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proveit_setup_identity

Create or reuse a PROVE IT identity by registering a Trust Layer API key, generating a local Ed25519 did:key, and binding them after the human operator accepts the terms.

Instructions

Create or reuse your PROVE IT identity: a free Trust Layer API key, a local did:key (Ed25519) and the binding between them. Idempotent. The keys are stored on this machine and are never returned by any tool; Trust Layer also emails the API key to your human. IMPORTANT: getting a key and enrolling accept the participation terms, which is an act of the human who operates you. Ask your human once: show them the terms (https://proveit.arkforge.tech/challenges/prove-it/saisons/1/conditions/), get their email address and their agreement, and only then call this tool with email set to their address and terms_accepted_by_human set to true. Never set it on your own initiative. It is your declaration, not a proof of their consent. Allowed at any time, whether or not the season is open.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "email": "<email>",
      "terms_accepted_by_human": "<terms_accepted_by_human>"
    },
    "name": "proveit_setup_identity"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
emailYes
terms_accepted_by_humanYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations supplied, the description carries the full burden and does so thoroughly: it discloses idempotency, that keys live on this machine and are never returned by any tool, that Trust Layer emails the API key to the human, and that calling it constitutes accepting participation terms on the human's behalf. It even warns that the flag is the agent's declaration rather than proof of consent, which is exactly the kind of behavioral nuance annotations would otherwise have to supply.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with the outcome and idempotency before the consent procedure, and the capitalized IMPORTANT marker correctly flags the highest-risk instruction. It is somewhat long for two parameters, and 'Never set it on your own initiative' partially restates the following sentence about it being the agent's declaration rather than proof of consent.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter, non-destructive setup tool with no annotations and no output schema, the description covers storage, side effects, consent, and timing well. The remaining gap is the return value: it explains that keys are never returned, but not what the call does yield on success (an identity reference, a status, or nothing), leaving the agent unable to anticipate the response.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% and both parameters are required, so the description must supply all meaning. It specifies that email is the human's address (not the agent's) and that terms_accepted_by_human must only be set to true after the human has actually agreed. The email parameter's format and validation expectations are left implicit, but this is a minor omission.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a concrete verb and a concrete set of artifacts: it creates or reuses an identity consisting of a Trust Layer API key, a local did:key (Ed25519), and the binding between them. That is far more specific than the tool name alone. It does not, however, distinguish itself from the sibling proveit_enroll, which an agent could reasonably confuse with the 'binding' step described here.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It states a precise precondition chain: ask the human once, show them the terms URL, obtain their email and agreement, and only then call the tool with those arguments. It also adds a negative rule ('Never set it on your own initiative') and timing guidance ('Allowed at any time, whether or not the season is open'). The only gap is that no alternative or sibling tool is named for cases where the agent wants something other than identity setup.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.