A
licenseB
qualityB
maintenanceAn MCP server that enforces fail-closed deterministic checks, independent refute-first review, and tamper-evident hash-chained receipts for AI agent outputs before claiming completion.
4
3
MIT
Proof Publisher MCP
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@Proof Publisher MCPPublish the proof summary for commit 4f6a2d to the webhook."
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
Proof Publisher MCP
A deliberately small TypeScript MCP server that publishes commit-bound proof summaries to an HTTPS webhook. The project exists to make one consequential external write easy to inspect, test, and place behind an authority boundary.
Consequential boundary
The publish_proof MCP tool calls ProofPublishingService.publish(). The
service validates and normalizes the exact target, repository, full commit SHA,
and summary, then calls ProofPublisher.send(action). The live implementation's
only external write is the fetch() POST inside
HttpWebhookProofPublisher.send().
MCP publish_proof
-> normalize exact action + SHA-256 fingerprint
-> ProofPublisher.send(action) <-- authority seam
-> fetch(allowed HTTPS origin) <-- consequential provider callWrites fail closed unless ENABLE_WEBHOOK_WRITES=true, and even then the
target must match WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_ORIGIN. Tests inject a recording provider;
they do not make network calls.
Related MCP server: com.aleeth/authority-mcp
Run the checks
npm install
npm run ciRun the MCP server
Read-only/fail-closed mode is the default:
npm run build
npm startTo permit a real webhook write, an operator must explicitly configure both the write switch and the only allowed origin:
ENABLE_WEBHOOK_WRITES=true \
WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_ORIGIN=https://hooks.example.com \
npm startNo credentials are stored in this repository. The project is intentionally small so future approval logic can bind to the normalized action immediately before the provider runs, without moving validation or external I/O into the authority layer.
Available Tools
1 toolpublish_proofB
Publish a commit-bound proof summary to an explicitly allowed HTTPS webhook.
ParametersJSON Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| summary | Yes | ||
| revision | Yes | ||
| targetUrl | Yes | ||
| repository | Yes |
TDQS
B3/5.0
Behavior2/5
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description must disclose behavioral traits. It only mentions the action and a constraint (explicitly allowed webhook) but fails to cover side effects, permissions, error handling, idempotency, or what the response looks like. Significant behavioral information is missing.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Conciseness5/5
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, well-structured sentence that conveys the core purpose and a key constraint without wasted words. It is front-loaded with the verb and resource, making it easily scannable.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Completeness1/5
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a tool with four required parameters, no annotations, and no output schema, the description is far too sparse. It omits parameter meanings, webhook payload expectations, authentication, failure modes, and return value behavior, making automated invocation unreliable.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Parameters1/5
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0%, and the description does not explain any of the four parameters (summary, revision, targetUrl, repository). 'Commit-bound' vaguely relates to revision/summary but does not clarify formats, constraints, or relationships. The description fails to compensate for the lack of schema descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Purpose5/5
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action (publish), the object (commit-bound proof summary), and the destination (explicitly allowed HTTPS webhook). It is specific and unambiguous, even without sibling tools to differentiate from.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Usage Guidelines3/5
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies a use case (publishing proof summaries to webhooks) but provides no explicit guidance on when to use this tool vs alternatives, nor does it state exclusions. The phrase 'explicitly allowed' hints at a prerequisite but does not elaborate.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
1 tool update
v0.1.0- First observed
publish_proof
TDQS
B3.4/5.0
Scored across 1 tool
Disambiguation5/5
With only one tool, there is no possibility of confusing it with another. The tool's purpose is clearly defined as publishing a proof summary to a webhook.
Naming Consistency5/5
The single tool name 'publish_proof' follows a clean verb_noun pattern, and with only one tool, there are no inconsistencies or mixed conventions.
Tool Count3/5
Having only one tool feels thin for an MCP server, and it falls below the typical 3-15 range. While the server's scope is narrow, the meager count makes the set seem insufficient for broader tasks.
Completeness4/5
The core action of publishing a proof is present and functional, but the server lacks supporting operations like querying published proofs or managing webhook allowlists. This leaves minor gaps that an agent might need to work around.
Maintenance
ActivitySlowing
ResponsivenessNo issues
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