Find Cve Tool

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

readOnlyHint=true already tells the agent this is a safe read. The description adds a real behavioral constraint beyond the annotation: it only covers *current* catalog images and tags, not historical or released ones. It does not disclose whether results are scoped to a user/workspace or how results are ordered.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

One sentence, front-loaded with the verb and resource, no filler. Every word earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be explained, and the single parameter is fully documented. The description is nearly sufficient, though a brief note on how this differs from the sibling vulnerability-lookup tools would close the remaining gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% for the single cve_id parameter, and the schema already documents the accepted advisory ID formats. The description adds nothing about parameter semantics, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ('Find') and a precise resource/scope ('which current catalog images and tags a CVE affects'), which is the reverse direction of siblings like get_tag_vulnerabilities_tool and get_catalog_vulnerabilities_tool. It does not name those siblings, so the differentiation is implied rather than stated.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no when-to-use guidance, no exclusions, and no named alternative (e.g., when to prefer get_catalog_vulnerabilities_tool instead). The only usage signal is the implicit 'current catalog' scoping.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.