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arc-mcp-hub

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arc-mcp-hub

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A thin, deterministic MCP hub for SAP BTP. It puts multiple ARC-1 instances — one per SAP system (DEV / QA / PROD) — behind one front door with one login, while keeping each system fully isolated and preserving per-user SAP identity.

                        one login
  MCP client  ───────────────────────────►  arc-mcp-hub  (one BTP app)
  (VS Code / Claude / Cursor)                  │  /dev/mcp  ─► ARC-1 (DEV)   ─► SAP DEV
                                               │  /qa/mcp   ─► ARC-1 (QA)    ─► SAP QA
                                               │  /prod/mcp ─► ARC-1 (PROD)  ─► SAP PROD

You connect your MCP client to https://<hub>/dev/mcp (or /qa/mcp, /prod/mcp). The hub validates your login, propagates your identity to that system's ARC-1 (so SAP sees the real you), and transparently relays the connection. Each system's tools come through unchanged.


When to use it

  • You run ARC-1 against several SAP systems and want one endpoint host + one login instead of N independently-configured servers.

  • You want per-user SAP identity preserved end-to-end (principal propagation), per system.

  • All those ARC-1 instances live in one BTP subaccount.

  • You want to front other SAP MCP servers too, not only ARC-1 — any XSUAA-protected, Streamable-HTTP MCP server qualifies (how).

Related MCP server: Multi-MCP Hub

When NOT to use it

  • One SAP system only → just point your client at that ARC-1 directly. The hub adds nothing.

  • You want a natural-language assistant that reasons across systems → that's a different, LLM-in-the-middle product. This hub is deterministic routing only — no server-side LLM, no merged tool list, no "ask it anything."

  • Backends in different subaccounts → not supported in v1 (the token exchange only maps within one subaccount). See roadmap.

  • You want the model to pick the system at call time → intentionally unsupported. The system is bound by which endpoint you connect to, so an agent can never accidentally write to PROD from a DEV conversation. That safety is the whole point.


How it works (one paragraph)

The hub is an OAuth 2.1 resource server (one shared authorization server → one login). Each /<env>/mcp advertises its own resource (per RFC 9728) so standards-compliant clients connect cleanly. On each request the hub takes your validated token, exchanges it via a BTP destination (OAuth2JWTBearer) for a per-user token scoped to that backend, and bridges the MCP Streamable-HTTP session to it. The backend (ARC-1) does its own principal propagation to SAP, so SAP enforces your real authorizations — a user without PROD access simply can't do anything on PROD, even if they connect to /prod/mcp.

There is no shared service account and no LLM in the path. See docs/architecture.md.


Quick start

  1. Deploy the hub into the same BTP subaccount as your ARC-1 instances:

    npm ci && npm run build
    cf push                 # uses manifest.yml  (or: mbt build && cf deploy *.mtar  for MTA)
  2. Wire each backend (a one-time per-system setup) — full steps in docs/operator-setup.md: create a destination, grant the hub a scope on the backend, assign developers the role collection.

  3. Configure backends — set HUB_BACKENDS:

    [{ "name": "dev", "destination": "arc1-dev" }, { "name": "prod", "destination": "arc1-prod" }]

    Adding a system later = create a destination + add one entry here. No code change.

  4. Connect a client to one system, e.g. in VS Code .vscode/mcp.json:

    { "servers": { "sap-dev": { "type": "http", "url": "https://<hub>/dev/mcp" } } }

    First use → one browser login → the system's ARC-1 tools appear.


Configuration

Env var

Required

Description

HUB_BACKENDS

yes

JSON array of { name, destination }. name is the URL segment (lowercase/digits/hyphen); destination is the BTP destination resolving to that backend.

ARC_HUB_PUBLIC_URL

no

The hub's public URL for OAuth metadata. Derived from the CF route if unset; set it behind a reverse proxy/custom domain.

ARC_HUB_DCR_SIGNING_SECRET

recommended

Stable secret so cached client_ids survive cf deploy. openssl rand -base64 48.

ARC_HUB_ALLOWED_ORIGINS

no

CSV CORS allowlist for browser MCP clients (e.g. https://claude.ai).

PORT

no

Defaults to 9000 (CF sets it).


Safety model

  • Connection-scoped systems. A session on /dev/mcp can only ever see DEV's tools. There is no runtime system selector to get wrong.

  • PROD is read-only at the backend. Set SAP_ALLOW_WRITES=false and a read-only SAP user on the PROD ARC-1 instance. Even if someone connects to /prod/mcp, writes are refused at the strongest boundary (SAP).

  • Per-user identity. Every call runs as the logged-in user via principal propagation — no shared service account.


Limits (v1)

  • Same subaccount for hub + backends (cross-subaccount → roadmap).

  • Single instance (in-memory session map). Scaling >1 needs sticky sessions or a shared store.

  • No server-side LLM — by design.

Roadmap

  • Cross-subaccount backends (OAuth2SAMLBearerAssertion / shared IAS).

  • Horizontal scale (shared session store).

Development

npm ci
npm test          # unit + local integration (proxy ↔ in-process MCP backend)
npm run typecheck
npm run lint
npm run build

Docs

License

MIT

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