AGA-mcp-server
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {
"listChanged": true
} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| get_server_infoA | Get AGA server info, public keys, and portal state. |
| get_portal_stateA | Get current portal state, loaded artifact info, and enforcement status. |
| init_chainC | Initialize continuity chain with genesis event. |
| attest_subjectC | Attest subject, generate sealed Policy Artifact. Auto-loads into portal. |
| measure_integrityB | Measure subject state, compare to sealed reference. Generates signed receipt for every measurement. |
| revoke_artifactA | Revoke an active policy artifact mid-session. Portal terminates on next measurement. (NCCoE Phase 3b) |
| verify_chainC | Verify continuity chain integrity. |
| generate_evidence_bundleA | Export the canonical SEP evidence bundle: signed PERMITTED/DENIED tool-call receipts + Merkle proofs + a mandatory signed checkpoint, for offline third-party verification (verify_bundle_offline, aga-verify, or aga-receipt-spec/verify/verify-sep.mjs). Pin gateway_public_key to prove provenance. |
| verify_bundle_offlineA | Verify a canonical SEP evidence bundle offline (full §6 algorithm: structural floor, receipt signatures, chain+ordering, leaf-recompute + Merkle bijection, signed checkpoint). Pass pinned_public_key to also prove provenance. |
| request_claimC | Request disclosure of a claim. Auto-substitutes if denied. |
| list_claimsA | List available claims with sensitivity levels. |
| delegate_to_subagentB | Derive a constrained policy artifact for a sub-agent. Scope can only diminish, never expand. (NCCoE constrained delegation) |
| measure_behaviorA | Measure behavioral patterns (unauthorized tools, rate violations, forbidden sequences). DETECTIVE-ONLY by default: it records and PROVES drift but does not block. Pass enforce=true to also trip the portal into phantom quarantine on drift (opt-in; off by default). (NIST-2025-0035) |
| get_receiptsC | Get all signed receipts, optionally filtered by artifact. |
| get_chain_eventsC | Get continuity chain events. |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 15 tools
Each tool has a unique purpose with no overlapping functionality. For example, measure_behavior and measure_integrity measure different aspects, and verify_chain vs. get_chain_events are distinct operations. The descriptions clearly differentiate them.
All tool names follow a consistent verb_noun pattern in snake_case (e.g., attest_subject, delegate_to_subagent, verify_chain). There is no mixing of conventions or irregular naming.
With 15 tools, the server is well-scoped for its attestation and policy domain. Each tool earns its place, covering setup, measurement, verification, and revocation without being excessively numerous.
The tool surface appears complete for the server's purpose, covering artifact creation, delegation, evidence export, chain initialization, state querying, claims handling, behavioral and integrity measurement, revocation, and offline verification. No obvious gaps in the core workflow.