests.
No update channel to hijack. Detection rules ship inside reviewed releases as signed, versioned rule packs. You can add your own by path (
--rules <dir>). Nothing is downloaded and run at run time.Releases you can verify. npm provenance through trusted publishing, a maintainer approval with 2FA for every version, SHA-pinned CI, CodeQL and OpenSSF Scorecard. Every release passes an internal audit of eight gates (latest report).
The claim map ties these claims to the tests that hold them.
Verify it yourself. In an empty folder:
npm install penthera@2.4.0 && npm audit signatures
npx penthera@2.4.0 rules listThe first checks npm's registry signature and the build provenance of the
package you got. The second lists every bundled rule pack and the key that
signed it; a pack whose signature does not verify is refused unless you pass
--allow-unsigned-rules.
Penthera finds known classes of problems, not novel ones, and it does not replace a human pentester or incident response. The decisions behind it, its limits, and how to challenge them are in the manifesto and FAQ.
How it fits with other tools
Penthera works next to the tools you already use; its SARIF output goes straight into GitHub code scanning, for example. Each comparison page says where the other tool goes further and how to run the two together.
Focus | Where it runs | How it decides | |
Penthera | Your app, dependencies and AI tooling; fixes; EU evidence | Your machine or CI, offline | Readable deterministic rules, with evidence |
Supply-chain risk across package registries | Cloud service, GitHub App, CLI | Registry-scale package analysis, including AI review | |
Known vulnerabilities in dependencies, code, containers, IaC | Cloud service, IDE, CLI | Curated vulnerability database plus static analysis | |
Known-CVE alerts, update PRs, CodeQL | GitHub | Advisory database, CodeQL queries | |
Dynamic testing of web apps | Your machine or CI | Active and passive scan rules | |
Static analysis of your own code | Your machine, CI, cloud platform | Pattern rules, plus a paid cross-file engine |
All comparisons, including Cloudflare's security-audit skill: docs/compare/.
Run the free tools you already have: --giants
--giants runs the free scanners installed on your
machine after Penthera's own scan: gitleaks, TruffleHog, Semgrep with your
local rules, osv-scanner, Trivy and Checkov for a repository, nuclei and the
ZAP baseline for a URL. Their findings go into the same report and SARIF, each
labelled with the tool, its version and its rule. Nothing is downloaded or
uploaded, and an area that neither Penthera's rules nor another tool reached
is reported as "not covered".
penthera giants # which tools you have
penthera --repo . --giants # Penthera, then each installed toolThis runs the tools you have and merges their findings. It is not a claim that the combination finds more: experiment E14 measured that (results). Details, safety rules and the policy key: docs/commands/giants.md.
Start here
You want to know | Read |
Is my app secure? | |
What should my small team do about security now? | A Practical Guide to Security for 2027: 10 steps, each with the command and its limit |
Is this package or MCP server safe? | |
How do I use it from my coding agent? | |
How do I put it in CI? | |
What do I give my auditor? | |
How do I run the fix loop? |
The full map, by situation and from first scan to research, is in docs/index.md.
Ethics and authorization
Penthera sends HTTP requests to the targets you give it, and some modes
(--deep, --fuzz, --adaptive, --all) send attack payloads, after a
confirmation.
Scan only what you own, what you have written authorization to test, or local
environments you control. Do not use it to probe third-party systems,
exfiltrate data, disrupt services, or harm anyone. Unauthorized testing may
break computer-misuse laws such as the US CFAA, the UK Computer Misuse Act, and
their EU equivalents. When in doubt, do not scan.
The software is provided "as is", without warranty. The author accepts no liability for misuse, and you are responsible for making sure every scan you run is lawful. The live check on penthera.org has its own terms.
Building in public
What changed, what we are measuring, and what comes next, in one place.
Where it stands | Read more | |
Latest release | 2.4.0 (2026-11-08) on npm | |
Research | Public benchmarks (E11b) published: on a sealed half of four public datasets, 1st of the free tools on npm and PyPI malware (tied 1st to 3rd), 1st on JS library injection bugs (tied 1st to 4th), 2nd on leaked secrets (summary). E10 pilot published: precision 0.88, recall 0.07 to 0.71 on two known-vulnerable apps after fixes (one labeller, not independent; a re-run is pending because default scans no longer send login checks). E1 on real code is pre-registered; E8 (agent guardrails) is a draft | E11b results, E10 results, E1 pre-registration, agents safely |
Next | Real-world precision and recall with intervals (E1), published whatever the result |
Watch the 80-second walkthrough: setup, a scan, the dashboard, a fix approved, the report. Demo data, no sound, captions in the video.
Releases are deliberately slow: a feature freeze, an independent review, the release checks, and a release candidate before any new minor version. Watch the repository for releases or join the Discussions.
How Penthera is built
Penthera is developed with substantial help from generative AI: 91% of the
commits up to v1.7.0 were written with Claude (Anthropic) through Claude Code,
directed and reviewed by the maintainer, and marked with an AI-Assisted: trailer.
Generated code passes the same gates as any change: tests, CodeQL, an
independent review, the internal audit, and a 2FA-approved release. Inside the
product, models only ever propose; deterministic checks decide. The full
disclosure, and the rules for AI-assisted contributions, are in
docs/genai.md.
Contributing and support
Clone the repository and run npm install, then npm test for the suite and
npm run bench for precision and recall.
CONTRIBUTING.md covers the project layout, the release
cadence and the release checklist; AGENTS.md is the short version
for coding agents. The roadmap shows what ships next, and the
research plan what we measure. Issues and pull requests
are welcome.
Penthera is free and stays free. If it caught something before you shipped it, you can sponsor its maintenance. Sponsorship pays for maintainer time and buys no influence over findings (tiers).
License
MIT. See LICENSE. Report vulnerabilities in Penthera itself through SECURITY.md.
Available Tools
6 toolsaudit_ai_toolingAudit AI agent configARead-onlyIdempotent
Audit the project's AI agent setup: skills, MCP servers, hooks, permissions, plugins and rule files, for hidden instructions, curl-pipe-shell, unpinned MCP packages, inline secrets and wildcard permissions. Grades A to F, or gives no grade when it finds no agent config. Offline, deterministic, read-only.
Inputs: path, max_findings.
check_dependenciesCheck dependenciesARead-onlyIdempotent
What each npm or Python dependency can do (install scripts, shell, network, eval, credential access), known-malicious packages and typosquats, read offline from the lockfile and installed tree. Read-only.
Inputs: path, prod, max_findings.
explain_findingExplain a findingARead-onlyIdempotent
Explain a finding's rule: what it checks, why it matters, how to fix it, effort, whether it is an owner action (rotate a key, change DNS), research references and OWASP MCP/Agentic ids. Pass the rule field of a finding as id (e.g. agents/mcp-unpinned, secrets, headers).
Inputs: id (required).
runtime_advisoriesRuntime advisoriesARead-onlyIdempotent
Is the PHP, nginx, Apache, Node.js, Python or OpenSSL an app runs affected by a published advisory, or past end of life? Give a project path (reads Dockerfiles, compose files and version pins) or the response headers you already have (Server, X-Powered-By). Offline.
Inputs: path, headers, max_findings.
scan_repoScan a repositoryARead-onlyIdempotent
White-box scan of a local project folder: hardcoded secrets, code-execution sinks, API routes and trust boundaries, runtime versions with known advisories, and security headers, cookie flags, CORS and login rate limits as the code sets them. Offline and read-only. Returns findings with evidence at file:line and confidence labels.
Inputs: path, max_findings.
scan_urlScan a running app (passive)ARead-onlyIdempotent
Passive black-box scan of a running web app the user is authorized to test: TLS, security headers, cookies, CORS, exposed files and docs, OpenAPI and auth checks. Sends no attack payloads: profile quick sends no login request, standard sends one POST /api/login with invalid credentials. Only loopback targets, or hosts the user listed with --allow-host when configuring this server, can be scanned, and a redirect off them is refused.
Inputs: url (required), profile, max_findings.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Loading tool schema changelog…
TDQS
Scored across 6 tools
The six tools are largely distinct along clear axes: black-box URL scanning (scan_url), white-box repo scanning (scan_repo), dependency capability analysis (check_dependencies), AI agent config auditing (audit_ai_tooling), and rule explanation (explain_finding). The main fuzziness is between scan_repo, scan_url, and runtime_advisories, which all touch security headers, cookies, CORS, and runtime versions — the descriptions acknowledge this but an agent may still hesitate over which one to call for a header or version question.
Five of six tools follow a consistent snake_case verb_noun pattern (scan_url, scan_repo, check_dependencies, audit_ai_tooling, explain_finding). runtime_advisories breaks the pattern by being a bare noun phrase with no verb, a minor but noticeable deviation in an otherwise predictable set.
Six tools is well within the ideal 3-15 range for a focused security-assessment server. Each tool maps to a distinct surface (runtime target, source code, dependencies, AI config, explanation, runtime advisories) with no obvious filler.
The surface covers the full scan lifecycle reasonably: black-box, white-box, dependencies, AI tooling, plus explanation and version advisory lookup. Gaps are minor — there is no tool to list, aggregate, or export findings across scans, and no remediation/verification step after fixing, but agents can work around these by re-running scans.
Maintenance
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Live threat intel for agents: incidents, actors, CVEs with KEV/EPSS, ransomware leak-site victims.
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