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mcp-server-planday

A Model Context Protocol server for the Planday Open API. It lets an MCP client (Claude or any other MCP-capable assistant) read a Planday portal's departments, employees, schedule and punch clock and, when enabled, create draft shifts, assign shifts and approve shift requests.

This is an independent, unofficial project. It is not developed, endorsed or supported by Planday.

  • Read-only by default; writes are opt-in per instance.

  • One Planday app (client id and refresh token) per server instance; the server does no per-user authorization itself (see Security model).

  • Careful with personal data: no CPR number, bank account, birth date, salary identifier, address or gender is ever asked for or passed on, and no wage or pay field (see Personal data).

  • Two transports: stdio for local clients, stateless streamable HTTP for containers and gateways.

  • Embeddable: the ./gateway export exposes the same tools, validation, policy and audit to a host application.

Tools

Tool

Purpose

planday_check_connection

Check that the app's token works; the number of departments.

planday_list_departments

Departments (id, name, number).

planday_list_employee_groups

Employee groups (id, name).

planday_list_employees

Active employees, 50 at a time: name, job title, work e-mail and phone, departments, groups, hired date. Search by name or e-mail (no digits).

planday_get_employee

One employee, with the same work fields.

planday_list_shifts

Shifts between two dates (at most 62 days), filtered by department, employee, group or status. No wages.

planday_get_shift

One shift.

planday_list_shift_types

Shift types, without pay fields.

planday_list_positions

Positions, without revenue fields.

planday_list_shift_requests

Shifts employees have asked to take, for the departments given.

planday_list_punch_clock_records

Punch clock records between two dates (at most 62 days).

planday_create_shift (write)

Create a shift as a draft (isDraft true, allowConflicts false, the department's break rules, no wage). The answer must be the shift asked for.

planday_assign_shift (write)

Give a shift to an employee, or make it open; the shift is read back to confirm.

planday_approve_shift_request (write)

Approve an employee's request for a shift, with no SMS or message; the shift is read back to confirm.

No tool deletes, publishes a schedule, approves punch clock records for payroll, swaps shifts, punches in or out, changes an employee, or reads or sets a wage. The client sends only the three writes above (a fixed list in src/planday/client.ts).

Personal data

Planday holds an employee's CPR number (ssn), bank account and birth date as "special" fields that the API returns only when the request asks for them with the special parameter; this server never sends that parameter. The salary identifier, address and gender are ordinary fields that come with every employee. What protects all of them is the schema: every answer is parsed with a schema per resource that drops every field it does not name, and none of these is named, so they are left out even when a portal returns them. The employee search refuses digits, because Planday also matches the search text against the CPR number and the salary identifier. Shift wages (defaultWage), shift type pay fields and position revenue fields are left out the same way. The audit log keeps ids, dates and times, never a name, a search or a comment.

Related MCP server: planday-bridge

Getting the app's credentials

An administrator creates an app in Planday under Settings > Integrations > API Access, chooses its scopes and authorizes it. The table then shows the app's App Id (the client id) and a Token (the refresh token). The server exchanges the refresh token for an access token (POST https://id.planday.com/connect/token, valid one hour) and renews it a minute before it expires. Planday documents that refresh tokens do not expire; if a new one ever comes back, it is used from then on (and handed to an embedding host through onRefreshToken).

Give the app read access to departments, employees, employee groups, shifts, shift types, positions and punch clock records, and for the writes the right to create and update shifts and approve shift requests; nothing more.

Quick start

Requires Node.js 22 or later and a Planday app's client id and refresh token.

npx mcp-server-planday

Or build from source:

git clone https://github.com/borgels/mcp-server-planday.git
cd mcp-server-planday
npm ci
npm run build

Claude Code:

claude mcp add planday \
  --env PLANDAY_CLIENT_ID=<app id> --env PLANDAY_REFRESH_TOKEN=<token> \
  -- npx -y mcp-server-planday

Claude Desktop (claude_desktop_config.json), or any client that launches stdio servers:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "planday": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "mcp-server-planday"],
      "env": {
        "PLANDAY_CLIENT_ID": "<app id>",
        "PLANDAY_REFRESH_TOKEN": "<token>"
      }
    }
  }
}

Docker and HTTP

Images are published to ghcr.io/borgels/mcp-server-planday: latest and the commit SHA from main, and vX.Y.Z for release tags. The container serves streamable HTTP at /mcp on port 3000, plus an unauthenticated GET /healthz.

TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 32); echo "$TOKEN"
docker run -d --name planday-mcp -p 127.0.0.1:3000:3000 \
  -e PLANDAY_CLIENT_ID=<app id> \
  -e PLANDAY_REFRESH_TOKEN=<token> \
  -e MCP_HTTP_TOKEN="$TOKEN" \
  ghcr.io/borgels/mcp-server-planday:latest

claude mcp add --transport http planday http://127.0.0.1:3000/mcp \
  --header "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"

To keep an audit log in the container, mount a writable directory and point PLANDAY_AUDIT_LOG into it (e.g. -v planday-audit:/audit -e PLANDAY_AUDIT_LOG=/audit/audit.jsonl); the image runs as the node user and /app is not writable.

Clients send Authorization: Bearer <MCP_HTTP_TOKEN>. The server will not start on a non-loopback address without a token of at least 32 characters. It does not terminate TLS; run it behind a reverse proxy or gateway that does.

Configuration

Configuration is read from the environment (see .env.example). Invalid numbers, booleans, URLs and unknown tool names stop the server at startup. Booleans accept true/false, 1/0, yes/no and on/off.

Upstream API

Variable

Default

Description

PLANDAY_CLIENT_ID

–

Required. The app's App Id. Sent as X-ClientId and in the token request; not a secret.

PLANDAY_REFRESH_TOKEN

–

Required. The app's Token (refresh token). A secret.

PLANDAY_BASE_URL

https://openapi.planday.com

API address. Must be on openapi.planday.com unless custom addresses are allowed (loopback http is allowed for local mocks).

PLANDAY_TOKEN_URL

https://id.planday.com/connect/token

Token endpoint. Must be on id.planday.com unless custom addresses are allowed.

PLANDAY_ALLOW_CUSTOM_BASE_URL

false

Allow addresses outside Planday's hosts.

PLANDAY_TIMEOUT_MS

30000

Timeout per request attempt.

PLANDAY_MAX_CONCURRENCY

4

Maximum concurrent upstream requests.

PLANDAY_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES

10485760

Largest response body read (at most 100 MB).

Access control

Variable

Default

Description

PLANDAY_ENABLE_WRITES

false

Enable the write tools.

PLANDAY_DISABLED_TOOLS

–

Comma-separated tool names to disable, with or without the planday_ prefix.

PLANDAY_AUDIT_LOG

–

Path of a JSONL audit log: one record per tool call start, finish and error, with ids, dates and times in clear text and no free text at all, duration, status and the caller passed by an embedding host. Write tools refuse to run if the log cannot be written.

HTTP transport

Variable

Default

Description

MCP_HTTP_TOKEN

–

Bearer token, at least 32 printable ASCII characters (also on loopback). Required unless bound to loopback.

MCP_HTTP_HOST or HOST

127.0.0.1 (0.0.0.0 in the image)

Bind address; MCP_HTTP_HOST takes precedence.

PORT

3000

Listen port.

MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS

localhost origins

Comma-separated browser origins allowed to call the server.

MCP_ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN

false

Allow any origin; requires a token.

MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS

loopback names on a loopback bind

Comma-separated accepted Host header names.

MCP_MAX_BODY_BYTES

10485760

Maximum request body.

MCP_AUTH_FAILURE_LIMIT, MCP_AUTH_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS

20, 60000

Failed-authentication limit per client address; 0 disables it.

MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED

false

Permit a non-loopback bind without a token. Only for isolated networks.

Embedding (./gateway)

A host application can run the tools in-process instead of over MCP:

import { createPlandayGateway, plandayToolCatalog } from 'mcp-server-planday/gateway';

const gateway = createPlandayGateway({
  clientId: tenant.plandayAppId,
  refreshToken: tenant.plandayToken,
  onRefreshToken: token => saveTenantToken(tenant, token),
  policy: { enableWrites: false, audit: record => writeAudit(record), pseudonymKey: tenant.auditKey },
});
const result = await gateway.callTool('list_shifts', { from: '2026-11-01', to: '2026-11-30' }, { caller: 'user@example.test' });
  • Explicit credentials. clientId and refreshToken are required; a missing value throws when the gateway is created. A gateway never reads PLANDAY_CLIENT_ID, PLANDAY_REFRESH_TOKEN, PLANDAY_BASE_URL or PLANDAY_TOKEN_URL from the environment, so one tenant cannot silently fall back to the process's credentials. The stdio and HTTP transports still read them from the environment.

  • Several tenants in one process. Create one gateway per set of credentials. Each instance keeps its own access token in memory and redacts error text, tool results and audit records with its own refresh token, access tokens and pseudonym key only; no secret is kept in a process-wide registry, and a dropped instance releases its key.

  • Instance policy from the host. Pass policy to createPlandayGateway: enableWrites (default false), disabledTools (must name known tools), pseudonymKey (at least 32 random printable characters or 32 random bytes, admitted like the refresh token: a key that shares a piece of six characters with any text of this server is refused, so no error, fallback or tool description can carry part of it; the caller and request id in audit records become hmac: and 16 hex characters with it, else sha256:) and audit, a function that receives each audit record instead of PLANDAY_AUDIT_LOG (without it the instance writes no audit; a write tool does not run if the sink throws on its start record). An instance with policy reads none of PLANDAY_ENABLE_WRITES, PLANDAY_DISABLED_TOOLS, PLANDAY_AUDIT_LOG or PLANDAY_ALLOW_CUSTOM_BASE_URL, so tenants in one process can have different settings. Without policy the instance uses the environment, like the MCP server. Each call runs in a scope of its own, so a call made from inside another instance's call never inherits its policy, sink or redactor, and every audit record is redacted as a whole with the instance's own key before the sink sees it. The limits (PLANDAY_TIMEOUT_MS, ...) are still read from the environment and apply to every gateway in the process. Per-user and per-tenant authorization is the host's job.

  • Result format. A successful callTool result has structuredContent and one text block: a short summary, a blank line, and the same data as compact JSON, as the MCP specification recommends (many clients read only the text). The JSON is built from the redacted result, so it holds exactly structuredContent. An error result has only its text.

  • Change resolution. resolvePlandayChange(tool, input, { pseudonymKey }) (or gateway.resolveChange) validates the input exactly as the call would, the tool's own checks included, and returns what a write call will change before it is sent, for a host that logs the change first: shift, department, employee, group, position and shift type ids, the date and the times; never the comment.

  • Call context in the audit. The caller and the requestId a host passes are never logged in clear: any text can hold a name, a phone number or an address, so both become pseudonyms (HMAC-SHA-256 with policy.pseudonymKey, else SHA-256), which still tie the lines of one call together for a host that knows the key. Without a request id the audit makes its own.

  • Tool catalog. plandayToolCatalog is a frozen list of every tool: name (without the planday_ prefix), title, description, riskLevel (read, write or destructive), enabledByDefault, inputSchema (JSON Schema), broad (true when a tool can read more than its name says, so a host gives it only to roles that may read everything) and upstream, the API requests the tool may make (access, method and path template). It is generated from the same tool table as the MCP server, so it cannot drift from the registered tools. plandayGatewayTools holds the same definitions without upstream and broad; gateway.tools lists those enabled on the instance.

Threat model

What this server guarantees about the app's tokens (the refresh token, the access tokens it gets and the host's pseudonym key; "the key" below), and what it does not. It is the yardstick for every change that touches errors, results or audit.

Scope. Guarantees (a), (b) and (c) apply to the embeddable gateway (./gateway), the surface a multi-tenant host uses. The standalone MCP server, configured from the environment for one key, keeps best-effort redaction: its errors and audit records are redacted with its key, but it is not held to these guarantees.

Guaranteed:

  • (a) The key never reaches anything persisted or shared: audit sinks and the audit log file, logs, error texts, export hooks or files. Errors are our own texts; audit records and everything a gateway instance returns are redacted with the instance's own key before they leave it.

  • (b) No vendor-controlled free text in errors. An error carries our own fixed text, the HTTP status, numbers we parse (Retry-After), and codes from a fixed list we wrote down; never a response body, a vendor message or code, a redirect's Location, a type or field name from the vendor, or the message of an error thrown while reading a response. A failure kept inside an otherwise returned result is the status or a fixed text as well. Errors never quote the key, the configured address or a refused configuration value (a timeout names its limit in milliseconds).

  • (c) Results go only to the tenant whose key it is. One gateway instance per tenant; every call runs in a scope of its own; nothing about a tenant is kept in process-wide state. The MCP server serves one key.

Not guaranteed (residual risk): a vendor that deliberately echoes the customer's own key back in data. Results are redacted on a best-effort basis: the exact key, its URL- and JSON-encoded forms and any piece of it of 6 characters or more, in strings, object keys and the string form of numbers and booleans, are replaced by "‹redacted›" before anything is serialised. A key that comes back otherwise transformed (split into pieces shorter than 6 characters, reversed, re-encoded, hashed) is not recognised. Such data reaches only the tenant whose key it is, which already holds the key. What leaves a gateway holds no piece of the key. This is checked at the sink, not inferred from our texts: every output is checked in its final form, and one that holds a piece of 6 characters of the key (or of one of its encoded forms) is replaced by a fixed fallback. The outputs are the tool list, every tool result as a whole (outer fields such as isError included), audit records and stderr lines, and construction errors. A result becomes a fixed "withheld" error, an audit record or line becomes a fixed one, and a construction error becomes the fixed refusal. Every error a gateway throws is a fresh error in final form: no cause, a stack of only name: message (no frames, paths or function names), and name, message and stack masked against the secret. The fallbacks are a small, closed set (src/fallbacks.ts), and a key that shares a piece with any of them, or with the tool list, is refused when the gateway is created.

Key admission. The refresh token is a secret Planday issues. A gateway accepts only printable ASCII (0x21-0x7E) of at least 16 characters, checked before anything is built from the key. As a cheap first filter it also refuses a key that shares a piece of 6 characters with a string literal in src/ (src/fixed-corpus.generated.ts, kept up to date by a test). The refusal is a fixed text that never repeats the key. The standalone MCP server applies the same redaction to errors and audit records on a best-effort basis; its successful results are passed on as the API returned them.

Security model

  • One shared identity. Every caller acts with the rights of the configured Planday app. Give it the least access that works; an administrator can withdraw the app under Settings > Integrations > API Access at any time.

  • Per-user authorization belongs in front of the server. The server checks a single bearer token and does not know the end user. For multi-user use, run it behind an identity-aware gateway that decides which users may call which tools, holds the bearer token, and is the only network path to the server. Hosts can also embed the tools through the ./gateway module export and pass the caller identity into the audit log.

  • Tool access is not data access. A gateway controls who may call which tool; every permitted caller still sees everything the Planday app can see. To separate data, run several instances with different apps.

  • Writes are off by default. Write tools are annotated as destructive so clients can ask for confirmation. Read-only tools get a client that refuses non-GET requests. When PLANDAY_AUDIT_LOG is set, a write tool does not run unless its start record is written; without it there is no audit record.

  • Upstream content is untrusted input. Data returned by the API may be written by anyone with access to it. Tool results label it as data; clients that combine this server with other tools should treat it accordingly.

  • The tokens stay on Planday's hosts. The refresh token goes only to id.planday.com and the access token only to openapi.planday.com (other hosts need an explicit switch), redirects are never followed, addresses must use https, and error messages and audit records are redacted (by each instance, with that instance's key) and size-capped. See the threat model above for what is and is not guaranteed.

  • The HTTP transport fails closed. It refuses to start on a non-loopback address or with any origin allowed unless a token is set, compares tokens in constant time, throttles failed authentication per client address, checks Origin and Host (DNS rebinding), and caps request bodies.

Report vulnerabilities as described in SECURITY.md.

Development

npm run dev          # stdio transport
npm run dev:http     # HTTP transport on 127.0.0.1:3000
npm run typecheck
npm test
npm run build

Project layout:

Path

Contents

src/tools/planday.ts

Shared tool table (MCP and gateway), policy and audit wrapper.

src/planday/

Upstream client, API calls, policy, audit, tool annotations.

src/transports/

stdio and HTTP entry points; HTTP auth, origin and host checks.

src/gateway.ts

Embeddable entry point (./gateway export).

src/config-env.ts

Validated environment readers.

Releasing

  1. Bump the version in package.json, server.json (version and the npm package version) and src/version.ts; tests and CI check that they agree. Update CHANGELOG.md. Merge.

  2. Tag the merged commit and push the tag: git tag vX.Y.Z && git push origin vX.Y.Z.

  3. release.yml tests, packs and publishes the tarball to npm through trusted publishing (no stored token; npm adds provenance when the repository is public), then publishes server.json to the MCP Registry. Versions already on npm or in the registry are skipped, so a failed run can be re-run. Pre-release tags (vX.Y.Z-rc.1) go to the npm dist-tag next and not to the registry. publish.yml pushes the vX.Y.Z image.

The first version of a new package is published by hand; see the header of .github/workflows/release.yml.

What is not tested against a live portal

The tests use answers shaped as Planday's published OpenAPI documents show them (https://openapi.planday.com/{hr,scheduling,punchclock}/swagger/v1.0/swagger.json) and the token flow as the developer guide describes it. No Planday portal was used. Not verified live: the exact field set a portal returns for employees, shifts and punch clock records; that special fields stay out without the parameter; whether the token endpoint ever returns a new refresh token; and the answers of the assign and approve endpoints (documented without a body; the shift is read back instead).

License

Apache-2.0

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Loading tool schema changelog…

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