Bulwark
Allows interaction with GitHub through Bulwark's MCP gateway, enabling governed tool calls for operations like listing issues, creating issues, comments, and pull requests, with policy enforcement, credential injection, and audit logging.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@Bulwarkshow me the latest denied tool calls in the audit log"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
Bulwark
Open-source governance layer for AI agents.
Bulwark sits between AI agents and external tools, enforcing policies, managing credentials, inspecting content, and maintaining a complete audit trail. One policy governs all your agents — Claude Code, OpenClaw, Codex, or any MCP/HTTP client.
Why Bulwark?
AI agents are powerful but ungoverned. They can access any tool, leak any credential, and leave no audit trail. Bulwark fixes this:
Policy enforcement — YAML-based rules control which tools agents can use, with glob patterns, scope-based precedence, and hot-reload
Credential management — Agents never see real secrets. Bulwark injects credentials at the last mile, encrypted at rest with age
Content inspection — Scan requests and responses for secrets, PII, and prompt injection. Block or redact automatically
Audit logging — Every action recorded in a tamper-evident SQLite database with blake3 hash chains
Rate limiting — Token-bucket rate limits per session, operator, tool, or globally. Cost tracking with budget enforcement
MCP-native — Works as an MCP gateway or HTTP forward proxy. Governance metadata on every tool call response
Related MCP server: Proofpane
Install
# Homebrew (macOS / Linux)
brew install bpolania/tap/bulwark
# Docker
docker pull ghcr.io/bpolania/bulwark
# From source
git clone https://github.com/bpolania/bulwark.git
cd bulwark && cargo build --releaseQuick Start: Govern Claude Code with GitHub
This walkthrough connects Claude Code to GitHub through Bulwark. Every tool call is policy-evaluated, audited, and credential-injected — in about 5 minutes.
Prerequisites: Claude Code installed, a GitHub personal access token, and Node.js/npm (for the GitHub MCP server).
1. Initialize and verify
bulwark init my-project && cd my-project
bulwark doctordoctor runs 9 diagnostic checks. All should pass.
2. Store your GitHub token
bulwark cred add github-token --type bearer_token
# Prompts for the token — hidden input, encrypted with age at restConfigure the credential-to-tool binding in your bindings file so Bulwark knows to inject this token for GitHub tool calls.
3. Configure the upstream GitHub server
Edit bulwark.yaml:
mcp_gateway:
upstream_servers:
- name: github
command: "npx"
args: ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"]
env:
GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN: "${GITHUB_TOKEN}"
policy:
policies_dir: "./policies"
hot_reload: true
audit:
enabled: true
inspect:
enabled: true
inspect_requests: true
inspect_responses: trueMake sure GITHUB_TOKEN is set in your shell (export GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_...).
4. Write a policy
cat > policies/base.yaml << 'EOF'
metadata:
name: quickstart-policy
scope: global
rules:
- name: allow-reads
description: "Allow all read operations"
match:
actions: ["read_*", "get_*", "list_*", "search_*"]
verdict: allow
priority: 10
- name: allow-github-writes
description: "Allow creating issues, comments, PRs"
match:
tools: ["github__*"]
actions: ["create_*", "update_*"]
verdict: allow
priority: 10
- name: block-destructive
description: "Block all delete and force-push operations"
match:
actions: ["delete_*", "force_push_*"]
verdict: deny
priority: 20
message: "Destructive operations are blocked by policy"
- name: default-deny
match: {}
verdict: deny
priority: -100
message: "No policy explicitly allows this action"
EOF
bulwark policy validate5. Create a session and connect Claude Code
# Create a session (--ttl is in seconds: 28800 = 8 hours)
bulwark session create --operator $(whoami) --agent-type claude-code --ttl 28800
# → Token: bwk_sess_7f3a...
export BULWARK_SESSION="bwk_sess_7f3a..." # paste your actual token
# Register Bulwark as an MCP server in Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport stdio bulwark \
--env BULWARK_SESSION=$BULWARK_SESSION \
-- bulwark mcp start6. Use Claude Code — now governed
Start Claude Code. GitHub tools appear namespaced as github__list_issues, github__create_issue, etc.
Try it:
"List the open issues in my repo"
Open a second terminal:
bulwark audit tail22:01:03 github__list_issues ✓ allow 3ms (allow-reads)Every call is logged with the verdict, matched rule, and timing. Now try something destructive:
"Delete issue #1"
22:02:01 github__delete_issue ✗ deny <1ms (block-destructive)Blocked. Sub-millisecond — policy evaluation happens in memory. The agent gets a structured error explaining which rule denied it.
What just happened
Claude Code connected to Bulwark (not directly to GitHub). For every tool call, Bulwark validated the session, scanned for secrets/PII, evaluated the policy, injected the real GitHub token, scanned the response, and recorded a tamper-evident audit event. Same agent experience — full governance underneath.
Going Deeper
Content inspection — 13 built-in patterns scan for AWS keys, GitHub tokens, private keys, PII, and prompt injection. Redaction happens before content reaches the agent.
bulwark inspect rules
bulwark inspect scan --text "my key is AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"Policy replay — Preview the impact of policy changes against real audit history before deploying:
bulwark policy test --dir ./new-policies/ --since 1hAudit forensics — Reconstruct a session timeline and verify the hash chain:
bulwark session inspect <session-id>
bulwark audit verify
bulwark audit export --since 24h --format jsonHTTP proxy mode — For non-MCP agents, Bulwark runs as a forward proxy with TLS interception:
bulwark proxy start
bulwark ca export # trust the CA in your HTTP clientArchitecture
┌─────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
│ │ │ Bulwark │ │ │
│ AI Agent │────>│ Session > Inspect > Policy > Inject > Proxy │────>│ Upstream │
│ (Claude, │<────│ <── Audit <── Inspect <── Response <─────── │<────│ Tool/API │
│ Codex, │ │ │ │ │
│ custom) │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────┘ └──────────────┘
└─────────────┘Integration Modes
Mode | Transport | Best For |
MCP Gateway (stdio) | stdio/JSON-RPC | Claude Code, OpenClaw, any MCP client |
MCP Gateway (HTTP) | Streamable HTTP | Remote agents, MCP registry, multi-agent |
HTTP Proxy | HTTP/HTTPS | Codex, curl, any HTTP client |
Example Policy
# policies/base.yaml
metadata:
name: my-policy
scope: global
rules:
- name: allow-reads
verdict: allow
priority: 10
match:
actions: ["read*", "get*", "list*"]
- name: block-destructive-in-prod
verdict: deny
priority: 100
match:
actions: ["delete*", "drop*"]
conditions:
environments: ["production"]
- name: default-deny
verdict: deny
match: {}See examples/policies/ for complete policy sets (startup, enterprise, development, multi-agent).
CLI
bulwark init <path> # Scaffold a new project
bulwark proxy start # Start HTTP/HTTPS proxy
bulwark mcp start # Start MCP gateway (stdio)
bulwark mcp serve # Start MCP gateway (HTTP)
bulwark doctor # Diagnose setup issues (9 checks)
bulwark status # Health dashboard
bulwark policy validate # Validate policy files
bulwark policy test --dir <path> # Test policies against audit log
bulwark session create|list|revoke|inspect
bulwark cred add|list|remove|test
bulwark audit search|tail|stats|export|verify
bulwark inspect scan|rules # Content inspection
bulwark ca export|path # CA certificate management
bulwark completions <shell> # Shell completions (bash/zsh/fish)Documentation
Agent Guides: Claude Code | Codex | OpenClaw
Development
git clone https://github.com/bpolania/bulwark.git
cd bulwark
cargo build --workspace
cargo test --workspace # 487 tests
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warningsProject Structure
crates/
cli/ # CLI binary and commands
proxy/ # HTTP/HTTPS forward proxy with TLS MITM
mcp/ # MCP governance gateway
config/ # Configuration loading and types
policy/ # YAML policy engine with hot-reload
vault/ # Credential storage and session management
audit/ # Tamper-evident audit logging
inspect/ # Content inspection (secrets, PII, injection)
ratelimit/ # Token-bucket rate limiter and cost tracker
common/ # Shared types and error definitionsLicense
Apache 2.0. See LICENSE.
This server cannot be deployed
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
Zero-secret MCP gateway for AI agents: risk-scored, audited calls with human-in-the-loop approval.
Zero-trust gateway for AI agents: score tool calls, verify agent cards, enforce policy, audit.
- gatewayOAuthai.sealgate
MCP gateway with runtime security policy, tool-call-level control, and audit of agent actions.
Security gateway for AI agents: policy, approval, and audited execution, no secrets shared.
Related MCP Servers
AlicenseNot gradedqualityAmaintenanceOpen-source MCP proxy that enforces security policies, content scanning, and audit logging between AI agents and tool servers25AGPL 3.0- AlicenseBqualityAmaintenanceA governance proxy for AI tools — every MCP/agent tool call is policy-gated, secret-redacted, and written to a hash-chained, offline-verifiable audit trail.13MIT

evav-gatewayofficial
AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceGoverned MCP gateway that lets AI agents call tools with policy enforcement, prompt-injection screening, a kill-switch, and tamper-evident signed audit logs.Apache 2.0- AlicenseAqualityCmaintenanceProvides a security governance layer for AI agents to safely access upstream MCP servers, enforcing tool-level RBAC, parameter constraints, authentication via static tokens or OIDC, and tamper-evident audit logging.21Apache 2.0