opus-tplink-mcp
Full management of TP-Link Archer (Wi-Fi 7 / BE series) routers through the router's own web-UI forms: reads router status, logs, clients and any of 238 catalogued forms, and performs safety-gated writes for WAN/IPv6, DNS-over-HTTPS/TLS, LAN and link aggregation, IPTV/VLAN, DHCP reservations and IP-MAC binding, Wi-Fi (including WPS, MLO, OFDMA, guest networks, schedules), EasyMesh, VPN server/client profiles, static routing, access and parental controls, port forwarding, UPnP/DMZ, USB sharing, DDNS, firmware and config backup/restore, diagnostics (ping/traceroute), QoS and administration. Every change is dry-run first with risk tiers and confirm tokens, verified by re-reading the router, journaled with before/after state, and undoable.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@opus-tplink-mcp show my router status and connected devices"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
opus-tplink-mcp
Built by AI, for AI.
An AI wrote it (reverse-engineering the routers' own web pages, testing every write live), and an AI is who it's for: an agent that can change a home network safely, see exactly what it is about to do, prove that it worked, and undo it.
A complete, safety-first MCP server for TP-Link Archer routers (Wi-Fi 7 / BE series) and RE range extenders. 33 tools covering virtually everything the router's web UI can do. Every change goes through the same pipeline: dry run → review → apply → verify → journal → undo.
Designed and re-engineered by Claude Opus 5.5 (Anthropic), with Fable 5.2 advising, for vehoelite. Grown from consigcody94/mcp-tplink-router (MIT).
Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or supported by TP-Link or Anthropic. "TP-Link" and "Archer" are trademarks of TP-Link. Use at your own risk: this software changes live network equipment.
Why this one
Everything, not just the basics. All 238 forms the web UI uses are catalogued and reachable. Every major feature also has a dedicated tool: WAN and IPv6, DoH/DoT, LAN, IPTV/VLAN, link aggregation, DHCP, IP-MAC binding, VPN server and client, routing, access control, parental controls, Wi-Fi (incl. WPS, MLO, OFDMA, guest), port forwarding, UPnP, DMZ, ALG, firewall, EasyMesh, USB sharing, DDNS, backup/restore, firmware, diagnostics and administration.
Safe by construction. Every write is a dry run first. Critical changes need a one-time confirm token. Everything is journaled with before/after state and can be undone. Writes are verified by re-reading the router, and a change the router silently ignores is reported as
no_effect, not "success".Field-tested. 84 write operations were exercised live across an Archer BE9300 (firmware 1.2.4) and an Archer BE4800 (older, encrypted firmware): change, verify, undo, verify restored. The BE4800 runs were repeated after the 1.0.1 transport fix (all but access control). An Archer BE3600 (fw 1.0.4) passed the same runbook plus MLO and USB (see Tested routers). More than a dozen firmware quirks found that way are handled for you (see Firmware quirks).
router_catalogmarks every operationlive,ui(from the web UI's code) ornone.Multi-router. Manage several routers from one server, including older firmware that uses the encrypted LuCI protocol (e.g. Archer BE4800 1.0.x).
Related MCP server: ax11000-mcp
Tools (33)
Area | Tool | Highlights |
Overview |
| WAN/LAN, internet state, Wi-Fi, clients, CPU/memory, firmware |
| Read any section or any of the 238 forms; per-operation risk tier and verification status | |
| System log with level/type/text/time filters (never touches the router's own log filter) | |
| Everything about one MAC: lease, reservation, every log line mentioning it, parental-control sites and blocked attempts, access/VPN/IoT status, traffic. Plus a local per-device history beyond what the router keeps | |
Safety |
| Every change with before/after; undo with conflict detection |
| Escape hatch, gated by the catalog's risk tiers | |
Internet |
| Connection type (DHCP, static, PPPoE, L2TP, PPTP, DS-Lite, v6plus, OCN), IPv6 (all modes), lease renew/release, DNS-over-HTTPS / DNS-over-TLS, MAC clone, WAN flow control, live speed / dual-NAT |
LAN |
| LAN IPv4/IPv6, port speed, link aggregation (LACP), flow control, IPTV / VLAN, UDP proxy, NAT / hardware NAT boost, ALG |
DHCP |
| Pool, lease, DNS; reservations with random-MAC detection |
| ARP binding, bind current devices, conflict checks | |
Wi-Fi |
| Per-band and guest SSIDs, passwords, channels, power, guest access/isolation, smart connect |
| WPS push button and PIN (returns the outcome and the paired MAC), Wi-Fi 7 MLO network, OFDMA/MU-MIMO, TWT, advanced radio settings, guest bandwidth/time limits, AFC | |
| Wi-Fi off periods | |
Mesh |
| EasyMesh status, devices, topology, naming/placing units, client steering, satellite reboot/unlink |
VPN |
| OpenVPN / PPTP / L2TP / WireGuard servers and accounts; VPN-client profiles and per-device routing |
Routing |
| Static routes and the live routing table |
Security |
| Allow/block lists; HomeShield profiles, sites, pause internet |
Ports |
| Virtual servers, port triggering, DMZ; UPnP and its mappings |
Clients |
| Rename devices, per-device speed limits, IoT network isolation, game accelerator |
USB |
| Drives and partitions (scan, browse, share/hide a partition, eject), Samba/FTP/SFTP sharing, media server, Time Machine, USB 4G modem |
DDNS |
| TP-Link DDNS, No-IP, DynDNS |
Maintenance |
| Config backup and restore, firmware (online, image upload, mesh satellites), ping / traceroute, operation mode, reboot schedule |
Admin |
| Admin password (RSA-encrypted like the web UI), remote management, HTTPS, local-management list, recovery e-mail, user permissions |
System |
| SPI firewall / ping replies, LEDs, eco mode, time/NTP/DST, auto-update, QoS, device priority, reboot |
Extenders |
| RE range extenders: model, mode, uplink signal, mesh role, extended and guest networks, clients, logs; LEDs, LED night mode, power schedule, reboot |
Read tools are annotated readOnlyHint; write tools are annotated destructiveHint. On an extender
(KIND=extender) only extender, extender_set, router_status, router_raw_read, router_journal
and router_undo are offered; the router tools answer "not supported" with the list.
How it talks to the router
Login:
tplinkrouterc6u.TplinkRouterV1_11(...).authorize()(RSA login), or the encryptedTplinkRouterfor older firmware. On the encrypted protocol the library is used only for login and AES; the body still goes out as the web UI's form string. (The library's JSON adapter, made for the BE805, collapses repeated keys, drops blank values and copies fields into the URL, so it is bypassed. That adapter was why MLO couldn't be switched on through earlier versions on a BE4800.)Requests: our own
application/x-www-form-urlencodedPOST to/cgi-bin/luci/;stok=<stok>/admin/<module>?form=<form>, the same requests the web UI sends. The URL carries only?form=;operationand every field go in the body. Multipart is used for backup, restore and firmware images.One session per tool call: the router allows one admin login, so each call logs in and always logs out. If the web UI or the Tether app is logged in, log it out. (WPS pairing is the one exception: it stays logged in until pairing ends, because logging out cancels WPS.)
Retries: a failed login, or an ambiguous error while reading or planning, is retried once. A write is never resent. If a write times out or the connection drops, the server logs in again, re-reads, and reports whether the change was applied.
Range extenders
Two more login generations, both taken from the extenders' own web pages:
extender(X-series, e.g. RE2700X / RE1750X / RE1500X): plain form posts like the BE9300; the password is RSA-1024 PKCS#1 v1.5 encrypted. Every request needs aRefererheader.encrypted-v2(the hardened generation, e.g. RE3200BE firmware 1.5): AES bodies, a SHA-256 login hash, an RSA-OAEP login signature, and an HMAC-SHA256 signature over each request's ciphertext. Without the per-request hash the device answers HTTP 403.
A refused extender login is never retried automatically: these devices lock the account after repeated failures.
Safety model
Tier | Examples | To apply |
read | every read, ping/traceroute, config backup | nothing |
normal | add a reservation, block a phone, change an SSID, WPS push |
|
critical | LAN IP, any WAN form, DHCP off, radio off, region, white-list access control, blocking this machine, VPN-client changes, admin / remote management, firmware, restore, reboot, operation mode, firewall off |
|
forbidden | factory reset, quick setup, cloud bind/unbind, debug shell |
|
Dry run by default. Without
apply=truea write tool returns the plan, a field-level diff, warnings, the risk tier and (for critical changes) aconfirm_token. It sends nothing.Confirm tokens are an HMAC over the exact requests, which embed the values being replaced. A token is valid for 5 minutes and is refused if the router changed since the dry run. Uploads are bound to the file's SHA-256.
Forms are read-merge-written, sending the field allowlist from the web UI's own code for that form, or only the changed fields where the UI does that.
Table rows are changed one at a time: re-load the table, find the row by its key, check it is unchanged, then send the request with the fresh index.
Collateral check: after every remove or update, the whole table is compared before and after. If any other row vanished or changed, the result is
status: "collateral", the remaining steps are not sent, androuter_undocan re-add the lost rows.Verification: after a write the router is re-read, and the result is
applied, amismatch, orno_effect(accepted but ignored).Automatic backup: before every critical change the router's config is downloaded to the backup folder (
pre_change_backupin the result;TPLINK_AUTO_BACKUP=0turns it off).Wi-Fi health check: after every Wi-Fi change the server re-reads the WPS PIN page, the read that crashes when the band configuration is damaged. Transient timeouts while radios restart are retried; a crash is reported loudly in
warnings_afterwith the restore instructions.Validation: DHCP pools, reservations, bindings and routes are checked against the subnet, the router's own IP, leases and conflicts. A randomised/private MAC gets a warning.
Journal:
~/.local/state/mcp-tplink-router/journal.jsonl(directory 0700, file 0600). The full before state is fsynced before the first request; the exact fields sent (wire) and the result follow. The journal keeps secrets so undo can restore them.Undo:
router_undo id=...restores old values, removes inserts, re-adds removed rows and swaps updates back. It refuses if the router changed since, unless you passforce. Reboots, firmware and other one-way actions are not undoable.Secrets (PSKs, passwords, private/preshared keys, PINs, tokens) are masked in every result, diff and error unless you pass
reveal=true. Account passwords are read from files, never from tool arguments.
Tested routers
Router | Firmware | Protocol | Live-tested |
Archer BE9300 | 1.2.4 | plain | full runbook (84 write types across both first routers), WPS, EasyMesh, USB, restore |
Archer BE4800 | 1.0.x | encrypted | runbook, MLO, advanced radio, USB, all reads |
Archer BE3600 v2 | 1.0.4 | encrypted | runbook, MLO (this model reboots after an MLO change), operation mode router ↔ AP, USB, HTTPS remote management, reboot, all reads |
Other Archer BE models with the same web UI (Archer BExxxx, firmware from 2024 on) should work.
Tested range extenders
All four were tested in repeater mode as EasyMesh members of a BE9300.
Extender | Firmware | Protocol | Reads | Changes (applied, verified, undone) |
RE2700X v1.0 | 1.1.9 | extender | status, uplink, networks, mesh, clients, system, logs | LEDs, LED night mode, power schedule |
RE1750X v2.2 | 1.0.6 | extender | same | LEDs, LED night mode, power schedule |
RE1500X v2.0 | 1.1.0 | extender | same | LEDs, LED night mode, power schedule, reboot |
RE3200BE | 1.5.3 | encrypted-v2 | same | LEDs, LED night mode, power schedule |
router_catalog shows which operations are confirmed live and which come from the web UI's code.
Install
pip install opus-tplink-mcp # or: uvx opus-tplink-mcpFrom source: python -m venv venv && venv/bin/pip install -e ".[dev]".
Configuration
Copy .env.example to .env, or pass the variables from your MCP client config.
Variable | Default | Meaning |
|
| Router address ( |
| The plain admin password | |
|
| Per-request timeout (s) |
|
| Journal (also the default parent of backups and device logs) |
|
| Where |
|
| Per-MAC histories written by |
|
| Download a config backup before every critical change ( |
| Comma-separated MACs whose VPN-client routing must not break silently (e.g. a filtered child's laptop). Changes affecting them are called out by name. | |
| unset |
|
MCP client entry (stdio):
{"command": "uvx", "args": ["opus-tplink-mcp"], "env": {"TPLINK_HOST": "192.168.0.1", "TPLINK_PASSWORD": "..."}}(or "command": "/path/to/venv/bin/opus-tplink-mcp" for a local install)
Several routers
TPLINK_HOST/TPLINK_PASSWORD is router main. To add more:
TPLINK_ROUTERS=upstairs
TPLINK_UPSTAIRS_HOST=https://192.168.1.1
TPLINK_UPSTAIRS_PASSWORD_FILE=/path/to/router2.pw
TPLINK_UPSTAIRS_PROTOCOL=encrypted # older firmware (e.g. BE4800 1.0.x): encrypted LuCIA range extender is added the same way, with its protocol (the kind follows from extender;
set it for encrypted-v2):
TPLINK_ROUTERS=hallway
TPLINK_HALLWAY_HOST=192.168.0.20
TPLINK_HALLWAY_PASSWORD_FILE=/path/to/extender.pw
TPLINK_HALLWAY_PROTOCOL=encrypted-v2 # or: extender (X-series)
TPLINK_HALLWAY_KIND=extenderEvery tool takes
router(defaultmain).router_statuslists the configured routers.Journal entries record the router, and
router_undoalways targets the router the change was made on.Risk tiers are per router. VPN-client protection applies to
main; on other routers, access-control mode/enable and parental internet pause are critical. Removing the last allowlisted device is critical on every router.Forms another firmware lacks return
no such callback, with a hint.Multipart uploads/downloads (backup, restore, firmware) are implemented for the plain protocol.
A per-device log
device_log action=record mac=... appends only what is new since the last record: online/offline,
router log lines, parental-control sites and blocked attempts. Run it on a timer for a continuous
history that outlives the router's own (daily) data, then read it with action=history.
Firmware quirks handled
Found against a live BE9300 (fw 1.2.4); each one is encoded in the catalog or the tools:
WPS:
option=connectstarts push-button pairing;pbc/pinonly poll the status. The router cancels WPS when the admin session logs out, sowps_pushstays logged in and polls until a device pairs or the window closes. Status replies take ~18 s.Guest Wi-Fi: only changed fields may be sent. A full write with blank
passwd_cycleis refused.DoH/DoT:
server_listmust be sent as a repeatedserver_list=field and included with every write ("no server found" otherwise). JSON wipes the list, andserver_list[]is refused.IPTV / link aggregation:
port_settingsmust always be sent as JSON, or the router returns HTTP 500. Saving IPTV restarts the network for about 40 s.OFDMA: on routers with the combined setting, the standalone switch is ignored. Use
ofdma_mimo(all/ofdma_only/disabled).IP-MAC binding: refused while the IP is DHCP-reserved for another MAC. The router drops custom names on bindings and reservations.
Speed limits are stored verbatim (
on/off). WPS wait time is read-only.LAN IPv6 address is recomputed by the router on every save.
MAC clone and WAN changes reconnect the WAN, and the ISP may assign a new public IP. Anything allowlisting your old IP (cloud firewalls, DNS-filter locations) will need updating.
Admin password fields are RSA-encrypted with per-field keys from the read. The server encrypts at send time, so the dry run's confirm token stays valid.
MLO network: off = only
enable=off. On = exactly the web UI's 7 fields, withselected_bandsas a repeated key and at least two bands (band_selectis read-only, and the UI never sends it). The recipe was taken from a capture of the BE4800 web page's own requests, then switched off/on twice through the tool on a BE4800, with an empty wireless-config diff afterwards. A malformed MLO write on a BE9300 once switched MLO off and made the firmware drop an internal per-band field (disabled_by): Wi-Fi kept working, but every WPS start failed ("Interface return exception") until a config restore. After every Wi-Fi change the server now reads the WPS page as a health check. Some models (Archer BE3600) reboot after an MLO change, as their web UI warns. The server reads the router's capability flags, flags the change as critical in the dry run, and reportsrouter_rebootinginstead of probing a router that is going down.Connected clients on encrypted-protocol firmware (BE4800, BE3600) are not in
status?form=all; they are read from the web UI'sloadDevicesource.User-permission switches are accepted but ignored for a normal admin login (
no_effect).Eco mode takes
strong/medium/weak; DST and the 24-hour clock usedst_enable/hour24_enable.USB sharing is saved as ONE request (server name +
enable="on,off,off"for Samba/FTP/FTP-internet); per-service saves are refused. The server name can't be written on its own.Fields the router keeps when blanked (the custom WAN MAC) don't count as a failed restore.
TP-Link DDNS has no refresh operation (it updates itself).
Known limitations
mesh action=pairis disabled. In testing, starting the satellite search and a WPS session in the same login locked a BE9300 up badly enough that a factory reset was needed. Pair satellites with the router's WPS button,wifi_extra action=wps_push, or the web UI.maintenance action=operation_modewas switched live router → AP → router on a BE3600. The device changes address with the mode (in AP mode it takes a DHCP lease on the upstream network; in router mode it is reached on its LAN side, or on its WAN address with remote management on), so point this server's host at the new address afterwards. Leaving router mode turns remote management off.keep_access=trueturns it on before switching back to router mode; it is opt-in because it exposes the admin page on the WAN side (the internet, if the WAN is your ISP), and the firmware ignores a restriction to one manager address.Extenders: tested in repeater mode only (access-point mode needs a wired uplink and is untested). Writing the extended networks or high-speed mode is not offered yet (not verified; high-speed mode is ignored by the firmware while the extender is in an EasyMesh network). An EasyMesh member takes its Wi-Fi settings from the main router, so local Wi-Fi changes may be overwritten. File upload/download (backup, firmware) is not implemented for extenders.
usb action=ejectis accepted by the router, but in testing the partitions kept reading as mounted until the drive was unplugged, so treat it as "safe to unplug" only after checking.Not yet exercised live (implemented from the web UI's code, covered by offline tests): firmware image upload and online update (no newer firmware was available), Time Machine, DDNS login, WPS client-PIN pairing, mesh satellite operations, adding WireGuard server accounts (the router refuses the format tried so far) and parental-control profile edits. Operations marked
uiornoneinrouter_catalogfall in this group.
Development
venv/bin/pytest -q # offline: a fake router; any socket/requests use fails the test
venv/bin/ruff check .docs/router/endpoints.txtlists every form the web UI references.tests/fixtures/shapes.jsonholds live field shapes (no values) for the readable forms. The catalog's writable fields are checked against it.
License
MIT. See LICENSE.
Available Tools
33 toolsaccess_controlADestructive
Access control (who may use the network). action=status | candidates | enable | disable | set_mode (mode=black|white) | block / unblock (mac[, name]) | allow / disallow (mac). Black mode blocks listed devices; white mode blocks everything NOT listed. Switching to white mode, enabling it, or blocking THIS machine is CRITICAL.
Inputs: mac, mode, name, apply, +4 more.
adminADestructive
Router administration. action=status | change_password (old_password_file, new_password_file; CRITICAL) | remote (remote management: enable, http_port, https_port, managers) | https | local_mode (everyone vs listed devices) | local_add / local_remove (mac, name) | recovery (password-recovery e-mail) | superadmin | permissions (what the local user may see/edit). No settings = read.
Inputs: mac, name, apply, action, +7 more.
clientsBDestructive
Connected devices. action=list | rename (mac, name: the name shown everywhere) | speed (limits/speeds) | speed_limit (mac, download_kbps, upload_kbps, enable) | game_accelerator | iot_status | iot_enable | iot_disable | iot_add / iot_remove (mac or macs: move smart-home devices to the isolated IoT network).
Inputs: mac, macs, name, apply, +7 more.
ddnsADestructive
Dynamic DNS. action=status | refresh (provider) | tplink: add / remove / bind / unbind (domain) | noip / dyndns: login (username, domain, password_file[, wan_bind]) | logout.
Inputs: apply, action, domain, reveal, +6 more.
device_logARead-onlyIdempotent
Everything the router knows about ONE device, plus a local per-MAC history. action=report (mac: online state, IP, DHCP lease/reservation, every router-log line mentioning its MAC or IP, its parental-control profile's sites today and blocked attempts, access-control / VPN / IoT status, traffic) | record (mac: append only what is NEW to /device-logs/-.jsonl; run it on a timer for a continuous log beyond what the router keeps) | history (mac, event?, limit) | list. Read-only on the router.
Inputs: mac, event, limit, action, +2 more.
dhcp_reservationADestructive
DHCP address reservations (stable IPs, e.g. for kiosk tablets). action=list (with lease status and random-MAC warnings) | leases | add (mac, ip, name) | update (mac + ip/name/enable) | remove (mac) | reserve_current (pin a client's CURRENT address; identify it by mac, current_ip or client hostname). MACs in any format. Warns when a MAC is randomised/private - that device must use its real MAC.
Inputs: ip, mac, name, apply, +7 more.
dhcp_server_setADestructive
DHCP server: action=get shows settings; otherwise change enable / start / end (pool) / lease_minutes (1-2880) / gateway / dns1 / dns2. Validated against the LAN subnet, the router's own IP, active leases and reservations. Disabling DHCP or a gateway other than the router is CRITICAL.
Inputs: end, dns1, dns2, apply, +8 more.
extenderARead-onlyIdempotent
TP-Link range extender (RE series). action=status (model, mode, uplink signal, mesh role) | uplink (the network it connects to) | extended (networks it broadcasts) | guest | mesh | network | clients | wifi_advanced | system (mode, time, LEDs, eco, power schedule) | logs. Secrets masked unless reveal.
Inputs: action, reveal, router.
extender_setADestructive
Change a range extender: action=led (enable) | led_night (enable, time_start, time_end) | power_schedule (enable) | reboot. (Extended networks / high-speed mode: read them with extender; writing them is not verified yet - use router_raw_write if needed.) No settings = show current values. Dry run first; critical changes need the confirm_token. Journaled and undoable (except reboot).
Inputs: action (required), apply, enable, reveal, +3 more.
internetBDestructive
Internet (WAN). action=status (connection, IPv4/IPv6, WAN port, dual-NAT, speed, DNS privacy) | protocols | get (family=4|6, proto?) | set (family, proto=dynamic|staticip|pppoe|l2tp|pptp|dslite|v6plus|ocn for IPv4; dynamic|static|pppoe|pass|tunnel for IPv6, settings={...}) CRITICAL | renew | release (family) | ipv6_enable | ipv6_disable | autodetect | dns_privacy (settings={dns_privacy: none|doh|dot, dns_mode: default|strict, server_list: [...]}) | dns_privacy_servers (kind=doh|dot) | dns_privacy_test (settings) | mac_clone (settings={mac_clone_type, mac_custom}) | flow_control (settings={rx_enable, tx_enable}).
Inputs: kind, apply, proto, action, +5 more.
ip_mac_bindingADestructive
IP-MAC binding (ARP binding): action=status|list (setting, bindings, live ARP table) | enable | disable | add (mac, ip, name, description) | update (mac + ip/name/description/enable; done as remove+re-add) | remove (mac) | bind_current (bind an ARP entry as-is, by mac or ip). Binding THIS machine to a different IP is CRITICAL.
Inputs: ip, mac, name, apply, +6 more.
lanADestructive
LAN side. action=status (all below + port status) | lan_ipv4 (router LAN IP/mask: CRITICAL) | lan_ipv6 | port_speed (settings={speed}) | link_aggregation (LACP: enable_agg, hashmode, lacpmode, port_settings) | flow_control (rx_enable, tx_enable) | iptv (IPTV/VLAN: enable, mode, internet/iptv/ipphone VLAN ids, IGMP, port_settings) | udp_proxy | nat (NAT and hardware NAT boost) | alg (settings={ftp, tftp, h323, rtsp, sip, pptp, l2tp, ipsec: true/false}). Firewall / ping replies: system action=firewall. No settings = read.
Inputs: apply, action, enable, reveal, +3 more.
maintenanceADestructive
Maintenance. action=info | backup (download the config to the backup folder) | backups (list) | restore (file = a backup name or path; CRITICAL, reboots) | firmware_check (router + mesh satellites, online) | firmware_update_online (CRITICAL, reboots) | firmware_status | firmware_upload (file = image path; CRITICAL) | satellite_firmware_update (mac) | ping / traceroute (target, count, size, max_hops, timeout) | operation_mode (mode=router|ap|repeater|client|multissid; none = read; CRITICAL; keep_access) | reboot_schedule (settings). Factory reset is deliberately only reachable via router_raw_write (forbidden tier).
Inputs: mac, file, mode, size, +11 more.
meshADestructive
EasyMesh: action=status|devices|clients|topology|search_status|ap_avoidance|device_detail (mac) (read) | pair (DISABLED: locked up a BE9300 in testing; use the web UI / Tether / WPS button) | enable | disable (CRITICAL if satellites are attached) | search_start | search_stop | link | unlink (CRITICAL) | reboot_satellite (CRITICAL) | add_onboarding (mac) | set_device (mac, settings={name, location, led, preferred_wifi_uplink_ap, traffic_separation, backhaul_steering}) | rebalance (clients re-pick the best unit) | bind_client (mac=unit, client_mac, bind=true|false: pin a client to a unit). Satellite firmware: maintenance action=firmware_check / satellite_firmware_update.
Inputs: mac, bind, wait, apply, +7 more.
parental_controlADestructive
HomeShield parental controls (local, per profile/'owner', e.g. a child). action=owners | devices | block_history (owner_id) | today_sites (owner_id) | filter_get / allowed_sites_get (owner_id) | internet_block (owner_id, blocked=true pauses the internet, false resumes) | filter_set / allowed_sites_set (owner_id, sites=[domains]) | add_owner (owner={...}) | remove_owner (owner_id).
Inputs: apply, owner, sites, action, +5 more.
port_forwardingADestructive
Port forwarding. kind=vs (virtual servers, default) | pt (port triggering) | dmz. action=list | add (rule={name, external_port, internal_port, ip, protocol ALL|TCP|UDP, enable}) | update (name, rule) | remove (name); for dmz: list | enable (ip) | disable. Overlapping external ports are refused.
Inputs: ip, kind, name, rule, +5 more.
router_catalogARead-onlyIdempotent
List every router form (219+), what each operation does to risk (read/normal/critical/forbidden) and whether its format is verified live or only copied from the web UI. filter narrows by text; path describes one form (fields, key, secrets).
Inputs: path, filter, reveal, router.
router_getARead-onlyIdempotent
Read one section of the router config by friendly name (e.g. dhcp, dhcp_reservations, dhcp_leases, clients, wifi, vpn_client_profiles, static_routes, access_control, upnp_mappings, firewall, time) or any form path from router_catalog. Call with no section to list sections. Secrets masked unless reveal.
Inputs: reveal, router, section.
router_journalARead-onlyIdempotent
This server's change journal: action=list (recent changes, with ids) or action=show id=... (full before/after and requests). Use the id with router_undo.
Inputs: id, limit, action, reveal, +1 more.
router_logsARead-onlyIdempotent
Read the router's system log (newest first when timestamps parse). Filters: level (minimum severity, e.g. WARNING), type (e.g. DHCPD, WAN), contains (text), since ('2026-11-17 08:00:00'), limit. Never changes the router's own log filter.
Inputs: type, level, limit, since, +3 more.
router_raw_readARead-onlyIdempotent
Send a read-only operation to any catalogued form, e.g. path='iptv?form=setting', operation='read', or custom read ops like operation='getBlockHistory' with fields. Refuses write-type operations.
Inputs: path (required), fields, reveal, router, +1 more.
router_raw_writeADestructive
Escape hatch: send ANY operation + fields to a catalogued form. Risk comes from the catalog (unknown ops are CRITICAL, so need a confirm_token). FORBIDDEN ops (factory reset, config restore, firmware upload, quick setup, cloud bind) also need TPLINK_ALLOW_FORBIDDEN=1. Prefer the specific tools.
Inputs: path (required), operation (required), apply, fields, +3 more.
router_statusARead-onlyIdempotent
Router overview: WAN/LAN addresses, internet state, Wi-Fi bands, client counts, CPU/memory, firmware, VPN-client switch. On an extender: model, mode, uplink, mesh role. Read-only.
Inputs: reveal, router.
router_undoADestructive
Reverse a journaled change (writes restore old values, inserts are removed, removes re-added, updates swapped back). Refuses if the router changed since, unless force=true. Reboots/firmware/actions are not undoable. Dry run first like every write.
Inputs: id (required), apply, force, reveal, +2 more.
routingADestructive
Static routes: action=list | system (the live routing table) | add (route={name, target, netmask, gateway, interface LAN|WAN, enable}) | update (name, route={...}) | remove (name).
Inputs: name, apply, route, action, +3 more.
systemADestructive
System settings. action=info (all of the below) | firmware_check (ask TP-Link for updates; changes nothing) | ddns (read) | device_priority (list) | set_device_priority (mac, enable, time_period) | led / led_night / eco / time / dst / hour24 / auto_upgrade / qos / firewall (no settings = read; settings={...} or enable=bool = change) | time_sync | reboot (CRITICAL, not undoable).
Inputs: mac, apply, action, enable, +5 more.
upnpBDestructive
UPnP: action=status|list (switch + current port mappings devices opened) | enable | disable. The router offers no per-mapping delete.
Inputs: apply, action, reveal, router, +1 more.
usbBDestructive
USB. action=status (disks, sharing, accounts, media server, Time Machine, modem) | scan | partitions (serial) | partition (serial, uuid, enable: share/hide one partition) | eject (serial) | browse (uuid, path) | service (protocol=samba|ftp|ftpex|sftp|sftpex, enable/settings={port}) | sharing_auth | media_server | server_name | time_machine | modem (USB 4G backup internet; CRITICAL) | modem_isps.
Inputs: name, path, uuid, apply, +8 more.
vpn_clientADestructive
The router's VPN CLIENT (router dials out). Configure a VPN, then choose which devices use it - this is how e.g. a child's device can be sent through a filtering VPN. Profiles: action=profiles | add_profile (profile={key,...}; added disabled) | set_active_profile (key; the ENABLED profile is the one in use) | update_profile / remove_profile (key). Devices (they use WHICHEVER profile is active; there is no per-device profile): devices | candidates | add_device (mac, name?, client_type?) | set_device (mac, use_vpn=true|false) | remove_device (mac). Also status | connection_status (key) | enable | disable. Everything that changes profiles or devices is CRITICAL.
Inputs: key, mac, name, apply, +7 more.
vpn_serverADestructive
The router's VPN SERVERS (people dialling in). kind=openvpn|pptp|l2tp|wireguard; action=get | set (settings={...}) | enable | disable (CRITICAL) | accounts | accounts_add (account={...}) | accounts_update (key, account={...}) | accounts_remove (key) | connected | disconnect (key). Secrets masked unless reveal.
Inputs: kind (required), key, apply, action, +5 more.
wifi_extraBDestructive
Wi-Fi extras. WPS pairing: action=wps_push (press the router's WPS button; the call stays connected and returns the outcome: success + the device's MAC, or timeout) | wps_client_pin (pin = the device's PIN) | wait (seconds, default 125) | wps_cancel | wps_status (a session the web page/button started) | wps_settings (enable) | wps_pin_enable / wps_pin_disable / wps_pin_generate / wps_pin_default. Also mlo (Wi-Fi 7 multi-link network) | ofdma | ofdma_mimo | twt | fast_roaming | advanced (beacon, DTIM, RTS, airtime fairness, zero-wait DFS...) | guest_bandwidth | guest_time | afc | afc_refresh | status. To add a mesh satellite use mesh action=pair. Main SSIDs/passwords/channels: wifi_set.
Inputs: pin, wait, apply, action, +6 more.
wifi_scheduleBDestructive
Wi-Fi off-schedule (e.g. no Wi-Fi 23:00-07:00 on school nights). action=get | enable | disable | add (rule={start 'HH:MM', end, days [sun..sat], bands [2g,5g,6g], enable}) | update (key, rule) | remove (key).
Inputs: key, rule, apply, action, +3 more.
wifi_setADestructive
Wi-Fi: action=get (band=2g|5g|6g|guest|guest_access|all) | set (band, settings={ssid|name, password, hidden, enable, channel, txpower, htmode, encryption, ...}; guest also takes guest_band=2g|5g|2g5g|6g|all; guest_access takes {access, isolate}) | smart_connect (enable). Turning a radio off is CRITICAL. This server's machine is wired, so it is not cut off.
Inputs: band, apply, action, enable, +5 more.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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TDQS
Scored across 33 tools
Most domain-specific tools are distinct, but router_status, router_get, router_catalog, and router_raw_read overlap heavily for read access, and broad multi-action tools like system, lan, wifi_extra, and router_raw_write can shadow specific tools. Descriptions help, but an agent still faces real selection ambiguity.
All names use snake_case, but the patterns are mixed: some are verb_noun or noun_verb forms such as router_status, dhcp_server_set, and wifi_set, while many are bare domain nouns like upnp, mesh, system, internet, lan, and clients. The set is readable but not predictable.
With 33 tools, the surface is heavy and exceeds the typical well-scoped range; several tools could likely be consolidated under broader domain actions. This is not an extreme mismatch for such a feature-rich router, but 25+ tools is too many for easy agent navigation.
Coverage is broad: WAN/LAN, Wi-Fi, DHCP, routing, VPN, mesh, parental/access control, port forwarding, USB, logs, DDNS, extender, maintenance, and raw escape hatches are all present. Minor gaps remain, such as unverified extender writes, disabled mesh pairing, and no per-mapping UPnP delete, but workarounds are documented.
Maintenance
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