tenable-activity-mcp
tenable-activity-mcp
MCP-сервер, который предоставляет журнал аудита/активности Tenable Vulnerability Management (GET /audit-log/v1/events) в виде небольшого набора инструментов, чтобы любой MCP-клиент мог по запросу получать информацию об активности платформы, использовании API-ключей и аномальном поведении.
Сервер выполняет анализ сам. Подсчёты, группировка, вычисление частот и сравнение с порогами выполняются на Python; инструменты возвращают готовые структурированные результаты (failure_rate_pct, by_actor, findings с пояснениями), а не выгружают сырые события для модели, которая должна их суммировать.
Что он даёт
Инструмент | Назначение |
| Лента событий за окно с фильтрами по актору и действию. Пагинация обрабатывается автоматически; возвращается возобновляемый |
| Детерминированная сводка за окно: подсчёты по актору, действию, типу CRUD и типу доступа, а также частоты отказов и анонимных событий. |
| Только активность по API-ключам, сгруппированная по актору: разбивка по действиям, уникальные исходные IP-адреса, первое/последнее появление. |
| Сравнивает окно с сохранённым базовым профилем каждого актора. Отмечает новых акторов, всплески объёма, ранее не виденные IP-адреса, всплески неудачных событий, устойчивые частоты отказов, всплески в нерабочие часы и ранее не встречавшиеся действия — каждое с доказательствами и поясняющим предложением. |
| Полная картина одного актора: роль (по возможности), разбивка по всем действиям, типы доступа, все виденные исходные IP-адреса. |
| Проходит/не проходит проверку того, могут ли настроенные ключи реально читать журнал аудита, с текстом по устранению проблем. |
Полезные свойства безопасности:
Ничто, похожее на учётные данные, никогда не возвращается. Значения полей, имена которых указывают на секрет (
secret_key,api_key,token,password, ...) или значения которых выглядят как ключевой материал Tenable, маскируются до последних 4 символов.Пагинация ограничена 20 страницами / 100 000 событий на один вызов инструмента; достижение предела явно сообщается вместе с курсором, необходимым для продолжения.
429-е ответы обрабатываются с ожиданием с использованием заголовка
X-RateLimit-Reset(эндпоинт не отправляетRetry-After), с экспоненциальным откатом и пределом повторных попыток.
Related MCP server: tenable-mcp-server
Требования
Python 3.11+
API-ключи Tenable VM, владелец которых может читать журнал аудита
Роль / разрешения Tenable
Чтение audit-log/v1/events требует роли Администратор или пользовательской роли с явным разрешением на чтение журнала аудита у пользователя, которому принадлежат API-ключи. В противном случае возвращается HTTP 403; check_permission_prereqs сообщает об этом простым языком.
Создайте ключи в Tenable VM в разделе Настройки → Моя учётная запись → API-ключи. Ключи наследуют разрешения пользователя, который их создал.
get_actor_profile дополнительно пытается определить роль актора из каталога пользователей. Если ключи не могут получить список пользователей, профиль всё равно возвращается — просто без метки роли.
Настройка
uv sync --extra devЗатем скопируйте .env.example в .env и заполните свои ключи:
cp .env.example .envПроверьте учётные данные и разрешения перед подключением к клиенту:
uv run python -c "from dotenv import load_dotenv; load_dotenv(); from src.server import check_permission_prereqs; print(check_permission_prereqs())"Запустите сервер напрямую (он общается по MCP через stdio, поэтому просто будет ждать клиента — это нормальное поведение):
uv run python -m src.serverПодключение клиента
Используйте абсолютный путь к вашему клону в конфигурации ниже. Чтобы вывести его, выполните pwd из корня репозитория на macOS/Linux или (Get-Location).Path в PowerShell.
Claude Desktop
Отредактируйте claude_desktop_config.json:
macOS:
~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.jsonWindows:
%APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"tenable-activity": {
"command": "uv",
"args": [
"--directory",
"C:\\path\\to\\tenable-activity-mcp",
"run",
"python",
"-m",
"src.server"
],
"env": {
"TENABLE_ACCESS_KEY": "your_access_key",
"TENABLE_SECRET_KEY": "your_secret_key",
"TENABLE_MCP_BASE_URL": "https://cloud.tenable.com"
}
}
}
}После этого перезапустите Claude Desktop. На macOS/Linux используйте путь в формате POSIX (/Users/you/tenable-activity-mcp).
Если uv отсутствует в PATH лаунчера, используйте его абсолютный путь (which uv / (Get-Command uv).Source) в качестве command.
Claude Code
claude mcp add tenable-activity --env TENABLE_ACCESS_KEY=your_access_key --env TENABLE_SECRET_KEY=your_secret_key -- uv --directory /absolute/path/to/tenable-activity-mcp run python -m src.serverИли добавьте тот же блок, что и выше, в файл .mcp.json на уровне проекта.
Учётные данные, переданные через env, имеют приоритет над .env; файл .env — это удобство для локальной разработки, и любой из механизмов работает.
Примеры вопросов после подключения
«Проверь, могут ли мои учётные данные Tenable читать журнал аудита.»
«Суммируй активность платформы Tenable за последние 7 дней — кто был наиболее активен, и какова частота отказов?»
«Какие API-ключи использовались против Tenable за последние 30 дней и с каких исходных IP-адресов?»
«Найди аномалии в активности Tenable за последние 3 дня относительно 30-дневного базового профиля и объясни всё, что отметишь.»
«Покажи всё, что когда-либо делал актор 00000000-1111-4222-8333-444444444444 — действия, типы доступа и IP-адреса.»
Как работает обнаружение аномалий
detect_anomalies требует историю для сравнения, которая хранится в локальном файле SQLite (state.db, создаётся автоматически):
Если сохранённые базовые профили старше
BASELINE_REFRESH_MAX_AGE_HOURS(12), сервер получаетbaseline_days, непосредственно предшествующие вашему окну, и пересчитывает средние значения по акторам, известные IP-адреса, известные действия и гистограмму по часам суток.Ваше окно загружается и сравнивается с этими базовыми профилями.
События в анализируемом окне не включаются в базовый профиль, поэтому повторный запуск того же окна даёт те же результаты.
Каждый порог — это именованная константа в начале src/anomaly.py, и она повторяется в каждом результате в разделе thresholds:
Константа | По умолчанию | Значение |
|
| События в окне в день должны превышать это кратное среднего базового |
|
| Минимальный порог, прежде чем всплеск вообще может быть отмечен |
|
| Как давно IP должен был быть виден, чтобы считаться «известным» |
|
| Триггер кластеризации сбоев |
|
| Триггер устойчивой частоты отказов (при как минимум 10 событиях) |
|
| Диапазон нерабочих часов |
|
| Доля нерабочих часов должна превышать это кратное базовой доли актора |
Базовые профили рассчитываются отдельно для каждого актора, поэтому сервисный аккаунт, который легитимно запускает 500 сканирований в день, не будет отмечен за то, что делает именно это.
Структура
src/
server.py MCP entrypoint (FastMCP-style) + the six tool definitions
tenable_client.py Auth, filter building, cursor pagination, 429 backoff, typed errors
classifier.py API-key vs UI/session tagging, IP extraction, redaction, rollups
anomaly.py Thresholds and the individual anomaly checks
state.py SQLite: cursors, accumulated actor history, computed baselines
tests/
test_pagination.py test_classifier.py test_anomaly.pyНаправление зависимостей одностороннее: server → {anomaly, classifier, state} → tenable_client.
Тестирование
Три уровня, в порядке, в котором их следует запускать.
1. Модульные тесты (без учётных данных, без сети)
uv run pytest -q105 тестов, покрывающих обработку пагинации/курсора, откат при ограничении скорости, классификацию API-ключ vs сессия, редактирование и каждый порог аномалий. Каждый ответ API имитируется через заглушку транспорта, поэтому набор тестов никогда не обращается к живому тенанту.
2. Офлайн-сквозное тестирование (без учётных данных, без сети)
uv run python scripts/smoke_local.pyЗапускает все шесть инструментов против сценарного фейкового Tenable (тихий базовый месяц, затем шумная ночь с нового IP) и проверяет результаты: отмеченные аномалии, замаскированные подсаженные секреты, неверный ввод, возвращаемый как структурированная ошибка вместо исключения. Завершается с ненулевым кодом при любой ошибке, поэтому работает как предкоммитный или CI-шлюз.
3. Живая проверка вашего тенанта (только чтение)
С заполненным .env:
uv run python scripts/live_check.py 7Сначала проверяет разрешения на журнал аудита и останавливается с текстом по устранению, если они неверны, затем выводит реальную сводку, разбивку использования API-ключей, результаты обнаружения аномалий и профиль самого активного актора за последние N дней (по умолчанию 7). Все вызовы — GET; ничего не записывается в Tenable.
4. Через MCP-клиент
Подойдёт любой MCP-клиент. Чтобы интерактивно поработать с инструментами без чат-клиента:
npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector uv --directory . run python -m src.serverИли подключите его к Claude Desktop / Claude Code (см. выше) и задайте один из примеров вопросов. check_permission_prereqs — правильный первый вызов: он подтверждает, что сервер запустился, нашёл свои учётные данные и может получить доступ к журналу аудита.
Просмотр локального состояния
uv run python -c "from src.state import StateStore; print(StateStore().stats())"Удалите state.db, чтобы сбросить базовые профили; следующий вызов detect_anomalies пересоздаст их.
Известные ограничения
Требуется роль администратора. Для чтения
audit-log/v1/eventsнеобходима роль администратора или пользовательская роль с явным разрешением на чтение журнала аудита у пользователя, которому принадлежат ключи API. В противном случае возвращается HTTP 403. Сначала выполнитеcheck_permission_prereqs— он сообщит именно об этом, с текстом по устранению проблемы.Для обнаружения аномалий нужна история, прежде чем оно станет полезным. Первый вызов
detect_anomaliesдля свежегоstate.dbстроит базовые показатели за 30 дней, предшествующих вашему окну, а затем сравнивает с ними. Субъекты (actors) с малой или нулевой предшествующей активностью помечаются какnew_actor, поэтому ранние запуски более шумные, чем последующие.Определение роли выполняется по принципу best effort.
get_actor_profileпытается определить роль субъекта в Tenable из каталога пользователей. Если ключи не могут получить список пользователей, профиль всё равно возвращается — просто без метки роли.Обнаружение нерабочих часов использует фиксированный диапазон UTC. Окно нерабочих часов — 20:00–06:00 UTC и не подстраивается под рабочий часовой пояс тенанта. Распределённые команды будут видеть результаты по нерабочим часам, которые на самом деле являются рабочим утром в другом регионе.
Базовые показатели локальны для машины, на которой запущен сервер.
state.dbне является общим для разных установок, поэтому два оператора, запускающие собственные копии, строят независимые базовые показатели и могут прийти к разным выводам об одном и том же окне.Широкие окна возвращают частичные результаты по замыслу. Один вызов инструмента обрабатывает не более 20 страниц / 100 000 событий. Достижение этого предела явно сообщается вместе с
next_token, необходимым для продолжения, так что это никогда не является молчаливым усечением — но очень большое окно требует нескольких вызовов.Только первые 1 000 событий возвращаются встроенно.
list_activity_eventsограничивает встроенный массивeventsдо 1 000 и устанавливаетinline_truncated, когда это происходит. Блокsummaryпо-прежнему охватывает все полученные события, поэтому агрегированные числа остаются корректными, даже когда встроенный список усечён.get_actor_profileпросматривает максимум 365 дней назад и не может видеть дальше, чем хранит сам журнал аудита.
Примечания
Создано для
mcp==2.0.0, где SDK переименовалFastMCPвMCPServer.server.pyимпортирует то имя, которое предоставляет установленный SDK, поэтому он также работает наmcp1.x.Получение событий выполняется через сессию pyTenable
TenableIO(audit_log.events(..., return_json=True)), что оставляет обработку аутентификации и подключения в поддерживаемой библиотеке, при этом курсорpagination.nextостаётся доступным для нас. Если pyTenable недоступен, используется эквивалентный транспорт наrequestsс заголовкомX-ApiKeys: accessKey=...;secretKey=....Временные метки везде в UTC, включая диапазон нерабочих часов.
state.dbнакапливает историю по каждому субъекту. Удалите его, чтобы сбросить все базовые показатели; следующий вызовdetect_anomaliesперестроит их.
Available Tools
6 toolscheck_permission_prereqsA
Verify the configured API keys can actually read the audit log.
Makes one minimal audit-log request and reports pass/fail with a plain explanation and remediation steps. Run this first when another tool returns an authentication or permission error. No secret material is echoed - the access key is shown with only its last 4 characters.
Returns:
A dict with ok, a human-readable message, remediation when
failing, plus configuration and local-state diagnostics.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description fully discloses behavior: it makes exactly one minimal audit-log request, reports pass/fail with a plain explanation plus remediation steps, and never echoes secret material (the access key shows only the last 4 characters). This goes well beyond a bare operation statement and gives the agent confidence about side effects and output safety.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The purpose is front-loaded in the first sentence, and the remaining sentences carry useful information about behavior, triggering, and secret handling. The 'Returns' section slightly overlaps with the provided output schema, but it only lists the key dictionary fields and is not padded. Overall it is tightly written for the information it needs to convey.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a tool with no parameters and a full output schema, the description covers everything an agent needs: what is checked, when to run it, what side effects occur (one request, no secret disclosure), and what the result looks like. There are no missing pieces that would cause an agent to misuses the tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool has zero parameters, so the baseline is 4. The description does not need to explain parameter meaning, and the empty input schema leaves nothing ambiguous; the description instead focuses on the output, which is appropriate here.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Verify the configured API keys can actually read the audit log,' which clearly states what the tool does. It also distinguishes itself from the sibling data-retrieval tools (list_activity_events, summarize_activity, etc.) by positioning this as a diagnostic preflight check rather than an analytics operation.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives an explicit trigger condition: 'Run this first when another tool returns an authentication or permission error.' This is clear contextual guidance, but it does not mention when not to use it or name alternative tools—though no sibling performs the same diagnostic role, so exclusions are not necessary.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
detect_anomaliesA
Compare a window against each actor's stored baseline and flag outliers.
Checks run: previously unseen actor, event volume above SPIKE_MULTIPLIER x
the actor's historical daily average, source IPs absent from the baseline
lookback, failed-event bursts, sustained high failure rate, off-hours
activity spikes, and never-before-seen action types. Every finding includes
the observed value, the threshold crossed, and a reasoning sentence.
Baselines live in the local SQLite state file and are refreshed from the period immediately preceding the window when they are stale. Events in the analysed window itself are not folded into the baseline, so re-running the same window yields the same findings.
Args: date_from: Start of the window under investigation, ISO-8601. date_to: End of the window under investigation, ISO-8601. baseline_days: Days of history preceding the window to baseline against.
Returns:
A dict with findings (severity-ordered, each with evidence and
reasoning), findings_by_type/findings_by_severity counts, and
the active thresholds.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| date_to | Yes | ||
| date_from | Yes | ||
| baseline_days | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries full burden and covers side effects (baseline refresh from local SQLite when stale), idempotence (analyzed window not folded into baseline), and output guarantees (evidence, reasoning, severity ordering). This exceeds what schema alone could convey.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The definition is dense but every sentence adds necessary operational detail; purpose is front-loaded, checks are grouped, and Args/Returns are clearly structured. No filler or repetition.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a tool with no annotations and moderate input complexity, it explains inputs, output shape, baseline mechanics, staleness handling, and idempotence. An agent has enough to select and call it correctly without further discovery.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0%, but the Args section documents all three parameters with semantic meaning: ISO-8601 window bounds and baseline history days. This fully compensates for the absent schema descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Opens with a specific verb-resource pair ('Compare a window against each actor's stored baseline') and an enumerated list of anomaly checks that distinguishes this from sibling event-listing/summary tools. The resource and behavior are unmistakable.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The intended investigation scenario is clear: detect baseline deviations in a date window using prior history. It does not explicitly name alternatives or when-not-to-use, but the detailed scope leaves little ambiguity about when this tool applies.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_actor_profileA
Full historical view of one actor: roles, actions, access types, IPs.
Combines a fresh audit-log fetch for the actor with everything previously persisted in the local state database, so IPs and actions seen in earlier sessions still show up. The Tenable role is resolved on a best-effort basis from the user directory and is omitted when the API keys cannot list users.
Args:
actor_id: The actor UUID (as it appears in actor.id on events).
lookback_days: How far back to fetch fresh events for this actor.
Returns:
A dict with identity, recent_activity (rollup over the lookback
window), lifetime (accumulated state: all IPs, all actions, all
access types, first/last seen) and pagination.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor_id | Yes | ||
| lookback_days | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations available, the description carries the behavioral burden and does so well. It discloses that data combines a fresh audit-log fetch with persisted local state, explains best-effort role resolution, and notes when role data is omitted. This is substantive behavioral context beyond a simple summary.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is well structured with a one-sentence summary, a clear behavioral explanation, and separate Args/Returns sections. It is appropriately detailed for the tool's complexity without padding, and each sentence adds useful information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's moderate complexity, zero annotation coverage, and 0% schema description coverage, the description supplies everything needed: what the profile contains, how data is combined, parameter semantics, and return structure. The output schema also exists, but the description goes beyond it by explaining the lifetime/recent_activity distinction.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description fully compensates. actor_id is explained as the actor UUID as seen in actor.id, and lookback_days is defined as how far back to fetch fresh events. Both parameters receive meaningful semantic detail not present in the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with 'Full historical view of one actor: roles, actions, access types, IPs', which names a specific resource and scope. It clearly distinguishes this from siblings like list_activity_events or summarize_activity by emphasizing the per-actor, history-combining nature.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Usage context is implied rather than explicit: the tool is for obtaining a comprehensive actor profile that merges fresh data with persisted state. It does not explicitly state when to prefer this over sibling tools or provide exclusions, so an agent must infer the right selection.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_api_key_usageA
Report API-key-driven activity per actor (UI/session activity excluded).
Events are classified as API-key driven using the audit event's access/auth-method field, falling back to user-agent shape (scripted client vs browser). Each actor gets an action breakdown, distinct source IPs, and first/last seen timestamps - all pre-aggregated.
Args: actor_id: Optional actor UUID. Omit to cover every actor with API-key activity in the window. date_from: Start of the window, ISO-8601. Defaults to 30 days ago. date_to: End of the window, ISO-8601. Defaults to now.
Returns:
A dict with actors (per-actor API-key usage profiles), an
access_type_totals breakdown for context, and coverage metadata.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| date_to | No | ||
| actor_id | No | ||
| date_from | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the burden of explaining behavior, and it does so well: it discloses the classification method (audit access/auth-method with user-agent fallback), that results are pre-aggregated, and what per-actor fields are returned. It does not mention permissions or rate limits, but 'Report' and 'Returns' strongly imply a safe, read-only operation.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with a clear one-sentence summary, followed by a concise classification note and clearly labeled Args and Returns sections. Every sentence adds useful information and there is no filler or redundant restating of the tool name.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a report tool with three optional parameters and an output schema, the description covers the core behavior, defaults, and return shape sufficiently. Minor gaps remain, such as date-boundary inclusivity and explicit guidance about which sibling tools to use instead, but nothing essential is missing for invoking it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate, and it does. All three parameters are explained with semantics beyond the bare schema: actor_id is an optional UUID, date_from defaults to 30 days ago, and date_to defaults to now, with ISO-8601 format specified.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: 'Report API-key-driven activity per actor' and explicitly excludes UI/session activity. It further clarifies the output (per-actor action breakdown, distinct source IPs, first/last seen timestamps), which distinguishes this tool from the sibling activity tools even without naming them.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The intended use is clear: this tool is for API-key-driven activity reporting, and the description explicitly notes that UI/session activity is excluded. It also explains the effect of omitting actor_id, but it does not explicitly name alternative sibling tools for when this tool should not be used.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_activity_eventsA
List Tenable audit-log events for a date range, with optional filters.
Pagination is handled internally (the next cursor is followed
automatically) up to a safety cap of 20 pages / 100k events per call; if the
cap is hit, pagination.next_token is returned so the next call resumes
exactly where this one stopped. Every event is normalised, tagged with an
access type (API key vs UI session), and has credential-looking field values
redacted to their last 4 characters.
Args:
date_from: Start of the window, ISO-8601 (e.g. "2024-01-01" or
"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"). Inclusive.
date_to: End of the window, ISO-8601. Inclusive.
actor_id: Optional actor UUID to filter on (actor_id.eq).
action: Optional exact action name, e.g. "user.create" (action.eq).
limit: Page size sent to the API (1-5000).
next_token: Opaque cursor from a previous call, to resume pagination.
Returns:
A dict with events (classified, redacted), a summary rollup of
those events, and a pagination block.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | ||
| action | No | ||
| date_to | Yes | ||
| actor_id | No | ||
| date_from | Yes | ||
| next_token | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so exceptionally well. It discloses internal pagination with a 20-page/100k-event cap, resume behavior via next_token, normalization of events, access-type tagging, and redaction of credential-looking fields. This is far beyond what a minimal description would provide.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is information-dense yet well-structured: purpose first, then behavioral caveats, then parameter breakdown, then return structure. Every sentence adds value, and the length is justified by the number of parameters and the pagination/redaction behaviors that need explanation.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 6-parameter tool with no annotations, the description covers use case, filtering, pagination limits, resume semantics, data normalization, redaction, and return shape. The optional filters and cap behavior are fully explained, leaving no critical gap for an agent attempting to invoke the tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, but the description compensates completely by explaining every parameter: date format and inclusivity, optional filters with their eq semantics, the exact action example, limit range, and the opaque next_token cursor. An agent can correctly populate all six arguments without needing extra documentation.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description begins with a specific verb ('List') and resource ('Tenable audit-log events'), and states the scope ('for a date range') with optional filters. This clearly distinguishes it from sibling tools like summarize_activity and detect_anomalies, so an agent knows exactly what this tool retrieves.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description makes the core use case clear: retrieve audit-log events within a date range, optionally filtered by actor or action. It does not explicitly name sibling alternatives or provide when-not-to-use guidance, but the event-listing purpose is unambiguous and the filter details help an agent choose appropriately.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
summarize_activityA
Summarise all audit-log activity in a window (counts computed in Python).
Returns event counts by actor, by action, by CRUD type and by access type, plus failure and anonymous rates - all pre-computed. Use these numbers directly; do not re-derive them from raw events.
Args: date_from: Start of the window, ISO-8601. Inclusive. date_to: End of the window, ISO-8601. Inclusive.
Returns:
A dict with a summary block (total_events, by_actor,
by_action, by_crud, by_access_type, failure_rate_pct,
top_failed_actions) and a pagination block describing coverage.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| date_to | Yes | ||
| date_from | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It discloses that counts are pre-computed in Python, that date boundaries are inclusive, and it exposes the exact return structure with summary and pagination blocks. It does not mention permissions, error behavior, or timezone assumptions, but for a read-only aggregation these are not critical.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is well-organized with a concise purpose line, a usage warning, and clear Args/Returns sections. There is slight redundancy where the prose mention of 'Returns event counts...' is later repeated as a structured returns block, but the text is otherwise efficient and front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a two-parameter aggregation tool with an output schema present, the description covers purpose, parameter semantics, and return keys sufficiently. It lacks an explicit when-to-use-versus-siblings statement and has no annotation safety profile, but the core invocation details are complete enough for an agent to call it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema provides only bare string properties with 0% coverage. The description compensates fully by defining date_from as 'Start of the window, ISO-8601. Inclusive' and date_to as 'End of the window, ISO-8601. Inclusive', adding format, semantic role, and boundary inclusivity to both parameters.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: 'Summarise all audit-log activity in a window', and enumerates the output dimensions (by actor, action, CRUD, access type, failure and anonymous rates). This clearly frames the tool as an aggregation over raw events and distinguishes it from siblings like list_activity_events or get_actor_profile.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Provides a strong usage directive: 'Use these numbers directly; do not re-derive them from raw events.' This tells the agent to rely on pre-computed counts rather than computing from raw event lists, which is clear contextual guidance. It does not explicitly name alternative tools or exclusion conditions, but the implied comparison to raw event access is present.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
6 tool updates
v0.1.0- First observed
check_permission_prereqs - First observed
detect_anomalies - First observed
get_actor_profile - First observed
get_api_key_usage - First observed
list_activity_events - First observed
summarize_activity
TDQS
Scored across 6 tools
Each tool targets a clearly different concern: raw event listing, summary rollups, API-key-specific usage, anomaly detection, actor profiling, and prerequisite checks. Even the two aggregation tools (summarize_activity and get_api_key_usage) are separated by access-type scope, and their descriptions reinforce the distinction.
All tool names follow a consistent snake_case verb_noun pattern: list_activity_events, summarize_activity, get_api_key_usage, detect_anomalies, get_actor_profile, check_permission_prereqs. The verbs clearly signal the action and the objects clearly signal the resource or concern, making the set predictable and easy to navigate.
Six tools is well-scoped for an audit-log activity server: two raw/aggregate views, two analysis-focused tools, one deep-dive tool, and one operational prerequisite check. Each tool earns its place without redundancy or bloat.
The tool surface covers the full audit-monitoring lifecycle: listing raw events, summarizing them, isolating API-key usage, detecting anomalies, profiling individual actors, and verifying access prerequisites. The automatic pagination and baseline handling close potential dead ends, so an agent can move from raw data to insight without missing critical operations.
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