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opus-tplink-mcp

Built by AI, for AI.

An AI wrote it (reverse-engineering the routers' own web pages, testing every write live), and an AI is who it's for: an agent that can change a home network safely, see exactly what it is about to do, prove that it worked, and undo it.

A complete, safety-first MCP server for TP-Link Archer routers (Wi-Fi 7 / BE series) and RE range extenders. 33 tools covering virtually everything the router's web UI can do. Every change goes through the same pipeline: dry run → review → apply → verify → journal → undo.

Designed and re-engineered by Claude Opus 5.5 (Anthropic), with Fable 5.2 advising, for vehoelite. Grown from consigcody94/mcp-tplink-router (MIT).

Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or supported by TP-Link or Anthropic. "TP-Link" and "Archer" are trademarks of TP-Link. Use at your own risk: this software changes live network equipment.

Why this one

  • Everything, not just the basics. All 238 forms the web UI uses are catalogued and reachable. Every major feature also has a dedicated tool: WAN and IPv6, DoH/DoT, LAN, IPTV/VLAN, link aggregation, DHCP, IP-MAC binding, VPN server and client, routing, access control, parental controls, Wi-Fi (incl. WPS, MLO, OFDMA, guest), port forwarding, UPnP, DMZ, ALG, firewall, EasyMesh, USB sharing, DDNS, backup/restore, firmware, diagnostics and administration.

  • Safe by construction. Every write is a dry run first. Critical changes need a one-time confirm token. Everything is journaled with before/after state and can be undone. Writes are verified by re-reading the router, and a change the router silently ignores is reported as no_effect, not "success".

  • Field-tested. 84 write operations were exercised live across an Archer BE9300 (firmware 1.2.4) and an Archer BE4800 (older, encrypted firmware): change, verify, undo, verify restored. The BE4800 runs were repeated after the 1.0.1 transport fix (all but access control). An Archer BE3600 (fw 1.0.4) passed the same runbook plus MLO and USB (see Tested routers). More than a dozen firmware quirks found that way are handled for you (see Firmware quirks). router_catalog marks every operation live, ui (from the web UI's code) or none.

  • Multi-router. Manage several routers from one server, including older firmware that uses the encrypted LuCI protocol (e.g. Archer BE4800 1.0.x).

Related MCP server: ax11000-mcp

Tools (33)

Area

Tool

Highlights

Overview

router_status

WAN/LAN, internet state, Wi-Fi, clients, CPU/memory, firmware

router_get / router_catalog / router_raw_read

Read any section or any of the 238 forms; per-operation risk tier and verification status

router_logs

System log with level/type/text/time filters (never touches the router's own log filter)

device_log

Everything about one MAC: lease, reservation, every log line mentioning it, parental-control sites and blocked attempts, access/VPN/IoT status, traffic. Plus a local per-device history beyond what the router keeps

Safety

router_journal / router_undo

Every change with before/after; undo with conflict detection

router_raw_write

Escape hatch, gated by the catalog's risk tiers

Internet

internet

Connection type (DHCP, static, PPPoE, L2TP, PPTP, DS-Lite, v6plus, OCN), IPv6 (all modes), lease renew/release, DNS-over-HTTPS / DNS-over-TLS, MAC clone, WAN flow control, live speed / dual-NAT

LAN

lan

LAN IPv4/IPv6, port speed, link aggregation (LACP), flow control, IPTV / VLAN, UDP proxy, NAT / hardware NAT boost, ALG

DHCP

dhcp_server_set / dhcp_reservation

Pool, lease, DNS; reservations with random-MAC detection

ip_mac_binding

ARP binding, bind current devices, conflict checks

Wi-Fi

wifi_set

Per-band and guest SSIDs, passwords, channels, power, guest access/isolation, smart connect

wifi_extra

WPS push button and PIN (returns the outcome and the paired MAC), Wi-Fi 7 MLO network, OFDMA/MU-MIMO, TWT, advanced radio settings, guest bandwidth/time limits, AFC

wifi_schedule

Wi-Fi off periods

Mesh

mesh

EasyMesh status, devices, topology, naming/placing units, client steering, satellite reboot/unlink

VPN

vpn_server / vpn_client

OpenVPN / PPTP / L2TP / WireGuard servers and accounts; VPN-client profiles and per-device routing

Routing

routing

Static routes and the live routing table

Security

access_control / parental_control

Allow/block lists; HomeShield profiles, sites, pause internet

Ports

port_forwarding / upnp

Virtual servers, port triggering, DMZ; UPnP and its mappings

Clients

clients

Rename devices, per-device speed limits, IoT network isolation, game accelerator

USB

usb

Drives and partitions (scan, browse, share/hide a partition, eject), Samba/FTP/SFTP sharing, media server, Time Machine, USB 4G modem

DDNS

ddns

TP-Link DDNS, No-IP, DynDNS

Maintenance

maintenance

Config backup and restore, firmware (online, image upload, mesh satellites), ping / traceroute, operation mode, reboot schedule

Admin

admin

Admin password (RSA-encrypted like the web UI), remote management, HTTPS, local-management list, recovery e-mail, user permissions

System

system

SPI firewall / ping replies, LEDs, eco mode, time/NTP/DST, auto-update, QoS, device priority, reboot

Extenders

extender / extender_set

RE range extenders: model, mode, uplink signal, mesh role, extended and guest networks, clients, logs; LEDs, LED night mode, power schedule, reboot

Read tools are annotated readOnlyHint; write tools are annotated destructiveHint. On an extender (KIND=extender) only extender, extender_set, router_status, router_raw_read, router_journal and router_undo are offered; the router tools answer "not supported" with the list.

How it talks to the router

  • Login: tplinkrouterc6u.TplinkRouterV1_11(...).authorize() (RSA login), or the encrypted TplinkRouter for older firmware. On the encrypted protocol the library is used only for login and AES; the body still goes out as the web UI's form string. (The library's JSON adapter, made for the BE805, collapses repeated keys, drops blank values and copies fields into the URL, so it is bypassed. That adapter was why MLO couldn't be switched on through earlier versions on a BE4800.)

  • Requests: our own application/x-www-form-urlencoded POST to /cgi-bin/luci/;stok=<stok>/admin/<module>?form=<form>, the same requests the web UI sends. The URL carries only ?form=; operation and every field go in the body. Multipart is used for backup, restore and firmware images.

  • One session per tool call: the router allows one admin login, so each call logs in and always logs out. If the web UI or the Tether app is logged in, log it out. (WPS pairing is the one exception: it stays logged in until pairing ends, because logging out cancels WPS.)

  • Retries: a failed login, or an ambiguous error while reading or planning, is retried once. A write is never resent. If a write times out or the connection drops, the server logs in again, re-reads, and reports whether the change was applied.

Range extenders

Two more login generations, both taken from the extenders' own web pages:

  • extender (X-series, e.g. RE2700X / RE1750X / RE1500X): plain form posts like the BE9300; the password is RSA-1024 PKCS#1 v1.5 encrypted. Every request needs a Referer header.

  • encrypted-v2 (the hardened generation, e.g. RE3200BE firmware 1.5): AES bodies, a SHA-256 login hash, an RSA-OAEP login signature, and an HMAC-SHA256 signature over each request's ciphertext. Without the per-request hash the device answers HTTP 403.

A refused extender login is never retried automatically: these devices lock the account after repeated failures.

Safety model

Tier

Examples

To apply

read

every read, ping/traceroute, config backup

nothing

normal

add a reservation, block a phone, change an SSID, WPS push

apply=true

critical

LAN IP, any WAN form, DHCP off, radio off, region, white-list access control, blocking this machine, VPN-client changes, admin / remote management, firmware, restore, reboot, operation mode, firewall off

apply=true and the confirm_token from the dry run

forbidden

factory reset, quick setup, cloud bind/unbind, debug shell

router_raw_write only, with TPLINK_ALLOW_FORBIDDEN=1 in the server environment, plus a confirm token

  • Dry run by default. Without apply=true a write tool returns the plan, a field-level diff, warnings, the risk tier and (for critical changes) a confirm_token. It sends nothing.

  • Confirm tokens are an HMAC over the exact requests, which embed the values being replaced. A token is valid for 5 minutes and is refused if the router changed since the dry run. Uploads are bound to the file's SHA-256.

  • Forms are read-merge-written, sending the field allowlist from the web UI's own code for that form, or only the changed fields where the UI does that.

  • Table rows are changed one at a time: re-load the table, find the row by its key, check it is unchanged, then send the request with the fresh index.

  • Collateral check: after every remove or update, the whole table is compared before and after. If any other row vanished or changed, the result is status: "collateral", the remaining steps are not sent, and router_undo can re-add the lost rows.

  • Verification: after a write the router is re-read, and the result is applied, a mismatch, or no_effect (accepted but ignored).

  • Automatic backup: before every critical change the router's config is downloaded to the backup folder (pre_change_backup in the result; TPLINK_AUTO_BACKUP=0 turns it off).

  • Wi-Fi health check: after every Wi-Fi change the server re-reads the WPS PIN page, the read that crashes when the band configuration is damaged. Transient timeouts while radios restart are retried; a crash is reported loudly in warnings_after with the restore instructions.

  • Validation: DHCP pools, reservations, bindings and routes are checked against the subnet, the router's own IP, leases and conflicts. A randomised/private MAC gets a warning.

  • Journal: ~/.local/state/mcp-tplink-router/journal.jsonl (directory 0700, file 0600). The full before state is fsynced before the first request; the exact fields sent (wire) and the result follow. The journal keeps secrets so undo can restore them.

  • Undo: router_undo id=... restores old values, removes inserts, re-adds removed rows and swaps updates back. It refuses if the router changed since, unless you pass force. Reboots, firmware and other one-way actions are not undoable.

  • Secrets (PSKs, passwords, private/preshared keys, PINs, tokens) are masked in every result, diff and error unless you pass reveal=true. Account passwords are read from files, never from tool arguments.

Tested routers

Router

Firmware

Protocol

Live-tested

Archer BE9300

1.2.4

plain

full runbook (84 write types across both first routers), WPS, EasyMesh, USB, restore

Archer BE4800

1.0.x

encrypted

runbook, MLO, advanced radio, USB, all reads

Archer BE3600 v2

1.0.4

encrypted

runbook, MLO (this model reboots after an MLO change), operation mode router ↔ AP, USB, HTTPS remote management, reboot, all reads

Other Archer BE models with the same web UI (Archer BExxxx, firmware from 2024 on) should work.

Tested range extenders

All four were tested in repeater mode as EasyMesh members of a BE9300.

Extender

Firmware

Protocol

Reads

Changes (applied, verified, undone)

RE2700X v1.0

1.1.9

extender

status, uplink, networks, mesh, clients, system, logs

LEDs, LED night mode, power schedule

RE1750X v2.2

1.0.6

extender

same

LEDs, LED night mode, power schedule

RE1500X v2.0

1.1.0

extender

same

LEDs, LED night mode, power schedule, reboot

RE3200BE

1.5.3

encrypted-v2

same

LEDs, LED night mode, power schedule

router_catalog shows which operations are confirmed live and which come from the web UI's code.

Install

pip install opus-tplink-mcp        # or: uvx opus-tplink-mcp

From source: python -m venv venv && venv/bin/pip install -e ".[dev]".

Configuration

Copy .env.example to .env, or pass the variables from your MCP client config.

Variable

Default

Meaning

TPLINK_HOST

192.168.0.1

Router address (https://... if it redirects)

TPLINK_PASSWORD

The plain admin password

TPLINK_TIMEOUT

20

Per-request timeout (s)

TPLINK_JOURNAL_DIR

~/.local/state/mcp-tplink-router

Journal (also the default parent of backups and device logs)

TPLINK_BACKUP_DIR

<journal>/backups

Where maintenance action=backup saves config files (mode 600)

TPLINK_DEVICE_LOG_DIR

<journal>/device-logs

Per-MAC histories written by device_log action=record

TPLINK_AUTO_BACKUP

1

Download a config backup before every critical change (0 = off)

TPLINK_PROTECTED_MACS

Comma-separated MACs whose VPN-client routing must not break silently (e.g. a filtered child's laptop). Changes affecting them are called out by name.

TPLINK_ALLOW_FORBIDDEN

unset

1 lets router_raw_write send forbidden-tier operations

MCP client entry (stdio):

{"command": "uvx", "args": ["opus-tplink-mcp"], "env": {"TPLINK_HOST": "192.168.0.1", "TPLINK_PASSWORD": "..."}}

(or "command": "/path/to/venv/bin/opus-tplink-mcp" for a local install)

Several routers

TPLINK_HOST/TPLINK_PASSWORD is router main. To add more:

TPLINK_ROUTERS=upstairs
TPLINK_UPSTAIRS_HOST=https://192.168.1.1
TPLINK_UPSTAIRS_PASSWORD_FILE=/path/to/router2.pw
TPLINK_UPSTAIRS_PROTOCOL=encrypted   # older firmware (e.g. BE4800 1.0.x): encrypted LuCI

A range extender is added the same way, with its protocol (the kind follows from extender; set it for encrypted-v2):

TPLINK_ROUTERS=hallway
TPLINK_HALLWAY_HOST=192.168.0.20
TPLINK_HALLWAY_PASSWORD_FILE=/path/to/extender.pw
TPLINK_HALLWAY_PROTOCOL=encrypted-v2   # or: extender (X-series)
TPLINK_HALLWAY_KIND=extender
  • Every tool takes router (default main). router_status lists the configured routers.

  • Journal entries record the router, and router_undo always targets the router the change was made on.

  • Risk tiers are per router. VPN-client protection applies to main; on other routers, access-control mode/enable and parental internet pause are critical. Removing the last allowlisted device is critical on every router.

  • Forms another firmware lacks return no such callback, with a hint.

  • Multipart uploads/downloads (backup, restore, firmware) are implemented for the plain protocol.

A per-device log

device_log action=record mac=... appends only what is new since the last record: online/offline, router log lines, parental-control sites and blocked attempts. Run it on a timer for a continuous history that outlives the router's own (daily) data, then read it with action=history.

Firmware quirks handled

Found against a live BE9300 (fw 1.2.4); each one is encoded in the catalog or the tools:

  • WPS: option=connect starts push-button pairing; pbc/pin only poll the status. The router cancels WPS when the admin session logs out, so wps_push stays logged in and polls until a device pairs or the window closes. Status replies take ~18 s.

  • Guest Wi-Fi: only changed fields may be sent. A full write with blank passwd_cycle is refused.

  • DoH/DoT: server_list must be sent as a repeated server_list= field and included with every write ("no server found" otherwise). JSON wipes the list, and server_list[] is refused.

  • IPTV / link aggregation: port_settings must always be sent as JSON, or the router returns HTTP 500. Saving IPTV restarts the network for about 40 s.

  • OFDMA: on routers with the combined setting, the standalone switch is ignored. Use ofdma_mimo (all / ofdma_only / disabled).

  • IP-MAC binding: refused while the IP is DHCP-reserved for another MAC. The router drops custom names on bindings and reservations.

  • Speed limits are stored verbatim (on/off). WPS wait time is read-only.

  • LAN IPv6 address is recomputed by the router on every save.

  • MAC clone and WAN changes reconnect the WAN, and the ISP may assign a new public IP. Anything allowlisting your old IP (cloud firewalls, DNS-filter locations) will need updating.

  • Admin password fields are RSA-encrypted with per-field keys from the read. The server encrypts at send time, so the dry run's confirm token stays valid.

  • MLO network: off = only enable=off. On = exactly the web UI's 7 fields, with selected_bands as a repeated key and at least two bands (band_select is read-only, and the UI never sends it). The recipe was taken from a capture of the BE4800 web page's own requests, then switched off/on twice through the tool on a BE4800, with an empty wireless-config diff afterwards. A malformed MLO write on a BE9300 once switched MLO off and made the firmware drop an internal per-band field (disabled_by): Wi-Fi kept working, but every WPS start failed ("Interface return exception") until a config restore. After every Wi-Fi change the server now reads the WPS page as a health check. Some models (Archer BE3600) reboot after an MLO change, as their web UI warns. The server reads the router's capability flags, flags the change as critical in the dry run, and reports router_rebooting instead of probing a router that is going down.

  • Connected clients on encrypted-protocol firmware (BE4800, BE3600) are not in status?form=all; they are read from the web UI's loadDevice source.

  • User-permission switches are accepted but ignored for a normal admin login (no_effect).

  • Eco mode takes strong / medium / weak; DST and the 24-hour clock use dst_enable / hour24_enable.

  • USB sharing is saved as ONE request (server name + enable="on,off,off" for Samba/FTP/FTP-internet); per-service saves are refused. The server name can't be written on its own.

  • Fields the router keeps when blanked (the custom WAN MAC) don't count as a failed restore.

  • TP-Link DDNS has no refresh operation (it updates itself).

Known limitations

  • mesh action=pair is disabled. In testing, starting the satellite search and a WPS session in the same login locked a BE9300 up badly enough that a factory reset was needed. Pair satellites with the router's WPS button, wifi_extra action=wps_push, or the web UI.

  • maintenance action=operation_mode was switched live router → AP → router on a BE3600. The device changes address with the mode (in AP mode it takes a DHCP lease on the upstream network; in router mode it is reached on its LAN side, or on its WAN address with remote management on), so point this server's host at the new address afterwards. Leaving router mode turns remote management off. keep_access=true turns it on before switching back to router mode; it is opt-in because it exposes the admin page on the WAN side (the internet, if the WAN is your ISP), and the firmware ignores a restriction to one manager address.

  • Extenders: tested in repeater mode only (access-point mode needs a wired uplink and is untested). Writing the extended networks or high-speed mode is not offered yet (not verified; high-speed mode is ignored by the firmware while the extender is in an EasyMesh network). An EasyMesh member takes its Wi-Fi settings from the main router, so local Wi-Fi changes may be overwritten. File upload/download (backup, firmware) is not implemented for extenders.

  • usb action=eject is accepted by the router, but in testing the partitions kept reading as mounted until the drive was unplugged, so treat it as "safe to unplug" only after checking.

  • Not yet exercised live (implemented from the web UI's code, covered by offline tests): firmware image upload and online update (no newer firmware was available), Time Machine, DDNS login, WPS client-PIN pairing, mesh satellite operations, adding WireGuard server accounts (the router refuses the format tried so far) and parental-control profile edits. Operations marked ui or none in router_catalog fall in this group.

Development

venv/bin/pytest -q      # offline: a fake router; any socket/requests use fails the test
venv/bin/ruff check .
  • docs/router/endpoints.txt lists every form the web UI references.

  • tests/fixtures/shapes.json holds live field shapes (no values) for the readable forms. The catalog's writable fields are checked against it.

License

MIT. See LICENSE.

Available Tools

33 tools
access_controlA
Destructive

Access control (who may use the network). action=status | candidates | enable | disable | set_mode (mode=black|white) | block / unblock (mac[, name]) | allow / disallow (mac). Black mode blocks listed devices; white mode blocks everything NOT listed. Switching to white mode, enabling it, or blocking THIS machine is CRITICAL.

Inputs: mac, mode, name, apply, +4 more.

adminA
Destructive

Router administration. action=status | change_password (old_password_file, new_password_file; CRITICAL) | remote (remote management: enable, http_port, https_port, managers) | https | local_mode (everyone vs listed devices) | local_add / local_remove (mac, name) | recovery (password-recovery e-mail) | superadmin | permissions (what the local user may see/edit). No settings = read.

Inputs: mac, name, apply, action, +7 more.

clientsB
Destructive

Connected devices. action=list | rename (mac, name: the name shown everywhere) | speed (limits/speeds) | speed_limit (mac, download_kbps, upload_kbps, enable) | game_accelerator | iot_status | iot_enable | iot_disable | iot_add / iot_remove (mac or macs: move smart-home devices to the isolated IoT network).

Inputs: mac, macs, name, apply, +7 more.

ddnsA
Destructive

Dynamic DNS. action=status | refresh (provider) | tplink: add / remove / bind / unbind (domain) | noip / dyndns: login (username, domain, password_file[, wan_bind]) | logout.

Inputs: apply, action, domain, reveal, +6 more.

device_logA
Read-onlyIdempotent

Everything the router knows about ONE device, plus a local per-MAC history. action=report (mac: online state, IP, DHCP lease/reservation, every router-log line mentioning its MAC or IP, its parental-control profile's sites today and blocked attempts, access-control / VPN / IoT status, traffic) | record (mac: append only what is NEW to /device-logs/-.jsonl; run it on a timer for a continuous log beyond what the router keeps) | history (mac, event?, limit) | list. Read-only on the router.

Inputs: mac, event, limit, action, +2 more.

dhcp_reservationA
Destructive

DHCP address reservations (stable IPs, e.g. for kiosk tablets). action=list (with lease status and random-MAC warnings) | leases | add (mac, ip, name) | update (mac + ip/name/enable) | remove (mac) | reserve_current (pin a client's CURRENT address; identify it by mac, current_ip or client hostname). MACs in any format. Warns when a MAC is randomised/private - that device must use its real MAC.

Inputs: ip, mac, name, apply, +7 more.

dhcp_server_setA
Destructive

DHCP server: action=get shows settings; otherwise change enable / start / end (pool) / lease_minutes (1-2880) / gateway / dns1 / dns2. Validated against the LAN subnet, the router's own IP, active leases and reservations. Disabling DHCP or a gateway other than the router is CRITICAL.

Inputs: end, dns1, dns2, apply, +8 more.

extenderA
Read-onlyIdempotent

TP-Link range extender (RE series). action=status (model, mode, uplink signal, mesh role) | uplink (the network it connects to) | extended (networks it broadcasts) | guest | mesh | network | clients | wifi_advanced | system (mode, time, LEDs, eco, power schedule) | logs. Secrets masked unless reveal.

Inputs: action, reveal, router.

extender_setA
Destructive

Change a range extender: action=led (enable) | led_night (enable, time_start, time_end) | power_schedule (enable) | reboot. (Extended networks / high-speed mode: read them with extender; writing them is not verified yet - use router_raw_write if needed.) No settings = show current values. Dry run first; critical changes need the confirm_token. Journaled and undoable (except reboot).

Inputs: action (required), apply, enable, reveal, +3 more.

internetB
Destructive

Internet (WAN). action=status (connection, IPv4/IPv6, WAN port, dual-NAT, speed, DNS privacy) | protocols | get (family=4|6, proto?) | set (family, proto=dynamic|staticip|pppoe|l2tp|pptp|dslite|v6plus|ocn for IPv4; dynamic|static|pppoe|pass|tunnel for IPv6, settings={...}) CRITICAL | renew | release (family) | ipv6_enable | ipv6_disable | autodetect | dns_privacy (settings={dns_privacy: none|doh|dot, dns_mode: default|strict, server_list: [...]}) | dns_privacy_servers (kind=doh|dot) | dns_privacy_test (settings) | mac_clone (settings={mac_clone_type, mac_custom}) | flow_control (settings={rx_enable, tx_enable}).

Inputs: kind, apply, proto, action, +5 more.

ip_mac_bindingA
Destructive

IP-MAC binding (ARP binding): action=status|list (setting, bindings, live ARP table) | enable | disable | add (mac, ip, name, description) | update (mac + ip/name/description/enable; done as remove+re-add) | remove (mac) | bind_current (bind an ARP entry as-is, by mac or ip). Binding THIS machine to a different IP is CRITICAL.

Inputs: ip, mac, name, apply, +6 more.

lanA
Destructive

LAN side. action=status (all below + port status) | lan_ipv4 (router LAN IP/mask: CRITICAL) | lan_ipv6 | port_speed (settings={speed}) | link_aggregation (LACP: enable_agg, hashmode, lacpmode, port_settings) | flow_control (rx_enable, tx_enable) | iptv (IPTV/VLAN: enable, mode, internet/iptv/ipphone VLAN ids, IGMP, port_settings) | udp_proxy | nat (NAT and hardware NAT boost) | alg (settings={ftp, tftp, h323, rtsp, sip, pptp, l2tp, ipsec: true/false}). Firewall / ping replies: system action=firewall. No settings = read.

Inputs: apply, action, enable, reveal, +3 more.

maintenanceA
Destructive

Maintenance. action=info | backup (download the config to the backup folder) | backups (list) | restore (file = a backup name or path; CRITICAL, reboots) | firmware_check (router + mesh satellites, online) | firmware_update_online (CRITICAL, reboots) | firmware_status | firmware_upload (file = image path; CRITICAL) | satellite_firmware_update (mac) | ping / traceroute (target, count, size, max_hops, timeout) | operation_mode (mode=router|ap|repeater|client|multissid; none = read; CRITICAL; keep_access) | reboot_schedule (settings). Factory reset is deliberately only reachable via router_raw_write (forbidden tier).

Inputs: mac, file, mode, size, +11 more.

meshA
Destructive

EasyMesh: action=status|devices|clients|topology|search_status|ap_avoidance|device_detail (mac) (read) | pair (DISABLED: locked up a BE9300 in testing; use the web UI / Tether / WPS button) | enable | disable (CRITICAL if satellites are attached) | search_start | search_stop | link | unlink (CRITICAL) | reboot_satellite (CRITICAL) | add_onboarding (mac) | set_device (mac, settings={name, location, led, preferred_wifi_uplink_ap, traffic_separation, backhaul_steering}) | rebalance (clients re-pick the best unit) | bind_client (mac=unit, client_mac, bind=true|false: pin a client to a unit). Satellite firmware: maintenance action=firmware_check / satellite_firmware_update.

Inputs: mac, bind, wait, apply, +7 more.

parental_controlA
Destructive

HomeShield parental controls (local, per profile/'owner', e.g. a child). action=owners | devices | block_history (owner_id) | today_sites (owner_id) | filter_get / allowed_sites_get (owner_id) | internet_block (owner_id, blocked=true pauses the internet, false resumes) | filter_set / allowed_sites_set (owner_id, sites=[domains]) | add_owner (owner={...}) | remove_owner (owner_id).

Inputs: apply, owner, sites, action, +5 more.

port_forwardingA
Destructive

Port forwarding. kind=vs (virtual servers, default) | pt (port triggering) | dmz. action=list | add (rule={name, external_port, internal_port, ip, protocol ALL|TCP|UDP, enable}) | update (name, rule) | remove (name); for dmz: list | enable (ip) | disable. Overlapping external ports are refused.

Inputs: ip, kind, name, rule, +5 more.

router_catalogA
Read-onlyIdempotent

List every router form (219+), what each operation does to risk (read/normal/critical/forbidden) and whether its format is verified live or only copied from the web UI. filter narrows by text; path describes one form (fields, key, secrets).

Inputs: path, filter, reveal, router.

router_getA
Read-onlyIdempotent

Read one section of the router config by friendly name (e.g. dhcp, dhcp_reservations, dhcp_leases, clients, wifi, vpn_client_profiles, static_routes, access_control, upnp_mappings, firewall, time) or any form path from router_catalog. Call with no section to list sections. Secrets masked unless reveal.

Inputs: reveal, router, section.

router_journalA
Read-onlyIdempotent

This server's change journal: action=list (recent changes, with ids) or action=show id=... (full before/after and requests). Use the id with router_undo.

Inputs: id, limit, action, reveal, +1 more.

router_logsA
Read-onlyIdempotent

Read the router's system log (newest first when timestamps parse). Filters: level (minimum severity, e.g. WARNING), type (e.g. DHCPD, WAN), contains (text), since ('2026-11-17 08:00:00'), limit. Never changes the router's own log filter.

Inputs: type, level, limit, since, +3 more.

router_raw_readA
Read-onlyIdempotent

Send a read-only operation to any catalogued form, e.g. path='iptv?form=setting', operation='read', or custom read ops like operation='getBlockHistory' with fields. Refuses write-type operations.

Inputs: path (required), fields, reveal, router, +1 more.

router_raw_writeA
Destructive

Escape hatch: send ANY operation + fields to a catalogued form. Risk comes from the catalog (unknown ops are CRITICAL, so need a confirm_token). FORBIDDEN ops (factory reset, config restore, firmware upload, quick setup, cloud bind) also need TPLINK_ALLOW_FORBIDDEN=1. Prefer the specific tools.

Inputs: path (required), operation (required), apply, fields, +3 more.

router_statusA
Read-onlyIdempotent

Router overview: WAN/LAN addresses, internet state, Wi-Fi bands, client counts, CPU/memory, firmware, VPN-client switch. On an extender: model, mode, uplink, mesh role. Read-only.

Inputs: reveal, router.

router_undoA
Destructive

Reverse a journaled change (writes restore old values, inserts are removed, removes re-added, updates swapped back). Refuses if the router changed since, unless force=true. Reboots/firmware/actions are not undoable. Dry run first like every write.

Inputs: id (required), apply, force, reveal, +2 more.

routingA
Destructive

Static routes: action=list | system (the live routing table) | add (route={name, target, netmask, gateway, interface LAN|WAN, enable}) | update (name, route={...}) | remove (name).

Inputs: name, apply, route, action, +3 more.

systemA
Destructive

System settings. action=info (all of the below) | firmware_check (ask TP-Link for updates; changes nothing) | ddns (read) | device_priority (list) | set_device_priority (mac, enable, time_period) | led / led_night / eco / time / dst / hour24 / auto_upgrade / qos / firewall (no settings = read; settings={...} or enable=bool = change) | time_sync | reboot (CRITICAL, not undoable).

Inputs: mac, apply, action, enable, +5 more.

upnpB
Destructive

UPnP: action=status|list (switch + current port mappings devices opened) | enable | disable. The router offers no per-mapping delete.

Inputs: apply, action, reveal, router, +1 more.

usbB
Destructive

USB. action=status (disks, sharing, accounts, media server, Time Machine, modem) | scan | partitions (serial) | partition (serial, uuid, enable: share/hide one partition) | eject (serial) | browse (uuid, path) | service (protocol=samba|ftp|ftpex|sftp|sftpex, enable/settings={port}) | sharing_auth | media_server | server_name | time_machine | modem (USB 4G backup internet; CRITICAL) | modem_isps.

Inputs: name, path, uuid, apply, +8 more.

vpn_clientA
Destructive

The router's VPN CLIENT (router dials out). Configure a VPN, then choose which devices use it - this is how e.g. a child's device can be sent through a filtering VPN. Profiles: action=profiles | add_profile (profile={key,...}; added disabled) | set_active_profile (key; the ENABLED profile is the one in use) | update_profile / remove_profile (key). Devices (they use WHICHEVER profile is active; there is no per-device profile): devices | candidates | add_device (mac, name?, client_type?) | set_device (mac, use_vpn=true|false) | remove_device (mac). Also status | connection_status (key) | enable | disable. Everything that changes profiles or devices is CRITICAL.

Inputs: key, mac, name, apply, +7 more.

vpn_serverA
Destructive

The router's VPN SERVERS (people dialling in). kind=openvpn|pptp|l2tp|wireguard; action=get | set (settings={...}) | enable | disable (CRITICAL) | accounts | accounts_add (account={...}) | accounts_update (key, account={...}) | accounts_remove (key) | connected | disconnect (key). Secrets masked unless reveal.

Inputs: kind (required), key, apply, action, +5 more.

wifi_extraB
Destructive

Wi-Fi extras. WPS pairing: action=wps_push (press the router's WPS button; the call stays connected and returns the outcome: success + the device's MAC, or timeout) | wps_client_pin (pin = the device's PIN) | wait (seconds, default 125) | wps_cancel | wps_status (a session the web page/button started) | wps_settings (enable) | wps_pin_enable / wps_pin_disable / wps_pin_generate / wps_pin_default. Also mlo (Wi-Fi 7 multi-link network) | ofdma | ofdma_mimo | twt | fast_roaming | advanced (beacon, DTIM, RTS, airtime fairness, zero-wait DFS...) | guest_bandwidth | guest_time | afc | afc_refresh | status. To add a mesh satellite use mesh action=pair. Main SSIDs/passwords/channels: wifi_set.

Inputs: pin, wait, apply, action, +6 more.

wifi_scheduleB
Destructive

Wi-Fi off-schedule (e.g. no Wi-Fi 23:00-07:00 on school nights). action=get | enable | disable | add (rule={start 'HH:MM', end, days [sun..sat], bands [2g,5g,6g], enable}) | update (key, rule) | remove (key).

Inputs: key, rule, apply, action, +3 more.

wifi_setA
Destructive

Wi-Fi: action=get (band=2g|5g|6g|guest|guest_access|all) | set (band, settings={ssid|name, password, hidden, enable, channel, txpower, htmode, encryption, ...}; guest also takes guest_band=2g|5g|2g5g|6g|all; guest_access takes {access, isolate}) | smart_connect (enable). Turning a radio off is CRITICAL. This server's machine is wired, so it is not cut off.

Inputs: band, apply, action, enable, +5 more.

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

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    TDQS

    B3.4/5.0

    Scored across 33 tools

    Disambiguation3/5

    Most domain-specific tools are distinct, but router_status, router_get, router_catalog, and router_raw_read overlap heavily for read access, and broad multi-action tools like system, lan, wifi_extra, and router_raw_write can shadow specific tools. Descriptions help, but an agent still faces real selection ambiguity.

    Naming Consistency3/5

    All names use snake_case, but the patterns are mixed: some are verb_noun or noun_verb forms such as router_status, dhcp_server_set, and wifi_set, while many are bare domain nouns like upnp, mesh, system, internet, lan, and clients. The set is readable but not predictable.

    Tool Count2/5

    With 33 tools, the surface is heavy and exceeds the typical well-scoped range; several tools could likely be consolidated under broader domain actions. This is not an extreme mismatch for such a feature-rich router, but 25+ tools is too many for easy agent navigation.

    Completeness4/5

    Coverage is broad: WAN/LAN, Wi-Fi, DHCP, routing, VPN, mesh, parental/access control, port forwarding, USB, logs, DDNS, extender, maintenance, and raw escape hatches are all present. Minor gaps remain, such as unverified extender writes, disabled mesh pairing, and no per-mapping UPnP delete, but workarounds are documented.

    Maintenance

    ActivityMaintained
    ResponsivenessNo recent community issues

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