Get Security Events Tool

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With readOnlyHint=true already declaring the safety profile, the description adds the aggregation behavior ('grouped by action and source'), which is real value. It does not disclose pagination, default window behavior, or result volume concerns beyond what the schema's defaults imply.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two short sentences with the core action front-loaded and the constraint immediately following. Nothing is wasted, though it is terse enough that some helpful context is omitted.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Return values are covered by the output schema and all five parameters are documented at 100% coverage, so the description doesn't need to explain them. It is complete enough to call correctly, with only marginal gaps around which sibling to choose.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is already 100%, setting a baseline of 3. The description goes beyond the schema by stating that zone_id and zone_name are mutually exclusive, an XOR constraint the schema cannot express, which meaningfully guides invocation.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ('Get') and resource ('security/firewall events') and adds that results are 'grouped by action and source', which tells the agent the shape of the output. It does not, however, differentiate itself from nearby analytics tools like get_zone_analytics_tool or get_top_pages_tool, so the boundary between siblings is left implicit.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description supplies one clear usage rule ('Provide either zone_id or zone_name, not both'), which is genuinely helpful mutual-exclusion guidance. It offers no when-to-use context relative to the other analytics/security siblings, so an agent must infer when this tool is preferred over them.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.