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Use secrets without seeing them (exec / http)

secret_use

Runs commands or HTTPS requests with secrets resolved only at use; each new action needs approval, and outputs are redacted.

Instructions

Runs an action with secrets resolved inside this server at the moment of use. exec: argv without shell (secrets via env or stdin), or a shell script where ${secret:name} becomes an env var. http: request to an allowlisted https host with ${secret:name} in url/headers/body. Every NEW action (exact fingerprint) needs the person's approval on a local page that shows the literal action; they may choose to remember it. Output is redacted (raw, base64, hex, url-encoded, quoted variants) and size-limited.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cwdNo
envNoexec: env vars for the child; values may contain ${secret:name}
urlNohttp: https URL on an allowlisted host
bodyNohttp: body; may contain ${secret:name}
namesNosecrets used (optional; derived from ${secret:...} references)
shellNoexec: POSIX sh script; ${secret:name} becomes an env var reference inside the child
stdinNoexec: stdin for the child; may contain ${secret:name}
actionYes
methodNohttp: method (default GET)
commandNoexec: argv, run WITHOUT a shell; ${secret:..} not allowed here
headersNohttp: headers; values may contain ${secret:name}
timeout_msNo
redact_env_filesNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so well: approval requirement on a local page, exact-fingerprint matching and optional remembering, redaction across raw/base64/hex/url-encoded/quoted variants, size-limiting, and the allowlisted-host constraint. These are the operational traits an agent must know before invoking an egress-with-secrets tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Dense but front-loaded: it leads with what the tool does, then mode-specific mechanics, then the approval and redaction behaviors. Every clause is information-bearing for a 13-param tool, though the mode syntax could be tightened.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No output schema exists, yet the description adequately covers the return contract (redacted, size-limited) and the approval lifecycle. For a 13-param, no-annotation tool it leaves minor gaps around timeout behavior, cwd, and the names/redact_env_files params, but nothing that would cause a misinvocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is a moderate 69%, and much of the description's parameter detail (exec argv without shell, env/stdin secret injection, http url/headers/body) mirrors what the schema's own field descriptions already state. It adds little for cwd, names, timeout_ms, and redact_env_files, so it neither amplifies nor compensates substantially.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific action ('runs an action with secrets resolved inside this server') and enumerates the two concrete modes, exec and http, each with its mechanics. An agent can tell this is the secret-injection egress tool. It does not explicitly differentiate itself from siblings like ssh_exec or web_capture, keeping it just short of a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear operative context: which mode to use for process execution vs HTTP, how ${secret:name} interpolates per mode, and the approval condition for any new action. It lacks explicit exclusions or named alternatives (e.g., 'use web_login for captured logins'), so it is clear context without routing guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.