mirc-mcp
This server does not currently have a deployable release on Glama. Follow the repository's setup instructions to install and configure it for your MCP client, including any required credentials and local dependencies.
mirc-mcp
A local MCP server (stdio only) that lets an MCP client read from and write to a running mIRC on the same Windows PC, through a restricted bridge.
It adds no network exposure. The server talks to mIRC with mIRC's documented
SendMessage interface: a window message plus a 4 KiB named shared-memory mapping
inside your Windows session. There is no socket, no port and no DDE, and the mIRC
side (mirc/mcp-bridge.mrc) opens no socket and starts no DCC. The MCP client
starts the server as a child process and talks to it over stdin/stdout.
Why this design
No MCP server for mIRC existed when this was written (2026-11-07). The IRC MCP
servers that do exist (tbarron-xyz/mcp-irc-ts, matheusfillipe/ircv3-mcp,
jbanier/irc-mcp, ...) are IRC clients in their own right. They would open their own
connection, bypassing any proxy or connect guard you have set up in mIRC, so they are the wrong tool for driving an existing client.
Way to drive mIRC | Network? | Verdict |
SendMessage | none | used: documented, synchronous, returns results, ctypes only |
DDE ( | none | works, but legacy, and any local program can use it. Consider turning it off (Options > Other > DDE) since nothing here needs it |
Script socket bridge ( | a listening TCP port | rejected: a port that any local process (or a browser via DNS rebinding) can reach |
Reading log files | none | read-only, needs logging to disk, and has no send |
Related MCP server: mcp-bridge
What it exposes
Tool | Does |
| cid, status, server, network, nick, and whether policy allows it |
| joined channels (users, topic) and open queries |
| recent TEXT/ACTION/NOTICE/own lines from the bridge's in-memory ring buffer (500 entries, never written to disk) |
|
|
| one of |
| one allowlisted identifier, e.g. |
| reads fixed leak-relevant |
| tightening only: |
| read-only: pid, version, |
| list mIRC's open modal dialogs; cancel one of |
| list loaded remote scripts; |
| runs exactly one alias, |
| trusts a server certificate by SHA-256 (see below). |
| applies only the appearance of a local |
| turns off "Show favorites on connect" ( |
Settings are changed with mIRC's own commands rather than by editing mirc.ini, because
mIRC rewrites that file from memory on exit and would undo an edit made while it runs.
Nick leak through a bouncer (verified on 7.86)
mIRC registers with its configured nick ($mnick). When a bouncer welcomes it under that nick
and then renames it, mIRC sends USERHOST <configured nick> to the network straight after the
welcome. Unticking Options > Connect > Local Info does not stop this. The fix is to set mIRC's
configured nick to the bouncer's nick. mirc_status warns while the two differ.
Included theme
themes/phosphor.mts is an original appearance-only MTS theme: green phosphor on black in
Consolas 14 pt (a negative MTS font size is a point size), like an old terminal. Notices and CTCP are amber, highlights yellow, kicks red, and colours 2 and 12 (the blues
bots and servers use for links) are a bright cyan-blue. Every palette colour has at least 7:1
contrast on the black background (WCAG AAA). Scheme 1
is an amber CRT. It contains no script, event, image or sound lines, so it is safe with any MTS
engine. Try it with apply_mts_theme("themes/phosphor.mts") (dry run), then dry_run=false.
CRT scanlines
themes/phosphor-scanlines.bmp (made by tools/make_scanlines.py) is an 8x3 tile of faint green
scanlines for Phosphor: two black rows and one green line, as bright as it can be while every palette
colour keeps at least 4.5:1 contrast on the line (main text 10:1).
Copy it into mIRC's folder and tile it with mIRC's own command (verified on 7.86: -s is the
status window, -e with # or = sets the default for every channel or query window):
/background -st "phosphor-scanlines.bmp"
/background -et # "phosphor-scanlines.bmp"
/background -et = "phosphor-scanlines.bmp"/background -sx, -ex #, -ex = remove them. Glow and screen curvature need a shader overlay
such as ShaderGlass; mIRC has no way to draw them.
Digital rain and CRT glow
themes/phosphor-rain-tile.png (made by tools/make_rain.ps1 -Tile) is an original, seamless "digital rain" tile:
half-width katakana, digits and symbols falling in columns, with the scanlines baked in. No pixel is
brighter than (0,54,19), so every Phosphor colour keeps at least 4.5:1 contrast anywhere on it. Show it
tiled (-t), so it covers a window of any size at 1:1 with no stretching:
/background -st "phosphor-rain-tile.png"
/background -et # "phosphor-rain-tile.png"
/background -et = "phosphor-rain-tile.png"-Seed gives another pattern. Without -Tile the script makes one full-screen picture instead
(themes/phosphor-rain.png, 2560x1440), which only fills a window up to that size.
Nick colour in messages
mIRC's own nick colours (/cnick) colour the nicklist only, never the nick inside a message line
(verified on 7.86). mirc/phosphor-nicks.mrc is a small display-only script that redraws incoming
channel and private messages and actions so each nick has its own colour and the text stays in "normal"
or "action". The colour comes from an MD5 hash of the lower-cased nick, so a nick looks the same
everywhere and after restarts. It picks from nine of mIRC's fixed extended colours (grey, lavender,
olive, teal, orange, mint, pink, peach, magenta), each 7.9:1 or better on black and kept away from the
message green, kicks, highlights, links and parts; with nine colours some nicks will share one. Edit
pn.palette to change the set. It only echoes and halts the default line: it sends nothing and leaves CTCP alone.
Your own lines are drawn by mIRC itself and keep the "own" colour. Load it with /load -rs phosphor-nicks.mrc.
Certificate pinning
mIRC 7.86 remembers certificates in servers.ini under [sslcache] as
nN=<SHA-1>,<subject CN>,<IP connected to>,<flag>. Through a SOCKS proxy mIRC never learns the IP, so for a .onion reached via Tor the third field is empty; pin_certificate therefore writes that empty-host form too when you pin a .onion host (verified on 7.86: without it the pinned certificate was still rejected through the proxy). Ticking "Automatically accept this
certificate in future" writes flag 1. Tested on 7.86: an entry with flag 1 is honoured
even when Options > Connect > SSL rejects invalid certificates ([ssl] warn=0), so pinning
needs no weaker setting. Hostname checks don't apply, which suits a bouncer with a
self-signed certificate.
pin_certificate makes one TLS handshake to fetch the certificate the server presents. For
a loopback host it connects directly; for a .onion host it goes through the first
tor_socks_ports entry on 127.0.0.1. Either way the only socket opened is to 127.0.0.1. If
the presented SHA-256 differs from the one you passed, nothing is written. On a match it
adds or updates the [sslcache] line and keeps a one-time servers.ini.mirc-mcp.bak.
Because mIRC rewrites servers.ini from memory, mIRC must be closed. With restart=true
the tool closes it (/exit -n), writes the entry, and starts the same executable again with
-noconnect. Use the host exactly as you connect to it: 127.0.0.1 for a local relay, or
the .onion name.
mIRC and Tor: what was verified (mIRC 7.86, 2026-11-07)
With the SOCKS5 proxy on, mIRC hands a
.onionname to the proxy unresolved. A fake SOCKS5 server receivedCONNECT ATYP=3 <name>.onion:6697, and the Windows DNS cache had no entry for the name. So pointing mIRC at Tor's SOCKS port is enough to reach an onion service; no relay or torsocks-style wrapper is needed.With the proxy off, mIRC asks Windows DNS for the name and fails with "Unable to resolve server". That leaks the onion name to your DNS resolver. RFC 7686 §2 says applications that don't implement Tor "SHOULD NOT perform a DNS lookup" for
.onion.With the proxy on,
127.0.0.1targets go through the proxy too (ATYP=1 127.0.0.1), so a local relay stops being reachable once the proxy is on.mIRC can contact
www.mirc.com(port 443) at startup outside any proxy, even with[update] check=0. A fresh unregistered instance did so in every run. The proxy settings don't cover this, so blockmirc.exeoutbound in Windows Firewall if mIRC must never touch the network itself.
Earlier reports of the same .onion problem in other clients: the mIRC forum on SOCKS5 and
DNS, an AdiIRC thread
where a DNS check before proxying broke .onion, and the TripSit Tor proxy guide.
There is deliberately no raw command and no raw evaluate tool. Evaluating an
arbitrary mIRC expression is code execution ($dll, $com, custom aliases), and a raw
command could start a /server, /dcc or /run.
Layers of the guard
Python policy (
policy.py): the address mIRC dialled ($server(-1), not the name the server announces, which through a bouncer is e.g.irc.znc.in) must matchallowed_servers(default*.onion), and targets must matchallowed_targets(default#*, so no private messages until you list nicks). Channels must already be joined. Text may not contain\x01(no CTCP, so no DCC offer), CR/LF or NUL, and is capped at 400 bytes. Identifier arguments may not contain$ % ( ) , [ ] |or whitespace, so they cannot nest an evaluation. The policy file can only narrow the built-in lists; naming an unsupported verb or identifier is an error.Transport: all user text and targets reach mIRC base64-encoded in a single
/mcp.do <cid> <verb> <b64> <b64>line, so mIRC never parses them for|,$or%.mIRC script (
mcp-bridge.mrc): re-checks the verb list, rejects\x01,=nick(DCC chat) targets, comma lists andjoin 0.Anything else you already run (a connect-guard script in mIRC, CTCP/DCC filtering on a bouncer) stays in force; the bridge adds no way around it.
What this does not protect against: any program running as you can already send
these window messages (or DDE) to mIRC directly. The bridge limits what the MCP client
can do; it does not sandbox your user account. As a mIRC-side backstop, consider
Options > Other > Lock to disable /run, /dll, /com and DCC.
Install
cd mirc-mcp
uv venv -p 3.14 .venv
uv pip install -p .venv\Scripts\python.exe -e ".[dev]"Copy mirc/mcp-bridge.mrc to %APPDATA%\mIRC\ and load it once in mIRC:
/load -rs "%APPDATA%\mIRC\mcp-bridge.mrc"Optional: copy policy.example.toml to %APPDATA%\mirc-mcp\policy.toml and edit it
(or point MIRC_MCP_POLICY at another file). If several mIRC instances are open,
MIRC_MCP_PID selects one.
Register with Claude Code (stdio):
claude mcp add mirc -- <path-to>\mirc-mcp\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m mirc_mcpCaveat: modal dialogs pause the buffer. While any modal dialog is open in mIRC
(Options, About, Favorites), mIRC still displays incoming lines but runs no script
events, so read_messages sees nothing new until the dialog closes. Sending and
evaluating still work.
Tests
pytest: policy unit tests, which need no mIRC.python tools\smoke.py: an end-to-end test (61 checks, all passing on mIRC 7.86 on 2026-11-07). It starts a throwaway mIRC with its own settings folder (-r <temp> -noreg -noconnect, no update check, identd off) and drives it by process id against a fake IRC server on 127.0.0.1. A background thread closes that instance's own first-run dialogs (the evaluation nag only once its OK button is enabled), because they would block script events. At the end the test kills the instance and deletes its profile. Your own mIRC and profile are never addressed.python tools\sandbox.py: runs the same smoke test inside Windows Sandbox with networking disabled. It maps mIRC, Python and this folder read-only and has one writable output folder. Written but not yet run: the sandbox was in use.
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