QueryShield
Executes validated SQL queries against PostgreSQL databases, with row-level security and audit logging.
Supports executing SQL queries against SQLite databases for testing and lightweight deployments.
This server does not currently have a deployable release on Glama. Follow the repository's setup instructions to install and configure it for your MCP client, including any required credentials and local dependencies.
QueryShield
Agent security suite. QueryShield is the lead product: a secure SQL proxy and a named credential vault, one qs_ API key, one Stripe customer, and this docs site.
Agents call a single endpoint in plain English (or structured SQL). QueryShield:
Translates natural language → SQL via Claude with prompt caching.
Validates every query at the AST level — only
SELECTis allowed, no stacked statements, no forbidden functions, LIMIT required.Applies per-agent row-level security: schema/table whitelists and
WHEREclause injection.Executes against the customer DB and returns rows.
Logs every attempt to an append-only audit table — metadata only, never row contents.
Agents never see connection strings.
The credential vault stores other secrets (API tokens the agent is allowed to use). It is the AgentVault product, folded into this service. Permission patterns decide which names an agent can read. Database connection strings stay in a separate encrypted store and are not readable through the vault.
Free tier / funnel: InjectShield scans untrusted text for prompt injection. It stays in its own repository (bch1212/injectshield) and its own API (api.injectshield.dev). Start there, then create one QueryShield workspace when an agent needs a database or a vault. Docs: injectshield.dev/docs. Suite page on this service: /suite.
Quickstart
pip install -r requirements.txt
cp .env.example .env
# Set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, DATABASE_URL, and VAULT_KEY in .env (see below).
# Do not commit .env. QueryShield reads secrets from the environment only.
python -m queryshield.startGenerate a Fernet key for VAULT_KEY once and never lose it. Credential
encryption and session signing both require VAULT_KEY (or SESSION_KEY
for cookies). If it is unset, those operations fail instead of using a
built-in key:
python -c "from cryptography.fernet import Fernet; print(Fernet.generate_key().decode())"Related MCP server: Midplane
End-to-end flow (curl)
# 1) Boot a tenant. Returns the admin API key — copy it.
curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/tenants?name=Acme
# 2) Register the customer DB. Connection string is encrypted at rest.
curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/databases \
-H 'X-Admin-Key: qs_...' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"alias": "prod",
"db_type": "postgresql",
"connection_string": "postgresql://READER:PASSWORD@db.example.internal:5432/app",
"allowed_tables": ["users", "orders"]
}'
# 3) Provision a scoped agent (different from admin) for your AI app.
curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/agents \
-H 'X-Admin-Key: qs_...' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{ "name": "reporting", "tenant_id": "<tenant>" }'
# 4) Set the agent's RLS policy.
curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/policies \
-H 'X-Admin-Key: qs_...' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"agent_id": "<agent>",
"database_alias": "prod",
"allowed_tables": ["users", "orders"],
"row_filters": { "users": "tenant_id = 42" }
}'
# 4b) Store a named credential and let one agent read it.
# The value is write-only on this call. Empty permissions grant nothing.
curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/credentials \
-H 'X-Admin-Key: qs_...' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"name": "openai_key",
"provider": "openai",
"value": "YOUR_SECRET"
}'
curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/agents \
-H 'X-Admin-Key: qs_...' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"name": "writer",
"tenant_id": "<tenant>",
"credential_permissions": ["openai_*"],
"budget_daily": 5
}'
# The agent uses the same qs_ key it uses for /v1/query.
curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/vault/get/openai_key \
-H 'X-API-Key: qs_...'
# 5) The agent queries.
curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/query \
-H 'X-API-Key: qs_...' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"database_alias": "prod",
"query": "how many active users do we have?",
"mode": "nl",
"max_rows": 10
}'MCP integration
Listed in the official MCP Registry as io.github.bch1212/queryshield.
Install the client:
pip install queryshield-mcpThen drop this into your Claude Desktop / Cursor / agent config:
{
"queryshield": {
"command": "queryshield-mcp",
"env": { "QUERYSHIELD_API_KEY": "qs_..." }
}
}Source for the standalone PyPI package lives in packages/queryshield-mcp/.
For MCP directory evaluators such as Glama, the repository root also includes a slim Dockerfile that launches the published queryshield-mcp stdio server for tool introspection. The container does not need QUERYSHIELD_API_KEY for MCP initialization/tool discovery; the key is only required when a discovered tool is actually invoked against a QueryShield API tenant.
MCP integration (legacy)
Drop this into any MCP-aware client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, custom agents):
{
"queryshield": {
"command": "python",
"args": ["-m", "queryshield.mcp_server"],
"env": {
"QUERYSHIELD_API_KEY": "qs_...",
"QUERYSHIELD_BASE_URL": "https://api.queryshield.io"
}
}
}Tools exposed:
query_database(database_alias, question, max_rows)— natural-languagequery_database_sql(database_alias, sql, max_rows)— pre-built SELECTlist_credentials()— names this agent may readget_credential(name, cost)— one permitted secret, same API keyget_audit_log(limit)— recent attempts for the calling agent
The PyPI package queryshield-mcp picks up the vault tools on its next release. Until then, python -m queryshield.mcp_server from this repo already exposes them.
Security model
Threat | Defense |
Agent crafts a | sqlglot AST refuses non-SELECT |
Agent sneaks | parser rejects |
Agent uses | function deny-list at the AST node level |
Agent reads tables outside its scope | RLS schema + table whitelist |
Agent reads other tenants' rows |
|
Connection string leaks via stack traces | Fernet-encrypted, never returned in any API |
Agent reads a secret it was not granted | fnmatch permissions; empty list fails closed |
Vault audit becomes the secret | credential access log stores metadata only |
Audit log becomes the data exfil vector | only metadata is stored — never rows |
| re-encrypt rows under new key (script-driven) |
safety.py is the single most important module. Every additional check
that lands there should ship with a test in tests/test_safety.py.
Pricing
Tier | Monthly | Databases | Credentials | Queries / month | Notes |
InjectShield | free | — | — | — | prompt-injection funnel, separate site |
Starter | $500 | 3 | 25 | 1,000,000 | |
Pro | $1,500 | 10 | 100 | 10,000,000 | audit export |
Enterprise | $3,500 | unlimited | unlimited | unlimited | SSO, SIEM webhook |
QueryShield tiers are one Stripe customer. InjectShield sign-up stays on injectshield.dev until that billing is folded in. Targets $32.5K MRR @ 15 customers (10 Pro + 5 Enterprise).
Deploy
The repo is Railway-ready. python -m queryshield.start is the entrypoint
(reads PORT via os.getenv, since Railway exec's the start command without
a shell). Provision Postgres + (optionally) Redis from Railway's marketplace
and the rest is env vars.
railway up/health is the liveness check. /ready returns 503 if the control-plane
DB is unreachable.
Tests
pip install pytest
python -m pytest tests/102 tests cover the original safety, RLS, proxy, and HTTP suites plus the credential vault (encryption, qs_ key hashing, permission checks, budgets, tenant isolation, and the column migration for existing databases) and fail-closed VAULT_KEY / SESSION_KEY checks. The original cases:
AST safety (24 cases — direct DDL, comments, encoded keywords, multiple statements, forbidden functions, missing LIMIT)
RLS engine (6 cases — whitelist enforcement, WHERE injection, conjunction with existing predicates)
Proxy end-to-end against a SQLite "customer DB" (5 cases — happy path, blocked DML, RLS row filtering, table whitelist, cache hit)
HTTP integration via FastAPI TestClient (7 cases — full provisioning → query flow, scoped agent with RLS, auth failures)
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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