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crunchtools

io.github.crunchtools/systemd

by crunchtools

unit_file_remove_tool

Remove a systemd unit file: stop and disable the unit, back up its file, optionally mask it, and then delete. Protected units are refused to keep critical services safe.

Instructions

Decommission a unit: stop, disable, optionally mask, back up and remove its file.

Refused for units on the protected list. Best-effort on stop/disable — a unit that's already stopped or was never enabled doesn't block file removal.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
maskNoAlso mask the unit so nothing can start it again by mistake
unit_nameYesBare unit file name

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure, and it does so thoroughly. It reveals the full side-effect chain (stop, disable, optionally mask, back up, remove file), calls out refusal for protected units, and explains best-effort semantics for stop/disable, including that already-stopped or never-enabled units do not block removal. This is exactly the kind of behavioral transparency an agent needs for a destructive operation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is two tight sentences with no filler. The first sentence front-loads the tool's core purpose and full operation; the second adds essential caveats about protected units and best-effort behavior. Every clause earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given that an output schema exists and the input schema covers parameters, the description is nearly complete for correct invocation: it states what the tool does, its edge-case behavior, and a refusal condition. It could go slightly further by noting whether a daemon reload is needed after file removal or recommending a sibling tool for non-destructive changes, but those are refinements rather than critical omissions.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema fully documents both parameters. The description adds no new parameter-level meaning beyond reiterating that masking is optional, which the schema already declares with a default of false. Baseline 3 is appropriate because the schema is doing the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a clear verb-resource pair: 'Decommission a unit' and then enumerates the concrete operations: stop, disable, optionally mask, back up, and remove its file. This unambiguously distinguishes the tool from siblings like unit_stop_tool, unit_disable_tool, or unit_mask_tool because only this tool removes the unit file as part of its purpose.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies the intended use case ('decommission a unit') and states a clear exclusion ('Refused for units on the protected list'), but it never explicitly contrasts this tool with sibling tools for lighter operations such as simple stop, disable, or mask. An agent must infer that those lighter actions belong on the sibling tools rather than being told directly.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.