@attested-intelligence/aga-mcp-server v2.0.0
MCP server implementing the Attested Governance Artifact (AGA) protocol - cryptographic compliance enforcement for autonomous AI systems.
What It Does
This server acts as a Portal (zero-trust Policy Enforcement Point) for AI agents. Every tool call is attested, measured against a sealed cryptographic reference, and logged to a tamper-evident continuity chain with signed receipts.
20 tools, 4 resources, 3 prompts, 159 tests
20 MCP Tools
# | Tool | NIST/Patent Ref | Description |
1 |
| - | Server identity, keys, portal state, framework alignment |
2 |
| Claim 3a | Initialize continuity chain with genesis event |
3 |
| Claims 1a-1d | Attest subject, generate sealed Policy Artifact |
4 |
| Claims 1e-1g | Measure subject, compare to sealed ref, generate receipt |
5 |
| Claim 10 | Verify artifact signature against issuer key |
6 |
| NIST-2025-0035 | Start/restart behavioral monitoring with baseline |
7 |
| - | Current portal enforcement state and TTL |
8 |
| Claims 1e-1g | Trigger measurement with specific type |
9 |
| V3 Promise | Generate signed measurement receipt manually |
10 |
| Claim 9 | Package artifact + receipts + Merkle proofs |
11 |
| Section J | 4-step offline bundle verification |
12 |
| Claim 2 | Privacy-preserving disclosure with auto-substitution |
13 |
| Claim 3c | Get chain events with optional integrity verification |
14 |
| Claim 5 | Quarantine state and forensic capture status |
15 |
| NCCoE 3b | Mid-session artifact revocation |
16 |
| - | Set verification tier (BRONZE/SILVER/GOLD) |
17 |
| All | Full lifecycle: attest, measure, checkpoint, verify |
18 |
| NIST-2025-0035 | Behavioral drift detection (tool patterns) |
19 |
| NCCoE | Constrained sub-agent delegation (scope only diminishes) |
20 |
| Claim 3 | Key rotation with chain event |
4 Resources
Resource | URI | Description |
Protocol Spec |
| Full protocol specification with SPIFFE alignment |
Sample Bundle |
| Sample evidence bundle documentation |
Crypto Primitives |
| Cryptographic primitives documentation |
Patent Claims |
| 20 patent claims mapped to tools |
3 Prompts
Prompt | Description |
| 4-phase NCCoE lab demo with behavioral drift |
| Session governance summary report |
| Drift event analysis and remediation |
CoSAI MCP Security Threat Coverage
The AGA MCP Server addresses all 12 threat categories identified in the CoSAI MCP Security whitepaper (Coalition for Secure AI / OASIS, January 2026).
CoSAI Category | Threat Domain | AGA Governance Mechanism |
T1: Improper Authentication | Identity & Access | Ed25519 artifact signatures, pinned issuer keys, TTL re-attestation, key rotation chain events |
T2: Missing Access Control | Identity & Access | Portal as mandatory enforcement boundary, sealed constraints, delegation with scope diminishment |
T3: Input Validation Failures | Input Handling | Runtime measurement against sealed reference, behavioral drift detection |
T4: Data/Control Boundary Failures | Input Handling | Behavioral baseline (permitted tools, forbidden sequences, rate limits), phantom execution forensics |
T5: Inadequate Data Protection | Data & Code | Salted commitments, privacy-preserving disclosure with substitution, inference risk prevention |
T6: Missing Integrity Controls | Data & Code | Content-addressable hash binding, 10 measurement embodiments, continuous runtime verification |
T7: Session/Transport Security | Network & Transport | TTL-based artifact expiration, fail-closed on expiry, mid-session revocation, Ed25519 signed receipts |
T8: Network Isolation Failures | Network & Transport | Two-process architecture, agent holds no credentials, NETWORK_ISOLATE enforcement action |
T9: Trust Boundary Failures | Trust & Design | Enforcement pre-committed by human authorities in sealed artifact, not delegated to LLM |
T10: Resource Management | Trust & Design | Per-tool rate limits in behavioral baseline, configurable measurement cadence (10ms to 3600s) |
T11: Supply Chain Failures | Operational | Content-addressable hashing at attestation, runtime hash comparison blocks modified components |
T12: Insufficient Observability | Operational | Signed receipts, tamper-evident continuity chain, Merkle anchoring, offline evidence bundles |
Full mapping details available via the aga://specification resource.
Quick Start
npm install && npm run build && npm testConnect to Claude Desktop
Add to %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"aga": { "command": "node", "args": ["C:/Users/neuro/AIH/aga-mcp-server/dist/index.js"] }
}
}Architecture
MCP Client (Claude Desktop)
│ JSON-RPC over stdio
▼
src/server.ts - 20 tools + 4 resources + 3 prompts
│
├── src/tools/ 20 individual tool handlers
├── src/core/ Protocol logic (artifact, chain, portal, etc.)
├── src/crypto/ Ed25519 + SHA-256 + Merkle + canonical JSON
├── src/middleware/ Zero-trust governance PEP
├── src/storage/ In-memory + optional SQLite
├── src/resources/ Protocol docs + patent claims
└── src/prompts/ Demo + report + analysis promptsTest Coverage
Suite | Tests | What |
Crypto | 33 | SHA-256, Ed25519, Merkle, salt, canonical, keys |
Core | 56 | Artifact, chain, portal, governance, behavioral, delegation, privacy, revocation, fail-closed |
Tools | 25 | All 20 tool handlers |
Integration | 38 | Bundle tamper, lifecycle, performance, NCCoE demo, crucible compatibility |
Total | 159 |
License
MIT - Attested Intelligence Holdings LLC
Resources
Unclaimed servers have limited discoverability.
Looking for Admin?
If you are the server author, to access and configure the admin panel.