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Lower Cloudflare zone protection

cloudflare_zone_setting_weaken
Destructive

Lower visitor protection for a Cloudflare zone by applying up to 20 ordered setting changes, with validation and confirmation before sending.

Instructions

Change 1 to 20 settings of a Cloudflare zone, in order, where a change lowers a visitor's protection: a lower step of ssl, min_tls_version or security_level, or turning off always_use_https, automatic_https_rewrites, tls_1_3 or email_obfuscation. Always confirmed. Every setting is read first, and nothing is sent if a value is not accepted, a setting is already at the value, or the zone's plan does not let you change it. If a later change fails, the result lists what was changed, the failure and the settings not sent. Zones are looked up only in the account's own zones.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
zoneYesThe zone domain or 32-hex id.
accountNoThe label of the credential pair to use, or "default" for the unlabeled one; left out, the unlabeled pair, else the only label.
changesYes1 to 20 changes, each setting at most once, applied in order. Allowed values: ssl: off|flexible|full|strict; always_use_https: on|off; min_tls_version: 1.0|1.1|1.2|1.3; tls_1_3: on|off|zrt; automatic_https_rewrites: on|off; http3: on|off; ipv6: on|off; websockets: on|off; development_mode: on|off; security_level: off|essentially_off|low|medium|high|under_attack; cache_level: basic|simplified|aggressive; browser_cache_ttl: 0|30|60|120|300|1200|1800|3600|7200|10800|14400|18000|28800|43200|57600|72000|86400|172800|259200|345600|432000|691200|1382400|2073600|2678400|5356800|16070400|31536000; always_online: on|off; email_obfuscation: on|off.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
zoneYesThe zone the settings belong to.
labelYesThe account label.
failedNoThe change that failed after earlier ones were applied; the rest were not sent.
changedYesThe changes that were applied, in order.
not_sentNoThe settings after the failed one, which were not sent.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the destructiveHint/openWorldHint annotations, the description discloses that every invocation is confirmed, that settings are read before any write, that nothing is sent when a value is rejected, already equal, or blocked by plan, and that partial failures return what changed plus what was not sent. These are exactly the operational details an agent needs before calling a destructive tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The scope constraint and the safety/validation behavior are front-loaded and every clause carries information, including the failure-reporting contract. The opening sentence is long and clause-chained, costing a little readability, but there is no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, multi-change mutation the definition covers scope, ordering, validation, confirmation, and partial-failure outcomes, and an output schema exists so return shape need not be described. Nothing an agent needs to invoke it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema already carries the value vocabularies; the description still adds sequencing semantics ("in order", each setting at most once) and the lookup scoping ("Zones are looked up only in the account's own zones") that the schema does not state. That is a modest but real increment over the baseline 3.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a specific verb and resource ("Change 1 to 20 settings of a Cloudflare zone") and narrows the scope to changes that lower visitor protection, naming the exact settings and directions (lower ssl/min_tls_version/security_level, turn off always_use_https, etc.). This lets an agent distinguish it from the sibling cloudflare_zone_setting_edit without opening either schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The gating condition for use is explicit: only changes that reduce protection, with the permitted setting/direction pairs enumerated. It does not name cloudflare_zone_setting_edit as the alternative for non-weakening edits, so the routing is implied rather than spelled out.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.