List free TLS certificates

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, closed-world, and non-destructive, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds the access requirement ('Requires certificates:read'), which is not in the structured data and is genuinely useful for call planning.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, zero filler, front-loading the identification and scoping before the permission note. Every clause earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-optional-parameter list tool with no output schema, the description conveys scope, exclusions, and the required permission. It could note pagination or return shape, but annotations and the enum schema carry most of the remaining load.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and the single enum parameter is fully documented in the schema. The description alludes to lifecycle state but adds no syntax or filter behavior beyond what the schema already provides, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('List customer-owned no-cost public-certificate requests') and explicitly names the sibling categories it is not (paid portable certificates, Automatic SSL subscriptions, Managed HTTPS). An agent can distinguish it from list_certificates and list_automatic_ssl_subscriptions without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Clear negative discrimination tells the agent when NOT to use this tool by naming the adjacent certificate families. It stops short of explicitly routing to a specific alternative (e.g., use get_free_certificate for a single request), so it's strong but not fully prescriptive.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.