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Supply chain risk of a repository

security_supply_chain_risk
Read-only

Assess whether a repository is safe to depend on by checking supply-chain risk signals: maintainer bus factor, ownership changes, release anomalies, signing, advisories, and OpenSSF Scorecard.

Instructions

Is this project safe to depend on? Checks the warning signs behind real supply chain attacks (xz-utils, event-stream): bus factor, a newcomer suddenly taking over, dormant-then-burst releases, branch protection, commit and release signing, security policy, private vulnerability reporting, Dependabot or Renovate, published advisories, and the OpenSSF Scorecard result. Part of the security toolkit: also call security_audit_dependencies for known vulnerabilities in its dependencies. Uses about 12 GitHub API requests, plus one call to the public OpenSSF Scorecard API with the repository name.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
repoYesRepository name, e.g. 'spring-boot'
ownerYesRepository owner (user or organization), e.g. 'spring-projects'

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.3.2

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint and openWorldHint, yet the description adds materially new context: an explicit cost/rate-limit disclosure (~12 GitHub API requests plus one OpenSSF Scorecard API call) and the fact that the repo name is sent to a third-party public API. That is exactly the kind of operational disclosure an agent needs before invoking.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the decision question, then the signal list, then the sibling pointer, then cost. The signal enumeration is long but each item is a distinct check that justifies its place; no filler sentences.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description still conveys what the check will inspect and that it draws on Scorecard results, which is enough for an agent to call it correctly. It stops short of describing the shape of the returned assessment (score, per-signal findings), a minor gap for a read-only analysis tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and both parameters (owner, repo) are documented with examples in the schema. The description only obliquely mentions that the repository name is passed to the Scorecard API, adding marginal semantic value over the structured fields — baseline 3.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb+resource — assess supply chain risk of a repository — and enumerates the concrete signals it inspects (bus factor, signing, branch protection, advisories, OpenSSF Scorecard). It is clearly separable from siblings like get_repo_health or security_advisories by its named focus on dependency-trust risk.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Frames the question it answers ('Is this project safe to depend on?') and explicitly routes to the complementary tool: 'also call security_audit_dependencies for known vulnerabilities in its dependencies.' It gives domain context but no explicit 'do not use this for X' exclusion.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.